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I Abstract 
Sino-Indonesian relations are unique and complex. They have been 
characterized by ups and downs, which ranged from suspicions, hostilities, close 
friendship, the freezing of, as well as the reestablishment of diplomatic relations in 
August 1990. From Indonesia's perspective, the relations have been dominated by its 
perception of China, which carried both domestic and external dimensions that tended 
to see China as a threat. In this regard, China has always had a special place in the 
discourse of Indonesian domestic politics, which also bears implications in foreign 
policy. However, Indonesian perceptions and policies towards China were not static, 
rather they changed because of a number of factors. These include change within 
domestic Politics, regional concerns and the impact of China's own behaviour. 
Initially, Indonesian perceptions of China were translated into action by the 
freezing of diplomatic relations between the countries. However, in August 1990 
Indonesia decided to restore its ties with China. This move appeared to end the period 
in which China was viewed as a threat. Yet, as this thesis demonstrates the Indonesian 
political elites were not unanimous in this move. In particular the military attempted to 
find a domestic justification for the maintenance of China as a threat. One strategy was 
to revive the controversial issue of the ethn=ic Chinese within Indonesia. This minority 
group has always provoked controversy because of their economic role, position, 
historical link as well as their close relations with the New Order elite leaders. This 
tendency has coincidentally been encouraged by the emergence of nationalism in 
China. This thesis also shows how the shifting of balance of power and the re- 
emergence of Islam has influenced the ethnic Chinese question. 
Thýis thesis also indicates that the United States remains to play a major role in 
the dynamic of relationship between Indonesia and China. Their respective differences 
with the US, such as on human rights issues, has undoubtedly brought the two 
countries together. Nevertheless, this factor has no spill over towards the development 
of closer relations as Indonesian domestic reality prevents such a tendency. This thesis 
also examines the manner in which Chinese actions were viewed by Jakarta, in 
III 
particular China's growing military development and apparent assertiveness in the 
context of South China Sea disputes indeed bring about a hardening of attitude towards 
China even after non-nalisation. This thesis also discusses the limits that bind Indonesia 
and China together not least their economic and trade activities. Early indications also 
showed that given the economic structure of both countries and various competitive 
advantages held by China, it appeared that Indonesia would have to compete with 
China in economic and trade activities. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
This study is about Sino-Indonesian relations, particularly from Indonesia's 
perspective under the New Order regime. The main question posed in this study is 
"What was Indonesia's perceptions of China before and after the August 1990 
normalisation of diplomatic relations? " A secondary question that is equally 
important is: "What was the impact of this changing perception for Indonesia's 
foreign policy towards China during that period? " 
1.1. National Interest and Foreign Policy 
In world politics, the tenn national interest is generally used in two senses: as 
an analytical tool identifying the goals or objectives of foreign policy and as an all- 
embracing concept of political discourse used specifically to justify particular policy 
preferences. ' In both senses it refers to the basic determinants that guide state policy 
in relation to the external environment. Thus, in inter-state relations each state 
always tries to pursue national interest as the basic determinant or primary 
justification that guides state policy and action in relation to the external 
environment. Accordingly, there is a close correlation between national interest and 
foreign policy. In other words, national interest has also become the objective of 
foreign policy. 
Although the concept is considered rather ambiguous, there is a wide 
agreement among scholars that the most obvious national interest is self-preservation, 
while the greatest threat to basic interests is for another state to invade and conquer it. 
Indeed, the main essence of national interest is the principle of national security and 
survival. The defense of homeland and the preservation of territorial integrity are 
basic to it. The term 'vital interest' is often used in this connection, the impact being 
1 Graham Ewans & Jeffrey Newnham, The Dictionary of World Politics, A Reference Guide to Concepts, 
Ideas and Institutions (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), p. 207. 
(T, 
2 
that the issue at stake is so fundamental to the well being of the state that it cannot be 
compromised and so may result in the use of military force to sustain it. Keith R. 
Legg and James F. Morrison, for instance, argued that the most fundamental source 
of foreign policy objectives is perhaps the universally shared desire to ensure the 
survival and territorial integrity of the community and state. 2 Robert Osgood also put 
national survival or self-preservation at the head of the list of national interests, 
because everything else depends on the achievement of this goal. 3 He further clarified 
survival or self-preservation in terms of territorial integrity, political independence, 
and maintenance of fundamental governmental institutions. 
Other sources of foreign policy may be divided into three groups of national 
interests that are considered as fundamental, middle-range and specific irnmediate 
objective. 4 They generally include the economic needs of the community, the 
political needs of a state and its leaders, cultural, psychological, and/or ideological 
needs of the state for prestige and status in the world, and the capability requirements 
of the state. While the threat of foreign invasion is increasingly rare in contemporary 
international relations, there are other "core national values" often mentioned such as 
the enhancement of a nation's economic development, independence from the 
interference of foreigners in one's domestic affairs, and preservation of the nation's 
5 way of life or culture. In the end, all these sources of foreign policy, either singly or 
in combination, could be regarded as vital interests depending, among other things, 
on the dominant perceptions of the decision-makers at the time. 
Disagreements - among scholars begin to appear when one asks both 
conceptual and substantive questions about the national interest: How do we arrive at 
2 Keith R. Legg and James F. Morrison, "The Formulation of Foreign Policy Objectives, " in Michael 
Smith, Richard Little and Michael Shackleton (eds. ), Perspectives on iYorld Politics (London: The Open 
University, 198 1), pp. 56-60. 
3 As quoted in William Clinton Olson, The Theory and Practice of International Relations, 86 edition 
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 199 1), p. 37. 
4 See, Robert L. Wendzell, International Politics: Policymakers and Policymaking (New York: John 
Wiley& Sons, 198 1), pp. 74-82. 
5 William Nester, International Relations, Geopolitical and Geoeconomic. Conflict and Cooperation 
(New York: Harper Collins, 1995), p. 12 1. 
a generally acceptable or standardized definition of national interest? What is 
specifically in the national interests of a given country and its people at a given time 
and in regard to a given issue? Who decides what the priorities of state action are 
going to be, and when and how they are to be implemented? How and by whom are 
enemies defined? How and by whom are friends designated? What is the role of the 
government when faced with serious internal disagreements regarding national goals 
and valueS? 6 The answer to each question appears to be heavily dependent on the 
form of the political system of any state. In this regard, there are two schools of 
thought that are usually viewed as elitist and democratic. Therefore the answer lies at 
the form of the political system of each country. 
What is it about the case of foreign policy? Basically, foreign policy is always 
concerned with activity whereby state actors act, react and interact. It has been 
termed as a boundary activity, which implies that those making policy straddle two 
environments, an internal or domestic enviromnent and an external or global 
environment. The domestic environment forms the background context against 
which policy is made. Thus factors such as the resource base of the state, its position 
geographically in relations to others, the nature and level of development of its 
economy, its demographic structure, its ideology and fundamental values will form 
the domestic or internal milieu. The international or external environment is where 
policy is actually implemented. The analysis of foreign policy making in countries 
that have long established institutional practices should be relatively less complicated 
by following models proposed by scholars. 7 
On the other hand, in countries that lack democratic institutional practices, as 
in the case of most developing countries, the study of foreign policy making is more 
complicated, varying from one country to another depending on the political system 
applied in any particular country. However, one of the most striking characteristics of 
6 See, Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press 
1978). 
7 See, among others, James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy, " in R. Barry 
Farell (ed. ), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern 
University Press, 1966), pp. 29-92, and James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New 
York: Free Press, 197 1); Graham T. Allison, Essence ofDecision (Boston: Little, Brown, 197 1). 
4 
the developing countries has been the dominant position of the executive branch or 
govenunent vis-A-vis other institution of the State. Indeed, unlike those in the 
developed countries that have achieved a certain level of institutional maturity, most 
of the developing countries are generally dominated by the executive branch. 
Therefore, the formulation of national interest and the making of foreign policy will, 
in many ways, be dominated by those who hold the power, particularly surrounding 
the top executive leader. 
Framework of Analysis 
By any standard, Indonesia undoubtedly falls into the category of a 
developing country. Apart from its level of development, Indonesia indeed possesses 
the characteristics that are commonly held by the developing countries, such as 
weakness in the idea of state that includes ideology and the concept of nation, lack of 
political development and other basic featureS. 8 A simple rationale would reveal that 
most of the developing states are generally ex-colonies, 9 as is Indonesia. Consequently, 
the concept of nation-states, as it is understood in the context of developed states, is an 
imported value imposed by the former colonial powers on their colonies that came into 
effect by the end of the Second World War. As a result, they carried problems from the 
start due to neglect of factors that should glue the nation-states together. Indeed, 
Indonesia falls into the pattern of a multi-ethnic state-nation, which means that the 
creation of the Indonesian State preceded the "existence" of the Indonesian nation. 
Thus, the idea of nation is still being nurtured through a nation-building process. In 
this context, the government plays an important role in formulating the idea of the 
state that is expected to be able to unite and integrate the diversity of Indonesians as 
8 For further discussion of Indonesia's profile, see, Ruth McVey, Indonesia (New Haven, Connecticut: 
Human Relations Area File, 1963); Gouri Mirpuri, Indonesia (London: Manshell Cavendish, 1990); 
Indonesia: An Oj'icial Handbook, Department of Information, Directorate of Foreign Information 
Services, 1995); Jeanne S. Mintz, Indonesia: A Projile (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand, 1961). 
9 Caroline Thomas, In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations (Boulder, 
Colorado: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987), p. 2. 
5 
a state and nation. As Suryadinata underlined, "... the so-called nations in Southeast 
Asian are in fact 'nations-in-making'. "lo 
However, before referring to who defines Indonesia's national interest and 
foreign policy, one has to look at Indonesia's political system. Indeed, there seems to 
be a general pattern of practice and historical legacy in Indonesian politics that the 
executive always plays a central role as the most powerfW and influential part of the 
state compared to other branches. The Indonesian 1945 Constitution (UUD '45) 
indeed grants the president, as head of the executive branch, a wide range of power. " 
Why is this the case? Historically, during mid 1945 and 1950s, there was a strong 
debate as to the constitution of Indonesia, that should have set the power of the 
executive, particularly among three schools of thought; (i) the integralist, also known 
as authoritarian, traditionalists or, to some, Pancasilaist; (ii) Islamist; and (iii) 
constitutionalist. 12 The majority of Indonesian founding leaders believed that a strong 
government was indeed required to overcome the diversity of Indonesia in many 
respects. 
Imbued by the spirit of revolution, in the end it was the views among the 
integralists that prevailed in Indonesia, and eventually took shape in the formulation 
of the 1945 Constitution. When Suharto came to power, he strengthened his power 
based on this Constitution with the support of his army generals and embarked on 
gradual steps to create a political system that enabled him to control Indonesian 
politics. Thus there is a general common understanding among scholars that the 
Indonesian government under Suharto is considered to be authoritarian. Accordingly, 
10 Leo Suryadinata, Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies- 
ISEAS, 1997), p. 5. 
" Chapter 3 of the Constitution defines the authority of the President, which includes the power to 
determine the government regulations, to hold the highest authority over the military, to declare war, 
peace and to conclude treaties with other states, to declare the state of emergency. 
12 See, Adrian Buyung Nasution, The Aspirationfor Constitutional Government in Indonesia: A Socio- 
legal Study of the Indonesian Konstituante l9j6-l9j9 (Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992); David 
Reeve, 'The Corporatist State: The Case of Golkar, ' in State and Civil Society in Indonesia, Arief 
Budiman (ed. ), (Clayton: Sentre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), pp. 151-176; Richard Robison, 
'Indonesia: Tensions in State and Regime, ' in Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarian, Democracy 
and Capitalism, Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison, and Gary Rodan (eds. ), (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 
1993). 
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national interest and foreign policy subjects have not really become issues of public 
debate. The political system did not either provide a mechanism by which public 
opinion may have an effective influence on national policy decision-making, so what 
are normally understood as national perceptions that determine national policies are 
essentially those of their leaders. ' 3 
Indeed, the question of foreign policy Nvill raise the familiar question of level 
of analysis. Although it has been much debated, agreement is lacking not only on the 
substantive dispute but even on the number of levels. Graham T. Allison, for 
instance, proposes three and James Rosenau five. 14 However, this study is somewhat 
inspired by the Weberian concept of patrimonial bureaucratic polity that has been 
followed by Karl Jackson, " Donald K. Emmerson, 16 and Harold Crouch. 17 This 
means that this study tends to use the framework of analysis of a patrimonial 
bureaucratic polity, taking also into account the nature of the state and the workings 
of domestic politics, the international environment which mainly focuses on China 
and, to a lesser extent, the international situation in East Asia. 
According to the Weberian tradition, Indonesian politics is interpreted in 
tenns of patrimonialism, such as patron-clients relationship, and the idea of 
bureaucratic polity or a strict separation between the state and its own society. In this 
regard, Karl Jackson explained that bureaucratic polity refers to cliques, circles, and 
patron-client ties, which override the importance of institutions. Therefore, power 
13 j. Soedjati Djiwandono, "Process of Comprehensive Security: An Indonesian Perspective, " The 
Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3, Third Quarter, 1995. 
14 See, Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban kfissile Crisis (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1971); James Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy, " in R. Barry Farell (ed. ), 
Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 
1966), pp. 29-92, and James N. Rosenau, The Scientijic Study of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 
1971). 
15 See, Karl Jackson & Lucien W. Pye (eds. ), Political Power and Communications in Indonesia 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California, 1978). 
16 See, Donald Emmerson, "Understanding the New Order: Bureaucratic Pluralism in Indonesia, " Asian 
Survey, Vol. 23, No. 11, November 1983. 
" See, Harold Crouch, "Patrimonial ism and Military Rule in Indonesia, " World Politics, Vol. 3 1, No. 4, 
1979. 
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lies much more with ruling personalities through patron-client links, which follow 
cultural affiliation, regional division and personal loyalty rather than bureaucratic 
organizations. 18 For Donald Emmerson, the Indonesian "bureaucratic-pluralism" 
refers to a hybrid type of institution that is neither completely totalitarian nor 
democratic. 19 This, in fact, refers to a government that lacks sufficient democratic 
foundations, and relies upon a military oligarchy to secure its legitimacy. 20 
Meanwhile, Harold Crouch emphasizes the exploitation in the state's political and 
economical life, with a focus on the politico-bureaucrats and the local business 
communities that maintain partnership through financial resources and licenses. 21 
As is the case in any other country, Indonesia also employs its foreign policy 
to safeguard Indonesia's national interest. For the New Order, the vital national 
interest has been maintaining national security, the creation of stability and economic 
development. The question now is who has defined Indonesia's national interests, 
and has forinulated Indonesia's foreign policy? There is no question that the answer 
lies in the structure of Indonesian domestic politics. Initially, the coming of the New 
Order was accompanied by the domination of Indonesian politics by the military. 
Accordingly, decision-making in the Indonesian 22 political system was dictated by a 
small elite, which was dominated by the military, especially the army. 23 SoCio_ 
political forces outside the military had less influence. Parliament, for instance, has 
generally been regarded as a rubber stamp, while political par-ties were weak and 
" Enunerson, "Understanding the New Ordee,, p. 122 1. 
19 Ibid. p. 1220. 
20 J. W. Garner, "Typology of States", in I. C. Johari, Comparative Politics (New Delhi: Sterling 
Publishers Pvy. Ltd., 1982), p. 44 10. 
21 Hal Hill, Indonesia's New Order., The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation (St. Leonard, 
New South Wales: Allen & Unwin, 1994), p. 6 
22 Under the New Order, the military was renamed as ABRI or the Indonesian Armed Forces. In 1999, 
the military was called as TNI (Indonesian National Armed Forces). In this study these terms should be. 
understood as carrying the same meaning. 
23 For the army's involvement in politics, See, among others: Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in 
Indonesia, Rev. edition (Ithaca, London: Comell University Press, 1993) Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to 
Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982); David 
Jenkins, Suharto and his Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
Modem Indonesian Project, Monograph Series, 1984). 
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dependent on the government. The government's domination has been facilitated by 
its success in establishing Golkar that has functioned as a political machine to win 
the five-yearly general election. 24 
With no Western educational background, Suharto embarked on a step-by- 
step approach in asserting his authority in Indonesian politics in accordance with the 
Javanese values. 25 At the bureaucratic level, Suharto designed intra-bureaucratic and 
inter-agency competition between those elite members seeking broader rule and 
support on policy issues and distribution of spoils. 26 Suharto also implemented a 
system of checks and balances, where power and influence were maintained in 
equilibrium, which prohibited their internal and external coalition. This mechanism 
ensured that the elite remained loyal to the President, even if it meant they bypassed 
the wishes of their superiors. 27 Such loyalty was assured because Suharto satisfied 
the elite's aspirations and at the same time skillfully balanced their vested interests in 
terms of appointments and facilities. The consequences of this pattern tended to 
strengthen Suharto's power in the long run. The success of this style of relationship 
is also rooted in the fact that the state's elite leaders lack an autonomous political 
base, and thus depend on the former for patronage. 28 
In the end, national interest and foreign policy issues are the primary concern 
of the Indonesian bureaucracy, with the President himself standing at the apex of the 
centralized mechanism, possessing the sole power to make decisions and to stifle 
opposition. Formal decisions were made and implemented through an established 
bureaucratic institution via intra-bureaucratic competition. The authority of the 
24 See, Julian M. Boileau, Golkar. Functional Group Politics in Indonesia (Jakarta: Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, 1983); David Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System 
(Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985); Leo Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy and Political 
Culture: A Study ofIndonesia's Golkar (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University: Center for Intehiational Studies, 
1989). 
25 See, Hamish McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia (Sydney: Fontana Collins, 1980), "The Puppet Master, " 
Sydney Morning Herald, 22 May 1998, by the same author. 
26 Emmerson, "Understanding the New Order", p. 122 1. 
27 David Jenkins, Soeharto and His Generals, p. 27. 
28 Dwight King, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy", in David Wurfel and Bruce Burton (eds. ), The Political 
Economy offoreign Policy in Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 80. 
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president was personalistic and institutional, while the authority of the top office 
holders derived from their personal relationship with the former and the holding of 
their respective offices. In this context, two of the most important bodies concerned 
with foreign policy have been the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military 
establishment.. 29 Although for practical purposes foreign policy was subject to the 
control of a military establishment a civilian face was presented to the outside world 
because of the importance of restoring international confidence. 30 However, 
Suharto's involvement in foreign policy was rather gradual. His involvement 
appeared to be in line with the dynamic of Indonesian politics, particularly the 
achievement of stability and economic development. 
Indeed, under Suharto and his New Order regime, the issue of China has been 
one of the most sensitive issues since it involved Indonesia's security interest and 
foreign policy. Accordingly, the military involvement on this issue was quite 
intensive. It is in this context that the issue of China has become one of the classical 
examples in which both civilian (the ministry, of foreign affairs) and the military 
institutions have been in some kind of contention to win the support of Suharto over 
policies on China. 
1.3. The Objectives and Purposes of the Study 
The nature of the threat to Indonesia may be understood to be internal. 
Accordingly, the Indonesian government has a deep-seated sense of insecurity and 
worries about the threat to national unity, ideology or economic development. 31 
However, Indonesia's historical experience, particularly during the revolutionary era, 
told its leaders that it was not domestic threats as such that had threatened 
Indonesia's survival, rather its linkage with external powers had jeopardized 
29 Particularly the Ministry of Defense and the influential intelligence body of BAKIN - the National 
Intelligence Coordination Agency. 
" Michael Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 13 1. 
31 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Indonesia: Ketahanan Nasional, Wawasan Nusantara, Hankamrata", in Ken 
Booth and Russell Trood (Eds. ), Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, (London: Macmillan 
Press Ltd., 1999), p. 212. 
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Indonesia's survival on several occasions. Indeed, Indonesia's vital national interest 
aftq 17 August 1945 proclamation was to protect Indonesia's independence, which 
also involved efforts to secure sovereignty and international recognition, and to 
maintain its territorial integrity that had been threatened by the interference of 
external powers. 32 These powers included the involvement of the Soviet Union in the 
1948 Madiun affairs, and the involvement of the US power in the 1950s regional 
rebellion. 33 
Having achieved international recognition and sovereignty by the end of 
1949, Indonesia adopted the Western democratic or parliamentary system. One of the 
motives has been to gain sympathy from the Western powers as Indonesia began to 
address its battered economic condition. Unfortunately, the political cleavages and 
domestic rivalries among Indonesian political parties had prevented the possibility of 
Indonesia benefiting from foreign aid and assistance, especially from the West. 34 
Ironically, any cabinet associated with Western power was accused of sacrificing 
Indonesia's principle' of a free and independent foreign policy. Thus, instability and 
change of government took place in a relatively short period of time and prevented 
the pursuit of development. In the end, the effort to pursue the national interest of 
economic development was defeated by the sense of anti-Westernism among 
Indonesian leaders, particularly in the wake of Western powers' ambiguity in 
supporting Indonesia's demand for the return of West Irian and as the result of the 
colonial and revolutionary period. 
The political instability and domestic rivalries under the parliamentary 
democracy had enabled Sukarno, with the support of the army, to assert his 
domination in Indonesian politics. He subsequently declared the implementation of 
32 At the same time, Indonesia's claim of its territory over the Dutch East Indies had not been fully 
realized as the Dutch remained occupied West Irian. 
33 A classic source on development in Indonesia during the revolutionary years is George McTurnan 
Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1952). 
See also Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1960). 
3' For discussion on the details of this period, See, Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional 
Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962). 
Guided Democracy that placed him at the center of the power structure between 
3 
various competing parties, particularly between the military and the PKI. 5 Under the 
Guided Democracy (1959-1965) foreign policy was used to achieve national 
integration and territorial integrity and to realize Indonesia's interest in leading the 
Third World movement. One of the important results from this period was closer 
relations between Indonesia and China, which was claimed to serve Indonesia's 
national interest. It was not considered to be violating Indonesia's principle of a free 
and independent foreign policy that was declared during the revolutionary period, 
rather it was a strategic move required in the service of national interest. 36 
Aware of the mistakes by his predecessor, Suharto made it clear from the 
very beginning that he intended to win Indonesian support through the pursuit of 
stability and economic development. Everything was always related and seen in the 
context of both causes. Consequently, Suharto also based his legitimacy on the 
success of the realiZation of these objectives. Thus, Indonesia's foreign policy was 
also focused to serve and facilitate the achievement of the interest of political 
stability and economic development. However, Suharto also continued his 
predecessor's policy on issues that benefited the achievement of stability and 
economic development, and with no hesitation discarded practices that were seen to 
be obstructing the realization of these two goals. 
In this regard, Suharto adopted Sukarno's invention of Pancasila and 
maintained the course to use it as an ideology that all Indonesians could accept and 
depend upon to cultivate consensus and harmony among the diverse people of 
Indonesia. 37 It was pursued in accordance with national interest to create national 
35 For discussion on Guided Democracy period, See, amon., others: Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to 
Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics (Ithaca: Modern Indonesian Project, Cornell University, 1966); 
Alfian, Pemikiran dan Perubahan Polilik Indonesia [Political Thinking and Changes in Indonesia] 
(Jakarta: Gramedia, 1992); and Ulf Sundhaussen, "Sukarno and Guided Democracy, " in Pacific Century: 
The Emergence ofModern Pacific Asia by Mark Borthwick (ed. ) (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992). 
" Interview with the Director General of Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nugroho 
Wisnumurti, 4 December 1998. 
37 The Indonesian national ideological of Pancasila consists of five principles: Belief in God Almighty, 
A Just and Civilized Humanitarianism, Indonesian National Unity, Democracy through Consultation and 
Consensus, and Social Justice. 
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integration or a nation-building process. The Suharto regime with his New Order 
(Orde Baru or Orba) adopted a new orientation and policies aimed at implementing 
a total correction from the Sukarno era - which was called the Old Order (Orde 
Lama). 38 Unlike his predecessor, Suharto further elaborated and oPerationalized the 
ideology in almost every sense. It even became a national ideology and political 
platform for just about everything, from opposition to communism, to village 
democracy, to defense of a "responsible" (not necessarily free) press. 39 It was the 
New Order government that defined and interpreted the proper meaning and 
implementation of Pancasila, and introduced the so-called Pancasila Democracy. 40 
Suharto systematically educated people to adhere to the government's interpretation 
and doctrines of Pancasila through a compulsory Pedoman Pengahayatan don 
Pengamalan Pancasila - P4 (Guideline for Understanding and Implementation of 
Pancasila) on a nation-wide basis. 
From the peýod of 1945 to the coming of the New Order in 1965, it appeared 
that Indonesia always retained an emphasis on the importance of national security, 
which was concerned with the survival of Indonesia, as the highest priority. 
However, there had been changes of priority or ranking in so far as specific policies 
were concerned depending on the dynamics of domestic politics and world situations 
at a particular time. This is the case since they are not only relative to one another 
and to the available power of a state, but they are also relative to the interests and 
power of other states, as these are perceived by the state formulating its policy. 
Therefore, thefirst objective of this study is to analyze Indonesia's national interest 
39 Sukarno was regarded as succeeding in developing nation building, while Suharto - prior to his fall in 
May 1998 - was often seen for as able to bring stability, order and development. The continuity and 
departure in domestic and foreign policies from the Old Order to the New Order period will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter 2. 
39 James C. F. Wang, Comparative Asian Politics: Power, Policy and Change (Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1994), especially Chapter 5, pp. 249-277. 
40 Suharto considered Demokrasi Pancasila as Indonesia's political system that is represented as an 
authentic Indonesian alternative to alien westem values. See, J. Soedjati Djowandono, Setengah Abad 
Negara Pancasila. - Tinjauan Kritis ke Arah Pembaruan [Half Decade of Pancasila State: A Critical 
Review towards Reformation] (Jakarta: CSIS, 1995), pp. 164-174. 
13 
andforeign policyftom its declaration of independence in 1945 to 1973, taking into 
account China as afactor in thatprocess. 
Indonesia's perception of China as a threat formally emerged in the aftermath 
of the 1965 abortive coup, in which the PKI was mainly to blame and China was 
implicated. It was a turning point in the development of Indonesian domestic politics 
and foreign policy. As a consequence, Suharto brought Indonesia to embark on 
pursuing an identity of a staunch anti-Communist state, and rejecting a negative 
ideology of Cornmunism. against the state ideology of Pancasila. For over thirty-three 
years "communist threat" has been one of the means to unite the people under the 
New Order. 41 It has become one of the most important criteria in determining and 
limiting the line for what was allowed and what was outlawed in almost every aspect 
of life in Indonesia. The portrayal of Communism and China as a threat has indeed 
enabled the New Order to concentrate and channel its energy for the creation of 
order, stability and 4evelopment. Indeed, Indonesia's success seemed to support the 
idea that every state needs a perceived common strong enemy. 42 
Although one may well find that China's external interference is well founded 
in some cases and thoroughly untrue in others, what mattered is that the New Order 
regime considered the involvement of China to be unquestionable. Thus, Indonesia's 
perception of China has been seen as posing a threat to Indonesia's security. Indeed, 
as Stoessinger argued that there are often great gaps between perception and reality 
in world politics. 43 One Indonesian scholar J. SoedJati Djiwandono of the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), stated that, "Whether perception is 
consistent with reality is of less relevance. vA4 In fact, perception already became part 
of reality. More importantly, reality is judged against the yardstick of experience. It 
1 Kompas, 20 Deccmbcr 1997. 
42 This can be seen in the case of the Japanese in early 1940s against the Allied Powers; the United States 
against Communists during the Cold War; China against Western Imperialism; and in the context of 
Indonesia, Sukarno against Neo-colonialism and Western Imperialism. 
43 John G. Stoessinger, The Might offations (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 39 1. 
44 J. Soedjati Djiwandono, "Sino-Indonesian Relations in the 1990s and Beyond" in Ji Guoxing and Hadi 
Soesastro (eds. ), Sino-Indonesian Relations in the Post-Cold lVar Era (Jakarta: Center for Strategic and 
Intemational Studies-CSIS, 1992). 
14 
was with this background that the perception of China as a threat was further pursued 
and developed. Thus, as Jarvis argued, one tends to see what one believes. 45 
It should be underlined that given the domination of Suharto and the role of 
the military in Indonesia's domestic politics, there is no question that Indonesia's 
perception of China mainly reflected their views. In fact, by pointing to the PKI, 
Suharto received a wide support from the military and other forces that had been 
hostile towards the Communists, such as the Islamic groups. Both inevitably found 
justification in claiming to be the savior of the nation from the Communist peril. 
Suharto immediately took a decisive measure to prevent the revival of Communism 
by formally outlawing the PKI from the course of Indonesian Politics. *46 Indeed, the 
New Order broadened the enmity towards the PKI by linking it to the external power 
of China, which was labeled as the PKI's patron. Therefore, the projection of China 
as a threat to Indonesia was indeed required to strengthen Suharto's domestic 
credibility. In this ýontext, Sheldon W. Simon argues that the Suharto government 
sought support and rationalized weaknesses by arguing, just as Sukarno did, the 
exigencies of encirclement. Instead of Nekolim [Neo-colonialism], the new devils 
were China and Communism. 47 
In fact, co-existing with China in her backyard presents a formidable threat, 
not in the conventional sense of outright threat but more particularly in terms of 
China's interference in Indonesia's domestic affairs through the exploitation of 
presence of the ethnic Chinese community in Indonesia, which currently number 
15 Robert Jarvis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), p. 170. 
46 One day after receiving the II March Letter of Order known in Indonesia as Supersemar (Surat 
Perintah 11 Maret) from President Sukarno in 1966, Suharto dissolved the PKI. Eventually, Communism 
officially banned in Indonesia through the issuance of TAP MPRS (The Decision of the Provisional 
People's Consultative Assembly) No. XXV/MPRS/1966 dated 5 July 1966. The actual circumstances 
surrounding the issuance of Supersemar remained unclear, as yet the original letter has never been found. 
Following the downfall of Suharto in May 1998, the discussion over this letter has come into surface 
again and openly contained in nearly all Indonesian leading daily newspapers, such as Jakarta Post, 00 Kompas, Republika, and Suara Pentbaruan. 
47 Sheldon W. Simon, The Broken Triangle, Peking, Jakarta and the PKI (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
Press, 1969), p. 17 S. 
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more than six millions. 48 Indonesia's leaders were, and still are, anxious about the 
presence of ethnic Chinese as part of its population. 49 The intertwining between 
domestic and external dimension of China and ethnic Chinese has always concerned 
Indonesian leaders . 
50 Historically, on some occasions the interaction between these 
two factors has undermined Indonesia's interests, particularly in term of domestic 
stability and the allegiance of ethnic Chinese to the State of Indonesia. The 
nationality status of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia became a source of irritation for the 
Indonesian government. In the early 1950s, for instance, the ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia had become a major issue between Taipei and Beijing in their competition 
to win the political and financial support of the overseas Chinese. Thus Indonesia 
became an extended area of conflict between Taiwan and China. In this regard, 
China had been accused of interfering in the domestic affairs of Indonesia. 
Eventually, the political orientation of a number of ethnic Chinese leaders and their 
organizations to the PKI led to the whole ethnic Chinese group being accused of 
sympathy towards communism. 
However, it appeared that history had played its part in Sino-Indonesian 
relations. The perception of Indonesian ethnic Chinese and China, in fact, should 
refer back to the pre-colonial and colonial periods. This is the case since history is 
the record of the accumulated experience of past generations, and the present 
generation is inevitably the product of that experience. The 'dead of the past' is not 
really dead; it continues to influence the living. Unless the circumstances in which 
the nation exists alter radically and permanently, the national outlook is not likely to 
change significantly. 5 1A prominent Indonesian scholar, Leo Suryadinata, drew a link 
49 In Indonesia, the term ethnic Chinese refer to both who have and have not been nationalized into 
Indonesian national. After the non-nalisation of diplomatic relations, the term should be understood as 
Indonesian citizen with Chinese descendants (warga keiurunan). In a wider context, the term "overseas 
Chinese" applies to a diaspora of well 20 million people of migrant origin who are dispersed disparately 
within the states of South-East Asia, including warga keturunan in Indonesia. 
49 Given the importance of the issue of ethnic Chinese in the context of Indonesia's perception of China, 
it will be discussed through out this study as far as it is relevant to the focus of this study. 
50 Regardless of the fact that many Indonesian leaders have benefited from the ethnic Chinese, especially 
in the context of economy and business opportunities. 
" Frederick H. Hartmann, The Relations ofNations, 4dedition (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 56. 
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between PRC, ethnic Chinese and the objectives of Indonesia's foreign policy. 52 
Most of Indonesian leaders did not have direct contact with China, but they have 
dealings with the local ethnic Chinese. Therefore it is understandable if they 
projected their knowledge about the ethnic Chinese on their attitude toward China. 
Indeed, a survey conducted in 1968 aimed at a major proportion of 
Indonesia's leaders revealed that the majority of them considered China as aggressive 
not because of communism, but rather because of being Chinese. 53 Unfortunately, 
the Indonesian leaders' perception of the ethnic Chinese minority was carried into the 
conduct of Indonesia's policy towards China. While occupying power, they 
perceived the local ethnic Chinese as a significant threat to the security of the 
government. Although foreign policy is always intended to promote national 
interests, of which national security is part, its formulation and emphasis is always 
decided by the ruling elite. As the Islamic nationalists and the military perceived 
communism as a threat to Indonesia's national security, therefore the effort to 
confront communism became a national priority. However, Indonesian secular 
nationalists did not come to an agreement on the concept of national security. While 
the right wing secular nationalists shared the views of the Islamic nationalists and the 
military, the left wing secular nationalists considered Western imperialism as the 
main threat to Indonesia's national security interest. 
Indeed, security is always given the highest priority in the objectives of 
Indonesia's foreign policy. Therefore, Indonesia's perception of the ethnic Chinese in 
so far as security is concerned differs from time to time, depending which elite 
occupies the decision-making power. For most of Indonesia's leaders, Indonesian 
ethnic Chinese seemed to have an orientation and loyalty to China. It was not 
surprising therefore that Indonesia's leader easily labeled the ethnic Chinese as a 
potential fifth column. Indonesian communists also considered most of the ethnic 
Chinese to be orienting themselves to China, but criticized those who fled during the 
" Leo Suryadinata, Dilemma Minoritus Tionghoa [The Dilemma of Ethnic Chinese Minority] (Jakarta: 
Grafiti Pers, 1980), pp. 176-77. 
53 Frankdin B. Weinstein, The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University: A 
PhD dissertation, 1972), pp. 288-308. 
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racial conflict. Unlike anticommunist Indonesian leaders, Indonesian communists 
considered the temporary political orientation of the ethnic Chinese to China as a 
blessing, as their perception of Indonesia's security interest was different from the 
anticommunist one. Indeed, the communists have never been in the government seat, 
while the ruling elite and decision-makers were anticommunist or non-conununists. 
Therefore, Indonesia's policy towards China has been influenced by the perception 
of the ruling elite during certain periods as well as their perception of the priorities of 
the Indonesian State. 54 Therefore, the second objective of this study is tofind out how 
the concept of a China threat has been defined under the New Order regime, and to 
inquire what has been thefunction of the threat of China. 
Indonesia's perception of China was primarily dominated by the views of 
Suharto and his military supporters. Indeed, the negative perception of China had 
been prolonged by China's continuous support of the PKI remnants in conducting 
subversive activities and insurgency movements in the following years. The 
consequences of viewing China as a threat were translated into the "freezing" of 
diplomatic relations with China in foreign policy as a parallel policy to that in the 
domestic domain by which the PKI/communism was declared as illegal. indeed, the 
New Order's attitude towards the PKI and foreign policy of China was a total 
reversal from the one adopted by Sukarno. While Sukarno regarded the PKI as one of 
the pillars of his Guided Democracy and his main domestic supporter, China was 
considered as one of Indonesia's main external friends. Thus, the freezing of 
diplomatic relations was meant to cut the link between the domestic element and the 
external factor. 
However, it should be underlined that Indonesia's perception of China has not 
been static, rather it developed, transformed and experienced evolutionary 
transformation along with the changes in both domestic and the external 
environment. In this regard, the dynamic of Indonesian and Chinese domestic politics 
as well as their environment should contribute to the dynamic of Indonesia's 
perception of China. This is the case since the security concerns and perception of its 
54 Suryadinata, Dilema Minorilas Tionghoa, Ibid. p. 176-77. 
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security problems are shaped by both internal and external factors. However, a 
relatively constant factor that is equally important in determining Indonesia's 
perception of China has been its historical background and experience in dealing with 
China. In this regard Buzan stated that, "threats also have an historical dimension 
which adds fin-ther at the complexities of assessment. A threat which resonates with 
the historical experience of a state may well be amplified by the heightened 
sensitivity thus created. "55 
While the object of the perception remains the same, there were indeed on- 
going changes in the nature and concept of the flueat. In the mid 1980s, Indonesia 
began to move towards rapprochement with China. It was mainly the result of 
domestic requirements in which Indonesia tried to shift its trade structure, which was 
mainly dependent on oil exports. In this regard, China had been regarded as a 
potential market for Indonesia's export conunodities, particularly as China appeared 
to show economic success resulting from the modernization process introduced by 
Deng Xiaoping from the late 1970s. It was ftirther realized through the opening of 
56 direct trade in 1985. Nevertheless, Indonesia's leaders, particularly the military, 
remained reluctant to embark on improving relations in the political field . 
57 This 
period also witnessed the emergence of cleavages among the Indonesian elite on the 
nonnalisation issue. These occurred mainly between the proponents of normalisation 
that circled around the civilian foreign minister Adam Malik, and the opponents of 
the restoration of diplomatic ties from the military establishment. 
Eventually, as the result of the dynamics in Indonesia's domestic politics that 
coincided with the coming of a new international environment by the late 1980s, 
Indonesia abandoned its previous rigid position by restoring diplomatic relations 
with China in August 1990.58 There was no doubt that this move could presumably 
55 Barry Buzan, People. States & Fear. - An Agendafor International Security Studies in the Post-Cold 
War Era (New York, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 199 1), p. 13 8. 
56 Antara, 26 July 1985. 
57 The issue of normalisation of diplomatic relations will be discussed in Chapter 4 along with the 
discussion on the development of Indonesia's perception of China. 
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be interpreted as Suharto's shift, as the dominant figure at the apex of the New Order 
political structure, to lessen his perception of the threat of China. This means that 
China was no longer considered as a threat, rather as a potential partner that might 
help boost Indonesia's economy, contribute to the settlement of regional problems 
and help increase Indonesia's chance of playing a bigger role in the international 
arena. It was the position that had been held by the proponents of normalisation. 
However, it also proved that Suharto was the master of Indonesia's foreign policy. 
Accordingly, the third objective of this study is to analyze the challenges tolvards 
Indonesia's perception of China that culminated in the normalisation of diplomatic 
relations in August 1990, and tofind out whatfactors have been involved. 
Apparently, the restoration of diplomatic relations with China did not mean 
the removal of the suspicions about China on the part of Indonesian elite policy- 
makers, particularly among the military. For instance, the then Defense and Security 
Minister L. B. Moerdani said that, "I don't have to say this, but anti-Chinese feelings 
in this country run very high. -... "59, Without specifically referring to China, one 
Indonesian senior minister even stated that communism is still one of the threats to 
Indonesian national security. 60 In describing this situation, one prominent Indonesian 
scholar, Jusuf Wanandi, concluded that a mood of distrust still exists among 
Indonesian leaders. 61 
On the other hand, the normalisation was generally seen as an important step 
and the beginning of an improvement of Sino-Indonesian relations, which inevitably 
carried its own promises. 62 A number of civilian leaders stated positively that 
58 As far as domestic perspective is concerned, it was mainly because of Suharto's ascendancy in 
Indonesian domestic politics. Meanwhile, the new environment has mainly been the collapse of 
communism in the Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as well as the importance of economic 
factor in international relations. 
59 Jakarta Post, 6 August 1990. 
60 Soesilo Soedarman, Co-ordinator Minister for Political and Security Affairs, as quoted by Kompas, 12 
September 1997. 
61 Jusuf Wanandi, "Tlie Correlation between Domestic Policies and Foreign Policy in Indonesia". In 
. 
Robert A. Scalapino (eds. ), Asia and the Major Powers, Dontestic Policies and Foreign Policy 
(Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1988), p. 9 1. 
62 Generally, the resumption of diplomatic relations is expected to: (i) boost economic relations between 
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Indonesia would be able to gain much from the restoration of diplomatic relations. 63 
Many predicted that Indonesia might gain business opportunities, as China would 
become a huge lucrative market for Indonesian goods in the next five to ten years. 64 
The high expectation on the part of Indonesia over economic profits was also 
encouraged by the increase of Indonesia's exports to China after the convening of 
direct trade in 1985 . 
65 Former Indonesian foreign minister, Roeslan Abdulgani, also 
agreed that one of the main factors behind normalisation has been Indonesia's 
economic interest. 66 
The above contradictory opinions therefore clearly indicated that the 
normalisation of diplomatic relations with China was received with mixed feelings 
among Indonesian leaders. Despite China's positive comments 67 and the assurance 
from its highest ranking official not to interfere in Indonesian domestic affairs and 
not to exploit the Indonesian ethnic Chinese for the interests of China, it appeared 
that the military's perceptions of China had not changed. 68 On the contrary, the 
normalisation of diplomatic relations gave the military a new reality in which 
maintaining and pointing at the same old threat would be seen as something less 
credible. At the same time, there has been a dramatic change in the fate of 
communism internationally, in which their appeal has now been overtaken by the 
economic capitalism. Accordingly, the military began losing its justification in 
China and Indonesia; ii) promote peace, security, stability and co-operation, particularly in Southeast 
Asia region and East Asia; and (iii) strengthen co-operation between China and ASEAN. The discussion 
on this issue is addressed in Chapter 4. 
63 See, Merdeka, 14 September 1990. 
64 Jusuf Wanandi, "The Correlation between... " Ibid. 
65 The values of Indonesian export to China since 1985 were steadily increasing as follows: US$84 
million (1985), US$139 (1986), US$343 (1987), USS492 (1988). See, Angkatan Bersenjala, 7 February 
1990. 
66 interview with fonner Indonesian foreign minister, Roeslan Abdulgani, 4 December 1998. 
67 "China, Indonesia to Connect Ties", Beying Review, Vol. 33, No. 29, July 16-22,1990, p. 5. 
6' Although the resumption of diplomatic relations was officially opened on 8 August 1990, the move was 
not followed by the abandonment of suspicion towards China. For instance, those Indonesian citizens 
who wanted to travel to China were still required to have a clearance or special permit from the military 
authorities. It took a year for Indonesian government to lift this regulation. Jakarta Post, 18 August 1990, 
and Media Indonesia, 8 August 199 1. 
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maintaining China and, to a certain extent, communism, as a threat. Thus, because of 
their inability to find a new replacement as a common threat, they faced a crisis of 
identity and legitimacy. 69 It is assumed that the military, which has long considered 
China a threat, were reluctant to abandon their perception of China. Instead, they 
made various alterations, which in essence were aimed at maintaining China as a 
threat. 
After the restoration of diplomatic relations, Indonesian domestic politics 
continued experiencing transformation, particularly the relationship between Suharto 
and the military. Encouraged by his success to create stability, address Indonesia's 
economic problems, and more importantly to promote Pancasila as the state's sole 
ideology (azas tunggao in 1985, Suharto appeared as a confident leader and began 
asserting his own dominance. Ironically, it was followed by a growing 
disillusionment among the military officers towards Suharto. Apart from criticism of 
his family's involvement in business and the interpretation of Pancasila in the 
second half of the 1980s, the military considered Suharto as undermining their role 
and position in Indonesian politics. This cleavage appeared in one of the infamous 
episodes in which the military refused to back Suharto's choice of Sudharmono as 
the Indonesian vice-president in 1988. Their disagreement was shown by their late 
endorsement of Sudharmono during the meeting of the People's Consultative 
Assembly (MPR), and the "interruption" by one of the members of the military's 
faction in the selection process. 70 Although Sudharmono was a member of the 
military corps, he was unpopular and did not do much for the interest of the 
military. 71 What is important from this sequence is that the military's effort to 
69 Kompas, 20 December 1997 
70 The incident of interruption expressed by Brig. Gen. Ibrahim Salleh, a member of ABRI faction in the 
People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). It became a big headline in Indonesian newspapers and public 
conversation. It was the first time during the New Order history that the right to "interrupt" was exercised 
against the prevailing spirit of deliberation and consensus. 
71 Sudharmono was the minister of powerful and influential State Secretariat. The Secretariat was 
empowered to nullify the recommendations of government agency, which in the past threw contracts in 
the direction of business linked to the military. In the process Sudharmono has been seen as more 
promoting his own group and interest, and not for the interests of ABRJ. During the campaign to discredit 
him, ABRI even spread the issue that Sudharmono was involved with the PKI. In that scenario ABRI has 
also tacitly encouraged Chairman of United Development Party (PPP), H. J. Naro, to stand as other 
candidate for the same seatý thus upsetting the standard practice of the MPR in which the prevailing spirit 
of musyawarah and mufakat (deliberation and consensus) might have been violated. 
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challenge Suharto in a constitutional way failed and as a result, Suharto tried to find 
another way of balancing the seemingly unreliable military's support. 
72 
In the end, Suharto chose the Islamic forces and reintroduced them to 
Indonesian politics. The indication of Suharto's favor towards Islain was shown 
through his support of the creation of ICMI in December 1990. There were many 
people surprised by this move. Why did Suharto take a gamble by playing the 
sensitive issue of the Islamic card? One political expert on Indonesia, Douglas E. 
Ramage, argued that: "Although Suharto remained pre-eminent, he was no longer 
supported by ABRI. 03 At the same time, Suharto did not consider the Islamic forces 
as posing a threat, as they already accepted Pancasila and enacted it in their 
respective legislation. 74 The military's disagreement with Suharto became apparent 
particularly with the leverage given to his controversial minister, B. J. Habibie, to 
preside over ICNE. 75 What is important from this sequence is that by the early 1990s, 
the Indonesian political configuration and structure changed with the inclusion of 
Islamic forces, particularly the ICMI. 76 it was a total reversal of his previous position 
in which the New Order had been suspicious of the Islamic forces, and even regarded 
72 The military were also very critical to Suharto, particularly upon his insistence to stay in power for 
unlimited period and his family involvement in business activities. 
73 Douglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the IdeoloSy of Tolerance (London: 
Routledge, 1995), p. 42. 
74 ICM1 does not represent the whole Muslim community. One of its prominent opponents is 
Abdurrahman Wahid, Chairman of the NU (Islamic Scholar). He is regarded as a religious nationalist 
who prefers that Indonesia should be de-confessionalized, meaning that the religious movements should 
be excluded from political scene. In 1991, he established the Forum Democracy aimed at balancing 
ICMI. 
75 Habibie's antagonism with ABRI will be discussed in Chapter 5. 0 
76 Suharto's decision to play the Muslim card was signaled by his agreement and support to the 
appointment of his German trained engineer minister, Professor B. J. Habibie as Head of the Suharto- 
backed ICMI. Habibie has been seen with suspicion in military circles, particularly because of his 
influence over Suharto that enable him to dictate the fulfillment of military needs. Habibie was also seen 
as a threat to military ambition to fill the vice-president post. The growing influence of the ICMI was later 
evident through the appointment of half a dozen of new ministers of Habibie's nominees. ICMI fin-ther 
developed its influence by publishing a Muslim-oriented newspaper, Republika, to balance the circulation 
of Kompas (oNvned by the Catholic group) and Suara Pembaruan (Protestant oriented newspaper). It was 
followed soon by the establishment of think-thank institution called CIDES (Center for Information and 
Development Studies), to balance the CSIS. Suharto's decision to play Muslim card and the decreasing 
role of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) will be discuss in detail in Chapter 5. For basic Information 
on ICMI, See "ICMI: Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia dalam Sorotan Pers, Desember 1990- 
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them as an extreme right threat. While the Islamic forces are not monolithic groups 
and their impact in Indonesian politics tends to be exaggerated, its immediate effect 
has been the increasing disillusionment among the military officials towards Suharto. 
The period after normalisation has also been characterized by increasing 
attention and hostility towards the ethnic Chinese, especially over their position in 
Indonesia's economy. VA-ffle their numbers are known to be relatively small, their 
domination over Indonesian economics, particularly in capital ownership, goods 
distribution and retailer network, has always caused problems. Under the New Order 
government, the ethnic Chinese dominated the economic field to the point where 
they are now believed to control around 70 per cent of Indonesia's economic 
78 wealth. There is no doubt that apart from their ability and skill in dealing with 
economics, in many cases they collaborated and did business with the support and 
backing of the government and the military. Thus the ethnic Chinese businessmen 
were regarded as significantly benefiting from the New Order rule. 79 This perception 
among ordinary Indonesians has created the situation in which any political changes 
in Indonesia always took the ethnic Chinese as their victims. 80 Although the 
economic gap between the Indonesian (pribumi) and the ethnic Chinese was 
generally to blame, in some cases government policy was responsible by using the 
April 1991" [ICMI; Indonesian Moslems Intellectuals' Association under the Scrutiny of the Press, 
December 1990-April 199 1 ], Jakarta, Central Secretariat oflCul, 199 1. 
77 The New Order regime always maintained the sources of domestic threat to Indonesia security as 
emanating from the extreme left (Communism) and the extreme right (Islam). 
78 The domination of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesian economy is discussed in Chapter 5. 
79 Two ethnic Chinese businessmen who were closely related to Suharto were Liem Sioe Liong (given 
monopoly in food processing), Bob Hasan (timber), and recently the infamous Eddy Tanzil who 
collaborated with the government bank company and believed to be close to Suharto's son. While he was 
found guilty of corruption charge and sent to prison, he managed to escaped and disappeared. 
so Throughout Indonesia's history, the ethnic Chinese have been the target of attacks, including, by 
European settlers during the colonial era. They were also targeted during the mass killings that occurred 
in the aftermath of the 1965 abortive coup. During the New Order era, the ethnic Chinese has always 
become the target of rioters. Although the issue of ethnic Chinese in Indonesian politics alone is not part 
of this study, but given its role in the development Indonesian politics and its impact on Sino-Indonesian 
relations, it will be discussed in almost every Chapter of this study. 
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ethnic Chinese as a scapegoat, thus diverting public attention from the real 
81 
problems. 
While the Indonesian government made every effort to integrate the ethnic 
Chinese into the Indonesian community as part of its national building process, their 
strong and strategic position in the Indonesian economy easily provoked anti-Chinese 
feelings among Indonesian pribumi. In many cases, these feelings erupted into mass 
anti-Chinese riots and the ethnic Chinese community in Indonesia has been the target 
of antagonistic reaction and the long-standing prejudice of indigenous Indonesians. 82 
In general the reasons for the worsening attitude towards the ethnic Chinese have 
ranged from old colonial links, stereotypes and prejudice, their dominant position in 
83 
the Indonesian economic structure, as well as their unfortunate link with the PKI. 
Unlike the period prior to norinalisation, when Indonesia's perception of 
China was mainly in terms of political and strategic security, what prevailed after the 
normalisation was the suspicion as a result of the emergence of Chinese nationalism 
and economic aspects. This is particularly related to the development of China as an 
economic power and its consequences in which the Indonesian ethnic Chinese might 
turn their allegiance to Beijing. In this context, China has been portrayed as actively 
persuading the overseas Chinese, including the Indonesian ethnic Chinese, to invest 
their capital in China. The convening of the meeting between the overseas Chinese in 
Singapore in 1991 and Hong Kong in 199' ) was strongly believed to be intended to 
increase capital investment in China by using cultural linkage. Accordingly, the 
81 For example, the Armed Forces Chief was reported to have met with the Indonesian . journalists and 
editors advising them to write articles critical of the ethnic Chinese Indonesians. See, Sydney Morning 
Herald, 16 February 1998. This policy was surely to prevent the public attention from blaming the 
authority for their failure in overcoming economic crisis. 
82 Although the people's frustration was directed against the government, it was the ethnic Chinese who 
were to blame. Many believe it was the result of New Order government policy to only allow them to 
participate in the economic sector, without giving any chance to participate in the political field. This 
issue will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
83 The May 1998 riots that eventually ousted Suharto from office also took the ethnic Chinese as one of 
its victims. The anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia continued to occur by the end of 1998, as the reaction to 
the worsening economic situation in Indonesia remains unabated. Many ethnic Chinese escaped the 
country and many of them remain reluctant to go back to Indonesia. It was the result of looters and 
rampage to their shops, particularly during May 1998 riots. The details on the issue of ethnic Chinese and 
their historical perspective will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
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fourth objective of this study is to investigate how the concept and nature of the 
perception of China has shifted in accordance with the dynamics of Indonesia's 
domestic politics and its environment. 
The New Order adopted parallel policies with regard to the PKI and China. 
While domestically the PKI was banned, relations with China were frozen. Indeed, 
the nature of Sino-Indonesian relations prior to August 1990 was dominated by the 
requirements of Indonesian domestic politics. As a result of viewing China as a 
threat after the 1965 coup, Indonesia froze its diplomatic relations with China. 
Therefore, Indonesia's policy towards China was non-cooperation and relatively non- 
existent. What has been Indonesia's foreign policy after normalisation? In this 
regard, one Indonesian scholar noted that Sino-Indonesian relations during the Cold 
War (prior to normalisation) 84 were not very much shaped by East-West conflicts; 
rather, they were influenced by the internal dynamics of China and Indonesia. He 
further predicted that the direction of Sino-Indonesian relations in the post-Cold War 
(after 1990 diplomatic resumption) would again be influenced by -the internal 
dynamics of China and Indonesia. However, he further underlined that the changed 
regional and global environments now have an equally important influence on the 
85 
relationship. 
Indeed, the period after normalisation with China was characterized by 
Indonesia's entrance to the world stage. Despite working together with China in 
expelling Vietnam from Cambodia and its subsequent contribution to the settlement 
of the Cambodian conflict, Suharto brought Indonesia towards greater involvement 
in the international forum, through his position as Chairman of the Non-Aligned 
Movement. Indeed, by the 1990s Suharto had been successful in putting Indonesia 
back on the international stage. Ironically, Indonesia's active participation has been 
overshadowed by continued criticism over Indonesia's human rights record and its 
occupation of East Timor. Additionally, the end of the Cold War has indeed reduced 
Indonesia's strategic importance in the eyes of the Western powers, particularly the 
" it coincided with the period of prior to the normalisation of diplomatic relations. 
15 Hadi Soesastro, "Introduction", Sino-Indonesian Relations in the Post-Cold War Era (Jakarta: CSIS, 
1992), p. 1. 
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US. Therefore, the coming of the Clinton democratic administration has often put 
Indonesia in the same position as China which has similar problems over human 
rights, trade and labor issues. Although this situation opened opportunities for 
cooperation, it remains to be seen that these two countries can develop cooperation 
based on this reality. 
While Indonesia's domestic perception of China has its own dynamic, Sino- 
Indonesian relations were characterized by apprehension as the result of China's 
ambiguous behavior. First, it was concerned with the development of China's 
military capability as the result of its economic success. Second, it was related to the 
disputes in the South China Sea, especially China's determination to resort to 
military force against other claimant states, while at the same time maintaining 
dialogue. Early indications showed that Indonesia embarked on increasing its 
military capability in the early 1990s. However, Indonesia had hardened its position 
vis-A-vis China by the mid 1990s, particularly after realizing that China had put its 
claim over the territorial waters of the Natuna Islands. 86 Interestingly, Indonesia also 
signed a defense agreement with Australia in 1995, which was widely believed to be 
concluded with China in the mind of Indonesia's leaders. " Although this dispute did 
not escalate into an open conflict with China, many Indonesian leaders were 
concerned and remained apprehensive about the true motive and the foundation of 
China's claim on the dispute. Indonesia has rejected China's argument based on its 
historical legacy. 
As far as economy and trade are concerned, Indonesia's domestic hostility 
towards the ethnic Chinese and the suspicion of their alleged linkage with China has 
become an obstacle to the improvement of Sino-Indonesian relations, particularly in 
the context of trade and economic activities. Although early indications showed that 
96 See, John Mcbeth, "Oil-Rich Diet, " Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 February 1995 and 27 April 
1995; Straits Times, 4 June 1995; Antara, 21 July 1995; "Cina tak Akan Menjawab 'Aide-Memoir, dari 
RP [China Won't Reply Indonesia's Aide Memoir], Kompas, July 24,1996. 'Fhe dispute between 
Indonesia and China over territorial dispute is extensively discussed in Chapter 6. 
87 Alan Dupont, "The Australia-Indonesia Security Agreement, " Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 2, 
Second Quarter, 1996, pp. 195-206. 
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the trade balance has improved in favor of Indonesia, " it remains to be seen whether 
Indonesia would be able to maintain the trend. Indeed, the attention towards the 
ethnic Chinese has been coupled with accusations of capital flight in which they 
invested their capital in China simply because of cultural links. This was considered 
against Indonesia's national interest of economic development in which Indonesia 
requires capital . 
89 It coincidentally took place as China was also in need of more 
capital to maintain its economic growth. Therefore, the last objective of this study is 
to analyze what has been the implication of Indonesia's perception of China on its 
foreign policy towards China. 
Sino-Indonesian relations have generated a considerable amount of interest 
among scholars. However, there are some points that need to be underlined from 
those previous studies. 90 First, most of the studies dealt with the period before the 
normalisation. Never before has a study focused on the whole period that covers both 
88 Indonesia gained a trade surplus with China in a consecutive years, 1989 (US$41.1 million), 1990 
(USS182.1 million, 1991 (USS355.9 million), 1992 (USS644.9 million), 1993 (USS313.3 million). The 
Indonesian Center ofStatistics Bureau, Jakarta, 1994. 
89 Merdeka, 2 April 1993, Bisnis Indonesia, 8& 12 April 1993. 
90 For the studies and documentation on the relationship between Indonesia and China, See, among 
others: Theresa C. Carino, China and Southeast Asia: Contemporary Politics and Economics (Manila, 
De La Salle University Press, 1984); Yao-chiu Chang, Communist China's StrateSy toward ASEAN 
Countries, (Taipei: World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter Asian People's Anti-Communist 
Lea( gue, 1986); Chou En-lai, China and the Asian-African Conference (Peking, Foreign Language Press, 
1955); Ganefo Federation: Ganefo Opens New Era in iYorld Sports: Chinese Sports Delegation in 
Djakarta Ganefo (Jakarta, Ganefo, 1966); Jacques de Goldfiem, Sous Pil du Dragon: Les Relations de la 
Chine avec les pays de VASEAN (Paris: Foundation pour les Etudes de Defence National Difruse par la 
Documentation Francaise, 1988); Ji Guoxing and Hadi Soesastro, Sino-Indonesia Relations in the Post- 
Cold War Era (Jakarta: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992); Joyce K. Kallgren, 
Mohamed Noordin Sopiee and J. Soedjati Djiwandono, ASE, 4N and China: An Evolving Relationship 
(Berkeley, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988); David P. Mozingo, Chinese 
Policy toward Indonesia, 1949-1967 (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976); David P. Mozingo, 
Sino-Indonesian Relations: An Overview, 1955 - 1965 (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corp, 1965); 
Sheldon W. Simon, The Broken Triangle: Peking, Djakarta, and the PKI (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1969); Leo Suryadinata, China and the ASEAN states: the Ethnic Chinese Dimension (Singapore: 
Singapore University Press, National University of Singapore, 1985); Leo Suryadinata, "Overseas 
Chinese" in Southeast Asia and China's Foreign Policy: An Interpretative Essay (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1978); Takashi TaJima, China and South-East Asia: Strategic Interests and 
Policy Prospects (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 198 1, ADELPHI Papers no. 172); 
Justus Maria van der Kroef, Peking Hanoi, and Guerilla Insurgency in Southeast Asia (New York: 
American Friends in Vietriam, 1971); Wu Yuan-li, The Strategic Land Ridge: Peking's Relations with 
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford 
University, 1975), Hong Liu, "Constructing a China Metaphor: Sukarno's Perception of the PRC and 
Indonesia's Political Transformation, " Journal ofSoutheast Asian Studies 28,1 (March 1997). 
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before and after the normalisation. Nevertheless, those studies are still very useful 
and important in understanding the basic relationship that was laid down during the 
1950's to 1960s, as well as its development up to the August 1990 normalisation. 
Second, Sino-Indonesian relations are often portrayed in the context of the political 
and security domain, while the economic perspective is less highlighted. Third, the 
relationship between both countries is often discussed in the context of regional or 
ASEAN co-operation, or within the context of interactions among Southeast Asian 
countries. Fourth, there has been no comprehensive study focusing thoroughly on 
Sino-Indonesian relations, particularly after non-nalisation. 
As far as the study of Indonesian foreign policy is concerned, there are two 
classical books written by western academics exploring Indonesian foreign policy in 
depth, and featuring foreign policy as identified and analyzed primarily in terms of 
domestic politics and requirements. The first book was written by Franklin Weinstein 
in 1976 with the title Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of 
Independence. 91 He conducted a comprehensive analysis of the interaction between 
foreign policy and domestic politics in the early years of the New Order, particularly 
with regard to the questions of aid, nationalism and dependence. He also examined 
different choices taken by Sukarno and Suharto in dealing with the dilemma of 
dependence and foreign aid. The second book was written by Michael Leifer entitled 
Indonesia's Foreign Policy, 92 and published in 1983. While covering a longer 
period, his study focuses on the analysis of the driving sources and requirements of 
Indonesia's foreign policy and its implementation during Sukarno and Suharto eras. 
What is important from this study is that there are clearly areas of both change and 
continuity from Sukarno to Suharto. 
While the above are very valuable and important in understanding the 
sources, substances, structure and the dynamic of Indonesian foreign policy, apart 
from a study by Sukma, 93 little has been done on the area that specifically focuses on 
91 Franklin B. Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma ofDependence: From Sukarno to 
Suharto (Ithaca: Comcll University Press, 1976). 
92 Michael Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983). 
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Indonesian perception and foreign policy of China. Therefore, this study is intended 
to enrich the literature on Sino-Indonesian relations and Indonesian foreign policy as 
well as to help understand the phenomena of foreign policy in the context of 
developing countries. 
1.4. Sources of the Research 
This thesis mainly uses the analysis of qualitative data drawn from primary 
and secondary sources. However, there are some characteristics that have been 
shown by Suharto with regard to foreign policy. 
94 First, the most basic and important 
factor is that the government has consistently allowed more leeway for critical 
discussion in the foreign policy field than it did in domestic politics. Second, there is 
a livelier and more open debate about foreign policy in Indonesia precisely because 
there is greater consensus about foreign policy than domestic Political affairs. Third, 
the foreign policy debate in Indonesia tends to be relatively open and lively, as 
Suharto wanted it this way. Accordingly, these characteristics are also applied as far 
as Indonesia's foreign policy of China is concerned. As a result, there have been 
plenty of resources on the issue, particularly from the mass media perspective, which 
often reflected Indonesia's elite perception of China. 
95 
The collection of primary materials were conducted through interviews in 
November-December 1998 with the Director General of Political Affairs of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nugroho Wisnumurti; former foreign minister, Roeslan 
Abdul Gani; academics or intellectual, Rizal Sukma, founding members of ICMI, 
Adi Sasono and Nasir Tamara and officials at the Embassy of China in Jakarta. 
Confidential interviews were also conducted with military sources. These interviews 
93 Rizal Sukma, Indonesia's Restoration of Diplomatic Relations with China: A Study ofForeign Policy 
Making and the Functions of Diplomatic Ties (London: Ph. D. dissertation at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 1997). 
'94 Gordon Hein, Soeharto's Foreign Policy: Second Generation of Nationalism -in Indonesia (Berkeley: 
Ph. D. dissertation at the University of California, 1986), pp. 99-102. 
9' it often contained in the newspapers depending on their affiliation. Angkatan Bersenjaia is owned by 
the military. Merdeka is a pro-Soviet nationalist newspaper. Suara Karya is owned by the government- 
backed Golongan Karya (Golkar). Kompas is owned by the Catholic group, while Sum-a Pembaruan is 
owned by the Christian/Protestant group. Pelita and Republika are owned by the Islamic groups. 
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were mainly meant to complete and confirm the already known views and 
perceptions that had been published through Indonesian news media. However, due 
to the sensitivity of the issue to the military and at the specific request of the resource 
persons, the result of these interviews cannot be used specifically within the thesis. 
The collection of secondary materials include literature or academic materials 
concerning the issues of Indonesia and China as well as in regional and global 
developments that have been published by experts in this field and are relevant to 
this study. Additionally, government position papers, statements by government 
officials or prominent persons, government publications as well as press reports or 
newspapers and weekly magazines such as Forum Keadilan, Tempo, Gatra, Kompas, 
Suara Pembaruan, Suara Merdeka and Republika complement the collection of this 
category of data. The activities of collecting primary and secondary materials were 
mainly conducted in Jakarta. 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter One is the Introduction, 
which discusses the theoretical concept, framework of analysis and the nature and 
objectives of the study. Chapter Two discusses the issue of Indonesia's national 
interest and foreign policy from 1945 to the coming of the New Order, taking into 
account China as a dividing factor. This part generally discusses Indonesia's basic 
foreign policy and the perception of threat in different phases of Indonesia's political 
history. Chapter Three focuses on the New Order perception of China that portrays 
China as a threat. This Chapter also examines the concept, nature and scope of China 
as a threat to Indonesia and the functional role of the threat of China and its impact 
on foreign policy. Chapter Four analyses the challenges to New Order's concept of 
the threat of China, particularly in the light of the domestic and international 
environment that eventually led to the normalisation of diplomatic relations in 
August 1990. Specific attention will be given to the differing perception among the 
military and the civilian foreign ministry officials. Chapter Five examines how the 
concept of China has been experiencing alteration and redefinition along with the 
transformation in Indonesian domestic politics, particularly the emergence of 
cleavages between the military and Suharto. Chapter Six analyses how Indonesia's 
perception of China after normalisation was translated into its foreign policy towards 
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China, which includes both political security and economic perspectives. Chapter 
Seven is the Conclusions. 
Chapter Two 
National Interest and Foreign Policy Orientation: 
China as a Dividing Issue (1945-1973) 
Discussion of the development of the modem Indonesian State can be divided 
into five phases. The first part starts from the period of 1945, which was mainly 
characterised by the struggle to secure independence and to gain international 
recognition, eventually achieved in December 1949. This period was later known as the 
revolutionary era that laid down the basic foundation of the course and path of 
Indonesian politics. The second phase is known as the liberal democracy era that lasted 
from 1950 - 1959. This was the period when Indonesia implemented parliamentary 
democracy as known in the West. 'I'lle third one is the Guided Democracy, which 
started in 1959 wheri Sukarno dissolved the parliamentary cabinet and reintroduced the 
revolutionary Constitution of 1945.1 It ended with the occurrence of the 1965 coup 
attempt that gradually terminated Sukarno's power. The fifth is the New Order period 
that lasted from the time when Suharto was appointed as acting-president in March 
2 1967 until May 1998. 
While maintaining national security interest, each phase had different priorities 
over other interests. Indeed, each episode in the development of Indonesian politics had 
its own characteristic that left its effect on the Indonesian leaders' outlook, particularly 
on their perception of a security threat as well as foreign policy. Therefore, this Chapter 
is aimed at exploring the route of Indonesian political history and experiences from the 
proclamation of Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945 to the coming of the- 
New Order, and examining Indonesia's relationship with China at each different 
1 See, Sukarno, Let Us Return to the 1945 Constitution (Jakarta: Ministry of Infonnation, 1959); J. C. T. 
Simorangkir and B. Mang Reng Say, Tentang dan Sekitar Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 [Around and 
About the Indonesian Constitution of 1945] (Jakarta: Jambatan, 1980). 
2 The period under J. B. Habibie was generally considered as the reformation or transition era. Eventually 
Indonesia were able to convene a free and democratic general election in July 1999 that led to the 
election of Abdurrachman Wahid as the fourth Indonesian president in October 1999. However, the 
period after the fall of Suharto is beyond the scope of this study. 
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episode. In so doing, this chapter is divided into six parts. The first section focuses on 
the revolutionary period (1945-1949), which considers security and threat perception, 
as well as examining the basic principle and roots of Indonesian foreign policy. The 
second portion deals with the period where Indonesia implemented parliamentary 
democracy (1950-1959). This section also discusses Sino-Indonesian relations in detail 
as they developed during this period. The third part explores the situation under the 
Guided Democracy (1960-1965). One of the most important portions in this section 
relates to the crystallisation of the suspicion of China and the ethnic Chinese. The 
fourth part discusses the aftermath of 1965 coup attempt and its domestic and external 
implications, particularly with regard to the fate of the PKI and Indonesia's relations 
with China (1965-1967). The fifth part focuses on the New Order regime, particularly 
their introduction of a new reorientation in domestic politics and foreign policy (1968- 
19733). The last part is the conclusion. 
2.1. National Revolution Period: The Seeds of Indonesian Foreign Policy and the 
Perception of Threats (1945-1949) 
The end of the Second World War dramatically changed the political 
constellation in Asia. In this period of time, the growth of nationalism aimed at 
achieving independence and national unity against the colonial powers in the region 
was prominent. Unfortunately, the spirit of independence through self-determination 
was impeded by the former colonial powers' intention to reclaim the territories that 
were occupied by the Japanese. Therefore, instead of a peaceful transfer of sovereignty 
to the new countries, conflict and struggle for independence movements were the 
characteristic of this period, especially those that prevailed in Indonesia and Vietnam. 
As far as China was concerned, the country was still preoccupied with the rivalry 
between the nationalist and communist camps. Thus, the relations between Indonesia 
and China prior to 1950 were practically non-existent as Indonesia was forced to fight 
the Dutch colonial power. 
The Japanese surrender in Indonesia was soon followed by the declaration of 
independence by nationalist leaders, Sukarno and Muhanunad Hatta, on 17 August 
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1945.3 While Indonesian territories were clearly claimed to be those existing under the 
Dutch colonial power, the transformation of sovereignty to the new Republic was 
hampered by the Dutch determination to reinstate its occupation of the East Indies 
territories. Therefore, the first task of the new Republic was to defend its very basic 
survival, namely the independence and integrity of the state. This important period in 
the history of Indonesia was characterised by a life and death battle to maintain the very 
existence and integrity of the new republic through both diplomacy and armed 
struggleS. 4 To maintain sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence, the new 
Republic had to adopt two distinct and opposite modes of foreign policy, namely 
negotiation (diplomasi) and struggle (perjuangan). 5 Strangely, the part of Indonesian 
armed struggle during the period has been over-emphasised and given a bigger portion 
in Indonesian official history, while the undertaking through diplomasi has been given 
less attention. Accordingly, revolution then became sanctified in the minds of 
Indonesia! s political elite. The revolutionary experience not only became a yardstick 
against which future political conduct would be measured, but it also laid down the 
foundation for Indonesia! s foreign policy in the following years. 6 
As far as Indonesia's foreign policy is concerned, it was the Indonesian vice- 
president, concurrently Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Dr. Muharnmad Hatta 
that laid down its basic principles. He delivered a statement before the Central 
Indonesian National Committee (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat - KNIP) on 2 
September 1948 that later became the milestone of Indonesian foreign policy. On that 
occasion he refuted the insistence of the People's Democratic Front of the Indonesian 
3 For the discussion on nationalism in Indonesia, see George McTuman Kahin, Nationalism and 
Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1955). 
4 Further discussion on the period of independence and the negotiations of transfer of sovereignty and its 
negotiation process, See: PS Gerbandy, Indonesia (London: Hutchinson & Co Publishers Ltd, 195 1). 
5 In this regard, the army is always proud of their role in the revolutionary struggle. Consequently, the P 
events such as army's leading role in the heroic struggle against the returning Dutch took place on 
November 10,1945 in Surabaya, and the army's attack of the Republic's capital in Yogyakarta in 1948 
when the civilian leaders were captured by the Dutch. 
6 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia and the Security of Southeast Asia (Jakarta: Monograph of the CSIS, 
1992), p. 1. 
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Communist Party, that the best foreign policy for Indonesia in the Cold War between 
the US and the Soviet Union was to side with Russia: 
Have the Indonesian people fighting for their freedom no other course 
of action open to them than to choose between being pro-Russian or 
pro-American? Is there no other position that can be taken in the pursuit 
of our national ideas? The government is of the opinion that the 
position to be taken is that Indonesia should not be a passive party in 
the arena of international politics but that it should be an active agent 
entitled to determine its own standpoint with the right to fight for its 
own goal -- the goal of a fully independent Indonesia. 
7 
This statement was intended to clarify the Government's stand on various 
domestic and international issues. This means that, as a matter of principle, Indonesia 
does not side with any world power (bebas, free or independent). Additionally, the 
foreign policy is active in the sense that Indonesia does not take a passive or reactive 
stand on international issues, but seeks active participation in their settlement. In other 
words, the independent and active foreign policy is not a neutral policy but one that 
does not align Indonesia with any of the superpowers, nor binds the country to any 
military pact. Hence the beliefs of post-independence foreign policy are a commitment 
to non-alignment and an attachment to the concept of an independent foreign policy. 
Domestically, this statement was intended to mitigate domestic rivalries among 
competing elites. Thus, the superpowers ideological competition was seen to aggravate 
acute political differences in Indonesia. Hatta ftirther defined four premises of the 
politics of bebas-aklif. First, the conduct of Indonesian foreign policy should be based 
on the ideological foundation of the state's philosophy of Pancasila. Second, foreign 
policy should be aimed at protecting the national interest as defined by the State's 
Constitution. Mrd, the pursuit of national interest would be best served through an 
independent policy. And fourth, Indonesia's foreign policy should be conducted 
pragmatically; namely, it "should be resolved in the light of its own interests and 
should be executed in consonance with the situation and facts it has to face. "8 In the 
end, it is Hatta's statement that is eventually accepted as the basic principles of 
' The speech was published under the title of "Mendayung Di Antara Dua Karang", Ministry of 
Infon-nation, Jakarta, 195 1. The English translation is from Michael Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, 
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1983) p. 20. 
' Mohammad Hatta, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs. vol. 3 1, no. 3 (April 1953), p. 446. 
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Indonesian foreign policy from time to time. While the principles remain the same, the 
emphasis, style and orientation may change subject to the domestic and international 
conditions. 9 
2.2. Under Parliamentary Democracy: Relations with China during an Unstable 
Period (1950-1959) 
A. Parliamentary Democracy Period: Instability, Regional Rebellion and 
the Emergence of the PKI 
Indonesia eventually gained international recognition on 30 December 1949 
through the signing of "The Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty. "' 0 To a certain extent, 
the success in crushing the communist rebellion of 1948 encouraged the Western 
leaders to support Indonesia's cause for independence. However, two central issues 
remained unresolved. The first was the question of West Irian territory. The exclusion 
of West Irian was considered as a total disregard to the nationalist leaders' claim that 
Indonesia should inherit the Dutch administrative territory. " The second, it was the 
question of the structure or form of the formal link between the Netherlands and 
Indonesia. In this regard, the Indonesian leader's determination to establish a unitary 
republic with central authority located in Java was denied by the Dutch insistence on 
maintaining a formal link with the Republic. The Dutch proposal was to create the 
United States of Indonesia. Therefore, although international recognition was officially 
achieved, the new Republic still had to secure its territorial integrity and total 
independence. 
With the final departure of the Dutch, Indonesian leaders moved quickly to 
establish a republic and parliamentary structure with one of its nationalist leaders, 
9 Further discussion on Indonesia's free and active foreign policy, see: Roeslan Abdulgani, Pegangan 
Politik Luar Negeri [Foreign Policy Guideline] (Jakarta: Universitas Nasional, 1976-77): H. M. Sabir, 
Politik Bebas Aktif- Tantangan dan Kesentpatan [Free and Active Politics: Challenges and 
Opportunities] (Jakarta: CV Haji Masagung, 1987). 
10 See PS Gerbrandy, Ibid. Annex E and F, pp. 209-216. 
11 See, Roeslan Abdulgani, Diplomasi Meivujudkan Kedaidatan yang Nyata dan Lengkap: Pembebasan 
Irian Barat [Diplomacy to Accomplish a Real and Complete Sovereignty: Liberating West Irian) 
(Jakarta: Universitas Rakyat, 1962). 
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Sukarno, as a figurehead president. In this direction, on 14 August 1950, the Indonesian 
legislature adopted a provisional constitution and embraced a unitary political system. 
12 
This "Provisional Constitution of 1950" adopted a parliamentary democratic system as 
practised in the West, that gave power to Parliament to determine the fate of the 
govenu-nent. While parliament consisted of many political parties, they often pursued 
and voiced narrow interests over the national one. 
13 Thus the government was always 
unstable and vulnerable, and subject to the balance of power in parliament. Initially, 
there was a smooth implementation of this system, particularly as evidenced in the co- 
operation between the Indonesian National Party (PNI) and Afasyumi (Majelis SyUro 
Muslimin Indonesia - the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims). In some cases, 
this co-operation also involved mediurn and smaller parties such as the Indonesian 
Socialist Party (PSI), Catholic Party and Indonesian Christian Party (Partindo). 
However the pattern of this co-operation was eventually disrupted due to various 
factors: the insistence of each party on occupying certain cabinet posts, the worsening 
ideological differences, and the growing influence of the Indonesian Communist Party 
(PKI). Thus, from 1950 on Indonesian politics was mainly Characterised by severe 
competition between political parties. 14 As a result, the implementation of 
parliamentary democracy in Indonesia witnessed the rapid turnovers of cabinets" 
5 and 
shifting alliances among political factions. 
12 It was a parliamentary democracy in which the state headed by president and governments were 
responsible to a unicameral House of Representatives elected directly by the people. Under this new 
system, Sukarno then became president. However, his power has drastically been reduced compared with 
those as prescribed in 1945 Constitution. Elections were postponed due to the reluctance of a substantial 
number of Dutch-appointed legislators from the federal states of the Republic of the United States of 
Indonesia whom most likely would be turned out of office by the election. 
13 Election was eventually held on 29 September 1955 and almost 38 million people participated. The 
result was: Indonesian Nationalist Party - PNI (22.3 percent and 57 seats in the House of 
Representatives); Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia/Council of Indonesian Moslems 
Association, 20.9 percent and 57 seats); the Nahdatul Ulama - NU (18.4 percent and 45 seats); the 
Indonesian Communist Party - PKI (16.4 percent and 39 seats); the Indonesian Socialist Party - PSI (2 
percent and 5 seats). 
" The discussion on the development of Indonesian politics in 1950s can be found in: Herbert Feith, The 
Decline ofConstitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962). 
15 During 1950-1957 there had been the changes for the post of the prime minister for eight times: M. 
Hatta (1949), Mohammad Natsir (1950). Dr. Sukiman Wirjosanjoyo (1950-1952), Mr. Wilopo (1952- 
1953), Ali Sastroamijoyo (1953-1955), Burhanuddin Harahap (1955-1956), Ali Sastroamijoyo's second 
cabinet (1956-1957), Dr. Djuanda Kartawidjaya (1957). 
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This period was also characterized by efforts to tackle domestic problems, 
particularly the issue of economic development. However, the conflicting opinions 
among political elite groups had prevented Indonesia from going ftirther towards 
embarking on economic development. The first group was led by Sukarno who mainly 
received support from the PNI and the PKI. Their primary objective after the transfer of 
sovereignty from the Dutch in 1949 was completing Indonesia's independence through 
the liberation of West Irian. To achieve this goal, Sukarno was even ready to seize the 
territory by force. The second group led by Vice-President Hatta argued that the 
achievement of that goal [the liberalisation of West Irian] should not be at the expense 
of Indonesia's economic well being. Indeed, he was concerned about Indonesian 
development and looked to the West, particularly the United States, for economic and 
technological assistance. Hatta and the other "administrators" entertained the hope that 
through close relations with the West they could achieve the objectives of 
independence and development. 16 Their views were later swept away as the hope that 
the United States go. venu-nent would intervene and pressurise the Dutch to relinquish 
West Irian, did not transpire. Instead, the Dutch succeeded in convincing the U. S. 
leaders that communist followers dominated Indonesia. 
Consequently, the choice between foreign aid and independence came into 
question and became a major issue in the parliament. Any policy seen as benefiting 
from Western economic interests and adopting a tacit international alignment would in 
effect be seen as challenging and deviating from the rhetoric of a free and active 
foreign policy. Therefore, any effort to use foreign policy to serve domestic economic 
development was totally impossible for any government. The competition among 
political parties had indeed encompassed foreign policy issues. Accordingly, foreign 
policy became interlocked with domestic economic and political requirements. The 
instability of the central government and the increasingly sharp differences between the 
political parties contributed to the instability. The post-revolutionary confidence soon 
disappeared and was replaced by dissatisfaction after the failure to deliver programs 
aimed at rehabilitating the war-ravaged economy. Eventually, the effort of the 
16 See, Franklin B. Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From 
Sukarno to Suharto (Ithaca and London: Comell University Press, 1976). 
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development of a like-minded group to seek econon-& assistance and political support 
from the West was ftu-ther undermined by the failure to regain West Irian. 
The emergence of regional tensions, which were supported by the military 
whose dissatisfaction YAth incompetent civilian leadership was becoming more salient, 
has been prevalent. In 1958, for instance, the regional army commander in Sumatra, 
Kalimantan and Celebes had, with the backing of the local populace, 'formed a 
resistance movement or PRRI/Permesta, against the central government in Jakarta. 17 it 
should be noted that these rebellions were not intended to establish separate states, 
rather they were demanding proper attention to be paid to regional grievances. 
Although the central government succeeded in putting down these regional 
dissatisfactions, the country was in fact paralysed. 
B. The Relations between Indonesia and China (PRC): The Intertwining 
between Domestic and External Dimensions (1950-1959) 
The Establishment of Relations with China 
The transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to the Indonesian govenunent did 
not receive a warm welcome from Beijing. When the Communists came to power on I 
October 1949, their leaders refused to recognise Indonesia as an independent state and 
even accused Sukarno and Hatta's government of being'fascist', the puppet of Japan. In 
November 1949, for instance, Liu Shaoqi criticised Sukarno as a puppet of Western 
imperialism. 18 This allegation was launched after the Indonesian armed forces 
successfully destroyed the 1948 PKI-Madiun rebellion affairs. 19 He also called for a 
17 Further discussion on these insurgencies, See: Jayashri Deshpande, Indonesia: The Impossible Dream: 
The United States and 1958 Rebellion (New Delhi: Prachi Prakashan, 198 1); Barbara Sillars Harvey, 
Permesta: llaý( a Rebellion (Ithaca: N. Y.: Cornell University, 1977); James Mossman, Rebels in 
Paradise: Indonesia's Civil War (London: Cape, 196 1); and Rudi Pirngadie Peristhva Permesta Sebagai 
Lanjulan PRRI [Rebels Without a Cause (Jakarta: New Nusantara Publishing Co., 1958). 
" Russel H. Fifield, Southeast Asia in the United States Policy (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 2 1. 
19 Although the event was mainly supported by the Soviets, the relations between the Communist China 
and the Soviet Union were at their peak and China itself was still preoccupied with its fight against the 
Kuomintang. Additionally, a defeat on the part of ally's friend was also considered as a setback for 
Communist China. What is important for the army is that it presented a challenge from the communist 
power against the Republic. For further discussion on the Madiun Affairs, see Ann Swift, The Road to 
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"national liberation movement" in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, under a 
"people's liberation army" led by the Communist Party. 20 Accordingly, in its early 
years the relations between Indonesia and China did not develop well and contained 
many problems. 21 
In fact, the opening of diplomatic relations with China was somewhat unique, 
and primarily sought to fulfil both the dynamics of domestic politics and international 
reality. For Indonesia under Hatta's cabinet, the opening of relationships with other 
countries should not only add credibility to his government, but it would bring financial 
assistance needed to build the Indonesian economy, to develop Indonesian security as 
well as to finance the large bureaucracy. 22 However, unlike the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with almost all major Western powers, Hatta did nothing insofar 
as its relations with the cornmunist states. This imbalance raised the criticism that 
Hatta's cabinet foreign policy was leaning to the West. 23 Indeed, as Herbet Feith 
described it, the Hattý Cabinet's foreign policy was pro-Western neutralist. 24 
However, in order to counter criticism and to impress the domestic audience as 
well as having realised that opposing China would make it difficult to exercise 
Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy, Hatta's government decided to 
recognize China on 15 January 1950. Indonesia subsequently closed all seven of the 
Taiwanese consulates in Indonesia. In return, China recognised Indonesia on 28 March 
Madiun: The Indonesian Communist Uprising of 1948 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Modem Indonesia 
Project, South-east Asia Program, Cornell University, 1989). 
20 Quoted in Lowell Dittmer, Liu Shao-Ch'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Politics of Alass 
Criticism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 25. 
21 Tempo, 4 March 1989. 
22 Especially from the Netherlands and the United States. 
23 The most critical political parties were: the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), who accused the Hatta 
cabinet of being too much under American influence; the Lenin ist-Marxist, Murba Party, who rejected 
any co-operation with the Dutch, as Indonesia's former colonial power, and the Indonesian Communist 
Party (PKI), who labelled Hatta' Cabinet as the lackeys of American and Dutch imperialism. 
24 Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Comell University 
Press, 1962), p. 87. 
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1950 . 
25 Therefore, Indonesia's decision to establish diplomatic relations with China 
was intended to maintain Indonesia's commitment to the principle of a free and active 
foreign policy and to appease a domestic audience. However, Hatta was still cautious in 
establishing a close relationship with communist countries, including China. His 
govenunent's -attitude was demonstrated by deliberately downgrading Indonesia's 
diplomatic representation to the level of a charge d'affaires. Former Foreign Minister 
Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung recalled that the decision was to show "that [Indonesia] 
26 intended to play down its diplomatic relations with Peking in a low key". It was 
surely aimed at containing criticism from Muslim political groups, especially the 
M Mi party. 
27 
aSYU 
In its development, the relationship between Indonesia and China appeared to 
be unstable, particularly after the replacement of the Natsir's Cabinet in May 1951 by 
the Sukiman's. In July of the same year, there was an incident in which Indonesia 
refused to grant entry to sixteen out of nineteen newly appointed Chinese diplomatic 
staff. The Indonesian authorities argued that it was due to the failure of the Chinese 
government to follow diplomatic courtesy. In fact, the Sukiman's Cabinet that was then 
dominated by the Masyumi intended to send a strong signal to China that Indonesia was 
willing to take necessary action, should the activities of the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta 
be considered as "inappropriate. " A more serious incident took place in the same year, 
which was known as "the August Raid", in which Sukiman arrested thousands of those 
suspected of planning to overthrow the goverriment with support from China. Tl-ýs 
incident prompted the Chinese government to offer protection to the PKI's leaders. 
One famous incident was the one given to Alimin in which he took refuge in the 
Chinese embassy, and the Chinese ambassador later on gave him diplomatic 
25 China's motivation to accept Indonesia's proposal to establish diplomatic relations was primarily 
aimed at winning the Overseas Chinese support in the context of rivalry with the Nationalist regime in 
Taiwan. 
26 Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Poli(ýý 1945-1965 (The Hague: 
Mouton, 1973), p-202. 
27 At the same time Hatta, also avoided the impression that his government had given in to demand from 
socialist-communist forces. 
42 
protection . 
28 Alimin was ftirther granted political asylum by the Chinese government. 
The occurrence of tensions and incidents reflected that there were strong forces 
opposed to the strengthening of relations with Cl-ýina, particularly among the Muslim 
community. 
Generally, Indonesian leaders and most of the political elite were suspicious of 
China. This perception was particularly related to China's attitude towards the overseas 
Chinese in Indonesia. For instance, the Chinese Ambassador in Jakaýta, Wang Renshu 
was seen as actively exercising his authority to gain influence over the overseas 
Chinese people's support for Beijing, and to undermine the influence of the Republic 
of China (Taiwan). His efforts paid off as indicated by his success in taking the Bank of 
China to his side. The Chinese Embassy and its four consulates were more effective in 
securing financial support for various embassy-sponsored activities, in providing pro- 
Beijing instructors and teaching materials to Chinese schoolS. 29 The main contention 
on this issue has been the question of loyalty of the ethnic Chinese - towards China or 
Taiwan - who were residing on Indonesian soil. To make matter worse, Ambassador 
Wang was also known as a fanatical communist who had a mission to revive the 
demoralised PKI that had been crushed during the 1948 Madiun rebellion movement. 30 
It was also reported that Alimin, a pro-Beijing PKI leader, often visited the Chinese 
Embassy in Jakarta and discussed matters concerning the revival of the PKI .31 It Was 
widely believed that the PKI obtained financial help from Chinese nationals who lived 
in Indonesia. 32 
29 See Arnold C. Brackman, "The Malay World and China: Partner or Barrier? " in A. M. Halpern, 
Policies Towards China: Views From Six Continents (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965). 
29 David Mozingo, Chinese Policy toward Indonesia, 1949-1967 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1967), p. 95. 
30 Ambassador Wang was bom in Indonesia, and was a member of the PKI. He had earlier been expelled 
by the Dutch colonial regime. 
31 Fizal Sukma, Indonesia's Restoration of Diplomatic Relations with China: A Study of Foreign Policy 
Making and the Functions of Diplomatic Ties (London: Ph. D dissertation, London School of Economics 
and Political Science, 1997), p. 48. 
32 Agung, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy, p. 4 10. 
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China's Interference 
Although Wang Renshu was withdrawn in late 1951 and the Wilopo's Cabinet, 
formed as a coalition between Masyumi and the Indonesian National Party (PNI), had 
replaced Sukiman, 33 the relations were not improving. It was only after the coming of 
another cabinet led by Ali Sastroamidjojo that relations were improved. Apparently, 
this was only made possible after the exclusion of the Masyumi party from the 
coalition, and at the same time the PKI was included to reach a majority in the 
parliament. Indeed, it was a new strategy adopted by the PKI that so far had been 
reluctant to co-operate with the parliamentary line. The support to Ali's Cabinet was 
nonetheless aimed at paving the way for the PKI to rebuild the party. 34 The 
improvement of relations between Indonesia and China was symbolised by the sending 
of Arnold Mononutu as Indonesia's first ambassador to Beijing in October 1953). Soon 
after assuming his new post, he addressed the Overseas Chinese issue and received a 
positive response. 35 
Given the favourable environment of Sino-Indonesian relations, Ali's Cabinet 
pushed finther to resolve the long-standing problem of the overseas Chinese. After a 
series of negotiations, China signed a treaty with Indonesia and at the same time 
renounced China! s jurisdiction over foreign-born ethnic Chinese who desired to be 
voluntarily considered Indonesian nationals. 36 It was concluded during the convening 
33 Because of his acceptance over American Aid under the 1951 Mutual Security Actý Sukiman cabinet 
had been criticised and eventually resigned in March 1952. Further discussion on this matter, See Feith, 
The Decline ofConstitutional Democracy, pp. 198-207. 
34 For discussion about the PKI, See, among others, Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964); Rex Morlimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: 
Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965 (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974). 
35 Mozingo, Chinese Policy, pp. 114-116. 
36 The Treaty mainly contains three important provisions. First, those overseas Chinese holding two 
nationalities should choose the nationality of one country within two years after the ratification of the 
Treaty. Second, Beijing was ready to renounce its formal claims to national affinity and loyalty on ethnic- 
Chinese abroad, and pledged that those Chinese who were PRC nationals would abide by the laws and 
customs of Indonesia and not participate in political activities. And third, Indonesia pledged to protect 
"the proper rights and interests" of those Chinese who remained PRC nationals. According to Mozingo, 
the Treaty did not solve the problem of the Chinese minority in Indonesia, but only served to remove the 
PRC's claims on the local-born Chinese. This Treaty was not free from criticism in Indonesia as many see 
the question of Chinese minority in Indonesia is purely Indonesia's domestic problem. See, Mozingo, 
Ibid. pp. 114-120. 
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of the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in April 1955. The Sino-Indonesian 
Treaty on Dual Nationality17 was an important first step since Jakarta was deeply 
suspicious of Beijing's ties with the overseas Chinese community. The financial 
success of the some 3,000,000 Chinese who dominated trade and economy in 
Indonesia proved to be a constant source of resentment and irritation to many 
Indonesian leaders. 
It was not until 1955 that Beijing began to apply its policy of alignment with 
'anti-imperialisf nations to Indonesia. 38 Having experienced 350 years of Dutch 
colonialism and three and a half years of Japanese occupation, it comes, as no surprise 
that 'anti-imperialism' was a dominant policy in Sukarno's political thought. China and 
Indonesia subsequently seized the opportunity by giving each party political support for 
the West Irian case on the part of Indonesia and the question of Taiwan for Cliina. 
While progress had been made and both countries seemed to be ready to embark on 
ftirther bilateral co-operation in the late 1950s, a new development took place in 
Indonesian domestic politics. It was the decision by Indonesia's Ministry of Trade to 
ban alien businessmen from operating retail shops in the rural areas that obstructed the 
improvement of Sino-Indonesian relations. The so-called aliens or the Chinese were 
advised to move to large cities. Apparently, this policy was issued with strong support 
from the army, as they suspected that the local Chinese had given financial support to 
the PKI. The central military headquarters issued its own decree authorising regional 
military commanders to remove aliens from their places of residence for "security 
reasons. " West Java's military commander, Colonel Kosasih, for instance, issued a 
37 Sino-Indonesian Treaty on Dual Nationality was signed on April 22,1955 in Bandung, by Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Zhou Enlai, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Indonesia, Sunarjo. For the full text of the Treaty, See, Leo Suryadinata, China and the 
ASEAN States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985, and Mary 
Somers-Heidhues, "Citizenship and Identity: Ethnic Chinese and the Indonesian Revolution", in 
Changing Identities ofthe Southeast Asian Chinese since World Wor 11, edited by Jennifer Cuchman and 
Wang Gungwu (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1988). For further discussions on Overseas 
Chinese in Indonesia See, Stephen Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking's 
Changing Policy 1949-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1972), pp. 107-110; and Donald 
E. Witmort, The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia, 1900-1958 (Ithaca: Cornell University, 
Modem Indonesian Project, 196 1), especially Chapter Four. 
38 David Mozingo, "China's Policy Towards Indonesia", in Tsang Tsou, China in Crisis, Volume Two, 
China's Policies in Asia and America's Alternatives (London: the University of Chicago Press, 1968), 
p. 334. 
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separate decree in August 1959 ordering all aliens (Chinese) to move to cities and 
towns by December 1959.39 This policy was intended by the army leaders to weaken 
the PKI basis in rural areas. It was estimated that about 300,000 Chinese aliens were 
affected by this policy. 40 
Initially, China reacted very cautiously to the expulsion of the ethnic Chinese 
from rural areas by adopting a low profile approach. Beijing seemed unwilling to upset 
Sino-Indonesian relations. However, as matters got worse, Beijing took firm action. 
The Chinese Foreign Minister, for instance, insisted that Indonesia terminate the anti- 
Chinese campaign, or Indonesia would be punished by calling on the Singaporean 
ethnic Chinese to launch a trade boycott. 41 In response to this threat, Indonesia stood its 
ground and arrested 165 Chinese who resisted the expulsion. The situation deteriorated 
as China's threat and protest was responded to by the hardening of Indonesia's 
position. Sukarno maintained that the trade ban should continue, and even issued the 
Presidential Regulation (Peraturan Presiden) No. 10/1959, aimed at overcoming the 
domination of the Overseas Chinese in Indonesian trade and economic life. 42 A 
Foreign Ministry spokesman even branded China "just another imperialist power with 
expansionist inclinations". 43 
In the final months of 1959, the ethnic Chinese even prepared to resist 
expulsion. 44 Apparently, it was encouraged by protests from Beijing and, reportedly, by 
the direct intervention of officers from the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta. Indeed, the 
Chinese government was prepared to involve itself in Indonesia's internal affairs by 
39 Mozingo, Chinese Policy, pp. 15 8-159. 
'0 Brackman, "The Malay World and China: Partner or Barrier? " p. 278. 
" George MacT. Kahin, "Indonesia and Malaysia", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 3, Fall 1964, p. 265. 
42 The decree, which modified the Trade Ministry's legislation of May 14,1959, exempted sixteen 
categories of Chinese traders, such as those firms engaged in service trade, and those which included one 
or more Indonesian partners, or provided alternatives to outright confiscation, such as promise for 
compensation. See J. A. C. Mackie, "Anti-Chinese Outbreaks in Indonesia 1959-1968, " in Mackie (ed. ), 
The Chinese in Indonesia: Five Essays (Melbourne: Nelson, 1976). 
43 Lea E. Williams, "Sino-Indonesian Diplomacy: A Study of Revolutionary International Politics", 
China Quarterly, No. 11, July-September 1962, p. 195. 
"Williams, Ibid. pp. 194-195. 
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adopting two measures. First, the Chinese embassy in Jakarta encouraged the overseas 
Chinese to resist Indonesian policy, particularly the army's effort to evacuate them 
from villages. The vice-Chairman of Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, Fang 
Fang, also accused the Indonesian army of using anti-Chinese measures "to undermine 
the patriotic forces in their own country to pave the way for achieving military 
dictatorship. "45 Undoubtedly, Indonesia's leaders regarded this policy as an act of 
interference in Indonesia's domestic affairs. Second, China launched a campaign to 
encourage the overseas Chinese living in Indonesia to go back to the mainland. It was 
believed that 119,000 overseas Chinese did so. 
However the exodus was suspended in April 1960, and the Chinese 
government urged potential repatriates to stay in Indonesia. The reason for China to 
soften its position against Indonesia was because the influx of a large number of the 
returned Chýinese created difficulties for China's government in integrating them into 
Chinese society. 46 In a wider context, it was a result of the growing rivalry between 
China and the Soviet Union in which China did not want to lose its growing close ties 
with Jakarta. Beijing also realized that Moscow's influence toward Jakarta began to rise 
after 1960, following the Soviet Union military credit, which amounted to US$ 1,250 
million - US$ 1 million that was extended in support of the campaign to acquire the 
disputed West Irian territory. 47 China thought that it was essential to end the overseas 
Chinese dispute if she wanted to avoid estrangement with Indonesia from which 
Moscow and Washington would derive major benefits. In December 1960, Jakarta and 
Beijing signed a protocol implementing the Dual Nationality Treaty. 48 In the following 
years, Sino-Indonesian relations developed very rapidly as Sukarno began dominating 
Indonesian politics through the implementation of Guided Democracy. 
45 Quoted in Mozingo, Chinese Policy, p. 176. 
46 Leo Suryadinata, China and the ASEAN States: The Ethnic Chinese Dintension (Singapore: Singapore 
University Press, 1985), p. 64. 
47 MozingO, Chinese Policy, p. 336. 0 
Williams, "Sino-Indonesian Diplomacy", pp. 196-97. 
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2.3. Under Guided Democracy: Converging Domestic Interests Leading to 
International Alliance (1959-1965) 
A. On the Road to Guided Democracy: The Ascendancy of Sukarno 
In the eyes of Sukarno, the parliamentary democracy system had damaged and 
brought no good to Indonesia. His criticism of liberal democracy started in 1949, and 
was expressed in a number of speeches delivered at the end of 1956 and the beginning 
of 1957. He made it clear by stressing that he was a Democrat; however, "I do not 
desire democratic liberalism. On the contrary I want a guided democracy. "A9 Sukarno 
considered Western parliamentary practices and majority decisions as essentially 
enhancing rather than solving conflict, putting minorities forever in the position of 
permanent losers. He favoured a return to the old form of democracy practised in the 
villages, where deliberations were held until consensus was eventually agreed upon, in 
the spirit of mutual co-operation (musyawarah untuk mufakat). In the opening meeting 
of the Constitutional. Assembly" on 10 November 1956, Sukarno explicitly introduced 
his idea of Guided Democracy. 51 "The principle is, democracy has to work with 
purpose, and under a relatively strong leadership, "52 said Usep Ranajaya, the-then 
Secretary of the Assembly. Sukarno's idea invited support and opposition from various 
political parties, members of the parliament and Constituent Assembly. In order to 
clarify Sukarno's idea, some members of Parliament asked him to explain finiher his 
proposal. It was simply ignored by Sukarno as he was on his way to dominate 
Indonesian politics. 
49 As quoted by Ulf Sundhaussen, "Sukarno and Guided Democracy, " in Pacific Century: The 
Emergence ofModern Pacific Asia by Mark Borthwick (ed. ), (Boulder: WestviewPress, 1992), p. 338. 
so Members of the Constituent Assembly consisted of those elected through September 1955 general 
election. 
51 "Guided Democracy" or known in Indonesian as Demokrasi Terpimpin is the name for the 
authoritarian political system inaugurated by decree by President Sukarno on July 5,1959 when he 
dissolved the elected Constituent Assembly and reinstated the independence constitution of 1945. See, 
Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics (Ithaca, New York: Modem 
Indonesian Project, Cornell University, 1966). 
52 As quoted in Forum Keadilan, August 1997. 
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On 21 February 1957, Sukarno invited 900 Indonesian national leaders and 
eminent persons to the Presidential Palace and explained his idea of Guided 
Democracy to them. During that meeting, he stated that the PKI should be given a wide 
opportunity to formulate a "national consensus. " From this point of view it seemed that 
Sukarno shared the revolutionary nature of the party as seen in line with the 
revolutionary spirit of the Indonesian people. 53 Sukarno then proposed the fon-nation of 
a strong government that stood over the four main parties, namely PNI (the Indonesian 
Nationalist Party), Masyumi (the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), NTJ 
(Nahdatul L17ama - the Religious Scholars), and PKI (the Indonesian Communist 
Party). It appeared to be one of the efforts by Sukarno to overcome the political 
instability between the competing parties by synthesising them and thereby become 
acceptable to all of them, under the blanket of his own charisma. He was quoted as 
saying, "It was said that Bung Kamo proposed this concept to bring the cabinet to the 
left. No, gentlemen, for me there is no term of left, neither right. I am only hoping that 
,, 54 Indonesian nation remain intact. 
Indeed, the subsequent domestic political situation and ideological 
confrontation during the parliamentary democracy had opened the opportunity for 
Sukarno to dominate Indonesian politics. 55 Eventually, in response to the acute 
domestic political situation, 56 on 5 July 1959 Sukarno issued a Presidential Decree 
suspending the provisional Constitution of 1950, and dissolving the Constitutional 
Assembly, 57 and immediately reintroduced the old 'revolutionary' 1945 Constitution. 
58 
53 See Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965 (Ithaca, 
N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974). 
54 As quoted in Forum Keadilan, August 1997. 
55 Due to the inability of political parties to form a government as a result of the 1955 general election, by 
1955-56 Indonesian domestic politics was beset by political discontent. Sukarno himself expressed his 
discontent by calling for the abolition of political parties and proposing a new style democracy. In March 
1957, Sukarno renounced the parliamentary system. The resignation of vice-president Hatta in previous 
year had made it easier for Sukarno to dominate the process of domestic politics. 
56 As well as because of the failure the Constituent Council to reach a consensus on a new constitution. 
57 Apart from dissolving the Constitutional Assembly, the Decree also terminated the work of the 
Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS) and Provisional Supreme Advisory Council 
(DPAS). Two days after the issuance of the Decree Prime Minister Djuanda returned the cabinet in 
accordance with the Constitution of 1950 to the President. 
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In other words, Sukarno replaced the parliamentary democracy with the presidential 
59 
system. Consequently, political parties ceased to be a political force in Indonesian 
politics, and power centres moved to Sukarno himself and ABRI . 
60 However, the only 
political party that seemed to gain influence was the PKI, as it was mainly protected by 
Sukarno himself. 61 
The President Decree indeed marked the beginning of Guided Democracy in 
Indonesia. Sukarno's Independence Day Address of 17 August 1959 was later given 
the title of "Rediscovering Our Revolution" (Penemuan Kembali Revolusi Kita), 
indicating that he opted for a radicalisation in internal politics. One of the most 
important parts of that speech was that of Sukarno's determination to implement 
62 Guided Democracy that became the political manifesto (Manipol). He also declared 
that the Indonesian revolution was not yet finished and, therefore, Indonesia would 
return to the road of the revolution (jalan revolusi). He denounced the "excesses" of 
liberal democracy and introduced various "revolutionary programs" of which the 
liberation of West Irian was given priority. From then on, every aspect of Indonesian 
politics was conceived in terms of the idiom of revolution. 63 He often addressed the 
masses to express his political thinking and slogans that became the vague basis of a 
national ideology. 64 
5' Sukarno's decision to return to the 1945 Constitution was fully supported by the army leaders as they 
saw it as an opportunity to strengthen their power that has been cut during the parliamentary democracy. 
59 This alteration to the 1945 Constitution had been made possible by three factors: (a) Sukarno's 
determination to play a more important role as Indonesian leader, instead of a symbolic one; (b) instead 
of fulfilling Indonesia's aspiration to develop its country, parliamentary democracy was dominated by the 
rivalry between various political segments that tended to tie the patrimonial linkage; and (c) there was a 
willingness on the part of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), particularly among Armed Forces, to 
play a bigger role in Indonesian politics. 
60 The military played an important and strategic role in Indonesian politics particularly since the 
declaration of state emergency in 1957 in the context of the central government's effort to put down 
regional rebellions. 
61 Alfian, Pemikiran dan Perubahan Polilik Indonesia [Political Thinking and Changes in Indonesia] 
(Jakarta: Gramedia, 1992), p. 69. 
62 This Political Manifesto developed into Manipol USDEK, which meant the 1945 Constitution, 
Socialism in Indonesian style, Guided Democracy, Guided Economics and Indonesian Personality. 
63 Sukma, Indonesia's Restoration ofDiplomatic Relations. p. 54. 
64 Another Sukarno's important slogan was Nasakom that came as the synthesis of nationalism, religion, 
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The Guided Democracy period was also characterised by the role of Sukamo as 
a central power. However, the army that had its disagreement with the liberal 
65 democracy also supported the implementation of the Guided Democracy. Aware of 
the physical power of the army, Sukarno found it necessary to promote a countervailing 
coalition to his physically unequal one with the armed forces. 66 His choice was the PKI 
to which the armed forces were hostile. In this structure, Sukarno delicately acted as a 
balance between the armed forces and the PKI into uneasy co-operation, and played 
them off against each other while other political parties were practically excluded. The 
rivalry between the PKI and the armed forces, particularly the army, had become 
apparent. Each realised that Sukarno was the central power that could not easily be 
ignored. The only way to stay in the political theatre was by supporting Sukarno's 
policies. 
Ironically, unlike the clamorous situation in the political fields, Sukarno's 
attention to economics was less significant. The well-known slogan has been politik 
adalah panglima (politics is in command). 67 Indonesia's economic condition was 
getting worse after Sukarno rejected the recommendations of technocrats and foreign 
aid donors. In late 1960, an eight-year economic plan was published, in eight volumes, 
seventeen parts, and 1945 clauses. 68 This plan was in fact more powerful in terms of 
rhetoric than in reality as ordinary people suffered from high inflation and food 
shortages. Although the US and the IMF tried to encourage rational economic policies, 
and communism. It was primarily used to symbolise his attempt to secure a coalition of the Indonesian 
Nationalist Party (the PNI), the Nahdatul Ulama (the NU), and the PKI. For further discussion on 
Sukarno's political thinking see Le.: J. D. Legge, Sukarno (London, Allen Lane: Penguin Press, 1972); 
Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno and the Strugglefor Indonesia Independence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1969); Justus M. van der Kroef, "Sukarno the Ideologue", Pacific Affairs, Summer, 1968; Roger K. Paget 
(ed. ), Indonesia Accuses: Sukarno's Defence Oration in the Political Trial of 1930 (Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford Unversity Press, 1975); Sukamo, Autobiography as Told to Cindy Adams (Indianapolis: 1963), 
and John P. Beilenson, Sukarno (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1990). 
6' The discussion of Armed Forces' role in this period, see, Daniel S. Lev, "The Political Role of the 
Army in Indonesia, " Pacific Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 4, Winter, 1963-64, pp. 349-364. 
66 Michael Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy (London: Allen & Unwin), p. 55. 
6' This is very similar to the one adopted by China in the 1960s. 
68 It represented the date of independence as was proclaimed, 17 August 1945. 
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Sukarno rejected all the recommendations, as they would surely have alienated his 
millions of popular supporters, particularly those among the PKI members. 
B. Liberating West Irian and Crushing Malaysia: Indonesia, China and the 
PKI 
While the negotiations to settle the West Irian issue appeared to be slow, the 
Dutch continued to effectively occupy the territory. Faced by this situation, the 
domestic pressure on Sukarno to take a hard-line position was mounting. 
69 Indonesia 
then decided to break diplomatic relations with The Hague in 1960, and embarked on 
the use of force to recover the territory. 70 However, full-scale war was avoided after the 
US belatedly intervened in favour of finding a compromise. Finally, on 15 August 
1962, the Dutch agreed to an immediate transfer of the administration of the territory to 
the United Nations, which would transfer authority to Indonesia .71 The United Nations 
replaced the Dutch in I October 1962 and Indonesian authority was later established in 
May 1963. What is important from this sequence is that, the Western reluctance to 
support the return of West Irian had deepened Sukarno's hostility towards the West. 
More importantly, the West Irian issue had served as a catalyst, which transformed the 
pattern and direction of Indonesian politics and pushed Indonesia to embark on a 
radical foreign policy. 
69 Dissatisfaction over the treatment of Indonesia's cause over Irian Jaya in the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1957 prompted a decisive challenge to Dutch economic interests in Indonesia. In response to 
widespread popular agitation, the Indonesian government took a dramatic action by expropriating all 
Dutch-owned enterprises and expelling Dutch nationals. The policy aimed at attacking the Dutch had 
been counter-productive, and in effect worsened Indonesian economics situation. 
70 In December 1960 Sukarno formed a special military unit called the Army Strategic Reserve Command 
(Kostrad) known also as Mandala Command based in Ujung Pandang sent to liberate West Irian. It was 
led by Major General Suharto who some years later replacing Sukarno as Indonesian 2nd President. 
" The agreement was signed in New York. It consists, among other things: the transfer of administrative 
power fom the Dutch to the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) on October 1, 
1962. From this date, the UN flag would replace the Dutch flag; On December 31,1962 Indonesian flat, 
will be hoisted next to the UN one; On May 1,1963 the Indonesian government formally accepted the 
transfer of authority from the UN. In accordance with the New York Agreement, a free-act choice was 
conducted in 1969. 
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In fact, the radicalisation of Indonesian foreign policy coincided with changes 
in Chinese foreign policy. It was the result of growing disappointment on the part of 
China towards its main ally, the Soviet Union, particularly after Kruschev's de- 
Stalinization speech in 1956.72 This speech also brought further implication as the 
Soviet Union changed its attitude towards the US by advocating a compromise. The 
implication of this new Soviet approach would certainly weaken the strategic position 
of China vis-ti-vis the US that had applied a containment policy on China. In response 
to this new strategic environment, China embarked on a more radical foreign policy to 
break the US containment. In this effort, China emphasized strengthening political ties 
with any state, communist or not, which would oppose US policies under an 
"international united front. "73 Thus Indonesia appeared to fit this requirement. In this 
regard, Mozingo argued that, "post-1957 Indonesia was [a] prime target for China's 
new attempt to revise the socialist camp's international aims and commitments. 9974 
Once the -West Irian issue had been settled, instead of concentrating on 
economic development, Sukarno embarked on another conflict. It was the fight against 
the creation of the Malaysian Federation or the independence of Malaysia from the 
British . 
75 This initiative was met with hostile reaction in Jakarta in which there was a 
massive anti-British and anti-Malaysian demonstration. Sukarno also declared that 
Indonesia must crush Malaysia, and adopted the Confrontation policy in which military 
units were sent to infiltrate Malaysian territory. Why did Sukarno embark on a new 
conflict, instead of concentrating on the development of Indonesia? One explanation is 
because Sukarno, supported by the PKI, strongly believed that this new state would 
7' At the twentieth congress of the Soviet communist party in 1956, Kruschev set about the demolition of 
Stalin's memory. De-Stalinization involved points of doctrine on which Mao could fairly claim to be 
heard, but he was not consulted and was perhaps offended by the Russians' evident assumption that such 
matters could be settled by Russians alone. Kruschev was still a new man, or at any rate unconfirmed in 
his new apogee, and it would have been at least becoming for him to consult an elder like Mao. For 
further details on this matter, see, Peter Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1945 (New York: Longman 
Group Ltd., 1986), pp. 60-69. 
73 J. D. Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy. - Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977) pp. 74-75. 
74 Mozingo, Chinese Foreign Policy, p. 137. 
75 Many observers are still puzzled by Sukarno's decision to embark on conflict with Malaysia 'while its 
people were suffering because of economics negligence. This is still a controversial issue as some believe 
53 
function as a base from which Nekolim (Neo-colonialism) would endanger Indonesian 
revolution. 76 The inclusion of Sarawak and North Borneo in the Federation, thus 
juxtaposing its frontier with Indonesian territory of Kalimantan, was perceived by the 
revolutionary elements in Indonesia as a direct attempt by the British to encircle 
Indonesia. 77 
Nevertheless, Indonesia's opposition to the creation of Malaysia should also be 
seen in the context of domestic political rivalry in Indonesia. It was indeed part of the 
conflict between the Right and the Left, or the competition between the army and the 
PKI. To the PKI, the Confrontation was calculated to abort the prospect of an 
American-backed economic stabilization . 
78 On the opposite side, the army position to 
support Sukarno's initiative was intended to maintain its nationalist stature and not to 
be eclipsed by Sukarno or the PKI. Standing between these two opposing parties was 
Sukarno himself in which his aim for the Confrontation was to keep political initiative 
in his hands by portraying a clear external enemy. This would enable him to fin-ther his 
revolutionary foreign policy in which Indonesia would figure as a lighthouse to the 
international community in building the world anew. His constant theme was to storm 
the bulwarks of imperialism, pitting the NEFOS (New Emerging Forces) against the 
OLDEFOS (Old Established Forces), in which Indonesia would play a key role. 79 
Indeed, Konftontasi was required to maintain Sukarno's domination and not to 
upset the domestic fragile balance between the army, the PKI, and Sukarno as a balance 
between these two opposing powers. Why did Sukarno turn to foreign policy? Daniel 
Lev argued that, "only those programs that did not threaten the elite could be attempted 
that the revolutionary romanticism seemed to overwhelm Sukarno, while others tend to view it as a 
necessity to deflect people's attention away from domestic difficulties. 
76 Sukarno also remained annoyed by the British interference in the Indonesia's Revolutionary 
Government (PRRI) rebellion in 1958. 
77 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism (Singapore: ISEAS, 
1994), p. 25. 
"' Ibid. p. 26. 
79 See, George Modelski (ed. ), The New Emerging Forces. Documents on the Ideology of Indonesian 
Foreign Policy (Canberra: Australian University, 1963); Leifer, Indonesia's... , especially Chapter 3. 
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seriously and these frequently were in the realm of foreign policy. "80 Indeed, Sukarno 
further tried to link domestic and foreign policy by applying a parallel between 
domestic and foreign policy. The two Indonesian revolution objectives that had been 
previously declared, namely the creation of a unitary state and a just and prosperous 
society, could not be realised unless the obstacles to these objectives were removed. In 
this context, Simon observed that Sukarno was able to intertwine domestic and foreign 
affairs so that success in one realm could occur only with comparable success in the 
other. 81 Sukarno further defined imperialism, colonialism, and capitalism as the main 
enemies. Accordingly, he underlined the importance to combat those enemies as the 
third objective of the revolution. 
While branding Malaysia as the product of British neo-colonialism, and 
accusing its leaders as being feudal, Beijing had no trouble in supporting Sukarno's 
confrontation policy against Malaysia as the price of drawing Indonesia closer to 
China. Beijing considered its relations with Indonesia in terms of its ideological and 
political challenge to the Soviets and its power struggle with the US. In other words, 
Beijing regarded its alliance with Jakarta as the key to break the US encircelment and 
containment of China in Southeast Asia. 82 Additionally, Taylor pointed out that 
Sukarno's ideological and psychological proclivities were compatible with those of 
revolutionary China and with those of the post-1951 leadership of the PKI. 
Consequently, Sukarno's assessment of China as the inevitable dominating force in 
Asia was paralleled by his attitude toward the PKI's role in Indonesia. 93 In the end, 
Sukarno's aggressive foreign policy on Malaysia made Indonesia an ally of China. 
Although at this stage the Soviet Union supplied massive arms and economic aid, 
relations with China through official and PKI charincls were growing closer, 
particularly in 1964 - 1965. 
so Daniel Lev, "The Political Role of the Army, " p. 353. 
81 Sheldon W. Simon, The Broken Triangle. Peking, Jakarta and the PKI (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
Press, 1969), p. 22. 
92 Jay Taylor, China and Southeast Asia: Peking's Relations with Revolutionary Movement (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 83. 
93 Taylor, Op. cit. 
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C. An Alliance with China 
In 1961 there was indication that a new chapter in the Sino-Indonesian 
relationship began to develop, as both countries rapidly moved closer and put aside 
their previous differences. During his visit to Indonesia, Chinese Foreign Minister 
Chen Yi offered to supply economic aid for the new Indonesian development plan, and 
reiterated China's support for Indonesia's claim over West Irian. 84 This relationship 
had been fully restored after Sukarno visited China in June 1961, in which China 
loaned Indonesia US$30 million credit. The reason why the relationship improved so 
quickly was because of the similarities in foreign policy perceptions and objectives that 
drove both countries to work together in the international arena. 85 For example, 
Sukarno's confrontational view of world politics converged with China's perception of 
86 the contradiction between imperialism and the Third World. Accordingly, both 
Indonesia and China embarked on a policy of establishing an "international united 
front" designed to drive the Americans and the British from Southeast Asia. China, in 
its part, became the main supporter of Sukarno's West Irian campaign, his idea of the 
struggle between NEFOS (New Emerging Forces) and OLDEFOS (Old Established 
Forces), and, as discussed earlier, on Sukarno's Confrontation against the 
establishment of Malaysia. 
Sukarno's political orientation towards China had presented an opportunity for 
the PKI to exert its influence. Indeed, a closer relationship between Indonesia and 
China under Guided Democracy had helped boost the power of the PKI in its 
competition with the army. Indeed, the power of the PKI in Indonesian politics had 
grown significantly. For instance, following Sukarno's call for implementation of 1960 
land reform law, the PKI unilaterally began the process of land reform by dispossessing 
8' Mozingo, Chinese Policy, p. 18 8. 
83 There had been a number of studies on Sino-Indonesian relations in this period, such as Simon, The 
Broken Triangle; Mozingo, Chinese Policy, Brackman, "The Malay World and Chinaý', and Peter 
Christian Hauswedell, The Anti-Imperialist International United Front in Chinese and Indonesian 
Foreign Policy 1963-1965: A Study ofAnli-Status Quo Politics (PhD. Diss., Comell University, 1976). 
96 Hauswedell, Ibid. p. 1 10. 
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landlords and redistributing the land to poor Javanese, northern Sumatran, and Balinese 
peasants. 87 Furthermore, under the leadership of D. N. Aidit, the PKI also carried out a 
so-called pro-Chinese policy. 88 With Sukarno's apparent blessing and Chinese backing, 
the PKI regained considerable influence and power in Indonesian domestic politics. 
After 1962, Sukarno became more explicit in his support of the PKI. The structure of a 
power relationship was better understood, as China became Indonesia's main foreign 
friend, the PKI became established as Sukarno's chief domestic ally. 89 Ironically, the 
growing relationship between Indonesia and China did not reflect the reality of the 
dynamics of Indonesian domestic politics. The close ties with China resulted in a 
growing discontent among the army and anti-Communist forces in Indonesia. 
Indeed, the majority of the Indonesian elite, particularly the military, Islamic 
forces, and nationalist groups were concerned that this so-called close relationship with 
China might present a threat to Indonesia. They remained suspicious of China's real 
intentions towards Indonesia, and its conciliatory approach to Indonesia did not 
overcome this suspicion. The anti-Commurdst forces in Indonesia eventually drew a 
line of danger between close relations with Communist China, the PKI, and the 
Overseas Chinese as constituting three forces that threatened Indonesia's national 
security, economic independence, and the social status quo. 90 They ftirthermore 
believed that Indonesian policy did not serve Indonesia's interests but those of China, 
the PKI and the local ethnic Chinese. Therefore these forces had tried to upset close 
relations with China through domestic policies and waited to seize the opportunity to 
destroy the PKI when the chance arose. 
97 The unilateral land reform conducted by the PKI had sharpened the rivalries between nominal muslim 
(abangan), many of whom were PKI supporters and the orthodox Muslim (santri). This rivalry re- 
emerged in a later stage in which many of the PKI supporters were slaughtered in the aftermath of the 
1965 coup d'etat. Further discussion on the issue of land reform, See, Rex Mortimer, The Indonesian 
Communist Party and Land Reform, 1959-1965 (Vic.: Monash University, 1972). 
88 Lie Tek-Tjeng, "Southeast Asian Regional Security in 1980s: A View from Jakarta", in T. B. Millar 
(ed. ), International Security in Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific (St. Lucia, London, New York: 
University of Queensland Press, 1983), p. 269. 
'9 Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, revised edition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1993), p. 68. 
90 Hauswedell, The Anti-ImperialislInlernational United Front, p. 159. 
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The determination of the Chinese government to maintain good relations with 
Indonesia was proved further during the outbreak of a demonstration against the ethnic 
Chinese on 13 May 1963 that eventually spread to Central and East Java, as well as 
East Sumatra. In responding to this development, China seemed ready to abandon the 
policy of "interfering" as had been shown in previous incidents. China even 
harmonized its voice by joining the Indonesian government in blaming the incident on 
"imperialist" and "counter revolutionary groups" that tried to undermine "Sino- 
Indonesian friendly relations". 91 Events soon showed that Sino-Indonesian relations 
had arrived at a point where their respective foreign policies seemed to converge, as 
both countries were seeking a more radical alignment in world affairs. 
92 In fact, 
domestic and international situations in both China and Indonesia around 1964-1965 
had encouraged both countries to create a "Jakarta-Peking Axis. " In this regard, Taylor 
argued that the most fundamental part of the development of the axis was the fact that 
both Jakarta and Beijing in the mid-1960s perceived a common interest in driving the 
imperialist and capitalist powers - the US and the British - out of Southeast Asia by a 
policy of struggle and confrontation. 93 China's objective of asserting political influence 
in Asia through its struggle with the US was perceived in Jakarta not as contradicting 
but complementing Indonesia's desire to assert its authority in the Malay world and to 
influence world politics. Indeed, Indonesia's decision to embark on such a close co- 
operation was motivated by Sukarno's confrontation policy against Malaysia that did 
not receive support from the Soviet Union and United States. Thus he had no other 
option but to choose China. Indeed, China's decision to support Indonesia was aimed at 
creating a united international front against hegemonic, imperialist and revisionist 
powers. 94 In the end, the launching of Konjrontasi enabled China to pull Indonesia two 
ways, first, at government level, particularly at Sukarno and government official level, 
91 BeUing Review, 24 May 1963. 
92 Simon, The Broken Triangle, p. 19. 
93 Taylor, China and Southeast Asia, pp. 66-67. 
94 Darwoto, "Masa-masa Terakhir Hubungan Diplomatic RI-RRC" [The Last Minute of Diplomatic 
Relation between Indonesia and China], Pelita, 17 December 1978. 
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and second, it was a people to people channel, which meant the nurturing of the PKI by 
the Chinese Communist Party. 
D. The 1965 Coup Attempt: The End of Balance 
To sum up, by 1965 there had been dangerous conditions in Indonesia that were 
dominated by social and political antagonisms. The military and the Islamic groups 
were hostile to the PKI's rapid growth, particularly in the number of their followers as 
well as influence over Sukarno. Sukarno's balancing act between the army and the PKI 
was heading nowhere and seemed to go wrong. One of the controversial issues that 
deepened the army hostility was the PKI's desire to ann the peasants and workers as 
Indonesia's fifth force. This proposal caused a greater resentment among army officers 
towards Sukarno and the PKI. The situation had further created a great tension in 
Indonesian politics, particularly between the army and the PKI. The army was 
concerned about what Sukarno and PKI might do next, and at the same time the PKI 
intensified their campaign to create a people's militia that would arm its supporters. In 
the end this tension led to a crisis that eventually burst on September 30/October 1, 
1965, when a group of middle-ranking officers launched a coup led by a Cakrabirawa 
palace guard, Colonel Untung, assassinated six generals and proclaimed their own 
assumption of power under Sukarno's aegis. 95 
The incident which took place at that time had been unthinkable as Sukarno 
appeared to be strong. One Indonesian observer even stated that neither a neglected 
economy, ruinous foreign adventurism nor raucous love life had seemed a real threat to 
Sukarno's hold on power. 96 Nevertheless, circurnstances leading to the 1965 coup 
attempt were characterised by Sukarno's effort to balance contradicting powers. There 
had been a struggle for power under the cover of Guided Democracy, particularly 
between the army, with most of the machinery in its hands, and Sukarno with his 
'5 The events of the abortive coup are very familiar to students and scholars interested in Indonesian 
politics. However, this study does not intend to examine in details of this episode, it rather looks at its 
implications towards Sino-Indonesian relations and the perception of China as a threat. The six generals 
are: Lt. Gen. Ahmad Yani, Maj. Gen. R. Suprapto, Maj. Gen. Harjono Mas Tirtodarmo, Maj. Gen. 
Suwondo Parman, Brig. Gen. Donald Izavus Pandjaitan and Brig. Gen. Soetojo Siswomiharjo. 
96 Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 1-2. 
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vintage charisma along with the loyal support of the PKI. Surprisingly, the balanced 
structure of this unstable political tripod between the army and the PKIand Sukarno in 
the middle, remained in function for some time. The balance soon proved to be too 
fragile as the two opposing parties became adrift while Sukarno was no longer able to 
control the balance. 
Nevertheless, there were several factors that functioned as catalysts to destroy 
the balance created by Sukarno. First, the army was always suspicious of the 
Communists. Its effort to limit the growing influence of the PKI had in effect caused 
the PKI to adopt a radical attitude against them. Sukarno's close relations with the PKI 
had deepened the army's suspicion of the PKI and endangered the army's position from 
the mainstream of the balancing power. Second, Sukarno's radical foreign policy as 
manifested in the liberation of West Irian and Confrontation with Malaysia tipped the 
balance of power in favour of the PKI. China's support for Sukarno with these two 
causes had also drawn the PKI close to China. Third, the PKI's unilateral action to 
-launch land reform in 1964 with Sukarno's support created anger among the Muslims. 
In the end, this policy had further distanced the Muslims from the PKI, and indirectly 
pushed them closer to the army. 97 Finally, as far as the economic situation was 
concerned, Guided Democracy moved into 1965 carrying mounting inflation that 
turned into classic hyperinflation. Thus, there was a growing frustration and 
disappointment among ordinary people as their basic needs were unfulfilled. 
However, there was much controversy and mystery surrounding the actual 
event of the 1965 abortive coup. From the very beginning the army maintained that the 
coup was plotted and carried out solely by the Indonesian Communist Party. 98 This 
interpretation or version of the coup remained questionable as it relied on sketchy 
evidence. It rests heavily on the presence of the party's leader D. N. Aidit and elements 
of Gerwani (women's movement) and youth groups at Halim airport, as well as on 
97 Muslim rural leaders considered the increasing influence of PKI as a threat to their preaching activities, 
thus taking villagers away from their side. 
9g For the government's official version of the event, see: Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, The 
Coup Attempt ofthe 'September 30th Movement in Indonesia (Jakarta: Pembimbing Masa, 1968). 
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later confessions by group plotters and Communist Party members. 
99 Another theory of 
the event revealed in 1966 by two scholars from Cornell University, Benedict 
Anderson and Ruth McVey. They presented the "Cornell Paper"100 which concluded 
that the coup was primarily the result of army divisions, in which younger Javanese 
officers had acted against an older Jakarta leadership which was seen as decadent and 
corrupt. The authors also doubted that the PKI had a strong motive to launch a coup as 
they had done well under Sukarno. In fact, Aidit's role was more reacting than leading 
the event. 
2.4. The Aftennath of the 1965 Abortive Coup: Domestic and Extemal 
Consequences (1965-1967) 
A. Domestic Perspective: The Elimination of the PKI 
In the aftermath of the abortive coup, a wave of anti-Communist filry erupted in 
Indonesia. In these circumstances, Suharto began asserting authority to control the 
situation. On I October 1965, he delivered a speech through the Indonesian Republic 
Radio broadcasting, announcing that the 30 September Movement was a coup attempt 
perpetrated by the contra-revolutionary forces. Having restored order in Jakarta, he 
began to hunt those involved in the killings of the army generals. During the 
exhumation of the bodies on 4 October, he made it clear that the PKI had been 
involved in the abortive coup. Four days later, the military's newspaper, Angkatan 
Bersenjata, stated that "Gestapu had been masterminded by PKI-Aidit. "101 Further 
accusation of the PKI involvement was strengthened by the publication of official 
support for Gestapu by the PKI's official newspaper, Harian Rakyat (People's Daily). 
The evidence found from the killings of the six generals further implicated the PKI's 
involvement. It was later revealed that members of the PKI-affiliated organisations 
99 The Indonesian Air Force was also allegedly involved in the coup. However, a number of retired Air 
Marshall has published a book denying the involvement of the air force in the incident. See, Aristides 
Katopo, Pumama Kusumaningrat, JMV Soeparno MM, Drs. Moh. Cholil (eds. ). Menyibak Kabut Halim 
1965 [Uncovering the Mist of Halim 1965] (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1999). 
100 Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1,1965 Coup in 
Indonesia (Ithaca: Comell Modem Indonesian Project, 197 1). 
101 Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, pp. 138-139. 
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such as the Indonesian Women's Movement (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia - Genvani) 
and the People's Youth (Pemuda Rakyat) had participated in the killings. 102 
The events following the coup attempt had been dominated by a purge against 
the communists. The period from the middle of 1965 throughout the first half of 1966 
was characterized by a series of acts of revenge against the communists. It was done by 
local army commanders, Muslims and other youth groups, and by village "volunteer 
guard. " Tens of thousands of real or suspected PKI members and sympathizers were 
killed. 103 Although the communists had been practically destroyed, the army's leaders 
still held the view that they always wanted to resurrect its party. Suharto's from anti- 
Communist attitude was openly expressed one day after receiving the Supersemar, by 
his declaration to disband and outlaw the PKI. 104 In Indonesian official history, the 
event of the abortive coup is officially known as Peristiwa 30 September, Peristiwa 
Gestapu or G30SIPKI and it was mainly attributed to the PKI. The movement was 
eventually put down-within a few days by forces under the command of Suharto as the 
Commander of the Army Strategic Command (KOSTRAD-Komando Strategis 
Angkatan Darat). 105 
Events soon proved that it was Suharto who held all the strategic cards. He and 
the army had engineered student demonstrations, expressing anti-PKI and anti-Sukarno 
voices, aimed at pressurising Sukarno. By using the martyrdom of the six-army 
generals as a rallying cry, Suharto with the support of the army launched an anti- 
Communist campaign. 106 These movements were intended to undermine Sukarno's 
102 Ibid. p. 138. 
103 Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism Since 1965 Coup, " Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLIII, No. 
(Spring 1970), p. 35-36. 0 
'()4 Sukarno was reported to have been upset by Suharto's decisive move against the PKI, as well as 
taking over the leadership of the anny without his approval. See Sulangkang Suwalu, "Dengan Pasukan 
Liar ke Supersemar" [With Irregulars Troops to Supersemar], Siar Xenvs Service, II September 1998. 
105 When Suharto emerged from the political chaos in 1965, an Indonesian expe rt, Harnish McDonald 
described that Suharto was obscure and second echelon general. See, Harnish McDonald, "Political 
Obituary: The Puppet Master", Sydney Morning Herald, 22 May 1998. 
" The circurnstances surrounding the abortive coup of 30 September 1965 and the rise of Suharto 
remain shrouded in mystery and controversy. Further discussion on this matter see: B. R. O'G Anderson 
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authority, to pave the way for the army to seize power, and to ftirther eliminate the PKI 
from Indonesia's political map. The tensions eventually culminated at a cabinet 
meeting in Jakarta on II March 1966, against a background of that rising student 
demonstration. To add ffirther pressure on Sukarno, his assistant reportedly told him 
that troops without insignia surrounded the palace. Faced by this situation Sukarno, 
accompanied by his close political associates, fled to the presidential palace in Bogor. 
Eventually, after a meeting with three senior army generals, 107 Sukarno was tactfully 
compelled to transfer executive power to General Suharto as contained in the II th 
March Order Letter in 1966 (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret - known as Supersemar). 108 
It was a letter of authorisation signed by Sukarno instructing Suharto "to take all 
necessary steps to guarantee security and calm and the stability of the Government and 
the course of Revolution. "' 09 With Supersemar in hand, Suharto and his army generals 
were able to reverse many aspects of Sukarno policies and systematically 
outmanoeuvred and removed Sukarno from power. He also succeeded in engineering 
the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS) to issue Ketetapan MPRS 
No. XXV/MPRS/1966 that outlaws the PKI and Marxism/ Leninism/Communism in 
Indonesia. 
Indeed, the failure of the coup attempt had dramatically changed the fortune of 
the PKI. 110 The aftermath of the abortive coup was marked by the wave of killings of 
the PKI members and followers in late October, particularly in the area of Central Java, 
and Ruth McVey, A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1.1965, Coup in Indonesia; John Hughes, The 
End of Sukarno (London: Angus & Robertson, 1968); Arnold Brackman, The Communist Collapse in 
Indonesia (Norton, New York: 1969); A. C. A. Dake, In the Spirit of the Red Banteng. Indonesian 
Communists between Moscow and Peking (The Hague: Mouton, 1973); W. F. Wertheim, "Suharto and 
the Untung Coup - The Missing Link", Journal of Contemporary Asia, I (Winter), 1970; and Harold 
Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, 1993), especially pp. 97-134. 
107 The three generals were Amir Machmud, Basuki Rachmat and M. Jusuf. 
108 The period from October 1965 to March 1966 marked the eclipse of Sukarno and the rise of Suharto 
to a position of supreme power. There has been a controversy to the exact circumstances of the issuance 
of Supersemar. 
109 The term "Supersemar"was taken from each first words of "Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret". The use of 
the acronym Supersemar was also believed to provide a basis in legitimacy for the transfer through 
invoking the name of Semar, a clown-god of Hindu mythology with a reputation for invincible authority. 
110 See, Arnold C. Brackman, The Communist Collapse in Indonesia; Robert Cribb, The Indonesian 
Killings of 1965-1966: Studiesfrom Java and Bali (Clayton, Vic.: Monash University, 1990). 
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East Java and Bali. "' While the army officers were not directly involved in the 
killings, they practically encouraged people to do so by providing assurance of support 
and sometimes firearms. The army objective was to eradicate the PKI and its 
supporters that used to be their main rival, and to eliminate the PKI as a political 
force. 1 12 Although the killings of late 1965 had eliminated many of the PKI's leaders at 
all levels, the army's security and intelligence apparatus continued to persecute and 
capture those of the party's activists still at large. It was followed by the arrest of those 
who had survived from the massacres that took place during the last three months of 
1965. The elimination of the PKI's followers was made easier as in most cases these 
actions were supported by the Islamic groups, particularly the Mahdatul Ulama (NTJ- 
Religious Scholars). 
By January 1966 Sukarno's strongest pillar of support, the PKI, had practically 
been all but eliminated as a political force, mostly at the hands of his other pillar of 
support, the army. This situation had presented the army with a chance to take its place 
at the apex of the government. Led by Suharto, the army was rapidly closing off 
Sukarno's room to manoeuvre and prevented him from making a political comeback. 
In so doing, Suharto and his army generals worked closely with the students to bring 
Sukarno down. On 2 May 1966, thousands of Indonesian students united as Kesatuan 
Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia - KAMI (Indonesian Students United Action) occupied the 
parliament building, and expressed their concern over penyelewengan (irregularity or 
deviation) under the Sukarno regime. 113 The political situation was changing very 
rapidly and practically left Sukarno powerless. Indeed, Suharto's road to power became 
more visible through his appointment as acting-President in 1966. In March 1967, the 
MPRS approved Suharto as Indonesian second president, and at the same time 
terminated Sukarno's power. It was the beginning of a new episode in Indonesian 
history, as the new government named itself as the New Order and dubbed the previous 
... There had been no exact number of the people killed. However, the most commonly accepted 
estimation was between 250,000 and 500,000. In 1976 the Head of the Kopkamtib (Security and Order 
Restoration Command), Admiral Sudomo estimated that between 450,000 and 500,000 had been killed, 
Tempo, July 10,1976, quoted also by Harold Crouch, p. 155. 
112 Harold Crouch, TheArmy and Politics in Indonesia, p. 153. 
113 This episode was very similar to the student demonstrations before the fall of Suharto in May 1998. 
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regime as the Old Order. However, ftilly aware of the popularity of Sukarno among the 
ordinary Indonesians, Suharto moved slowly and cautiously to depart from many of 
Sukarno's policies. 114 He soon embarked on pursuing political stability and economic 
development as the main objectives of his regime. At the same time, the New Order 
government insisted that Indonesia needed to be constantly vigilant from the 
communist threat. 
B. External Implications: The Break of Diplomatic Relations Nvith China 
Indonesia's foreign policy towards China after the coming of the New Order 
was not adopted in an abrupt manner, rather it was the result of a sequence of events in 
both the dynamics of domestic politics in Indonesia and China respectively. It took 
nearly two years for the relations to be frozen. Initially, China expected to maintain its 
relations with Indonesia, hoping that political developments in Indonesia would swing 
in favour of China. At least, the presence of a Chinese Embassy in Jakarta gave China a 
last chance to maintain contact with groups that were sympathetic to them. Given the 
presence of seventeen Indonesian delegations in China lead by Chairul Saleh prior to 
the coup, to discuss economic and technical co-operation and its subsequent joint 
communiqud announced after the G30S/PKI, there was no indication that Beijing 
would sever its relations with Indonesia. On the contrary, the developments in 
Indonesia showed that there had been an increase in incidents against China. 
Apparently, the army's efforts to destroy the PKI in domestic politics appeared 
to be accompanied by a move in foreign policy to distance Indonesia from China, by 
accusing the latter of involvement in the coup attempt. Court examinations and 
proceedings had produced evidence that the PKI had been assisted by non-natives [the 
ethnic Chinese in Indonesia] who had organised themselves under the "Baperki" group, 
and by support from mainland China. 115 As a result, Sino-Indonesian relations 
114 Because Sukarno was still popular among his mass supporters, the New Order regime had put him 
under house arrest until his death in June 1970. 
11,5 AnNvar Nasution, "Political Aspect of Economic Development, " Strategic Review, No. 9, December 
1990, p. 35. For the court proceedings See: "Special Military Tribunal Trials of Ex-Indonesian 
Communist Party coup to Leaders, 15 February 1966-31' May 1969", Jakarta, Department of 
65 
deteriorated rapidly as they were dominated by intense hostilities on both sides. A wave 
of students' anti-Communist and anti-China demonstrations took place in Jakarta. 
Supported by the army, demonstrators demanded that Sukarno to disband the PKI, and 
break off diplomatic relations with China. 116 The nature of demonstrations were violent 
as the Chinese embassy in Glodok, Jakarta (China Town) was destroyed by the 
demonstrators, and soon they turned their attention to the local Chinese property, 
houses and shops. 
In response to this situation, Sukarno desperately called for an end to the 
attacks on Chinese nationals and the violence that was being wreaked upon PKI 
members, 117 which seemed to reveal the depth of his alliance with the PKI and China. 
Thus, Sukarno's efforts had deepened the army's suspicion of the PKI and strengthened 
their determination to cut links with China. Furthermore, the sequence of the abortive 
coup and its subsequent repercussions in Indonesia coincided with the onset of the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China that turned the country's domestic 
politics inio a radical ferment. It was, in fact, the consequence of the success of radical 
elements in dominating Chinese politics from the second half of 1966. Radicalisation 
became the characteristic of China's domestic politics that was fiu-ther reflected in its 
foreign policy. In these circumstances, there had been mass demonstrations and public 
gatherings expressing anti-Indonesian feelings, such as the one conducted by several 
hundred Chinese youth led by Red Guards in April 1967, in which posters condemning 
Indonesia were shown. At government level, China's Vice-Premier and Minister of 
Defence Man Fuzhi delivered a speech at a public gathering 27 April 1967 that 
severely condemned the government of Indonesia. ' 18 It was followed by demonstrators 
Information, 1969; "Njono's Trials before the Special Military tribunal, February 15-28,1966", Jakarta, 
Department ofInformation, 1966; "The Special Military Tribunal's Trial of Kamaruzzaman, alias Sjam", 
Head of the PKI Central Committee Special Bureau, February 19-March 11,1968, Jakarta, Department 
of Information, 1968; "The Special Military Tribunal Tries Dr. Subandrio, 1-22 October 1966", Jakarta, 
Department of Information, 1967; and "The Special Military Tribunal's trial of Untung", Jakarta, 
Department ofInformation, 1967. 
116 Statement by General Kemal 1dris, see Tempo, 4 March 1989. 
117 New York Times, October 17,22,23,24,28,1965, as quoted by Taylor, China and Southeast Asia, 
p. 125. 
118 Darwoto, "Masa-masa Terakhir Hubungan Diplomatic RI-RRC", Ibid. 
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destroying and burning the Indonesian embassy, and the intimidation of its diplomatic 
staff. 119 
The hostilities between Jakarta and Beijing, as manifested in antagonistic 
diplomatic languages from both sides, finiher took its shape in the form of the 
expulsion of their respective diplomats. As retaliation to Indonesia's 27 April 1967 
decision to expel two Chinese diplomats, Yao Dengshan (interim charge d'affaires) 
and Xu Ren (consul general), China discharged Indonesia's representative Baron 
Sutadisastra. (interim charge d'affaires), and the head of the Information Section, 
Sumarno. On August 24, Indonesia recalled all of its representatives from Beijing, and 
in the following month ordered China's interim charge d'affaires Lu Zubo and second 
secretary and consul of Chinese embassy in Jakarta Xu Shen, to leave the country 
before September 14. The worst event took place when China decided to declare 
Indonesia's interim charge Nahar Sjamsuddin and second secretary Rumamby 
personae non grata. t2O 
Eventually, diplomatic incidents and political tensions reached a point of no 
return on 9 October 1967, when the Indonesian government decided that Sino- 
Indonesian relations would be "frozen" as of from 30th October. Surprisingly, the term 
used by Indonesia was rather unique, as it was not expressed in the conunon diplomatic 
language such as suspension, termination or breaking off. However, it was understood 
to be an effective defacto diplomatic break. Thus, the position of the new Indonesian 
government led by Suharto was practically anti-Communist and anti-China. VA-dle the 
PKI's main external supporter was kept at bay, Suharto began addressing domestic 
political order and economic development. 
2.5. New Orientation in Indonesian Politics: Continuities and Points of Departures 
(1967-1978) 
119 Ibid. 
120 jUStUS van der Kroef, "The Sino-Indonesian Rupture", China Quarterly, No. 33,1968, p. 24. 
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A. Domestic Politics: Order, Stability and Development 
As far as the structure of Indonesian politics is concerned, Suharto was 
determined to depart from his predecessor's mistakes and to make a total correction of 
the previous eras. In practice, Suharto's government adopted a number of policies that 
claimed to put Indonesia back on course. The New Order confirmed its determination 
to follow the ideology of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (UUD 45). Suharto 
simply tried to reaffirm Pancasild as an ideological foundation and UUD 45 as the 
constitutional basis of the state. However, the driving feature of the New Order has 
been economic development and the building of a strong political institution to 
guarantee stability as a prerequisite for dev elopment. The New Order began promoting 
the notion of stabilitas dan pembangunan (stability and development) as its hallmark. 
Thus he made it clear that his government had abandoned the political adventurist, 
revolutionary slogans and economic negligence adopted by his predecessor. Order, 
stability, growth and development were the buzzwords of the Suharto years. 121 
Accordingly, every effort and policy should be directed to guarantee the achievement 
of these objectives. 
Just as Sukarno needed something to satisfy his supporters in the mid 1950s by 
implementing Guided Democracy, according to Herbert Feith, Suharto in 1968 also 
faced a similar problem which was how to find out a new political format that could be 
relied upon. 122 The experience of the so-called parliamentary as well as Guided 
Democracy made The New Order government rule out copying the political formats 
applied during these periods. Suharto believed that the multi-party system as applied 
during the liberal democracy period was incompatible to Indonesia. He simplified the 
Indonesian political system by limiting the number of political parties. 123 In January 
1973 the four Islamic parties were obliged to merge into a single party known as the 
United Development Party (PPP), while non-Islamic parties were subdued to merge 
121 Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharlo, (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 33. 
122 Herbert Feith, "Suharto's Search for a Political Format, " Indonesia, October 1968, p-89, as quoted by 
Alfian, Pemikiran don Perubahan Politik Indonesia, p. 30. 
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into the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). It meant that the role of the political 
parties in the DPR (the People's Representative Assembly) was practically diminished. 
The government also continued to interfere in the party's affairs and always made 
every effort to keep them weak. 124 Accordingly, they informally constituted the 
government parties as many of their top leaders were picked, or at least endorsed, by 
Suharto. Additionally, the representatives of those parties in parliament had to be 
screened by the government and security apparatus. In the end those elected through 
the ritual general election were those of government supporters. Thus, instead of acting 
as an opposition party, they were indeed strengthening Suharto's control on parliament. 
The government's influence has been strengthened through the Golkar (the 
Joint Secretariat of Functional Group) that was established by senior army officers in 
October 1964.125 Although the government did not categorise Golkar as a political 
party, in reality it indeed functioned as a political organisation that played a central role 
in rallying electoral support for Suharto's regime, particularly during general 
elections. 126 From the 1971 general election, Golkar, with government support has 
continued to emerge as the winner with a decisive vote in every election. 127 Golkar was 
none other than the political tool of Suharto. 128 Its orientation was no more than a copy 
of the one expressed by Suharto himself. 129 The famous slogan of Golkar had been 
"politics no, development yes". 
123 Except in the time leading to the five-yearly general election, the party has been banned from 
maintaining a direct contact with their grass root supporters. Thus the government declared the voters as a 
floating mass. C, 
124 In Indonesian these two parties were more known as "partai pendamping7 (accompanying parties) in 
which their presence were only to complete the number or formality. 
123 The creation of Golkar was initially aimed at countering the influence of PKI within the National 
Front set up by Sukarno. 
126 According to Harold Crouch, this is the key difference between Sukarno and Suharto. While Sukarno 
relied on mass support, Suharto had cleverly created a reliable semi-political party to support his power. 
127 In 1971 Golkar won by 62.8 percent; 1977 (62.1 percent); 1982 (64.3 percent); 1987 (73.2 percent); 
1992 (68.0 percent); 1997 (74.0 percent). The PPP is always the second and the PDI is the last. The 
power of the political parties in the legislative body is very weak since, as the consensus not to participate 
in the general election, ABRI is automatically represented by 100 representatives. 
128 Unlike two other parties, Golkar was allowed to establish branches up to the village level and to 
expand its membership. 
129 Further discussion on Golkar, See: Julian M. Boileau, Golkar Functional Group Politics in Indonesia 
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However, there were similarities between Suharto and his predecessor. This is 
particularly evident as both shared a similar ambition to build a unitary state whose 
territory extends from Sabang to Merauke. Sukarno's fight to regain West Irian as well 
as his confrontation against Malaysia was similar to that of Suharto's policy on East 
Timor. 130 While Sukarno's enemy was the so-called colonialist and imperialist western 
countries, for Suharto, the enemy was the communists. As both took a similar policy of 
using force to achieve their goals, the result was the same, namely control over 
domestic politics and apprehension brought about to Indonesia's neighbours, such as 
Malaysia, Singapore, and, to a certain extent, Australia. While the New Order always 
claimed itself as different from the Old Order and even described itself as the antithesis 
to it. However, in practice, this was not always the case as the New Order then adopted 
similar features. In this regard, one schol ar noted that, 
There were some important continuities from the Old Order, to the New 
Order, and especially from 1959-65 Guided Democracy period, to the 
New Order: the army's view of its place in history and in government; 
the president's belief in a powerful presidency; a broadly shared sense of 
nation; a domineering Java; a divided Muslim community; a resented 
ethnic Chinese business class; a weak legal system and, a closely related, 
a rich tradition of corruption, nepotism, smuggling and patronage. 131 
B. The Domination of the Military 
When the New Order assumed power, it inherited a chaotic political system. 
The political parties ceased to be a driving force in Indonesian politics. It was a result 
(Jakarta: CSIS, 1983); Masashi Nishihara, Golkar and the Indonesian Elections of 1971 (Ithaca, N. Y.: 
Comell University Modem Indonesian Project, Publication no. 56,1972); David Reeve, Golkar of 
Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), and Leo 
Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy and Political Culture: A Study of Indonesia's Golkar (Athens, Ohio: 
Ohio University, Centre for International Studies, 1989). 
130 The East Timor issue should be seen in the context of the Cold War, particularly in the aftermath of 
the defeat of the US in Vietnam and the growing influence of communism in Southeast Asia. Indonesia 
under Suharto performed a staunch anti-Communist power. It is widely regarded that the proclamation of 
independence by the Fretilin (one of the social ist-communist faction in East Timor) on November 25, 
1975, the Indonesian military dominated government was sensitive to the possibility of the creation of 
communist state in its own backyard. Eventually, Indonesian sent "volunteer" forces, whom believed to 
be members of the Indonesian armed forces, to enter East Timor. By 15 July 1976, the territory was 
incorporated as the twenty-seventh province of Indonesia. 
131 Schwartz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s, p. 3. 
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of the implementation of Guided Democracy and the decline in the people's trust 
towards them. Therefore, the first task laid before the New Order government was to 
create stability as a prerequisite for economic development. In order to realize these 
objectives, the New Order government adopted a security approach. This meant that 
the stability of the country was paramount and nearly above anything. This policy 
inevitably gave the military a special role and held a dominant power in Indonesian 
politics as a guardian of Indonesian security. These objectives indeed created an 
opportunity for Suharto and the army to exert their domination of Indonesian politics. 
One prominent Indonesian scholar, Alfian, stated that the political atmosphere enabled 
Suharto and the armed forces to play a dominant and determining role in Indonesian 
politics. 132 
However, military domination was simply inevitable since it was the army, 
under the leadership of Suharto that was the only force to come out from the Guided 
Democracy with less damage. However, the army was not as solid as they looked, they 
were also divided between several factions, particularly those supporting the leftist 
movement. It was particularly caused by the PKI's infiltration in which some ranks of 
the army that sympathised with the Party made moves to exert control over several 
cities. 133 Therefore, the first priority for Suharto was to consolidate the unity of the 
army and the armed forces as a whole, and to purge the leftist elements. Indeed, the 
military had experienced various changes that aimed mainly at strengthening its 
organisation and unitary force, as well as reorganising the, hierarchical structure of 
command. Under the leadership of Suharto, it subsequently turned into a more unified 
institution in which discipline was enforced with firm control resting in the hands of 
Suharto and his closest generals. 
After putting the armed forces under control, Suharto reinforced the doctrine of 
dwifungsi. 134 This doctrine maintained that the armed forces constituted not just a 
132 Alfian, "A Perspective of Indonesia's Political Development", Strategic Review, No. 9, November - 
December 1990, p. 5. 
133 It mainly took place in cities of Salatiga Semarang, Solo, Yogyakarta that belong to the Central lava 
province. See, Harould Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, p. 144. 
"' Dual function doctrine originated in the critical role played by ABRI during the National Revolution, 
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defence force, but also a social and political one. 135 The military based their claim of 
aývifungsi as not something new, it had already been practised since the early struggle 
to gain independence in 1945. Therefore, the military are always called to actualise its 
role in the implementation of both functions, not only a defence and security force, but 
also as a social and political one. 136 Accordingly, the implementation of dwifungsi was 
intended to guarantee the success of creating stability and achieving economic 
development. The military always rejected the criticism over its role as similar to that 
of militarism as it claimed to have a different history to others in the world. 137 ABRI 
also claimed that it was they who proposed that Sukarno reintroduce the 1945 
Constitution, as part of the implementation of aývifungsi. 
The military has indeed emerged as the central force in Indonesia. Its personnel 
played a pivotal role not only in occupying the highest ranks of government and civil 
service but also at regional and local levels. Their personnel also filled the bureaucratic 
apparatus, thus expanding the military's presence in government administration. At 
national level, military generals held important and strategic minister posts. 138 At 
regional level, military personnel occupied the position of governor (provincial), bupati 
(regent), camat (head of sub-district), and in many cases down to the head of village. 
The Head of regional military command also assumed a role of nurturing territorial 
especially at the time when the Indonesian political leaders were captured by the Dutch. Dual function 
gained a new impetus after the failure of parliamentary democracy and the declaration of martial law in 
1957. The notion was firstly introduced by Major-General Abdul Harris Nasution as a middle way course 
in which ABRI would neither totally disengage from public life nor totally dominate it. See, Peter Britton, 
"The Indonesian Army: 'Stabilizer' and 'Dynamiser', in Rex Mortimer (ed. ), Showcase State: The 
Illusion ofIndonesia's 'Accelerated Modernisation'(Sydney: Angus& Robertson, 1973). 
135 In August 1966, ABRI convened a seminar at the Army School of Staff and Command (SESKOAD) 
in Bandung, in which. it decided that dwifungsi should feature in Indonesian politics. For a brief 
discussion on this doctrine, See, David Jenkins, "The Evolution of Indonesian Army Doctrinal Thinking: 0 
The Concept of Dwifungsi, " Southeast Asian Journal ofSocial Science, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1983), pp. 15-30. 
136 Lieutenant General Syarwan Hamid, vice-Chairman of the DPR/MPR, as quoted in Suara 
Pembaruan, 10 May 1997. 
13' See "Buku Putih Kebijakan Hankarnneg Rl" [White Book: Indonesian Defence and Security 
Policies), Ministry of Defence, 1995. For further discussion on dwifungsi, See, Bilveer Singh, Dwifungsi. - 
Asal-usul, Aktualisasi dan Implikasinya bagi Stabilitas dan Pembangunan [Dualfunction: History, 
Actualisation and its Implication for Stability and Development] (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 
1995). 
138 The considered important ministries were, among others, ministry of internal affairs, ministry of 
defence, ministry of manpower, and ministry of transformation. 
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development, particularly in the political field. In some cases, the military personnel 
also occupied a position in strategic economic activities, such as the post of director of 
the National Oil Mining Oil Company (Perfamina). It was argued that one of the 
reasons for this policy was the fact that there had been a lack of expertise on the part of 
a civil population. In fact, it was also practised as a way of rewarding economic 
advantage for those supporting Suharto, particularly those generals who could not get a 
position in a govemmental institution. This policy is known as ABRIyang dikaryakan 
(the military officials who are assigned to private or Govenunent Company). Thus the 
military personnel assumed a role as agents of development. 
There has been a debate about the true nature of the Suharto goverrunent, 
especially among foreign analysts. The debate was over whether the New Order regime 
was an authoritarian or democratic regime. 139 It was not a military government, since 
many civilians, however limited, play their part in the government. It was more precise 
to name it "the government full of military officers" or even as "soft authoritarian", 
implying the existence of an institution-building ruling elite that may challenge its 
control over the nation's social, political and economic resources. However, there is 
another way to examine the New Order political system that is by applying the cultural 
approach. Historically Indonesians were not familiar with the idea of democracy other 
than so-called feudalism. 140 
Consequently, the dynamics of political life in Indonesia had been dominated 
by: feudalism that required a centralized govenunent; militarism as the consequences 
that feudalism would never work without a strong military support to face the enemy 
that come from within and without; and capitalism in which economics rested in those 
holding power. 141 Over all, the New Order government consisted of a mixture of the 
139 See Donald K. Emmerson, "Understanding the New Order: Bureaucratic Pluralism in Indonesia, 
Asian Survey, Vol. 23, No. II (November 1983), pp. 1220-124 1; Benedict Anderson and Audrey Kahin 
(eds), Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate, Interim Reports Series, 
publication no. 62 (Ithaca: Cornell University, Modern Indonesian ProjecL 1982). 
140 See, Clark D. Neher, Democracy and Development in Southeast Asia: The Winds of Change 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), especially Chapter 5, and R. William Liddle, Leadership 
and Culture in Indonesian Politics (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996). 
"" See, Mochtar Naim, "Trilogi Budaya Politik" [Trilog( Political Culture], Republika, 16 June 1998. 
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military and civilians. While the Suharto government was not totally authoritarian, it 
was not democratic either. 142 Nevertheless, one could not deny the fact that military 
personnel heavily dominated the New Order. They have assumed a leading and 
commanding role in every aspect of the life of the Indonesian. 
C. The Implications for Foreign Policy: Orientation and Decision Making 
Changes in domestic political orientation and priorities were fin-ther expanded 
into foreign policy. Sukarno's radicalism in domestic and foreign policy had been 
replaced by pragmatism. Suharto transformed Indonesia's foreign policy orientation to 
falfil domestic requirements, particularly political stability and economic development. 
Indeed, fully aware of his predecessor's aggressive foreign policy that was upsetting 
Indonesia! s neighbours in the Southeast Asian region, Suharto immediately rectified the 
excesses committed by his predecessor, particularly within the Southeast Asian region. 
The relationship with Malaysia was restored and the Association of Southeast Asian 
National (ASEAN) that include four other neighbouring countries (Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines) was established in 1967. Indonesia then 
became an enthusiastic supporter of regional co-operation. It was undoubtedly aimed at 
restoring its credibility as a peaceful and responsible member of the international 
community. ASEAN became the symbol of Indonesia's new commitment to a good 
neighbour policy as well as an important gesture in Jakarta's attempt to attract Western 
support. 
Accordingly, Indonesia then performed a generally moderate or low profile 
foreign policy, inclined to the West and regionally focused on Southeast Asian and 
distanced itself from the socialist/communist states. As a member of the non-aligned 
countries, it maintained a policy that in principle kept it equi-distant from the rivalry 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, the approach has been on co- 
operation and accommodation that was aimed at gaining international support for 
Indonesia's stability and economic development, while at the same time, maintaining 
142 To understand Suharto's thinking, see among others: Suharto, Suharto, My Thoughts, Words and CP 
Deeds (Jakarta: PT Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989) and O. G. Roeder, The Smiling General (Jakarta: 
Gunung Agung, 1970). 
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its freedom of action. 143 Given Indonesia's strategic location at the eastern entrance of 
the Indian Ocean, including command of the Malacca and Sunda straits, the country 
has been considered as vital to Asian security interest of the United States and its allies 
in the context of Cold War. 144 The American government had been generous to 
Indonesia, as they extended a significant amount of military aid and became the 
principal supplier of military equipment to the Indonesian armed forces. Indonesia did 
not have to forge a formal military alliance with the US, as it may violate one of its 
principles as a non-aligned nation, but she indirectly benefited from United States 
security arrangements with the countries in the region, such as Australia and the 
Philippines. One of the most significant supports for Indonesia has been the United 
States' blind-eye policy on the repressive nature of the New Order regime. 
Nevertheless, Suharto was practically close to the West, and it was a clear departure 
from his predecessor's positions that maintained distrust and suspicion towards the 
Western countries. 
Additionally, Japan also had an important role in the development of Indonesia. 
During the 1970s, for instance, Japan was the largest aid donor to Indonesia. Tokyo's 
aid included export promotion, establishment of an infi-astructure base for private 
foreign investment, and the need to secure a stable source of raw materials, especially 
oil, aluminiurn and forest products. The aid from Tokyo was needed by Jakarta to 
finance development. 1'5 However, Indonesia did not alter its orientation directly to the 
West, or at least did not want to be seen as allying with the West, instead she 
maintained her independence as a non-aligned state and continued following the path 
of afree and independent foreign policy. One of the examples of Indonesia's efforts to 
143 It was a distinct departure from Sukarno's approach in which he actively attacked the international 
status quo, particularly the Western countries and dubbed them as the Neo-colonialist powers. 
"' This was without doubt supported by the fact that the New Order had reversed Indonesia from bcin, a 
the third largest country with cornmunist party members into an anti-Communist. 
"5 Relations between Japan and Indonesia are a well- studied subject. Further discussions on this matter, 
See, among others: Sumio Edamura, Indonesia andJapan in the Pacific Age (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1989); 
"Internal Developments in Japan and Indonesia, CSIS, Jakarta, 1985); lkuo Iwasaki, Japan andSoutheast 
Asia: A Bibliography of Histiry, Economic and Political Relations (Tokyo: Library Institute of 
Developing Economies, 1983); Lie Tek Tjeng, An Indonesian Perspective: Japanese-Indonesian 
Relations in the Seventies (Jakarta: Indonesian Science Agency, 197 1). 
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show its consistency has been its participation in the Non-Aligned Movement and the 
conduct of normal diplomatic relations with the former Soviet Union. 
The military have also played their part in foreign policy. Their participation 
was regarded as part of securing national security. Thus, their officers occupied several 
key positions in the foreign ministry, such as director-general of Social, Cultural and 
Information Affairs. 146 'ne strategic outlook of the military has also influenced 
Indonesia's foreign policy orientation. According to the strategic military's outlook, the 
immediate outlying area in the Southeast Asia region is regarded as the seventh 
military region in terms of security importance. 147 That was one reason why Indonesian 
ambassadors to ASEAN capitals are from the military. 149 To that extent, a retired 
diplomat has described that, "foreign policy also falls in the domain of dvvifungsi. "149 
However, Suharto was fully aware of the situation in which the military lacked 
knowledge, expertise and --experience in dealing with international affairs and 
diplomacy. Thus in order to close this gap and to give a good reputation to the 
international community, Suharto appointed a civilian foreign minister, Adam Malik as 
foreign minister. According to Michael Leifer, Malik's revolutionary credentials, his 
proven anti-communism, and his diplomatic experience made him a natural political 
partner for a military establishment which required a civilian figure as public 
interlocutor with the outside world. 150 Nevertheless, in making any decision on foreign 
policy, Suharto was surrounded by his advisers who gave him advice and 
recommendations. They consisted of Ministry of Defence or Hankam (represented by 
Gen. Soemitro of Kopkamtib and Benny Moerdani of BAKIN), Foreign Ministry or 
'" One of its subsidiary bodies is called as DIT&UNBINUASLUGRI (Directorate of Security and 
Construction of the People Abroad), and headed by a director who comes from an active military 
personnel. One of its functions was also to screen the new recruits and to ensure those diplomat who are 
going to be posted as clean from the leftist elements. 
147 From military's point of view, Indonesia was divided into six military regions, each under a military 
commander. 
14' Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASE, 4M Foreign Policy and Regionalism, p. 137. 
149 Forum Keadilan, 31 July 1995. 
150 Leifcr, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, pp. 113 -114. 
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Deplu (Adam Malik), CSIS (Ali Moertopo and Soedjono Humardhani), Bappenas 
(Widjojo Nitisastro and Ali Wardhana). 151 In the early part of the New Order, Ali 
Moertopo (CSIS) played a big role in the formulation of foreign policy. It did not last 
after 1978 when the role was taken over by Hankam. 
As far as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is concemed, during the Sukamo era, 
this institution became one of his mouthpieces, especially under foreign minister 
Subandrio. While retaining the main function of the conduct of diplomacy and relations 
with other countries, the coming of the New Order was followed by the anny's effort to 
cleanse the Ministry of the leftist elements and those supporting Sukamo's adventurous 
foreign policy. 152 In April 1966 a special section was established to eliminate the 
"unwanted elements", particularly against the PKI's activities abroad. 153 It was seen as 
imperative because the anny considered the Ministry a strategic point in which the 
domestic force of the PKI had successfully driven Indonesia to ally itself with the 
extemal Communist power-of China. In other words, the domestic threat of the PKI 
was considered to be collaborating ývith the extemal elements through the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Consequently, the Ministry had to share authority on issues related to 
security and defence with the military, including the issue of China. As a result, there 
often emerged an overlapping of authority, friction and differences of opinion on 
several issues. Another institution is the less influential Komisi Satu of Parliament, 
wl-&h. deals with security, defence and foreign policy. In line with the impotence of the 
parliament vis-A-vis the executive, this body only held a deliberation without any real 
implication in determining the direction of foreign policy. Nevertheless, the 
deliberation in the institution was not good enough to function as a barometer to 
15 1 Leo Suryadinata, Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia di Bawah Soeharto (Indonesia's Foreign Policy 
Under Soeharto, Aspiring to International Leadership] (Jakarta: PT Pustaka LNES, 1998), p. 49. 
132 During Guided Democracy, the Foreign Ministry played an active role in supporting Sukarno's vision 
of foreign policy. Former foreign minister Dr. Subandrio was an active supporter of radical foreign policy 
such as seen in the case of revolutionary diplomacy aimed at restructuring international system, the 
creation of Jakarta-Beijing Axis, and Konfrontasi against Malaysia. 
153 Currently, a security directorate remains exist with its main task to screen Indonesian government 
officials travelling abroad or as a requirement in obtaining visa and taking care of Indonesian living 
abroad. The Directorate is under the Directorate General of Socio-Cultural Affairs General and led by an 
active military officer who has a rank of Colonel, while the Director General is an active one star military 
rank. 
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measure domestic political reality as its membership was dominated by the pro- 
government factions. 
2.6. Conclusion 
The route of Indonesia's historical background and experience has undoubtedly 
contributed to the formulation of Indonesia's perception of security, threat as well as 
foreign policy. The revolutionary phase in Indonesian history was marked by 
Indonesia's effort to pursue the vital national interest of national security. It involves 
the maintenance of unity and territorial integrity and the achievement of international 
recognition. The threat to Indonesia had come from within and without the boundary of 
Indonesia. The Communist action to launch a rebellion in 1948 was widely seen as an 
act of betrayal as stabbing Indonesia in the back, while the struggle to achieve a full 
independence was still on course. Meanwhile, the Western powers that were regarded 
as the champions of democracy, in fact, did not support Indonesia's independence. 
Instead, they were rallying their support behind the Dutch colonial power. The reason 
behind this unsympathetic attitude of the West has been their suspicion that the 
communist followers dominated Indonesia. The situation was rather opportune after 
Indonesia successfully put down the communist rebel in the 1948 Madiun affitirs. 
Apparently, the Western leaders were aware that their suspicion of Indonesia was 
untrue. This condition helped facilitate the recognition of Indonesian independence that 
was finally achieved by December 1949. Nevertheless, the ambiguous attitude of the 
Western powers has left a deep suspicion and distrust among Indonesian leaders 
towards the major powers. At the same time, Indonesian leaders felt widely suspicious 
of the communists. Indeed, this period has also laid down the principles of free and 
active foreign policy, which reflected Indonesia's determination not to rely on any 
external powers. 
Tle period of the implementation of parliamentary democracy (1950-1959) was 
characterised by political instability and domestic cleavages following the line of 
ethnicity and religious sentiment. The failure of this system was symbolized by the 
inability of any cabinet to realize Indonesia's national interest of economic 
development. Foreign policy had become a contentious issue. Any effort to attract 
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foreign aid has been accused of sacrificing Indonesia's free and independent foreign 
policy. Thus the Indonesian political system has been interlocked by domestic political 
rivalry among elite leaders. Indonesia's unity was also threatened by the emergence of 
regional rebellions. These situations have indeed united Sukarno and the army's leaders 
with the idea that the implementation of parliamentary democracy was incompatible 
with Indonesian society. For different reasons, both shared the view that Indonesia 
should get rid of the system. 
Since the very beginning, there was suspicion among Indonesian political 
leaders, particularly from the army and Muslim quarters, about China. Apart from 
ideological communism which was considered anti-Islamic, the army considered the 
PKI's early involvement in the launching of the 1948 coup against the central 
government was unforgivable. Despite ideological reasoning, the Islamic groups 
maintained a deep suspicion because of unilateral land reform that brought 
disadvantages to many Muslim preachers in the village. Indeed, mixed feelings among 
the Indonesian elite leaders had prevented the opening of diplomatic relations with 
China. Only after the exclusion of the Islamic party and the inclusion of the PKI in the 
cabinet, did Indonesia eventually establish diplomatic relations with China. Indeed, the 
opening of diplomatic relations with China was mainly intended to serve a domestic 
requirement and to maintain Indonesia's free and active foreign policy. 
With the full support of the military Sukarno eventually introduced the 
implementation of Guided Democracy. He rested his power base on two main pillars, 
namely the army and the PKI, and often played one against another aiming at 
maintaining his authority and at the same time kept them in check. Under the Guided 
Democracy, Sukarno intensified Indonesia's effort to gain the national interest of 
achieving comprehensive independence, particularly the return of West Irian. In its 
course, Indonesia was then dominated by a revolutionary wave that coincided with 
radicalisation in foreign policy. The threat had been portrayed as Western neo- 
colonialism. Indeed, the struggle for West Irian and the fight against neo-colonialism 
made Indonesia draw closer to China. On the contrary, China had no difficulty in 
supporting Sukarno's revolutionary struggle, including the crushing of Malaysia. China 
became one of Indonesia's main supporters and fHend. 
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The alliance between China and Indonesia was followed by a similar pattern 
between the PKI and China's Communist Party. However, the structure of a 
relationship between both countries did not reflect Indonesian domestic political 
reality. The growing relationship between Sukarno and the PKI tipped the balance for 
the latter at the expense of the army. This situation gave a momentum for forces hostile 
to the PKI, particularly the army and the Islamic forces, to form an alliance. Indeed, the 
balance of power between the army and the PKI in which Sukarno played his part as a 
balancing force proved difficult to maintain. It resulted in the 30 September/1 October 
1965 coup that changed the direction of Indonesian political history. Although there 
remains controversy surrounding the exact nature of the coup and the issue remains 
debatable, the New Order's version has been that the PKI was the main perpetrator of 
the coup that was supported by an external power, namely China. 
The Guided Democracy eventually came to an end in which the army came out 
to be the victor against Sukarno's other pillar, the PKI. It created a chance for Suharto 
and the military to dominate Indonesian politics. Subsequently, Suharto gradually 
asserted his authority to replace Sukarno, and subsequently introduced the coming of 
the New Order. The PKI was practically eliminated from the Indonesian political map 
and its members and sympathisers had been purged. The action against the PKI had its 
repercussions in Indonesian external relations. China has been considered as the 
external supporter of the PKI and was implicated in the 1965 abortive coup. Inevitably, 
the freezing of diplomatic relations with China was the consequence of the domestic 
requirement, particularly the demand from the army. Accordingly, Communist China 
was regarded as a threat to the New Order's goals of creating stability and economic 
development. However, the reference to China became somewhat complicated as the 
ethnic Chinese who lived in Indonesia had also been accused of playing their part in the 
incident. 
Although Suharto declared his regime as the New Order, in fact he continued 
some of Sukarno's policies, particularly on the conduct of domestic politics as well as 
on the principles of a free and active foreign policy. However, the main difference was 
the domination by his military supporters in every aspect of Indonesian life. As far as 
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foreign policy was concerned, military officials inevitably participated in its 
formulation. This was more prevalent especially when it concerned matters that 
fimdamentally related to the question of security and defence, notably the issue of 
China. Thus, as the main institution responsible for the conduct of foreign policy, the 
ministry of foreign affairs had to share its authority with the military. 
Chapter Three 
The Concept and Nature of China as a Threat: 
The Intertwined Foreign and Domestic Perspectives 
Indonesia's historical background and experience during the revolutionary 
period, liberal democracy, and guided democracy, suggested to the New Order leaders 
the presence of various threats and challenges to the Republic. While most of the 
threats were purely domestic in nature, the involvement of external powers would 
undoubtedly add to the gravity of threat. Indeed, Indonesian leaders were sensitive to 
any kind of external interference in form. It is against this background that the New 
Order leadership developed the line in which the PKI was linked with the support of 
China as an external power as well as China's influence over the overseas Chinese 
living in Indonesia. The reason why Indonesia adopted an-anti Communist and anti- 
China attitude was simply because the government was dominated by the military that 
had held long grievances and suspicions towards communism. Therefore, this chapter 
is aimed at finding out and analyzing the nature and concept of the threat of China, as 
well as exploring what has been its the function in Indonesia's internal politics. 
In so doing, this chapter is divided into four parts. The first section focuses on 
the historical perspectives of the domestic and external perceptions of China. The 
second part analyzes how the New Order defined the nature and concept of China by 
linking domestic and external dimensions. The third portion explores how the 
functional threat of China contributed to Indonesia's domestic politics and economy as 
well as towards regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. The last part is the conclusion. 
3.1. Historical Perspectives of Sino-Indonesian Relations: Domestic and External 
Perception of China 
A. The External Perception of China: A Historical Legacy 
Historically, China considered itself as the Middle Kingdom (Zhongguo), thus 
any neighbouring countries wishing to have dealings with her had to recognize the 
Emperor as "the Son of Heaven" that acted as their suzerain. In this notion, the states 
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outside China should be put within the context of the tributary system. This system was 
the traditional way of managing foreign relations. Tbrough the establishment of the 
rules and controlling the means and symbolic terms by which foreign countries entered 
into and conducted their relations with China, the Chinese found the system an 
effective mechanism for exacting compliance from neighbouring states and peoples on 
important matters of political, defensive, economic, and diplomatic concern to China. ' 
According to the usual practice, foreign peoples were bound to present the tribute, 
usually a largely token offering of native products or rare valuable commodities, as 
well as to perform an act of kowtow, 2 as a symbol of recognition of their subversience 
to the Chinese emperor. This Chinese concept that viewed world order in terms of the 
superordination and subordination of states seems to be similar with the early Christian 
world order, in which the church and emperor were the two superior authorities. 
The relationship between Southeast Asian entities 
3 
and China could be traced 
4 back almost two thousand years. They were confined at first to the countries now 
comprising Vietnam, Java, Sumatra and the Malay, and it was later extended to 
Cambodia, Thailand, Burma and the fin-ther islands of Indonesia. By the end of the 
second century, China had established frequent diplomatic relations with all the 
kingdoms then prevailing in these countries. Among the Southeast Asian entities, only 
Vietnam was under direct rule from China. This incorporation is easily understood 
since the Chinese considered Vietnam in the Sinic Zone that consists of the most 
nearby and culturally similar tributaries. 5 The rest were engaged in asymmetrical 
relations, and mainly focused on cultural and trading activities. In return for trading 
1 John K. Fairbank, Edwin 0. Reischauer & Albert M. Craig, EaslAsia: The Modern Transformation, A 
History ofEast Asian Civilization, Vol. 2 (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1967), p. 15. 
2 Kowtow is the act of the three kneelings; and nine knockings of the head on the ground. In return, the 
emperor showed his appreciation of the homage by giving presents to the envoy. It was then followed by 
allowing the tributary mission to open market and to sell t heir local products. 
3 The formation of modem states in Southeast Asia has not been an indigenous development. They are 
relatively recent formations, constituted in response to the enforced imposition of European colonialism 
and to the exigencies of the modem world order. In the process, traditional polities have been swept 
aside, even if some traditional forms and concepts have been woven into the modem political fabric. 
4 C. P. Fitzgerald, China and Southeast Asia Since 1945 (London: Longman, 1973), p. 1. 
3 Roland L. Higgin, "The Tributary System", in Mark Borthwick, Pacific Century: The Emergence of 
Modern Pacific Asia (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), p. 3 0. 
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access and occasional protection, these entities had to send tributes, such as gold and 
silver trees, to China. Therefore, China was seen as an alien great power that had been 
wielding great influence in the Southeast Asian region. 
Judging by the behavior of the old Chinese Empire, many Indonesian leaders 
were, and still are suspicious that China remains an expansionist power that has always 
tried to advance her influence into the Southeast Asian region. Much historical 
evidence supports this perception. One classical Indonesian history tells the story of the 
dispute between the Indonesian Kingdom of Singhasari and the Yuan Dynasty of China 
in the 13th century. Under the Second Emperor, Kubilai Khan, China attempted to 
expand its territory and influence deep into the Southeast Asian region. With the 
support of the strong navy inherited from the Song Dynasty, China launched a military 
conquest overseas. For this purpose, the kingdom in Java was identified as one of the 
countries to be incorporated into the Yuan's sphere of influence, together with 
6 Champa. 
The perception of China has been maintained through various scripts and one 
Indonesian ancient history noted: 
The last king of Singhasari was Kertanagara. Kertanagara's famous 
contemporary was Kubilai Khan, the Emperor of China, who was so 
ambitious as to attempt to conquer all the lands of the "Southern Sea" 
either by diplomacy or by force. He managed to get a few countries in 
his power, but he had no success with Kartanegara. 7 
What is interesting from this reference is that the author fails to differentiate between 
the Mongols and the Chinese, rather it underlines the expansionist nature of Chinese 
power. Many ordinary Indonesians share the ignorance of the fact that the Chinese and 
the Mongols are two different and distinct peoples. 
6 Wang Gungwu, China and the Chinese Overseas (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 199 1), p. 107. 
7 Satyawati Sulaeman, Concise Ancient History of Indonesia (Jakarta: The Archeological Foundation, 
1974), p. 3 1. 
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In fact, the portrayal of China as an ambitious and expansionist power has been 
transformed and communicated to many generations through history texts, and they 
became an important source of information about China. Although the significant 
influence of these references remains to be separately examined, they most likely 
played their part in the formulation of many Indonesians views on China. In this 
respect, Carl Taylor has claimed that such texts represent "what casual and educated 
Indonesians may have read about China. "8 The portrayal of China as a negative force 
was ftirther reinforced by picking up the examples of China's invasion during the Han 
Empire, particularly during the reign of Wudi (Wu Ti, 141-87 BCE) emperor to the 
west, the invasion of Korea, 9 as well as the occupation of Tibet in 1950.10 
In this regard, a publication by one of Indonesian authors describes and portrays 
how China used to behave. This author focused on China's expansionist behaviour at 
the end of the Indonesian Kingdom of Sriwijaya, in which "Palembang [one city in 
Sumatra Island] fell ýmder China. Some thousands of Chinese from Fukien and Canton 
were brought in and established a colonial administration. In 1377, the head of the 
colony was Liang Tan Ming from Kwangtung. "l 1 The main idea that can be drawn 
from this publication is that China has seen as an imperial power, while Indonesia is 
described as the victim of China's ambitious expansionist policy. Although the impact 
of such publications remains to be seen, these facts underline that China has been 
negatively portrayed. 
While seeing China as an expansionist and imperialist power, what is 
interesting is that there has been a prevailing admiration among Indonesians to view 
China for its "greatness. " China is always seen as a major country in almost every 
8 Carl Taylor, "Indonesian Views of China, " Asian Survey, Vol. 3, No. 3, March 1963, p. 165. 
9 Mark Borthwick (ed. ), Pacific Century. ý The Emergence of Pacific Asia (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1992), pp. 17-26. 
'0 China did expand its own borders. The Qing dynasty was enormous by comparison with that of the 
Han (206 B. C. -A. D. 220). Yet the increase in the size of China's territory was anything but gradual; it 
varied sharply from dynasty to dynasty. See, Colin Mackerras, Eastern Asia: An Introductionary History 
(Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1994), pp. ] 08-112. 
11 Hidajat Z. M., Masyarakat dan Kebudayaan Cina Indonesia [The People and Culture of Indonesian 
Chinese] (Bandung: Tarsito, 197 1), p. 64. 
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Indonesian politics Nvill be more meaningful if it is linked with the domestic 
perspective. In other words, the presence of ethnic Chinese on Indonesian soil has 
ftirther exaggerated the negative perception of China. 
B. Indonesia's Domestic Perspective of China: Early Suspicions and 
Historical Legacy towards the Ethnic Chinese 
The ethnic Chinese always appear to form a small minority in Indonesia. In 
1961, for instance, their numbers were predicted to be around 2.45 million, which were 
never considered as representing more than 2,5% of the total population. 
15 To date, the 
ethnic Chinese are currently believed to be around 5.76 million. 16 Nevertheless, the 
ethnic Chinese are always seen as a distinct race, regardless of the Indonesian national 
motto of "Unity in Diversity". This is particularly evident when one looks at their 
dominant role and position in Indonesia's economy. Additionally, they are generally 
concentrated in the cities, as opposed to the majority of priburni that live in urban areas. 
However, since the freezing of diplomatic relations with China, the New Order regime 
banned the use of Chinese characters in various publications and trade promotion 
activities, including Chinese newspapers, fearing that they might be infiltrated by the 
teaching of communism. 
In order to encourage assimilation, Suharto also suggested the use of the 
Indonesian name for that of the ethnic Chinese. The use of the word "Tionghoa" was 
officially replaced by "China", which according to the nationalist newspaper Merdeka 
was aimed at creating political hatred towards China rather than linguistic 
considerations. 17 According to the Dual Nationality Agreement between Indonesia and 
China of 1955, there are some criteria in determining the ethnic Chinese or Zhongguo 
based on their nationality. 18 First, it refers huagiao, which according to the Mandarin 
15 See, G. William Skinner, "The Chinese Minority, " in Ruth McVey (ed. ), Indonesia (New Haven, 
Conn.: 1963), p. 99- 
16 See, Leo Suryadinata, "Masalah Tionghoa di Indonesia dan Penyelesaiannya, " in Riyanto D. Wahono 
(ed. ), 70 Tahun Junus Jahja: Pribumi Kual Kunci Pembauran [70 Years Jujus Jahja: A Strong Pribumi 
as a key to Assimilation] (Jakarta: PT. Bina Pariwara, 1977, p. 8 1. 
17 Merdeka, 18 January 1977. 
'a Lie Tek Tjeng, "Kebijakan RRC tentang Keamanan" [The PRC Policy on Security], Kompas, 16 and 
17 February 1996. 
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dialect means overseas Chinese that entails those retaining the nationality of PRC or 
Taiwan. Second, it relates to those who already gave up the nationality of PRC or 
Taiwan and decided to hold Indonesian citizenship. Those people are more precisely 
called Huaren or ethnic Chinese. And third, it includes those who reside in the territory 
that have not de facto been reintegrated with mainland China such as Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan. The people in these territories are called tongbao (compatriot). 
While the above agreement supposedly resolved the question of nationality, its 
implementation was overtaken by political events in Indonesia as well as in its relation 
with China. 19 
However, in the context of domestic perspectives, the word "China" is often 
associated with the ethnic Chinese regardless of the status of their nationality. From 
this point of view, there are at least six major perceptions of the ethnic Chinese widely 
held by the majority of Indonesians. 20 
First, many of the eflu-& Chinese came to Indonesia as traders and established 
themselves as a successful commercial community as early as the 19th century. 
Fitzgerald noted that the period of Dutch colonialism saw a great increase in the 
immigrant Chinese community. 2 1 While receiving privileges and special treatment 
from the Dutch, the Chinese acted as middlemen between the Indonesian pribumi and 
the Dutch. They were acting as merchants, traders and tax collectors for the colonial 
regime. 22 Given this role, the Chinese were granted second-class citizenship putting 
them right below the Dutch or other Europeans, while Indonesians were left at the 
lowest strata. The Chinese were classified as foreign Orientals (vreemde oosterlingen), 
and Indonesians were called "native" (inlander). 23 This categorization was a deliberate 
19 The issue of the status of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia was resolved through the normalisation of 
diplomatic relations in August 1990. This issue will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
20 For more details, See, among others, Charles A. Coppel, Indonesian Chinese in Crisis (Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University Press, 1983), especially Chapter 1; Mackie (ed. ), The Chinese in Indonesia; and 
Suryadinata, The Chinese Minority in Indonesia. 
21 C. P. Fitzgerald, China and Southeast Asia Since 1945, p. 33. 
22 Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s (Boulder Westview Press, 1995), p. 12. 
23 Coppel, Indonesian Chinese, p. 3. 
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policy by the Dutch to fill the gap it needed from the skilful Chinese merchants, while 
many Indonesians were considered far from sufficient in assuming that role. It was 
considered to be one of the biggest humiliations imposed on many Indonesians and 
remains in the minds of many Indonesians pribumi (indigenous populations). In the 
end, the employment of ethnic Chinese by the Dutch colonial power estranged these 
people from the indigenous population and served to separate the ethnic Chinese even 
finther politically and economically. 
Second, as a consequence of the privileged position granted by the Dutch, the 
ethnic Chinese succeeded in developing themselves as successful economic players. 
Inevitably, they were able to reach a standard of economic well being and living far 
better than those of the Indonesians under the Dutch colonialist. Such a gap had 
become a source of hatred and resentment among Indonesians, as the latter considered 
the ethnic Chinese as benefiting from the Dutch occupation of Indonesia. Even worse, 
Indonesians accused- them as being the extension of colonial power and even called 
them the kaki-tangan (henchmen) of the Dutch. 
Third, the Dutch policy on creating the social structure that hierarchically 
consisted of the Dutch/European, the Chinese and the pribumi, has left a deep social 
gap between the ethnic Chinese and Indonesian pribumi. In this kind of socio-political 
structure, the Chinese were divided between those who identified themselves with the 
Dutch, and those who were anti-colonial identified themselves with mainland China. 
24 
However, very few were prepared to identify themselves with the indigenous 
population. This social orientation among the Chinese implied that they viewed 
Indonesians as inferior to them. On the other hand, Indonesians interpreted the ethnic 
Chinese attitude of identifying themselves either with the Dutch or their homeland as 
arrogant. 
Fourth, many Indonesians, if not most, perceived the ethnic Chinese as 
following a stem line in embracing and practicing Chinese values. One of the famous 
expressions among Indonesians is "sekali Cina, tetap Cina" (once a Chinese, always a 
24 Lie Tek Tjen-, Kompas, 6 August 1990. 0 
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25 Chinese). Their belief and perception that the ethnic Chinese attitude of maintaining 
their kinship links with the mainland reinforced the Indonesian assumption that the 
ethnic-Chinese were unchangeable. For example, it has been asserted that "this strongly 
uniform, cohesive race, separated by seas and frontiers, is essentially one people with a 
,, 26 shared heritage, the Chinese civilization. Ironically, Indonesians also consider the 
ethnic Chinese as one solid community originating from the same territory in the 
mainland. In this regard, Leo Suryadinata explains that, 
Despite the heterogeneity of the Chinese, the perception of a 
homogenous Chinese community persists. This is due partly to the 
relatively strong economic position of the Chinese as a group across 
Southeast Asia and the existence of a group of first-generation Chinese 
who refuse to identify themselves with the indigenous population. The 
perception is also often linked to the desire of the PRC government to 
utilize the ethnic Chinese to serve the interests of China. T'hese factors 
have helped to perpetuate the prejudice against the Chinese population. 27 
Fifth, despite viewing the ethnic Chinese as another nation, the majority of 
Indonesians believed that they have a negative characteristic. Indeed, the stereotype has 
been that the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia is opportunist and its main preoccupation is 
to advance its economic well being. One Indonesian historian, Tengku Luckman Sinar, 
stated that one of the negative characteristics of the ethnic Chinese is that they have 
always pursued their own interests. "During the Dutch colonial era, they worked as 
traders and acted as middlemen, they did so during the Japanese occupation, in the 
New Order period they were clinging to Suharto. They surely knew that Suharto was a 
dictator and symbol of KKN (corruption, collusion and nepotism). That is why in every 
political upheaval, they will always become the target of people's anger". 28 This 
25 A comprehensive study by Wang Gungwu reveals that during the past decades, contrary to the 
stereotype "once a Chinese, always a Chinese", the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia have changed and 
they were capable of undergoing further change. See, Jennifer Cushman and Wang Gungwu (eds. ), 
Changing Identities of the Southeast Asian Chinese since fVorld War II (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 1988). 
26 C. P. Fitzgerald, The Third China (Melbourne: 1965), quoted also in Coppel, Indonesian Chinese, p. 8. 
27 Leo Suryadinata (ed. ), Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1997), p. 10. 
2' Delivered at the Symposium and Discussion Panel, held by North Sumatra Exponent 66, as quoted in 
Latar, 20 October 1998. 
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assumption went back to the Indonesian Revolutionary period, during which they were 
accused of having a wait-and-see policy in order to safeguard their own interests. The 
following description shows how Indonesians considered the Chinese attitude: 
... the Chinese community was very ambivalent in its support of the 
national struggle for independence from the Dutch. Many overseas 
Chinese preferred to stay on the fence at least and seemed desirous of 
reaping the greatest possible profit during these disturbed times. During 
the four years of struggle, while the Indonesian people were fighting 
hard, with great loss in human life against the Dutch colonial troops, the 
Chinese concentrated their attention on safeguarding their privileged 
economic position. 29 
Sixth, the ethnic Chinese has often been put in a difficult position during any 
political changes. This may be traced back to the Japanese occupation, when China was 
at war with Japan, thus in a sense making them an ally to the Dutch. The Chinese 
community as a whole sympathized with and had given financial support to their 
motherland. 30 On the other hand, Indonesian nationalist leaders and ordinary 
Indonesians were hostile to the Dutch and more willing to a certain extent to co-operate 
with the Japanese for the preparation of Indonesia's independence. This contradictory 
attitude tended to create, or to exacerbate, anti-Chinese feeling among the Indonesian 
people. 31 
During the Sukarno era, the word used to refer to the ethnic Chinese was 
Tionghoa while the country was referred to as Tiongkok He underlined the importance 
of the ethnic Chinese as part of the Indonesian nation, and blamed the use of the Dutch 
that had exploited the ethnic Chinese minority as an imperialist tool. He also claimed 
that the Dutch divided the majority and minority on purpose, and the hatred between 
them was transferred from generation to generation. 32 However, in current Indonesian 
29 1 Gede Agung Anak- Agung, Tiventy Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945-1965 (The Hague: 
Mouton, 1973), p. 427. 
30 The Japanese occupation in Indonesia also benefited from the presence of the ethnic Chinese through 
the collection of money for war purpose. 
3' Fitzgerald, China andSoutheast Asia Since 1945, p. 34. 
32 See Siar News Service, 9- 10 September 1998. 
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parlance, the word China or Cina is used to replace the word Tionghoa as a country as 
well as the ethnic Chinese. When one mentions Cina, it would automatically refer to 
both mainland China and the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. The government policy to 
refer to this community as WNI keturunan (naturalized Indonesian citizen of Chinese 
descent) did not help distinguish the notion of China as a state and Cina as Indonesian 
citizen. In this regard, one Indonesian scholar, Ariel Heryanto argued that the term non- 
pribumi or "WNI Keturunan Tionghoa" [Indonesian citizen with Chinese descent] has 
never existed in real life, it was only the result of indoctrination for many decades 
under the New Order regime. 33 Consequently, the term "China" only exists in the 
imagination and propaganda of a regime that called itself the New Order. 
However, the domestic and foreign perspectives of China did not materialize 
into an issue in Indonesian politics until a later stage when Indonesia and China began 
to establish formal diplomatic relations that eventually took place on 15 January 1950. 
Prior to the diplomatic move up to 1960, China became one of the dividing factors 
among the competing political parties in Indonesia, particularly between the army and 
the PKI. The episode during these years later crystallized the army's perception of 
China, in which Beijing frequently called on the overseas Chinese to assist in the 
development of their ancestral land and to spread revolution. In this way the ethnic 
Chinese became a contentious issue. However, one prominent scholar on ethnic 
Chinese in Southeast Asia argued that Indonesian perceptions of China was the result 
of the projection of its image of domestic Chinese due to the lack of knowledge about 
China among the Indonesians. 34 
3.2. The Nature of the Threat of China: A Linkage between Domestic and Foreign 
Dimensions 
A. The Roots of Rivalry between the Anny and the PKI 
33 See, Ariel Heryanto, "Nonpribumi: Apakah Ada? " (Non-pribumi: Is There Any? ], Forim Keadilan, 
No. 13, Vol. VII, 5 October 1998. 
34 Leo Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians, the Chinese Minority, and China: A Study of Perception and 
Policies (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann, 1978), p. 165. 
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Early suspicion of the army leaders towards the PKI and communism 
originated from the September 1948 Madiun affair during which they launched a coup 
against the weakened central authority. It was at a critical point so the PKI's act was 
considered an unforgivable betrayal of the struggling Indonesian State. Under the 
leadership of its charismatic leader, General A. H. Nasution, the army developed an 
anti-Communists stance among its members. 35 During the liberal democracy period, 
this perception did not materialize into contention as the PKI adopted a more co- 
operative strategy through the parliament. It was during the implementation of the 
Guided Democracy that the army's hostility and suspicion was mounting. Sukarno's 
balancing act to put the army and the PKI as his main pillars backfired and deepened 
the army's hatred towards the communist. 
Domestically, Sukarno had relied on the PKI as his mass political base to 
counter the army. Similarly, a closer relationship with China was a necessity, simply 
because Sukarno shared the rhetoric of revolutionary ideas, and China had been 
generous in supporting Indonesia's fight to regain West Irian and in combating the 
36 creation of the Federation of Malaysia at a later stage. Sukarno did not consider 
China to be posing a danger to Indonesian security, let alone a threat. However, 
Sukarno's closer link with the PKI and China had deepened the army's suspicions of 
the link between these two domestic and external elements. The army tried every 
means to discredit the PKI and weaken its growing influence. The banning of ethnic 
Chinese from residing in the villages and their purge in 1959 was also part of the 
army's effort to reduce the PKI's base in which some of its members were ethnic 
CHnese. More importantly, the army also intended to create problems in the 
relationship of both countries with the aim of dividing Indonesia and China. 
While most of this study focuses on the issue of China as a threat in the 
aftermath of the 1965 attempted coup, it is worth noting that there was a clear 
35 Further discussion on A. H. Nasution, see, C. L. M Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution, 
A Political Biography (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1985). 
36 For discussion on Sukarno's perception of China, see, Hong Liu, "Construct ing, a China Metaphor: 
Sukarno's Perception of the PRC and Indonesia's Political Transformation", Journal ofSoutheast Asian 
Studies 28,1, March 1977. 
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difference in perceptions of external threat between Sukarno and the army leaders. This 
was basically revealed in a study conducted SESKOAD (Sekolah Staf Komando 
Angkatan Darat- the Army Staff and Command College) in 1964 that proposed a 
framework for army thinking on Indonesian foreign policy. 37 This study underlined that 
Indonesia faced a potential threat from the North, and recommended measures to 
counter such a threat. Although both Sukarno and the army used similar language about 
this particular threat, in fact there was an obviously different perception between 
Sukarno's pro-Communism and the arm), leaders anti-Communism. As far as Sukarno 
was concerned, the threat from the North was Western military power activities and 
their involvement in the region, particularly the British colonial and neo-colonial 
presence. Accordingly, the creation of the Malaysian Federation was seen as an attempt 
by the British to maintain a presence in their former colony, which would threaten and 
constrain Indonesia and its anti-colonial allies. Thus to counter this threat, Sukarno 
opted to forge close relations with China now considered a friend. On the contrary, the 
army leadership identified the threat from the North as the communist countries, 
particularly China. 
The army's position coincided NNith Muslim suspicions of the PKI, that had 
been labeled as "atheist" and had undermined their role in rural areas during Guided 
Democracy in mid 1960s. Additionally, the Islamic forces also held grievances as 
Sukarno had effectively curtailed their political influence, due to their involvement in 
the 1950s regional rebellion. The decreasing role of political parties during Guided 
Democracy left the army to directly face the PKI in the balance created by Sukarno. 
The PKI was the strongest civilian political party with an effective organization, 
qualified activists and cadres. The army's competition against the Communists was 
shown by the efforts to prevent any PKI representative from assuming ministerial posts 
during that time. This provoked Sukarno to call that kind of attitude "communist- 
phobia.,, 3 8 This was one of the points that led to the deterioration of the relationship 
37 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asia, 1995), p. 124. 
3' Alfian, Pemikiran dan Perubahan Polifik Indonesia (The Political Thoughts and Changes in 
Indonesia] (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1992), p. 42. 
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between the army and Sukarno, as the latter tried to embrace the PKI in the concept of 
Nasakom (Nationalists, Religion and Communism) under Guided Democracy. 
However, the most sensitive issue for the army was the PKI's plan to create a 
so-called "fifth service" militia of the Indonesian armed forces. The leadership of the 
army had rejected the Communist initiative from the very beginning, because it was 
fully aware that arming the peasants and laborers and thus creating a semblance of a 
people's army would mean the creation of a rival force which would be completely 
under the influence of the PKI. 39 While the PKI tried to win Sukarno's approval and 
his position seemed to be ambivalent, China persuaded Sukarno to go through with this 
plan. During his visit to Jakarta in 1965, it was reported that Chou En-lai discussed the 
issue with Sukarno and urged him to comply with the PKI's proposal to arm the 
peasants and laborers in order to intensify the struggle against imperialism and 
colonialism. According to court proceedings after the 1965 coup, the air force chief of 
staff, Marshall Umaf Dhani testified before a military trial that a short while before the 
attempted coup he had been sent to Beijing by Sukarno to arrange for the delivery of 
arms for a hundred thousand new recruits, which the Chinese government had 
promised to provide. 40 
In the end, the coming of the New Order was the culmination of domestic 
rivalry between the PKI and the army in which the latter received support from the 
Islamic forces. Given their rivalry and the depth of hostility, the competition was 
becoming a zero-sum-game, in which a win at one side was meant to be a total loss to 
the other side. In this case, the army has won the competition against the PKI. 
Accordingly, the army that dominated the New Order pursued a policy of viewing the 
PKI, communism and China as threats to Indonesia. It is in this context that the army 
would always try to eliminate, to prevent its revival and to cut its link- with any external 
forces. 
B. Ideological Factor: A Tbreat to Pancasila 
3'A, cy,, un, c,, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945-1965, p. 441. 
40 Ibid. 
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In his speech on 17 August 1954, Sukarno underlined his role -as the founder 
and not the creator of the state ideology of Pancasila. 41 Ironically, amidst protest and 
demonstration against him in the aftermath of the coup, the MPRS (Provisional 
People's Consultative Assembly) issued a decision that contained the elaboration of 
Sukarno's deviation (penyelewengan) in the implementation of Pancasila during the 
"Old Order" period. The consequence of deviation from Pancasila was the communist- 
inspired coup attempt of 30 September 1965. It was in this background that Suharto 
received a full mandate from the MPRS to make a total correction from the previous 
deviation. In implementing the mandate, Suharto then embarked on efforts to develop 
Indonesia's ideology of Pancasila by redefining its role, meaning as well as its 
implementation. Thus the communist and the PKI threat was considered in the context 
of their potential implication on the development of the ideology of Pancasila. 
Ironically, there had not been much open discussion as to how the teaching of 
communism as an ideology would threaten the ideology of Pancasila. This was quite 
understandable given the totalitarian nature of the New Order regime. Instead, the 
banning of communism and the PKI from Indonesia on 12 March 1966 was claimed to 
eliminate the possibility of communism jeopardizing Pancasila. Subsequently, in its 
meeting in July 1966, the MPRS decided to prohibit the teaching of communism. The 
New Order then sought to discredit communist ideology as a negative ideology through 
various measures. All books, teachings, writings and anything related to communism 
were outlawed. Why was ideology so important? The answer is because of its ability to 
unite the population or to explain why the people are bound together into socio- 
political and territorial entities, as well as its ability to dictate the form of the 
government that should be in place. 
Indeed, both Sukarno and Suharto used the ideology of Pancasila to unite 
Indonesia and maintain its population intact. Unfortunately, the implementation of 
Pancasila by Sukarno was overtaken by his tumultuous political adventurism in both 
domestic and foreign policy. Meanwhile, Suharto used Pancasila to contradict 
41 See, Rachmat Subagya, Pancasila: Dasar Negara Indonesia [Pancasila: The Foundation of Indonesian 
State] (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Basis, 1955), p. 19-20. 
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communism, simply by arguing that communism. required a form of government that 
was against the objectives of the New Order. The ambiguous concept of a communist 
threat against Pancasila was ffirther supported by one Indonesian prominent political 
scientist who explains that: 
So far we have always been appealed to be vigilant on the possibility of 
the danger of latent communism. Actually, Pancasila is always 
threatened not only from the communists, but also the danger from 
extreme right, that is theocracy, or totalitarianism or etatism. But the 
attention to the danger from the extreme right seemed to be non-existent, 
or replaced by liberalism, individualism, etc., while the danger from the 
extreme left, especially the communist is always over em? hasized, 
although it has never been clear what that is supposed to mean. 
4 
However, in the process of developing ideology one of the characteristics has 
been its vulnerability in its interplay with others. In the process of organizing ideology, 
it can be penetrated, distorted, corrupted or even undermined by contact with other 
ideas. Apparently, the government felt itself to be threatened by the PKI and 
cornmunism. because of their being inspired by Marxist-Leninist teachings. There are 
several reasons why Marxism/Leninism or communism is considered to be anti- 
Pancasila ideology. 43 First, communism is regarded as a totalitarian ideology because 
of its demand to be recognized as the only way of life that covers all aspects of human 
beings. Communism does not only guide social, political, economic and cultural 
aspects, but is also a source of science thinking. Because of its nature, cornmunism, is a 
closed ideology, which does not give any chance for any other thinking and becomes 
dogmatic. Second, the communist teaching was translated into dialectic materialism, 
which begins from materialism as the only reality. Accordingly, conununism follows 
atheism that would not allow the development of religious life. Additionally, the 
aggressive revolutionary nature of the PKI has several times tried to topple the 
legitimate Indonesian government by force and through a being brutal way. Third, 
'2 J. Soedjati Djiwandono, Seiengah Abad Negara Pancasila: Tinjauan Krilis ke Arah Pembaruan [Half 
Century of the Pancasila State: A Critical Overview towards Reformation) (Jakarta: Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, 1995), p. 6. 
43 See, Soerjanto Poespowardojo, "Mengapa Menentang Komunis? Tinjauan dengan Orientasi Pancasila" 
[Why against Communist? An Analysis with Pancasila Orientation], in Alex Dinuth (ed. ), Ke-waspadaan 
Nasional dan Bahaya Laten Komunis [National Vigilance and Communist Latent Danger] (Jakarta: 
Penerbit Intermasa, 1997). 
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communism as an ideology also exhibits the perception of how the reality of society is 
observed. Accordingly, the society is seen in a structural context. Fourth, according to 
Marx, the history of the society is the history of class struggle. In the end, these factors 
are definitely against the ideology of Paneasila, which is considered to be an open 
ideology, which rejects the base of materialism, and considers the society as an integral 
unit, and is contrary to the idea of class struggle. 
Nevertheless, the government actively conducted a series of training exercises 
for government officials within which the issue of a threat to Pancasila became one of 
its main focuses. This training was mostly given by military officials who were 
involved in the intelligence service. In this regard, one of the sources distributed among 
the participants reveal that communism was indeed perceived as contradicting the five 
principles of Pancasila. First, it was related to the first principle of Belief in God 
Almighty. Pancasila does not allow any activities that are in contradiction and hostile 
to religion. Indeed, communism was described as atheist and antagonistic to the 
religion, and it tended to see contradiction as a lasting reality that should be exploited. 
Second, the principle of humanitarianism contains the recognition that human beings 
should be viewed as the creation of God that inherit rights, dignity and responsibilities 
regardless of their race, origin, religion, social status, sex etc. This principle also 
upholds the value to develop the attitude of helping each other and cooperation with 
other nations. On the contrary, communism is regarded as not recognizing human 
beings as God's creation, rather as "mammals" and "production tools" that are useful 
as long as being productive. 
Third, the principle of Indonesian unity contains the value of nationalism that 
underlines the importance of unity, oneness, national interest, national security and the 
readiness to sacrifice for the interest of the nation and state. This principle also 
encourages the achievement of world peace based on independence, lasting peace and 
social justice. Conversely, communism was characterized by internationalism. For the 
communists, the interest of the party or groups is above everything else, which is 
accompanied by the aspiration to communize the world. Nation and state are not 
considered as important and they would eventually disappear. The communist 
followers were seen as only prepared to sacrifice for the sake of the aspiration of 
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communism and if it is deemed necessary they would create and add contradiction to 
topple the government wherever they are and replace them with a communist one. 
Fourth, it was related to the principle of deliberation and representation that regards 
every citizen as having equal position, right and responsibilities in the process of the 
decision making which are implemented in accordance with deliberation and consensus 
principles. However, the democratic system applied in the communist state is basically 
an individual dictatorship, where power is held by the communist party leader. 
Accordingly, there will be no individual rights in a communist state, while the party 
elite enjoys extraordinary rights that are not available to ordinary citizens. Finally, the 
principle of social justice contains the value and aspiration to realize social justice in 
the life of the Indonesian nation that should be achieved through mutual cooperation 
(gotong royong) and in a family spirit (kekeluargaan). Accordingly, there should be a 
balance between rights and responsibilities in achieving collective welfare. On the 
contrary, the communist was described as not recognizing the existence of individual 
rights, while these rights belong to the state and their utilization is regulated by the 
communist party. These were certainly considered to be against Pancasila. 
C. The Revival of Communisni/the PKI 
In the early years of independence as well as towards the proclamation of 
independence, it appeared that the PKI leaders were still follovAng the Dirnitrov policy, 
which favored cooperation with Western capitalist. Therefore, the communists did not 
play any role nor support proclamation, as they did not reveal their activities openly. 
Additionally, the communist leaders took a different strategy of underground 
resistance, which prevented them understanding the thinking of other Indonesian 
nationalist leaders at that time. Indeed, the New Order also defined communism as a 
latent danger (bahaya laten) which always poses a threat to the security of Indonesia. 44 
The term of latent danger was used to describe the resistance and resilient nature of 
cornmunism and the PKI to endure an unending struggle until their objective to 
44 For the government's official version, see, Materi Balatkom [The Materials on the Latent danger of 
Communism] (Jakarta: Lemhanas, 1988). 
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overthrow the legitimate govemment and to establish an inspired-communist state 
comes into reality. 
Interestingly, to prove this danger the government referred to communist 
struggles way back into the colonial period. Despite the 1948 Madiun Affairs, the 
government exposed the PKI's determination in the struggle to seize power in the 
period before independence. In 1926, for instance, the PKI launched a rebellion against 
the Dutch colonial power that resulted in their being banned from Indonesian soil. 
Three years later, a similar effort to revive the party was also put down by the Dutch. 45 
It was also claimed that in early 1945, when the Indonesian Republic was just six 
months old, the then so called "Red PKI" in Cirebon of West Java tried to seize power 
by force from the government. 46 Therefore, the 1965 coup attempt was not regarded as 
the end of the communist/PKI struggle, as the government anticipated that they would 
make every effort to make a come back. One study showed that a typical response from 
the military officials- when asked about the nature of the threat to the New Order was 
"the PKI will never give up its attempts to seize power by armed struggle, turn 
Indonesia into a communist state, and destroy Pancasila. 47 
The government strongly believed that the failure of the coup attempt did not 
halt the activities of the PKI to revive and conduct subversive acts against the 
legitimate government. After the coup, the first attempt conducted by D. N. Aidit was to 
salvage the party by denying PKI's involvement and by taking refuge behind Sukarno 
so as not to dissolve the party. Additionally, Aidit instructed a people's armed struggle 
strategic party. However, along with the weakening position of Sukarno, the PKI was 
further pushed out, especially after the army's special force (RPKAD) persecuted Aidit 
and his followers in Solo in October 1965. Indeed, to anticipate the possible revival of 
communism/the PKI, the army continuously demanded "strong vigilance" against a 
45 Soetopo Soetanto, "Kaum Komunis Tidak Ikut Dalarn Mempersiapkan Berdirinya Negara Indonesia 
Merdcka7 [The Communist did not participate in the Establishment of Indonesian Independence], in Alex 
Dinuth, Kewaspaddan Nasiona, p. 18-19. 
46 The Department of Information of the Republic of Indonesia, Indonesian Government Policy in 
Dealing with the G-30-SIPK-I (The 30'h September Movement of the Indonesian Communist Party) 
Detainees (Jakarta: The Department of Information, 1978). 
47 Sukma, Restoration ofDiplomatic Relations, p. I 11. 
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communist revival. In June and July 1966, for instance, army leaders warned that the 
PKI/Gestapu had changed its strategy by launching an underground guerrilla war. The 
area that was used as a power base of the PKI was in the suburbs of southern Blitar, 
Pandan, Kelud/kawi, Lawu and Banyuwangi. The aim was to revive the PKI by 
applying "desa mengepung kota" (villages besieging cities). 
Suharto also clearly stated that elements of Gestapu were trying to destabilize 
. 
48 
the country The anny leaders' claim over the Communist revival at that time was 
proven as the PKI were claimed to have struck back. In January 1967, the Jakarta 
Military Commander, Major General Amir Machmud, provided an extensive report 
indicating that the PKI had been able to reorganize the New Central Committee in 
West Java lead by Sudisman, a PKI politburo member before the abortive coup. In 
Central and East Java it was found that Rewang alias Karto (PKI central Java 
Chain-nan) and Ruslan Widjajasastra (PKI East Java Chairman) set up an underground 
party "Central Conunittee. "49 The PKI forces were reportedly undertaking subversion 
within the territory of Indonesia through acts of terrorist operations, such as those 
perpetrated by various groups under code names such as PKI Malam (Night PKI) and 
Kuying Hitam (Black Cat). The army continued its war to eradicate the PKI and its 
sympathizers. Having been squeezed from its main territory in Central Java, the PKI 
remnant seemed to move its base to East Java led by the Politburo member, Rewang, 
Oloan Hutapea, and Ruslan Widjajasastra (the East Java Leader). They based their 
movement in an isolated region south of Blitar in which the poor infrastructure 
permitted the PKI refugees to carry out their activities unhindered for some time. 50 
To maintain its position as a nationalist and staunchly anti-Con-anunist force, 
the military often reported the activities of the PKI remnants. The military officers 
continued to keep the issue alive by repeatedly stating that the Indonesian people would 
49 Cited in van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism Since the 1965 Coup", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLIII, 
No. 1, Spring 1970. 
49 van der Kroef, Ibid. p. 36-37. 
50 Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia. Revised edition (London: Cornell University 
Press, 1993), pp. 224-228. 
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always be vigilant because the cornmunists would always try to rebuild the PKI. 
51 In 
February 1972, for example, Suharto stated that, "the Indonesian Communists will try 
with every means to revive the Cornmunist Party, through all ways and channels, from 
outside and inside. 52 In the mid 1970s, particularly in the wake of student 
demonstration ABRI stepped up its campaign against the threat of Communists and 
again stated the "latent danger" of communist remnants in Indonesia and linked the 
student movements with that of the communists endless efforts to disrupt national 
stability and even overthrow the government. To add credibility to thýis claim, in 
February 1974, the Minister of Defense and Security, General M. Panggabean stated 
that an investigation of the incident indicated that there were subversive movements 
that had been directed by the PKI as well as by "some elements of political parties. ? )53 
Furthermore, since the Malari incident, the campaign against communists increased, 
and the discovery of new communist networks and activities were widely reported in 
the Indonesian press, thus establishing the fact that the Communists threat indeed still 
existed. 54 While the true nature of the findings was still questionable, none of the 
Indonesian mass media dared to question these facts, as government control over the 
press was very tight. 55 
China's Interference 
It has been the traditional belief of the New Order leaders that Cfiýina was 
involved in the 1965 abortive coup. There are two opinions that should be mentioned 
` One of the examples was the PKI remnants that were involved in an armed insurgency in West 
Kalimantan. it was carried out by two guerrilla organizations in part legacy of Confrontation, Pasukan 
Gerilya Rakyat Sarawak (People's Guerrilla Army Sarawak operating in the western, and Pergerakan 
Rakyat Kalimantan Utara (North Kalimantan People's Movement-Paraku) in eastern border. See The 
Guardian, August 21,197 1. 
52 As quoted in Justus van der Kroef, "Before the Thaw: Recent Indonesian Attitudes Towards People's 
China, " Asian Survey, Vol. XIII, No. 5, May 1973, p. 517. 
53 Antara, February 16,1974. 
54 See Antara, 2 February 1974,13 August 1974 and 27 December 1974; Berita Buana, 15 February Cý 
1974; Merdeka, 19 February 1974; Berita Yudha, 15 April 1975 and 12 June 1974; Angkalan 
Bersenjata, 16 June 1974; and Pelita, 5 August 1974. 1 
55 The government can easily revoke the right of the publisher to publish newspapers. In the name of 
national security interest, the right permit to publish newspaper may at any time be withdrawn by Minister 
of Information. In Indonesian language, the goveniment's action is known as dibreideL 
0 
102 
with regard to the involvement of China. First, China supported the coup and supplied 
military armaments without the knowledge and control of Indonesian military 
authority. In this regard, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report revealed that there 
has been no strong evidence that China was behind the coup. 56 Chinese officials in 
Beijing knew about the coup six hours after the incident occurred. Meanwhile, the 
medical adviser from Beijing informed D. N. Aidit, one of the PKI leaders, of the 
seriousness of Sukarno's health condition in which case it may eventually have 
encouraged the PKI to launch the coup. However, due to the fact of Aidit's visit to 
China and the fact that the PKI's early preparation for the coup coincided with his 
return from China, a case was developed in which China was indirectly accused of 
inspiring the coup. Second, Beijing did not support the coup on the grounds that the 
political situation in Indonesia before September 1965 was favorable to China. 'Ilius 
there was no reason for Beijing not to maintain the situation. At the same time, it was 
also nearly impossible for the PKI to receive orders from Beijing. 57 
Although the exact involvement of China in the event is still debatable and 
difficult to prove, what is more important is that the New Order perceived it in that 
way. China was portrayed to be the force that would always try to interfere in the 
domestic affairs of Indonesia. China's policies and attitude following the incident 
seemed to substantiate this perception. As published through its mass media, the 
Chinese government was very hostile to the New Order regime by accusing the 
Indonesian new government of being the result of collusion between right-wing 
military regime and imperialism, revisionism and reactionaries of the world. 58 Indeed, 
China gave the impression of continuing support to the remnants of the PKI in 
Indonesia. In September 1967, for instance, China announced that "people's armed 
forces" in North Borneo "in recent months scored several remarkable victories in 
attacks against the enemy. "59 The New Order government also accused China of 
56 US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Indonesia-1965: The Coup that Backfired (Washington DC: 
Library of Congress, 1968), especially pp. 216-235. 
57 See, Peter van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Supportfor Wars of National 
Liberation (Berkeley: California University Press, 1970), especially pp. 10 1-I 10. 
58 Hsinhua News Agency, 5,6 and 12 September 1966. 
59 Quoted in van der Kroef, "The Sino-Indonesian Rupture, " China Quarterly, No. 33 (January-March 
10^3 
sending its agents to and masterminding the guerrilla "people's war" along the 
Indonesian-Sarawak border and even of sending Chinese military officers into 
Indonesia to lead the anti-government resistance. 60 
China's support was also shown by itswillingness to give refuge to the escaped 
PKI leaders and allow them to continuously attack Indonesia from China. One of the 
strongest groups was the one led by the former PKI Politburo member, Jusuf Adjitorop, 
who lived in Beijing and adopted a Maoist orientation. One of the activities of this 
group was campaigning against the New Order government through the publication of 
The Indonesian Tribune that often attacked what they called the "fascist military 
govemmenf' in Indonesia. A so-called Politburo Declaration of 7 August 1966 for 
example appeared in its first edition , stating that the "urgent task" of the Party was for 
"the creation of a united front under PKI-leadership and the development of armed 
struggle to overthrow the fascist regime of Suharto-Nasution. Beijing also sponsored 
the publications of the Afro-Asian Journalists and the Bulletin to be used by Adjitorop 
I group in articulating the new Maoist-PKI program, tactics, and strategy, as well as in 
launching attacks on the New Order government. Chinese mass media was also hostile 
to the New Order govenu-nent, particularly the radio broadcasting that spread 
propaganda. 61 It also continuously called for a general uprising throughout Indonesia, 
62 to which it again offered the "finn support" of the Chinese party and people. Indeed, 
the Suharto government appeared to rely on the dynamics of an officially maintained 
"red scare". 63 
China has undoubtedly been regarded as being anti-Indonesian, actively 
supporting its fellow communists to make a political comeback in Indonesia. The call 
1968), p. 27. 
60 van der Kroef, "Before the Thaw", p. 515. 
61 China broadcast a short wave radio broadcast from Yunan that consisted of support for communist 
movement in Southeast Asia, including the PKI. It was part of China's determination to maintain party- 
to-party relations. 
62 Red Flag, No. 11, July 1967, quoted by Jay Taylor, China and Southeast Asia: Peking's Relations with 
Revolutionary Movements (London: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 127-128. 
63 van der Kroef, "Before the Thaw", p. 517. 
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for vigilance against the revival of Communism/PKI was therefore not only directed 
against PKI, but it was also waged against foreign elements that had supported them, of 
which China was believed to have been the most likely. More importantly, there had 
also been allegations of China's involvement in helping a communist comeback in 
Indonesia. Occasionally, the army leaders presented proof of China's continued 
interference. In mid-June 1974, for instance, the Commander of the West Kalimantan 
Military Region Brigadier General Seno Hartono announced the involvement of ethnic 
Chinese in the rebellions in West Kalimantan was "a link in the struggle of the 
overseas Chinese in this region to try and become a class grouping of their own, which 
seeks power over the native born. in social and political sense. "64 This has been used as 
an example of a threat posed by the link between the local ethnic Chinese residing in 
Indonesia, and mainland China. 
E. The Ethnic Chinese Element 
The New Order underlined that the history of the 1965 coup attempt noted the 
involvement of Chinese support and the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia (BAPERKI) 
which created the reaction of the people towards Chinese representatives and ethnic 
Chinese in Indonesia. Since the communist threat will always be present along with 
their strategic struggle to communize the world, therefore the cornmunists would 
always use the overseas Chinese as personnel and logistic supports. 
Thus, apart from communism, the PKI and the factor of China, the New Order 
considered the presence of ethnic Chinese minority in Indonesia as another source of 
threat to Indonesia's security. There had been a general suspicion, particularly among 
the army officers, which alleged the ethnic Chinese were acting as an important link 
between the PKI and China. Such suspicions can be seen from several considerations. 
First, many of the ethnic Chinese community allegedly supported the PKI, which was 
well known for its policy of defending the ethnic Chinese. 65 Second, there had been a 
64 Angkolan Bersenjala, 20 June 1974. 
65 Nearly all experts on Indonesia's politics, such as George McTurnan Kahin, Herbert Feith and Donald 
Hindley argued that the significant financial support for the PKI come from ethnic Chinese, ordinary 
people and possibly from foreign communist parties, especially Chinese Embassy in Jakarta. See, for 
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strong assumption among the military leaders that Communist Chinese agents were 
among the Chinese who were legally still Chinese citizens. Third, as a consequence of 
the close link between the PKI and ethnic Chinese, the Muslim groups had their own 
grievances. Apart from their hostility to the PKI, which was considered atheist, many 
Muslims lost their land properties as a result of the unilateral land reform launched by 
the PKI in rural areas during the 1960s. The situation led the Muslim group to forrn an 
anti-Chinese alliance with the army. Last but not least, after the abortive coup of 1965, 
, Arith the destruction of the PKI, the perceived "ethnic Chinese connection" became the 
core of Indonesia's threat perception of China. 
This small community, compared to the whole population of Indonesia, has 
been seen as a meeting point between domestic and external threats to Indonesia. It is 
in this context that the prevailing stereotypes among Indonesian political leaders 
towards the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, as discussed earlier, played a role by finiher 
undermining and exaggerating their position and linking them with China. In this 
regard, Suryadinata argued that the majority of Indonesian leaders had no contact 
experience with China, and they had only knowledge of local ethnic Chinese. 66 
Therefore, it was logical that they projected their knowledge about Indonesian ethnic 
Chinese (Tionghoa) towards China. A survey conducted in 1968 towards most 
Indonesian leaders revealed that the majority of them considered China as aggressive 
not merely because of communism, but also because of its Chineseness. 67 
in order to maintain the threat posed by ethnic Chinese elements, the New 
Order government has frequently exposed findings to enforce their suspicion through 
announcements by the military commanders, which reiterated the involvement of 
ethnic Cl-dnese in financing the Communists underground in certain areas. In 
November 1968, for instance, it was reported that the army had found documents in a 
number of Central Java towns indicating that the ethnic-Chinese in Semarang had been 
instance, Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1961-1963 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1964). 
66 Leo Suryadinata, Dilema Minoritas Tionghoa [The Dilemma of Tionghoa Minority] (Jakarta: Graffiti 
Press, 19), p. 176. 
6' Franklin B. Weinstein, The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia (Dissertation, Cornell University, 
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financing the PKI. 68 In the following year, similar revelations were also reported in 
Jakarta, Bandung and Yogyakarta in which a new Conununist underground party, the 
Partai Nasional Merah Indonesia [Indonesian National Red Party] has been found. 
Interestingly, the majority of its members were said to be "foreign Chinese and 
Indonesian nationals of Chinese extraction". 69 
The government's effort to discredit and link the ethnic Chinese with the PKI 
and communism as well as China did not have any difficulty in receiving wide spread 
support from ordinary Indonesians. Despite the strong position of the government, this 
was due to the presence of stereotypes and suspicion towards ethnic Chinese. The 
government's campaign to discredit China after the 1965 coup attempt has brought a 
negative implication towards the ethnic Chinese. The government's policy to change 
the use of word "Tiongkok/Tionghoa" with the word "Cina', 70 created confusion as the 
term carries two connotations of referring to the Chinese government and ethnic 
Chinese in Indonesia. Subsequently, the strong anti-China feeling after the 1965 
abortive coup and government's campaign to integrate ethnic Chinese into Indonesian 
society by using the term "Cina" has put them in a politically vulnerable position. 
While political participation has been limited, they were given an unlimited leverage 
and access in the economic field .71 As a result, they were more involved in the 
economic activities, thus preventing them from integrating with Indonesian pribumi. 
3.3. Functional Role of China as a Tlireat: Facilitating the Creation of Stability, 
Economic Development and Regional Security 
1972), pp. 288-305. 
68 van der Kroef, "Indonesia, Communist China, and the PKI, " pp. 29-30. 
69 Ibid. p. 4 1. 
70 The Indonesian Government circulars note No. SE-06/Pres. Kab/6/1967. 
71 In line with the emphasis of development, a number of ethnic Chinese have benefited from doing 
business through its close relations with the army. The main advantages for them had been the availability 
of protection to their business, while for the army the reason is financial one. See, "Konglomerasi ABRI. 
Pengantar: Bisnis dengan Sepatu Lars dan Laras Panjang" [Conglomeration of ABRI. Introduction: 
Conducting Business with Army-shocs and Barrel of Rifle], dispatch from Siar New Service, 5 November 
1998. 
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A. Domestic Function: A Source of Legitimacy 
What have been the functions of the threat of China in Indonesia's domestic 
politics? First, it is concerned with Suharto. When Suharto took charge of security in 
the aftermath of the abortive coup, he and his army supporters lacked the justification 
and legitimacy to assume full control of Indonesian politics. Suharto then took the 
initiative and blamed the PKI and its link with China. In addressing the National 
Independence Day on 17 August 1967, Suharto made it clear that Beijing has been 
involved in Gestapu and continued to support subversion in Indonesia. Indeed, 
Suharto's decision to implicate China was supported by domestic reality in which the 
hostility towards the PKI and China was running high. However, it was the military 
that pressurized Suharto through the convening of student mass demonstrations. The 
military was not alone as the Islamic faction supported them. 
In the end, as one scholar noted, Suharto must have felt that he was hardly in a 
position to curb the anti-Chinese demands by its own principal sources of support, the 
militantly anti-Beijing students and their army patrons in the capital. 72 He was faced 
with a situation in which any delay in severing diplomatic relations with China might 
have reduced popular support. On the contrary, a swift severance would strengthen his 
government legitimacy. Therefore, Suharto's New Order policy to break diplomatic 
relations with China was essentially to fulfil domestic requirements, particularly a 
demand from his main supporters, the military. In return, Suharto won the heart of 
military officials. There is no doubt that strong support from the military would also 
strengthen Suharto's chance and confidence in consolidating his power at the expense 
of Sukarno. In the end, he was able to increase the legitimacy of his authority and his 
own popularity. Consequently, Suharto's success would always be judged by his ability 
to combat the communist/PKI threat as well as in containing China's threat. 
Second, it relates to the role of the military. It has been understood that the 
concept of China as a threat revolved around the issues of the revival of communism, 
the problem of the ethnic Chinese minority, and the attitude and behavior of the 
72 van der Kroef, Ibid. p. 42. 
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People's Republic of China. The military strongly believed that the PKI remnants were 
still active in Indonesia and at any time would always try to rebuild the Party. Since the 
independence period, the military has always claimed to be the vanguard of Indonesia. 
Thus in the aftermath of the 1965 attempted coup, again they maintained its stature as 
the force that had been able to unite the country and to overcome the communists 
threat. This* kind of threat, which might resurface, was still considered as a strong 
possibility, especially, of course, with help from China. Thus, the perception of the 
threat of China was still linked to the domestic circumstances in which the PKI 
remnants were regarded as bahaya laten (latent danger) and would endlessly try to 
rebuild their power base. Therefore, the existence of potential and real threats from 
Communists has functioned to maintain the role of the military in Indonesian politics. 
In fact, their concern over the revival of the communist that they may threaten internal 
stability, was not the only reason. The more important issue dealt with here was the 
question of the potential challenge to regime legitimacy from other forces, either within 
the ruling elite or society at large, or both. In Indonesia's New Order, there was a 
"national consensus" about a Communist revival as a threat to national security, but the 
threat to regime legitimacy was also closely tied up with the overall question of internal 
stability and national security. Therefore, the ability of the government, particularly the 
military, to contain this threat may have increased the legitimacy of the New Order as a 
whole. 
The military even assumed a significant role in the context of political stability 
and national development. They had justified their role as bringing benefit for 
Indonesians. ABRI's role in Indonesian politics was also seen as a "stabilizer and 
dynamiser" of society and the vanguard of national unity. While it was generally 
understood that ABRI had a special status in its defense and social-political role, in 
development matters they have gone ftirther by entering and playing in the economic 
sector. How did this happen? According to Richard Lowrey, 73 the tradition dates back 
to the 1950s when Suharto, then a colonel, headed the Diponegoro division in Central 
Java. He formed business partnerships with two entrepreneurs, 74 who today rank 
7' For detail and further discussions on army's business, see Richard Lowrey, The Armed Forces of 
Indonesia (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996). 
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among the most powerful tycoons in Indonesia. At the same time, each branch of the 
armed forces plays their own part in the economic field by developing their own 
business empire. 76 T'hus the implementation of dual function has gone further to 
infiltrate the economic sector beyond their original purposes. 
Third, it is concerned with the creation of stability and order. In an effort to 
counter the challenge to the government, particularly from student demonstrations, the 
military always used anything associated with communism as a pretext to discourage 
student protests with the argument that their actions would provide an opportunity for 
the conununists to incite disturbances, and use them for their own purposes. There 
were some examples confirming the military's attitudes. In May 1971, the Commander 
of the Jakarta Military Region Major-General Poniman stated that, "there were people 
who sought to undermine the Pancasila and the Constitution; their activities must be 
stopped in order to prevent their destructive aspirations from growing into a force 
potentially harmful to national stability.,, 77 In the following year, the Restoration of 
Security and Order Command (Komando Keamanan dan Ketertiban-KOPKAMTIB) 
had banned all student movements by arguing that they posed a threat to security and 
public order, authority, and national stability. 78 In its view, such activities would 
provide an opportunity for the remnants of the PKI and extreme subversive groups to 
misuse and manipulate them. 79 The concern over the conununist threat was again 
expressed in November 1973 when the Deputy Commander of KOPKAMTIB asked 
all segments of society "to refrain from creating conditions that the communist 
remnants could easily exploit for their political ends. " 
7' They are Liem S ioei Liong and Bob Hassan. 
75 See, "Its Payback Time: Suharto may have bowed out, but Indonesians are eager to get hold of his 
family's ill-gotten wealth, " Time, June 15,1998. 
76 See "Civilian Concerns: Army's Business Operations Obstruct Civilians, " and "Indonesia's Army: The 
Power behind the Throne", Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 February 1998. 
77 Asian Research Bulletin, 1-31 May 197 1, p. 31.173. 
71 See, "Restoration of Peace, Security and Order (Kopkamtib, Its Past Story", Gatra, No. 12, Vol. 111,8 
February 1997. 
79 Ibid. 
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Fourth, it relates to the unity of Indonesia. Indonesia consists of various 
differences in many ways. The founding fathers of Indonesia realized that Indonesia 
was a weak state in the sense that there were few common shared values, culture and 
even ethnicity. Historically, internal conflicts and national cleavage always 
characterized the state of Indonesia. During the revolutionary period, internal conflict 
did not come to the surface as the state was facing a common enemy, namely the Dutch 
colonial power. The unity of the state was threatened during the implementation of 
liberal democracy. The reason was there was simply no common enemy during that 
time, while elite leaders were preoccupied with strengthening their power base. In the 
end, Sukarno, supported by the army, was able to point to an external enemy that 
enabled the country to stand behind him, particularly in the case of West Irian. It 
appeared that the New Order realized the importance of the presence of an external 
enemy to unite the country. Whether the portrayal of China was just a coincidence or 
by design, what matters is that the New Order under Suharto's leadership has been 
united against the danger of communism/the PKI and China. Indeed, the importation of 
an external threat has enabled the creation of stability and order. 
B. The Realization of Stability and Economic Development 
Having consolidated power and gained political stability by the early 1970s, the 
New Order government began to turn its full attention to economic development. It 
came as no surprise as Indonesia inherited economic disarray, such as a negative 
growth, 600 percent inflation, zero foreign reserves, and a national debt of over $US 2 
billion. 80 In this regard, Suharto has clearly shown discontinuity from his predecessor 
by rejecting communism and introducing a pro-West economic PoliCY. 8 I In order to 
gain sympathy, trust and confidence from the Western donors, Suharto pursued his 
economic development program to be engineered by his economics ministers who had 
an American education background, which was later known as "The Berkeley 
so Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto: Order. Development and Pressure for 
Change (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 33. 
8' Sukarno rejection to western or foreign donors was based on his dislike of the West and belief that this 
policy may have distanced himself from his supporters. On the contrary, Suharto policy to foreign donors 
was intended to strengthen his legitimacy by developing the Indonesian economy. 
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Mafia. "82 Ile Western powers, particularly the US, had no hesitation in supporting 
Suharto, and even the latter was considered as relieved from the fear that Indonesia 
would succumb to the communist blocs especially after the fall of South Vietnam in 
1975. 
Indonesia inunediately restored its link with non-communist countries, and 
international finance institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank. Indonesia's "problem" was subsequently addressed in a multilateral 
meeting with Western creditor countries to schedule repayment of international debts 
and to gain new loans and aid. As a result of that meeting, Indonesia met regularly with 
these western creditors who had formed themselves into an informal grouping: "Inter- 
Governmental Group on Indonesia" (IGGI). Foreign aid initially came to help develop 
Indonesia through the IGGI, chaired by the Netherlands in 1967.83 Indonesia then took 
a series of five-year step-by-step development plans that emphasized different aspects 
in each stage. 84 The increase of oil prices in 1973, and high prices until 1982, played an 
important role in the effort of the New Order to develop Indonesia. This development 
process had been boosted by the increase in the price of oil as Indonesia's main 
com. modity amounted by thirty times. 85 
Indeed, under Suharto, Indonesia departed from the idea of socialism 
introduced by Sukarno, and Suharto was more inclined to follow the pattern of 
capitalism. The policy approach adopted by the New Order government contrasted 
82 Those ministers were: Prof. Widjojo Nitisastro, Mohammad Sadli, Emil Salim, and Ali Wardhana. 
See, Richard Robison, The Rise of Capital in Indonesia (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986). 
93 The Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) was dismantled at Suharto's request after the 1991 
Dili incident. Suharto rejected the idea of linking foreign aid and human rights as was done by the Dutch. 
In a sharp language, Suharto asked the Dutch to halt the IGGI work. Later on Indonesia was able to form 
a new body called the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (the CGI), excluding the Dutch. 
84 Indonesia implemented a series of five-years plans; the first plan, Repelita 1 (1969 - 1973) emphasized 
on increased production of staple goods and infrastructure development; Repelita 11 (1974 - 1978) on 
agriculture, employment and regionally equitable development; Repelita 111 (1979 - 1983) on 
development of agriculture-related and other industries; Repelita IV (1984 - 1988) on basic industries; 
Repelita V (1989 - 1993) on transport and communications; and Repelita VI (1994 - 1998) on Science 
and Technology. Since mid-1983 Suharto has been awarded as Bapak Pembangunan - the father of 
development. 
g5 In 1972, Indonesian crude oil sold less than $US3 a barrel, and by 1980 it reached over $US 30 per 
barrel. 
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sharply with the heavily interventionist policies of the Sukarno government. Other 
measures taken by the new government included re-an-angement of the exchange rate 
system, increasing domestic productivity, issuing a regulation on foreign investment. 
The process of economic recovery was relatively smooth and swift since the New 
Order government was concerned with restoring and rehabilitating an economy that 
had been producing at 20-30 per cent capacity, a badly damaged economic 
infrastructure, very low levels of trade, negligible foreign exchange reserves and 
hyperinflation. 86 By adopting a staunch anti-Communist state, the NeNý Order regime 
has indeed been able to gain economic and political support from the West. In line with 
the general trend, the Western powers tended to ignore the violations of human rights 
and civilian freedom, as otherwise communism would take power. In the end, 
economic development was pursued at the expense of civil and political rights. Indeed, 
the security approach was the approach of the New Order, simply because the creation 
of stability was a prerequisite for economic development. However, stability should not 
only be understood in the context of domestic politics, as Indonesia tried to widen the 
concept by encouraging stability in its environment, particularly the Southeast Asian 
region. 
C. Facilitating the Creation of Regional Co-operation 
Suffice it to say that following quiet diplomacy and an exploration of the areas 
of congruence and convergence in the aspirations of the various nations, ASEAN was 
created on 8 August 1967. It occurred during the historic meeting in Bangkok attended 
by the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand. The meeting agreed to the signing of the ASEAN Declaration (The Bangkok 
Declaration) and to establish a new and vibrant regional organization. Nevertheless, 
ASEAN did not start from scratch, but thanks to the legacy of its predecessor, the 
ASA 87 (the Association of Southeast Asian) and the Maphilind088 (Malaysia, 
86 Mari Pangestu, "Economic Policy reform in Indonesia", The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. XVII, No. 3, 
Third Quarter, 1989, p. 219. 
87 The Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was established on 31 July 1961. It consisted of the 
governments of Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand and was expected as a replacement of the SEATO 
(South-East Asia Treaty Organization) that was regarded as the extension of the US's hand in Southeast 
Asia region. The ASA never worked because of the intensity of conflicts between its members (the 
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Philippines and Indonesia) that left a constructive foundation from which ASEAN have 
learned. First, the ASA's diplomatic framework was incorporated into ASEAN's 
structure, as were many of its aims. Second, Maphilindo provides the foreign policy 
stance of non-alignment. Third, the shortcomings and ultimate failure of both the ASA 
and Maphilindo forcibly illustrated the dangers that political differences could pose to 
any regional organization. But the most important legacy left to ASEAN was the habit 
of consultation and the concept of Southeast Asian regionalism. 89 
Aware of the bitter experiences of the intertwined links between domestic 
problems and the interference of major powers in the affairs of Indonesian politics, the 
New Order regime emphasized the importance of protecting Indonesia's security and 
territorial integrity from external threats through both inward and outward looking 
strategies at the national and regional levels. At the national level Indonesia promoted 
the development of national resilience (ketahanan nasionao. 90 It does not emphasize 
military strength, but rather a balanced resilience in all aspects of national life, 
encompassing ideological, political, social, and economic as well as defense and 
security fields. Economic development is regarded as the foundation for all the other 
components of national resilience. To ensure its national resilience the country must 
fin-ther avoid involvement in ideological confrontation and bloc politics, be they 
military, racial or religious blocs. 
Philippines and Malaya over the former's claim to Sabah) and the onslaught of the Confrontation by 
January 1963 in which the Philippines supported Indonesia. 
'a Maphilindo is an acronym taken from the first part of its three members. The organization never 
materialized beyond its declaratory establishment and failed to assume any institutional form. The reason 
was simply because of the absence of common purposes. For the Philippines, it was mainly aimed at 
preventing the creation of the Federation of Malaysia in which the northern Borneo would be part of it, 
by providing an alternative for confederation of nations of Malay origin. For Indonesia, it was done so as 
to give a flattering gesture to the Philippines. As far as Malaysia was concerned, joining the organization 
was expected to help facilitate the acceptance of Malaysia Federation by Indonesia and the Philippines. 
'9 Jonathan Rigg, Southeast Asia: A Region in Transition (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 208. 0 
90 National resilience is defined as the ability of a nation to cope with, endure and survive any kind of 
challenges or threats in the course of her struggle to achieve her national goals. "Dengan Konsepsi 
Ketahanan Nasional Kita Atasi Segala Tantangan" [With the Concept of National Defense We Overcome 
all the Challenges], Information Bulletin, no. 22/Pen/ind/72, Singapore, Indonesian Embassy, 25 
February 1972. 
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Suharto's effort to pursue economic development linked national security and 
regional security in which the achievement of the former would strengthen the latter. 91 
His concept of regional security is based on the fact that on many occasions the 
domestic problem had been complicated and worsened by the involvement of major or 
outside powers. Thus the exclusion of external powers from the arrangement of 
regional matters is paramount to the foreign policy of the New Order. In the end, this is 
the reaffirmation of the independent and active foreign policy. Indonesia also places the 
Southeast Asian region as its first danger zone area against external threat. Therefore, 
by working closely with her neighbours within ASEAN, Indonesia should then be able 
to advance socio-economic progress aimed at eliminating social and economic 
deprivation in order to undermine the appeal of, at that time, communist revolution. 
Stability in her neighbouring countries will in itself strengthen Indonesia's defense. By 
participating in ASEAN co-operation, at least Indonesia strengthens her defense against 
possible external attack. 
Additionally Indonesia's participation also increases its bargaining power vis-A- 
vis other countries' positions. Morrison and Suhrke, for example, explain how ASEAN 
may enhance the overall bargaining positions of the members. 92 A study by Dewi 
Fortuna Anwar on Indonesia in ASEAN has innovated, albeit within the confines of 
traditional foreign policy history, in providing insights on the linkages between national 
and regional. She further argues that ASEAN has served Indonesia! s interest as an 
international bargaining toot and as a buffer against external threat and subversion. 
Over all, the functions of ASEAN for Indonesia are as: a contributor to Indonesia's 
good name; a contributor to regional harmony; a vehicle for a more autonomous 
regional order; an international bargaining tool; and enhancing Indonesia! s stature. 93 
While a combined power of ASEAN in terins of military power seems uneven, at least 
91 The effort to pursue national resilience will strengthen the regional resilience, that is their ability to deal 
with external power or any changes brought about by external environment. The ASEAN approach to 
security is similar to the one which was firstly introduced by Japan in the seventies known as 
"comprehensive security'. However, in Southeast Asia context, ASEAN and Indonesia adopted the term 
"national resilience" and "regional resilience", while Malaysia and Singapore used the term 
"comprehensive security" and "total defense" concept respectively. 
92 Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke, Strategies ofSurvival. The Foreign Policy Dilemmas ofSmaller 
Asian States, (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1978). 
93 See, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEW., Foreign Policy and Regionalism, pp. 196-234. 
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it seems to have worked when it comes to the matter of moral pressure against a 
stronger country. 
Generally, the formation of regional co-operation is possible as long as there is 
a common reaction to the presence of threat. It was this factor that led to the creation of 
ASEAN, the response to internal conflicts as well as the presence of threat following 
the new developments in Indochina, particularly in the wake of the Vietnam War. 
Other opinions emphasize the factor of instability and vulnerability in each of the 
domestic member states, particularly with regard to regime security. In this regard, 
Michael Leifer argues that the ASEAN governments had been motivated to create a 
"collective internal security". 94 Because of similarity in facing security problems, 
regional co-operation is then seen as a way not to complicate the domestic affairs of the 
others. Regime security and domestic vulnerability become important factors in 
encouraging regional co-operation. 
The New Order also maintained that China was not only a threat to its security, 
but it was also a threat to the whole Southeast Asian region. China's support for the 
communist insurgency movement in Southeast Asia was seen as an attempt to create 
instability. China was also regarded as an expansionist and hegemonic power that tried 
to put the entire Southeast Asian region under its "sphere of influence. " Despite 
differences on threat perceptions and foreign policy priorities, a common fear of China 
was one of the key factors that led to the creation of ASEAN. As Bernard Gordon has 
stated, "China's increasing unfriendliness has provided something the 'environment' 
for regional co-operation has long lacked: a common perception of threat. As long as 
that was absent, the concept of regionalism had no special urgency. "95 Therefore, 
Gordon considered the negative incentive of China as the primary element in the 
creation of ASEAN. Another scholar has argued that, "Suharto's decision to stop 
94 Michael Leifer, ASEAN andSecurity in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 2-3. 
95 Bernard K. Gordon, Towards Disengagement inAsia (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1969), 
p. 83. 
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confronting Malaysia and to begin confronting PRC [China] has led him to search for 
,, 96 new allies. 
3.4. Conclusion 
The notion of the threat of China should from the very beginning be understood 
as having two dimensions, namely the external and domestic one. As far as the external 
dimension is concerned, China has been portrayed as inheriting the attitude of the old 
Chinese Empire. Accordingly, the modem state of China is always perceived as an 
expansionist and aggressive power that always tries to expand its influence over 
Southeast Asia. Although there are positive factors that aroused the sympathy among 
Indonesian leaders, in fact the negative perception of China has outweighed the 
positive elements. The events after the opening of diplomatic relations with China 
seemed to reinforce the perception of China as an aggressive and colonial power. This 
perception seemed to be maintained from generation to generation through the teaching 
and the official publication of Indonesian historical textbooks. In effect, China is 
always seen as an external power that would always try to dominate the Southeast 
Asian region, including Indonesia. Contemporary historical experiences seemed to 
strengthen Indonesia's perception of China. It was particularly shown by China's 
efforts to influence the ethnic-Chinese against the Nationalist Taiwan, China's policy 
to protect the ethnic Chinese in the 1950s, and the Chinese Embassy's interference in 
reviving the PKI movement. However, the perception of China as a negative power had 
been formalized through the coming of the New Order. The perception of its elite was 
nothing more than the views prevailing among the military, that is anti-Communist and 
anti China. Therefore, the coming of the New Order was immediately followed by anti- 
Communist policies, namely the elimination of the PKI from the Indonesian political 
map and the freezing of diplomatic relations with China. 
As far as the domestic factors are concerned, the threat of China is always 
associated with the issue of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, which with their small 
96 Sheldon W. Simon, The Broken Triangle. Peking, Jakarta and the PKI (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
Press, 1969), p. 178. 
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number of population has dominated Indonesian economics. Indonesian perceptions 
towards the ethnic-Chinese are not recent phenomena, but they are rather the products 
of long historical experience. However, the social and privileged status conferred upon 
them by the Dutch colonial powers has left a deep hatred among ordinary Indonesians 
for Chinese. The ethnic Chinese attitude during the independence movement 
exacerbated* Indonesian perception towards them, particularly over the question of their 
national loyalty. Indeed, the kinship link and cultural differences added to the 
complexity of Indonesia's perceptions that the ethnic Chinese would never change or 
"once a Chinese, always a Chinese. " Thus the perceived attitude of ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia has enabled China to exert its influence over the ethnic Chinese and 
subsequently to interfere in the domestic affairs of Indonesia. 
In fact, the concept of dueat was a point of contention between Sukarno and the 
military that may go back to the period under the Guided Democracy. For Sukarno, the 
so-called threat from the North was associated with the creation of the Malaysian 
Federation and the British involvement in that process which was considered as-a neo- 
colonialist threat to encircle Indonesia. On the contrary, the military perceived the 
North threat as a danger posed by the communist, notably China. Accordingly, the fall 
of Sukarno which also brought victory to the military meant that it was the views of the 
latter that prevailed in Indonesia. This was particularly evident as the military 
dominated Indonesia's domestic politics. 
The concept and nature of the China threat under the New Order has been 
defined as involving three elements. First, it is against the ideology of Pancasila. 
Indeed, China with its communism was regarded as a danger to the ideology Pancasila 
that does not recognize class struggles. It was indeed perceived as a danger to the 
already diverse Indonesian society. Second, China has also been considered as 
supporting the communist movements in Indonesia, particularly the PKI's effort to 
make a political come back. Finally, China has been accused of interfering in the 
political affairs of Indonesia. Despite support for the PKI, China was also perceived as 
supporting Indonesia's ethnic Chinese who were sympathetic to the communists. 
Indeed, when launching accusation of China's involvement and interference in 
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Indonesian domestic politics, the military also made efforts to justify their claim by 
revealing proof of the former's involvement. 
China as a threat indeed has functioned as a key to the legitimacy of the New 
Order and to be more precise to the role of the military in Indonesian politics. Suharto 
and the military have put themselves forward as the saviors of the state, thus giving a 
source of legitimacy for the New Order regime in pursuing stability. Pointing to 
Communist China as a threat had enabled the New Order to gamer support from the 
anti-Communist Western countries, particularly the United States, in terms of financial 
and political support, that was required to build Indonesia's economy. Additionally, the 
portrayal of Communist China as a threat enabled the New Order to work with its 
neighbouring countries in creating a stable environment in Southeast Asia. The 
subsequent establishment of ASEAN also played an important part in Indonesia's 
course, as the latter did not have to bother about possible external interference while its 
environment was sufficiently secure. 
t 
Chapter Four 
The Development of the Concept of China as a Threat: 
Challenges to Indonesian Perceptions and Foreign Policy 
towards China (1978-1990) 
For more than two decades, the New Order view and perception of China was 
mostly determined by the dynamics and requirements of Indonesian domestic politics. 
In that period, China was regarded as a threat to Indonesia. The rationale of this 
perception was that China as a communist external power, interfered in Indonesian 
domestic affairs, helped revive the PKI and exploited the ethnic Chinese factor in 
Indonesia. This perception was maintained for more than two decades along with its 
translation into foreign policy form that distanced Indonesia from China. Eventually, 
and to the surprise of many observers and some Indonesian elite policy makers, 
Suharto decided to. change Indonesia's rigid position and normalize diplomatic 
relations with China in August 1990. Why did the New Order change its long held 
position towards China? What factors were involved? Did this mean that Indonesia's 
perception of China had changed? What were the sources of this change? 
The achievement of foreign policy objective of reopening diplomatic ties with 
China was by no means a simple one. In this regard, Legg and Morrison stated that the 
costs and benefits of most foreign policy decisions are unevenly distributed, and 
consequently there is usually considerable internal conflict over what foreign policy 
should be. ' Presumably, the move in foreign policy was mainly the result of changes in 
Indonesia's domestic politics. However, the discussion in this chapter takes into 
account three level of analysis. First, it relates the shift to the dynamics of Indonesian 
domestic politico-economics. Second, it takes account of Chinese domestic politico- 
economics, especially after the coming of Deng Xiaoping in 1978. Third, it correlates 
with the developments in regional and global politico-economics, particularly in the 
context of ASEAN and interrelations among the major powers in Asia. 
1 Keith R. Legg and James F. Morrison, "The Formulation of Foreign Policy Objectives" in Richard 
Little and Michael Smith (eds. ), Perspectives on World Politics (London: Routledge, 199 1), p. 59. 
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Accordingly, this chapter will examine and analyze factors that challenged 
Indonesia's perception of China, which eventually led to the normalization of 
diplomatic relations. In so doing, the discussion is divided into five parts. The first part 
focuses on the discourse of Sino-Indonesian relations in Indonesian domestic politics, 
particularly between the proponents and opponents of normalization (1977-1978). The 
second section explores the changes that took place in China and Southeast Asia 
(1978-1985). The main focus is related to the transformation in China as well as its 
implications for foreign policy. The third section deals with Indonesia's perception of 
China after the coming of Deng Xiaoping in 1978. The main discussion in this section 
focuses primarily on forces proposing and opposing the restoration of diplomatic 
relations. The fourth part considers factors that eventually led Indonesia to normalize 
relations with China. The last part analyses how Suharto, finally decided to embark on 
norinalization. 
4.1. China in Indonesian Domestic Politics: Proponents and Opponents of the 
Rapprochement with China (1977-1978) 
Since the very beginning, the New Order's foreign minister, Adam Malik, had 
made it clear that Indonesia never cut its ties with China. Instead, the relations were 
frozen or dibekukan. Although, theoretically the relationship was non-existent, 
Indonesia still recognized China. 2 By maintaining this position, Malik cleverly 
appeased Indonesia's domestic audiences who were determined to completely sever 
ties with China and it would make it easier to restore relations when the time came. 
However, there was no challenge whatsoever to the military and government 
perception of China as a threat. This was mainly due to three conditions. First, the 
military were still actively crushing the PKI and its followers, while the wave of anti- 
communism in Indonesia remained high. Second, the New Order was preoccupied with 
its efforts to create stability. Third, China was still actively supporting Communist 
movements in Southeast Asia, including the PKI. Therefore any idea or suggestion to 
embark on rapprochement with China would have been considered as political suicide. 
2 Indonesia is always consistent in maintaining a one-China policy. Relations with Taiwan are mainly 
confined to trade and economic activities. 
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Eventually, in 1977, the issue of China emerged in the discourse of Indonesian 
domestic politics, particularly the issue of normalization of diplomatic relations. The 
initiative did not originate from domestic sources, rather it was the result of an external 
factor. On his return from China, Papua New Guinea Prime Minister Michael Somare 
visited Indonesia and delivered a signal from China for the improvement of relations. 
While denying he was bringing a message from Beijing, he stated that China was ready 
to open diplomatic relations with Indonesia, should Indonesia be willing to do S0.3 This 
development opened the issue of Indonesia's relations with China, and unavoidably 
attracted opinions among the Indonesian elite and mass media. As predicted, 
Indonesian military leaders expressed skepticism and suspicion. The Deputy Chief of 
the powerful and influential National Coordination Intelligence Agency (BAKIN) Ali 
Murtopo, for instance, stated that there was no urgency to hastily thaw diplomatic 
relations with China, and even warned about intensified communist activity in 
'Mailand 
.4 
Objections to such a move were strong as China appeared to support the ex- 
PKI leadership, particularly by officially receiving Jusuf Adjitorop in May 1977,5 in his 
6 capacity as the Head of the delegation of the PKI . This 
development was interpreted as 
proving that China continued its support for the PKI. 
In October 1977, for the first time under the New Order regime, Malik met his 
Chinese counterpart Huang Hua in New York. It was later revealed that both ministers 
discussed the issue of normalization. In responding to Chinese willingness to reopen 
ties with Indonesia, Malik told his counterpart to be patient. 7 On another occasion, the 
Chinese Deputy Prime Minister was quoted as stating that: "The non-nalization of Sino- 
Indonesian relations depends on President Suharto. Whenever he wants, we are ready 
for it. But if he thinks the situation is not yet ripe, we are willing to wait.,, 8 
Nevertheless, Malik fully realized that the question of normalization remained a 
3 Suara Karya, 15 January 1977. 
' Sinar Harapan, 7 February 1977. 
5 A. Dahana, "Cina dengan Dunia, Asia dan Indonesia [China Nvith the World, Asia and Indonesia], 
Prisma, No. 9, Year 6, September 1977. 
Y. Endi Rukmo, Suara Merdeka, 3 March 1989. 
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sensitive issue in Indonesia as it directly challenged the very notion of the New Order's 
perception of China as a threat. )While continuing his support for normalization, Malik 
underlined that the issue very much depended on developments in Indonesia's 
domestic situation, especially over the security concerns. 
However, against prevailing domestic opposition, Malik often expressed his 
support for normalization. In an interview with a Singaporean newspaper in 1977, he 
surprisingly stated that Indonesia and China had reached an agreement in principle on 
the main issue to be resolved prior to normalization, 9 namely the question of dual- 
nationality. While maintaining that Indonesia was still busy reeducating and registering 
the ethnic Chinese, Malik recognized that the decision to normalize relations rested 
with Indonesia. However, in his view, this objective was conditional upon people 
feeling secure and the government being assured that there was no subversion from 
China. 10 Malik seemed to defy the opinion of military leaders and surprised many of 
them. Nevertheless, -he denied that normalization would be soon realized, instead he 
diplomatically indicated that it "will take place soon. " Malik's repeated calls for 
normalization were designed to keep the issue alive and open for examination, while at 
the same time appeasing military circles by highlighting the necessity of resolving 
problems prior to normalization. 
Parliament's view on normalization was supportive of the goverrunent's 
position. Indeed, the military supported by the Islamic faction and Golkar ruling party 
maintained their suspicion of China. A Member *of Parliament stated that the 
normalization depended on China, as Indonesia could not eliminate the feelings caused 
by past history. " Other members warned that Indonesia should be vigilant towards the 
PRC's approach to ASEAN and Indonesia. 12 Another member from a different party 
Merdeka, 3 October 1977. 
Quoted in Kompas, 8 November 1977. 
9 Sinar Harapan, 9 May 1977. 
10 Antara, 29 July 1977. 
11 Amin Iskandar, Member of Parliament of the Islamic PPP, Antara, 13 November 1977. 
12 Expressed by V. B. da Costa, from the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), Kompas, 25 April 1978. In 
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also expressed his concern about the PRC, this was because of suspicions towards 
China's Political ambition in Southeast Asia. 13 Generally, they shared the opinion that 
it was not timely yet for Indonesia to normalize its relations with China. The bitter 
experience of the involvement of China in the G-30S/PKI and the danger to domestic 
security, particularly towards the national ideology of Pancasila was often put forward. 
Apparently, the views expressed by members of parliament were similar to the view 
that prevailed among ABRI members regarding the danger of China. This fact also 
underlined that parliament was dominated by the presence of the military faction. 
The change at the top level of foreign ministry, with the appointment of 
Mochtar Kusumaatmadja in April 1978, did not bring a breakthrough in the 
relationship between China and Indonesia. He argued that there were still many 
problems to be resolved, particularly the issues of the nationality and loyalty of ethnic 
Chinese and security. Up to this point, it underlined that Indonesian foreign policy 
making on China wds in the* hands of top executive President Suharto who eventually 
concluded the direction of the debate by addressing the issue before the general 
assembly meeting of the MPR in 1978. He stated that, 
There are no obstacles whatsoever to befriend and cooperate with other 
nations that follow social or political systems that are different to us. 
This is the reflection of the implementation of free and active foreign 
policy. These relationships are surely based on the main principles of 
mutual respect and non-interference in the domestic affairs. Based on 
these principles, we are currently developing preparatory activities that 
would enable the restoration of diplomatic relations with the People's 
Republic of China, which are still frozen, while keeping increasing our 
alertness due to past bitter experiences. 14 
Suharto's intervention in the debate guided the direction of Indonesian political 
discourse on China, and set clear preconditions if Indonesia was to have its relations 
with China restored. First, Indonesia recognized the need to normalize diplomatic 
relations with China as part of Indonesia's free and independent foreign policy. Second, 
this context, the PRC also appealed ASEAN to create a united front aimed at combating the interest of 
big powers in Southeast Asia. 
13 Expressed by Kamil Karnka of Golkar, Kompas, 25 April 1978. 
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Indonesia needed assurances and guarantees from China not to interfere in the domestic 
affairs of Indonesia. Third, Sino-Indonesian relations should be based on the principles 
of non-interference and mutual respect. Fourth, past history would remain a factor in 
the development of Sino-Indonesian relations. Fifth, it was recognized that Indonesia 
was in the process of preparing for normalization. 
However, events soon proved that there was still a long way to go on the road 
towards normalization. Indonesia's resistance to responding positively to China's 0 
proposal of restoring diplomatic relations had so far mainly been based on domestic 
considerations. Nevertheless, China's ambiguous attitude towards Southeast Asia as a 
whole, let alone Indonesia, had further lengthened the prospect of normalization. For 
example, during his visit to Malaysia in 1978 Deng Xiaoping stated that China was 
interested in creating good relations with Southeast Asian states on government-to- 
government basis, but he reaffirmed support of the Communist Party of China (CPQ 
for the outlawed ýommuriist parties of the region. 15 On the occasion of the 
commemoration of the 28h anniversary of the PRC in October 1978, he also described 
ethnic Chinese that already held nationality in the country where they lived as 
remaining within the Chinese people's family, although they were also expected to 
strengthen the fhendship between China and those countries. 16 Furthermore, the 1979 
event when China attacked Vietnam through its limited war from 25 February to 5 
March was received with great alarm in Indonesia. It was interpreted as proof that 
China was willing to take military action to protect its fellow Chinese, regardless of the 
fact that they had already become citizens of another country. 17 
In the end, China's initiative to normalize diplomatic relations did not receive a 
positive response from Indonesia. There are three factors that contributed to this 
14 Suharto's Statement before the General Assembly of the MPR, delivered on II March 1978. 
15 Donald H. McMillen, "Ile Maintenance of Regional Security in the Southeast Asian Region: China's 
Interests and Options", in T. B. Millar, International Security in the Southeast Asian and Southwest 
Pacific Region (London: University of Queensland Press, 1983), p. 250. 
16 Sinar Harapan, 24 April 1978. 
17 Manai Sophiaan, Merdeka, 30 October 1979. 
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situation. First, Indonesian leaders generally remained suspicious of China. Although 
recognizing the need to maintain relations with any countries regardless of their 
political systems, Suharto was still throwing his support behind the military's position 
that refused to non-nalize relations with China. Second, China sent an ambiguous 
message to Indonesia with regard to its attitude on the ethnic Chinese and communist 
movements in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia. Third, any hope of early 
rapprochement has been tarnished by China's action against Vietnam. It was 
interpreted as indicating China's readiness to embark on military action, should its 
national interest be threatened. 
It should be stressed that any shift in Indonesia's attitude towards normalization 
with China had only been made possible after changes had taken place in China as well 
as the dynamics in Indonesia's domestic politics. That is why the following part will 
review the transformation that took place in China as well as its implications towards 
the Southeast Asian. region*. It will be followed by an examination of Indonesia's 
domestic politics, particularly of determinant factors that pushed Indonesia towards 
normalization. 
4.2. Developments in the External and Regional Environment: China and Southeast 
Asia (1978-1985) 
Due to its size, historical perspective and strategic importance, China has been 
at the center of the world's attention for many years. When a wave occurs in China, a 
wide repercussion on the international scene, let alone the regional, would undoubtedly 
be felt far beyond China's border. This impulse was felt more strongly among its 
neighbours, particularly those who that had long considered China as a threat to their 
security, including Indonesia. Indeed, one of the most significant changes in China was 
without doubt the transfer of power from the radical regime led by Mao to the reformist 
Deng Xiaoping. It was followed by significant changes through the introduction of 
modernization of China, the opening-up policy and economic development. The 
transformation in domestic politics had been epitomized by the replacement of the 
ideological cause by the drive to bring China into a modem state. 
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A. China in Transition: From Political Imperative to Economic 
Pragmatism 
The idea of modernization was introduced by Zhou Enlai at the first National 
People's Congress convention in 1954. He called for China's modernization in 
industry, agriculture, transportation, and defense. In 1964, the term 'Four 
Modernizations, referring to agriculture, industry, defense, and science and technology, 
was formally put forth to the Chinese people. 18 Due to the dynamics of Chinese 
domestic politics the idea of modernization experienced a period of ups and downs and 
had been neglected for sometime. It nevertheless gained a new momentum after the 
ending of contention between Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng, that centered on 
Deng's advocacy of thoroughgoing economic and educational reforms and his status as 
senior surviving victim of the Cultural Revolution. 19 It was the Third Plenum in 
December 1978 that appeared to be the beginning of the ascendancy of Deng to power. 
Thus the starting point of the current modernization effectively began at the end of 
1978 when the Party's Central Committee endorsed Deng Xiaoping's call to "seek 
truth from facts". This was a clear departure from the old pattern of following blindly 
any policies associated with Mao. 
In a previous speech to the National Science Conference in March 1978, then- 
Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping declared: 
The crux of the Four Modernizations is the mastery of modem science 
and technology. Without the high-speed development of science and 
technology, it is impossible to develop the national economy at a high 
speed. 
Thus it was clear from the very beginning that modernization in China was intended to 
support economic development. The first reforms affectin1c, China were instituted ,: I 
between 1979 and 1984. The programs were systemic economic refon-ris aimed at 
'a Li Ping, Kaiguo zongli Zhou Entai [The Founding Premier Zhou Enlai), Beijing, 1994, Zhonggong 
zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, as quoted by Quansheng Zhao in Interpretating Chinese Foreign Policy, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 50. 
19 Hua was more inclined to increase reliance on Maoist symbols and slogans to buttress his own 
authority. 
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revising China's foreign economic relations and refocusing the country's agricultural 
system. In this regard, one of the most important steps taken by China's government 
was the decision to open China's economy to the outside world. It was seen as an 
answer to the desire to purchase foreign equipment and technology needed for China's 
modemization. This policy was also expected to eventually bring foreign exchange 
through tourism, exports, and arms sales. 20 However, the most important aspects of the 
policy were concerned with foreign investments, international trade and the creation of 
Special Economic Zones. 21 
. 
Historically, foreign investment is not something new to the Chinese people. 
Mao himself encouraged an opening policy in the 1950s, when China received massive 
technical assistance and capital investment from the Soviet Union. The introduction of 
key projects such as metallurgy, motor vehicles and coal production laid the basis of 
Chinese economic growth until 1960, when Kruschev abruptly cut off aid. Soviet 
assistance undoubtedly boosted the Chinese economy as China's foreign trade grew 
rapidly, two-thirds of it in 1950s with the Soviet Union and East Europe. 22 However, 
the characteristics of Deng's open door policy are totally different from the one applied 
by Mao. While the latter emphasized the relationship with fellow communist states, 
Deng embarked on a policy which mainly opened relations with most capitalist states 
such as Japan, European countries and US. Deng's policy is often called a "policy of 
opening to the outside" or didwai kaifang zhengce, which in effect means the 
integration of the China economy into the international economy. At the same time this 
policy inevitably made China more dependent on the world economy, thus reversing 
the Maoist commitment to the ideal of self-reliance. 
In rural areas, the economic reform program was initiated by decollect 
agricultural activities through a contract responsibility system based on individual 
20 The opening up policy also includes the activity of the sending large numbers of students abroad to 
acquire special training and needed skills. 
2' Robert Kleinberg, China "Opening" to the Outside World The Experiment with Foreign Capitalism 
(Oxford, Westview Press, 1990), p. 3. 
22 Deng Weizau in Xu Dixin (ed. ), China's Searchfor Economic Growth (Beijing, New World Press, 
1982), p. 167-170, as quoted by Robert Kleinberg, China "Opening " to the Outside World, p. 9. 
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households. The people's communes established under Mao were largely replaced with 
a system of family-based fanning. The rural reforms successfully increased 
productivity, the amount of available arable land, and peasant per capita income. Their 
success stimulated substantial support in the countryside for the expansion and 
deepening of the reform agenda. Thus modernization replaced class struggle as the 
focus of Party work. In the late 1970s rural refonns restoring the production team and 
eventually the family household as the basic agricultural unit were pioneered in 
Sichuan and Anhui. In 1981, another plenary meeting of the Central Cornmittee 
adopted a resolution on Party history that repudiated the Cultural Revolution, the Great 
Leap Forward, and most of the other programs associated with Mao's later years. 
Furthermore, the Twelfth Party Congress in September 1982 approved new reforms 
policies including rural decollectivisation, more autonomy for industrial enterprises, 
expansion of free urban markets. 
The establislýment of the special economic zone Yingyi 1equ) is an important 
policy in which investors receive special facilities and favorable treatment and 
regulations such as low income tax, cheap land rental, electricity and water bills. 23 In 
the end, the changes brought about by Deng inevitably attracted many foreign 
companies. From the enterprise point of view, there are at least two reasons why they 
went to China. First, investors pouring their money into China must be seen in the 
context of their global strategy in which China's market provides a large potential for 
investing enterprises in terms of size and, increasingly, quality. Many Western 
Multinational Corporations (M`NCs) also consider China vital, particularly those from 
Japan, US and Western Europe in their efforts to control the world market. Western 
MNCs fear that Japanese competitors could attain leadership in the Chinese market 
which eventually will result in cost reductions, helping to undercut prices in the US or 
23 Further discussions on the special economic zones see: Y. C. Jao and CK Kung (eds. ), China's Special 
Economic Zones: Policiesý Problems and Prospects (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986); George T. 
7 
Crane, The Political Economy of China's Special Economic Zones (London, M. E. Sharpe Inc., 1990); 
Kwan Yiu Wang (ed. ), Shenzhen Special Economic Zone: China's Experiment in Modernization 
(Hongkong, Tai Dao Publishing Co., 1982); Kwan-Yiu Wang and David Ky Chu (eds. ), Modernization 
in China: The Case of the Shenzen Special Economic Zone (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985); 
Thomas P. Lyons and Victor Nee (eds. ), The Economic Transformation of Sollih China: Reformation 
and Development in the Post-Mao Era (Ithaca, Comel University, 1994); and 'Hainan, China's Youngest 
Province', China Today, Vol. XLVII, No. 4, April 1998. 
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developing countries. This is what is referred to by Daniels, as a reason for the Western 
investors seeking a strategic presence in China. 24 Second, foreign firms migrate to 
China as the result of a weakening position in their respective home markets. 25 
Therefore, the underlying forces driving foreign investment to China are mainly based 
on economic considerations. 
During the early part of reform up to 1984, the mood for changes was very high 
and many reformists went further for change. This upbeat, even ebullient, ideological 
atmosphere was reinforced by the publication of Deng Xiaoping's book, Building 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, in December 1984.26 In the following year, 
there had been growing criticisms of the handling of the economy raised by the 
conservatives that took the advantages of policy errors and economic problems. The 
first criticisms related to macro-economic factors in which the rate of high economics 
and industrial growth created imbalances in the economy and that the central leadership 
27 had been raising unrbalistic expectations for continued high growth . In the end, these 
criticisms ended in the devolution of economic decisiOn-making authority and the 
market-oriented approach that lay at the core of reform. As far as the opening to the 
outside world was concerned, criticisms centered on the decline of China's foreign- 
exchange reserves. The conservatives even publicly attacked Deng's opening policy 
and dismissed the slogans "Time is money; efficiency is life". It was clearly expressed 
by Politburo member Hu Qiamu in his visit to Fujian province. 28 However, the 
culmination of criticism towards the open door policy took place in the summer of 
24 a J. Daniels, J. Krug, and D. Nigh, 'US Joint Ventures in China: Motivation and Management of Political 
Risk', California Management Review, Vol. 27 (1985), pp. 46-58, as quoted by Stefan Kaiser, David A. 
Kirby and Ying Fan in Grealgr China: Political Economy, Inward Investment and Business Culture, 
p. 52. 
25 See W. H. Newman, 'Launching a Viable Joint Venture', California Management Review, Val. 35 
(1992), pp. 68-80. 
26 it was been the view of Deng on building socialism with Chinese characteristics expressed in August 
1984. It signaled Deng's determination to push ahead with reform. See Joseph Fewsmith, Dilemmas of 
Reform in China: Political Conflict and Economic Debate (London, M. E. Sharpe, lnc, 1994), p. 148. 
27 The imbalance was meant to be between state revenues and expenditures. In 1984 China had a deficit 
in its trade balance (58.05 billions yuan of export and 62.05 billions yuan of import). Other aspects of 
macroeconomics include money supply, capabilities of China's national resources, and budget deficit, 
that may threaten economic stability and inflation. 
28 Fujian Ribao, 7 February 1985, translated in FBIS, February 26,1985. Quoted also by Joseph 
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1985 after the revelation and publication of a report on corruption in Hainan Island. 29 
Up to this period, it was evident that the radical forces remained on the map of Chinese 
politics. 
However, by the end of the 1980s this process had begun to show tangible 
results. China was accordingly often referred to as an 'emerging power' whose 
economic prowess had become a reality. In this regard, Charles Morrison and Allen S. 
I Whiting noted that since China had a strong rate of internal growth, it had been one of 
the dynamos of economic growth in the region over the past 10 years. 30 In other 
respects, China had also shown a potential to become a formidable military power in 
the region. 
B. China's Foreign Policy: Embarking on a Friendlier Attitude 
Once in power, Deng embarked on reform and the most dramatic change that 
altered the direction of Chinese politics was the reform of Marxism, especially Mao's 
ultra-leffist political line. 31 First, Deng replaced the essence of the "great leap forward" 
through the implementation of "communes" with four strategic Modernizations, 
namely the application of science and technology to achieve modernized industry, 
agricultural and defense technology. Second, against the teaching of Karl Marx, Deng 
introduced opening a policy aimed at attracting foreign investment, mixing planned and 
market economy. Third, he even adopted liberalization, which included both social- 
economy and social-political sectors. In foreign policy, Deng also embarked on the 
Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence as elaborated in Beying Review of January 
Fewsmith, in Dilemmas ofReform in China: Political Conflict and Economic Debate, p. 152. 
29 An investigation by the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) in March 1985 reported that 
cadres in Hainan island found guilty of using an excessive amount of foreign exchange to import some 
89,000 foreign automobiles and 2 million television sets with the intention of reselling them in China's 
interior. In fact the CDIC reported an extensive corruption extending from the island to Guangdong and 
elsewhere. See "Investigation Report of the Cental Discipline Inspection Commission, " Xinhua, July 3 1, 
1985, translated FBIS, August 6,1985, pp. 1-8, as quoted by Joseph Fewsmith, Ibid, p. 153. 
30 Charles Morrison & Allen W. Whiting, 'China's Role in tile Asia-Pacific Region', in Pacific Century: 0 The Emergence ofModern Pacific Asia, Mark Borthwick (ed. ), (Boulder, Westview Press, 1992) p. 456. 
31 Hardi, Sinar Harapan, 14 Au-ust 1985. 
131 
1983.32 These Principles are implemented as a base for developing intemational 
relations between China and other countries, including socialist states, and the third 
world that apply a different system to Cl-ýina as well as the Soviet Union and US. 
More importantly, Beijing adopted a pragmatic approach in the sense that the 
conduct of Chinese foreign policy was projected to support national interest and the 
creation of world peace. Bearing in mind the pragmatic approach and the importance of 
national interest, it seemed that Beijing had revised the Marxist assumption of 
international solidarity among communists in the world. 33 In this regard, one 
Indonesian scholar and Director of Center for Strategic and International Studies Jusuf 
Wanandi observed that in the past few years there had been changes in China, 
particularly the victory of moderate elements led by Deng Xiaoping. 34 Consequently, 
the PRC needed a friendlier environment with ASEAN countries, particularly in its 
effort to combat the then enemy of Soviet encirclement. 
As far as Indonesia is concerned, for decades, the New Order had consistently 
followed political developments in China. The advent of Deng did not go unnoticed. 
However, the early perception of China under the new pragmatic regime tended to be 
cautious, as China had not definitely withdrawn its support for Communist movements 
in Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. 35 At the same time, the unfinished rivalry 
between radical and pragmatic forces gave a justification for the military to continue 
warning of the potential danger should the radicals regain control of power in China. 
At the same time, the development of China as a potential super power invited 
suspicion . 
36 This was particularly with regard to the uncertainty of how Cl-dna would 
32 The Five Principle of Peaceful Co-existence was firstly declared in Bandung in 1955. 
33 This tendency has been shown in the context of Sino-Soviet border conflict in Usury River and the 
rapprochement between the US and China through the signing of the Shanghai Communiqud in 1972. 
34 Tempo, 29 March 1980. 
35 In a press conference during his visit to Beijing, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia stated 01 
that China is not yet ready to cut the link between Chinese Communist Party and Malaysian Communist 
Party, See Sinar Harapan, 27 November 1985. 
36 Suara Kar), a, 27 February 1980. 
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project its economic power. Would they embark on militarization, would they try to 
expand their influence towards its neighbors? 
In line with the new policies introduced by Deng, China was seen as showing 
its moderation towards Indonesia. The Chinese press began reducing its hostility 
towards Indonesia. The congratulatory messages that used to be sent by the Chinese 
mass media to the PKI began to disappear from 1979.37 At the official level, Zheng 
Weizhi, member of the National People's Congress and the advisor to the Foreign 
Affairs Committee denounced Mao's approach of cultivating influence over 
communist parties in other countries. 38 Consequently, the Chinese government had 
shown its readiness to respect the Indonesian sovereignty and not interfere in the 
domestic affairs of Indonesia. These should be seen as a change of direction in which 
the Chinese government began distancing itself from the PKI, wl-dch was seen as the 
biggest obstacle to normalization. One of the indications that the Chinese government 
no longer supported. the PKI was by allowing many of the PKI members to move to 
other countries. However, the Chinese government had not yet formally informed the 
Indonesian government of this policy, and at the same time Indonesian leaders 
continued to wait for a change to be more visible shown by the Chinese Cornmunist 
Party. 
Nevertheless, Indonesian leaders recognized that in recent years China had 
gradually changed and begun abandoning its closed-door policy and undertaking 
reform. In foreign policy, for instance, its orientation was intended to support the 
development process, which meant that China abandoned its leftist and adventurist 
foreign policy. The then Foreign Minister Kusumaatmadja recognized that Indonesia 
was following developments in China, particularly after the coming to power of Deng 
Xiaoping in 1978 as well as the growing closeness of China and the US. 39 He also 
noted that there was a strong indication that China was different from twenty years ago. 
37 Tempo, 4 March 1989. 
39 Interviewed by Hardi, "Deng, Mau Kernana? [Deng, Heading to Where? ], Sinar Harapan, 14 August 
1985. 
39 Sinar Harapan, 2 January 1985. 
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C. ASEAN and China: Improved Relations 
China had expressed strong niisgivings about the formation of ASEAN by 
calling it an alliance of US stooges, and accusing the Association of being for 
economic cooperation in name only and of being a military alliance directed 
specifically against China. The Chinese attitude was hostile, and it was almost certainly 
so because the Vietnam War was reaching its peak with US military strikes being 
launched from bases in Thailand and the Philippines, both members of the ASEAN. 
China indicated that she would develop bilateral relations with each Southeast Asian 
country, but it had no intention of having relations with ASEAN as an organization. 
Accordingly, diplomatic relations with Malaysia were established in May 1974, 
followed by the Philippines and Thailand in June and July 1975 respectively. 
Singapore decided to be the last country among ASEAN states to recognize China, 40 
while Indonesia's powerful military leadership remained extremely suspicious of the 
Communist threat. By mid 1970s, China further developed her relations with those 
ASEAN countries in the fields of trade, sports and medicine, and refrained from 
supporting revolutionary movements as publicly as she had done before. 41 
In line with its deteriorated relationship with the Soviet Union and the latter's 
closer relations with Vietnam, China began appreciating the work of ASEAN and even 
went so far as supporting the Declaration of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality 
(ZOPFAN). In this regard, China suggested that countries in the region must not 
commit themselves to any kind of military alliance with any powers. 42 The best option 
was of course Neutralism. Therefore, ASEAN was positively praised in its effort to rely 
on itself and to cooperate in establishing a stable region. As far as China was 
concerned, apart from slowing the permeation of Soviet influence through Asia, 
40 This position was later confirmed by Singaporean Foreign Minister Dhanabalan. See, Sinar Harapan, 
23 January 1985. 
4' Takashi Tajima, "China and Southeast Asia: Strategic Interests and Policy Prospect", in Security in 
East Asia, by Robert ONeill (ed. ), (Hants: Gower Publishing Company, the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, ADELPHI Library no. 9, Hants, 1984) p. 96. 0 
42 A. Dahana, Prisma, No. 9, Year 6, September 1977. 
134 
ASEAN exemplified the Three World Theory, illustrating the kind of cooperation 
among Third World Countries, and cooperation between the Third World and the 
Second World, which the theory advocated. China considered the activities of ASEAN 
to be a blow to the ambitions of the super-powers, Soviet social imperialism in 
particular, to dominate Southeast Asia. For many ASEAN member countries, China 
could be useful to contain their worry about Vietnam, then in possession of five billion 
dollars worth of American military equipment, as well as the possibility of the 
withdrawal of American forces from the region. 
Indeed, China's shifting policy on ASEAN was officially shown when 
Thailand's Prime Minister Kriangsak Chamanand's visited China in 1978. On that 
occasion, Vice-Premýier Deng Xiaoping expressed his recognition of the increased 
activities and role of ASEAN as a regional organization in the international arena. 
Accordingly, by 1978 China appeared to have already scaled down its support for the 
communist movements in -Southeast Asia. And since the Vietnam invasion of 
Cambodia in 1978 - with full Soviet backing - China pursued the policy of seeking a 
significant reduction of the Soviet presence in Indochina. 43 The signing of a twenty- 
five-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Vietnam and the Soviet Union 
in June 1978 was also regarded as an effort to encircle China as it was fin-ther followed 
by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979.44 China's reply to the Soviet and 
Vietnamese move was also in the form of closer relations with the US. 
As the 1980's got underway, Chinese leaders undertook an abrupt and major 
change in foreign policy. Support for coalition or alliance was dropped, and the new 
theme was 'non-alignment', and identifying politically with the Third World '45 thus 
opening a way to a better relationship with ASEAN. Accordingly, cooperation between 
ASEAN and China was shown in their joint efforts to end the Vietnamese occupation 
43 Robert R. Ross, "China and the Cambodian Peace Process", Asian Survey, Vol. 3 1, No. 12, December 
199 1, p. 1170-117 1. 
44 This Treaty is considered significant as a symbol not only of political closeness but also a de facto 
military alliance between the two countries. 
45 Robert A. Scalapino, Major Power Relations in Northeast Asia, (London: The Asia Society, University 
Press of America, 1987) p. 3 1. 
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of Cambodia both diplomatically and militarily. Although there was still reluctance in 
the attitude of ASEAN members, particularly Indonesia, Thailand formed a close 
cooperation with China, and even allowed its territory be used as a supply basis for the 
resistance movement against the Vietnamese backed Cambodian government. This was 
mainly aimed at militarily weakening the Phnom Penh regime. At the diplomatic table 
ASEAN supported Thailand's position and worked together with China in search of a 
peaceful settlement and bringing Sihanouk back to power. Improved relations between 
ASEAN and China, to a certain extent, facilitated the success of the settlement of the 
Cambodian problem. 
Thus, during the 1980s China has no longer considered ASEAN a threat to its 
security. On the contrary Beijing believed that ASEAN was very important for the 
creation and maintenance of peace and stability in the region, especially the settlement 
of the problems in Indochina. China significantly improved its relations with every 
ASEAN member state. 46 In this situation, Indonesia seemed to be being left behind. 
The growing confidence and cooperation between ASEAN and China had its effect on 
Indonesia as the latter had to cooperate and maintain direct and frequent contacts with 
China in the context of ASEAN, thus paving the way for the non-nalization process. In 
this regard, the then Indonesian foreign minister stated that, "The freezing of 
diplomatic relations with China are not going to continue for a thousand years. Because 
the ASEAN member countries have normalized their relations with China, therefore 
we also have to open and normalize our relation with China. ', 47 
4.3. Differing Views of China in Indonesia: Between Security Interest and 
Economic Necessity 
By the late 1970s, there were three developments that had compelled Indonesia 
to take a different look at China. First, it was related to changes in China's domestic 
politics as the result of the introduction of a reform and modernization prograrn. 
46 Further discussions on this matter see: Joyce K. Kallgren, Noordin Sopiee, and Soedjati Djiwandono I (eds. ), ASE4N and China: An Evolving Relationship (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 
University of California, 1988) and Leo Suryadinata, 'Indonesia-China Relations: A Recent 
Breakthrough', Asian Survey, 30 (7), July 1990. 
47 Pelita, 8 March 1978. 
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Second, it was related to the adoption of a new orientation in Chinese foreign policy. 
Third, China had also embarked on a cooperative and friendlier attitude towards 
ASEAN member countries. These developments were surely followed by Indonesian 
leaders. 
A. Normalization Issue: Political/Security Considerations and Lack of 
Assurance 
Entering the 1980s, China reiterated its readiness to reopen ties with Indonesia, 
as it was clearly expressed by foreign minister Huang Hua during his visit to Manila. 48 
As expected, Indonesia's elite reactions to this statement were divided between those 
who opposed and supported normalization. Unlike previous years, it became obvious 
that Indonesian leaders were not always totally united on the normalization issue. 49 
Those who opposed normalization generally comprised military officials, particularly 
in the Ministry of Defense and BAKIN. Meanwhile, the group supporting 
normalization was centered on the late vice-president and longtime serving foreign 
minister Adam Malik and individuals at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who had for 
many years advocated normalization. However, the Indonesian parliament's view on 
the issue was split. Those in favor were the civilian factions of the Golkar ruling party 
and a large segment of the Indonesian Democratic Party faction, while those in 
opposition were the military and the Islamic factions. According to an informed source, 
there was within the Indonesian Ministry of Defense and Security a group of younger 
officers who are "inward-looking" as opposed to a few older generation generals who 
were "outward-looking". It was the "inward-looking" group that persuaded the military 
50 faction in the parliament to oppose resumption of diplomatic ties with China. 
The military's mistrust was well reflected by Admiral Sudomo's statement, 
chief of the National Security Agency and deputy commander of the Indonesian armed 
forces who stated that, "We had two bad experiences with ... con-ununism in 1948 and 
" Kompas, 12 March 1980. 
'9 Leo Suryadinata, "Jakarta Faces up to the Pekin-g, BogY", Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 February 
1985. 
50 Asian Research Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 10,31 March 1980. 
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1965.1 don't think we can afford it for a third time". 51 Meanwhile, the proponents of 
normalization reiterated their position that Indonesia should reestablish its ties with 
China because of its increasingly significant role in the world. Consequently, China 
could no longer be ignored, as it was crucial to stability in the Asian region as a whole. 
China was a major country, a permanent member of the Security Council, with a 
population of over one billion, and had an important role in determining the political 
future of Indochina and the settlement of the Cambodian problem, and economically 
was one of the biggest potential markets for Indonesian commodities. Adam Malik also 
underlined that it was the right time to take the opportunity because "PRC is currently 
busy consolidating its development and has no time to conduct subversion abroad ý'. 52 
He later underlined that normalization with China was a must, if Indonesia wanted to 
take a leadership role, and because China paid most attention to Indonesia in Southeast 
Asia. It was only Indonesia that could speak firmly, strongly and straightforwardly to 
China. 53 
Interestingly, in the 1980s there had been a significant shift in the attitude of 
Indonesia as the Indonesian Permanent Mission in New York was officially assigned to 
channel the effort to restore diplomatic relations. This also indicated that the general 
attitude of Indonesia towards China was not as hostile as in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
reason was well put by a Member of Parliament who stated that, "The PKI elements 
that received protection from the Chinese government had become old and they no 
longer posed a force to worry about. Thus there is no regeneration of PKI in China. , 54 
Although Indonesian leaders began recognizing the process of change in China, they 
remained cautious and unsure about the attitude of China. Therefore, from Indonesia's 
point of view, the key to normalization was in the hands of the Chinese government, 
51 Ibid. 
52 Tempo, 17 March 1984. 
33 Kompas, 9 March 1984. 
5' Chalid Mawardi, Member of Parliament from the United Development Party (PPP) as quoted by 
Tempo, 29 March 1980. 
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particularly in the form of a formal declaration of the termination of China's support 
for the PKI. 55 
Though signs of a diplomatic thaw were appearing, Indonesia seemed in no 
hurry to resume its ties with China. At least the support for normalization appeared to 
increase. While admitting the need for normalization, the Indonesian former foreign 
minister and prominent nationalist figure Roeslan Abdulgani argued that there was no 
need to be in a hurry, as some issues that had caused the freezing of diplomatic 
relations remained unresolved. He made it clear that Beijing had to clarify its position 
about the PKI and its policy towards the ethnic Chinese. 
56 A Member of Parliament 
also stated that there was no reason not to non-nalize relations with China, and it was 
irrelevant to relate the diplomatic relations of a state to ideological factors. 
57 However, 
he made it clear that the obstacles to normalization were psychological and related to 
security, particularly the G30S/PKI incident. Accordingly, to enable the normalization 
to materialize there needed to be concrete action conducted by Beijing. In this regard, 
China should renounce its support for ex-leaders of the outlawed PKI who lived in 
exile in Beijing, cease its anti-Indonesian propaganda; and refrain from interfering in 
the domestic affairs of Indonesia. 
In line with the general tendency in both domestic realities, the relations 
between these two countries were gradually improving. In this regard, Indonesia issued 
an invitation to China to attend the commemoration of the 30th Anniversary of the 
Asian-African Conference. It was widely expected that on this particular occasion the 
Chinese delegation would state its position concerning the issues of the PKI and ethnic 
Chinese. However the Chinese foreign minister Wu Xueqian was regarded as having 
failed to deliver this expectation, which to some Indonesians was seen as quite 
regrettable . 
58 He was also unable to formally meet the Indonesian President, due to 
" Some of the military hard-liners even insisted that China must formally apologize for its involvement in 
the 1965 coup. 
56 Tempo, 29 March 1980. 
51 Chalid Mawardi, Ibid. 
" Indonesian leaders, particularly among the military, expected the Chinese Foreign Minister to bring a 
letter of apology. However, China considered it as a too expensive price to pay for the normalisation as 
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time difficulties on both sides. 59 Nevertheless, both foreign ministers concluded that 
there was no rush for normalization. 60 Wu also made it clear that Indonesia had little 
reason to demand that China should cease supporting the PKJ because China had not 
supported the PKI for 18 years. 61 In the end, there was no breakthrough towards the 
restoration of diplomatic relations. To say the least, such a high level official visit to 
Indonesia created an opportunity towards a better understanding between the two 
countries, and the Indonesian Foreign Minister stated that Indonesia should adjust to 
the new realities in China. 62 
As far as Suharto was concerned, he seemed to be reluctant to get involved in 
the debate directly. Instead, he let the debate continue and only interfered when it was 
deemed necessary. There was no doubt that up to this stage, Suharto remained behind 
the military's position. Nevertheless, a new reality in the Indonesian economy began to 
emerge which eventually compelled the government to embark on economic 
cooperation with China that clearly could not be pursued without Suharto's support. 
t 
B. Pushing towards the Opening of Trade Relations: Serving Economic 
Interest 
Domestic Reality 
By the 1970s, Indonesiajoined the exclusive ranks of oil producing countries or 
OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries). Tle revenues from oil 
enabled Indonesia to implement a remarkable program of development. The economic 
Indonesia would easily use that apology as a proof of China's involvement in the 1965 attempted coup. In 
this regard, Chinese officials believed that Indonesian military was still dominated by the anti-Chinese 
group, which perceived China as Indonesian main threat in the long term. See, Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 24 May 1985. 
59 Foreign Minister Wu managed to speak with Suharto for four minutes at a palace banquet, but failed to 
., n minister 
had to go back soon to Beijing to fulfill his prior hold a formal dialogue because his foreig 
engagement with Danish foreign minister. 
60 Sinar Harapan, Kompas, Berita Buana, Jakarta Post, 25 April 1985. 
61 Jakarta Post, 24 April 1985. 
62 The realities mention are the trial of radical groups, the opening for investment, China's intention to be 
a major power and its willingness to present a new face. See, Suaro Karya, 22 May 1985. 
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development program, especially in macroeconomics, has stabilized the Indonesian 
economy and saved Indonesia from the brink of economic disaster. There is no doubt 
that Indonesia, and of course Suharto, himself, was fortunate with Indonesia's natural 
wealth. The sudden increase of oil prices in 1970s has given the regime a massive 
boost for its development process, as revenues from Indonesia's main commodity 
brought about unprecedented help. In the period of 1970-1981, export revenues from 
oil increased at a rate of 45.5 per cent. Oil and gas accounted for 37 per cent of total 
export revenue in 1970; by 1981 this proportion had climbed to 82 per cent. During 
this period the country's growth rate (GDP) averaged 7-8 per cent per year. The 
Indonesian economy was fin-ther boosted by the increase of foreign investment, 
particularly from Japan. 63 
Apart from the increase in income per capita, the country has been able to reach 
a level of being nearly self-sufficient in foodstuff, and to provide basic health and 
education facilities. Indeed, Suharto's policy to create order and stability had paid off 
as Indonesia began enjoying the results of development. 64 One of Suharto's most 
successful achievements had been turning Indonesia from one of the world's largest 
rice importers for many years to self-sufficiency by the mid 1980S. 65 In tackling the 
population problem, Suharto succeeded in controlling its growth through the 
introduction of an extensive family planning program. All these success stories and his 
paternalistic rule earned him the name of Bapak Pembangunan (the Father of 
Development) in mid-1983. Accordingly, Suharto's legitimacy was strengthened 
through his success in the realization of development and in promoting the standard of 
living of Indonesian citizens. 
However, the Indonesian route to economic development was not without 
problems. By the mid-1980s, there was an external factor that forced Indonesia to 
review its position towards the communist states. It was the beginning of economic 
63 In 1967 Japan had only two investment projects with the total value of USS6.7 million. Two years later 
this figure had risen to seventeen projects with a total value of USS132.3 million. 
64 Indonesia's income per capita increased from USS260 in 1970 to over US500 in 1980. 
65 Pantjar Simatupang et. all, "Economic Efficiency and Policy Incentives of Rice Production in 
Indonesia, Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 4, Fourth Quarter, 1989, p. 296. 
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difficulties caused by uncertainty in the international economy. The fluctuation of the 
price of Indonesia's main export commodity and the emergence of protectionism in the 
Western countries compelled Indonesia to increase its non-oil exports and to find new 
markets. 66 This inevitably necessitated Indonesia to include the communist countries as 
potential markets for Indonesian products. Thus Indonesia began exploring other 
markets, including the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It was to this area that 
Indonesia sent trade missions. From this tendency, it seemed very clear that Indonesian 
foreign policy began paying attention, not only to the Western countries, but also to the 
socialist/communist countries. In this respect economic factors became increasingly 
important in the evolution of Indonesian foreign policy. 
The Resumption of Direct Trade 
In line with the freezing of diplomatic relations in 1967, the trade links between 
Indonesia and China were also officially closed. Trade activities however remained 
active, albeit through third states, namely Singapore and Hong Kong. This meant that 
the absence of diplomatic relations did not necessarily halt trade activities. Like the 
case of diplomatic normalization, the initiative to hold formal direct trade with China 
became a contentious issue among Indonesian leaders. In this regard, Leo Suryadinata 
pointed to the existence of different bodies of opinion. 67 Those in favor of direct trade 
included the foreign minister, many Jakarta businessmen and some Indonesian 
newspapers such as Jakarta Post. The central argument presented by this group was the 
benefit of direct trade with China. 68 
Indeed, the proponents of direct trade argued that such a link would be 
beneficial to Indonesia and the time was ripe for it, given the coming of a pragmatic 
66 Indonesia's heavy reliance on oil exports made it vulnerable to the fluctuation of oil prices in the 
international market. In the period of 1982-1986, oil export revenues declined from SUS14.7 billion to 
under $US7 billion, decreasing by 16.4 per cent per year, as oil prices plummeted from $US30 per barrel 
to under $USIO. Accordingly, the national economic growth was cut by half, and reached as low as two 
per cent in 1985. 
67 Leo Suryadinata, "Jakarta Faces up to the Peking Bogy", Ibid. 
69 The conduct of indirect trade has resulted in Indonesian commodities being less competitive as well as 
making Chinese goods more expensive. 
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regime with which many states in the world were more than pleased to deal. They 
further argued that direct trade could be conducted without diplomatic ties as already 
happened between Indonesia, Taiwan and Singapore with China. They also believed 
that the local Chinese community was now "under control" and no longer posed any 
major security problems. On the contrary, the opponents of direct trade, particularly the 
generals in the military circle, believed that the mere presence of Chinese 
representatives at a trade rnýission in Jakarta would in itself pose a security risk. They 
repeatedly quoted China's involvement in the coup and its role in communist 
subversive activities in various Southeast Asian countries. At the same time, they also 
stated that there was no need for Indonesia to have diplomatic relations with China, as 
Indonesia had not encountered any difficulty on the world stage. 
The second body of opinion took a more cautious stand. They channeled their 
opinion through the Merdeka nationalist newspaper, which was well known for its anti- 
Beijing stance. They maintained that Beijing might use a trade link to encourage 
improvement in the field of foreign policy. Meanwhile, the Indonesian armed forces 
newspaper, Angkatan Bersenjata, argued that the opening of direct trade was natural 
given the already large amount of commodities from China entering Indonesia and the 
big demand for primary products in China . 
69 However, Indonesia needed "a mature 
preparation, because with the direct trade there will be a presence of representatives 
offices in each country which would lead to two possibilities ... diplomatic 
00 normalization or (the destruction of) the hope of improving relations. 
Eventually, Suharto threw himself in favor of opening direct trade, while 
keeping the normalization issue aside. Foreign Minister Kusumaatmadja revealed that 
he made a request of President Suharto some eight months ago for normalization with 
China, but was told the time was not opportune .71 Indonesia immediately sent an 
unofficial trade mission to China in 1985 that was aimed at gaining a significant 
69 Angkotan Bersenjata, 9 November 1984. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Jakarta Post, 10 March 1984. 
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segment of the growing Chinese domestic market. This move was understood to be in 
the context of Indonesia's effort to diversify its economy away from dependence on oil 
exports over the past few years. China was considered to be a trading partner. 72 Many 
Indonesians argued, particularly among businessman and civilian leaders, that 
Indonesia should conduct direct trade with Chýina. 73 The opening of direct trade would 
also provide an opportunity for Indonesia to redress its trade balance with China, which 
so far had benefited China. Therefore, Indonesia's readiness to embark on direct trade 
relations was intended to serve national interests, particularly the export of Indonesian 
commodities such as cement, urea, plywood, timber and steel. 74 
Table 4.1 below reveals that Indonesia had suffered a trade deficit with China, 
meaning that the yearly trade balance was always in favor of China from 1968 to 1984. 
Table 4.1: Indonesia-China Balance of Trade (000 US$) 
Vear 
1968 
E%port 
38 
Import 
38.418 
Balance 
-38.380 
1969 13 43.026 43.013 
1970 - 32.759 - 
1971 27.552 -27.552 
1972 39.013 -39.013 
1973 48.813 -48.813 
1974 113.945 -113.945 
1975 203.476 -203.476 
1976 131.799 -131.789 
1977 153.495 -153.495 
1978 112.171 -112.171 
1979 0 131.777 -131.777 
1980 - 197.273 -197.273 
1981 8.295 253.549 -245.254 
1982 14.174 230.887 -216.713 
1983 26.945 204.032 -177.087 
1984 6.524 209.602 -203.078 
Source: Indonesian Statistic Central Bureau (BPS), 1985. 
Even worse, from 1970 to 1980 Indonesia had not exported any goods to China. On the 
contrary, China's exports to Indonesia had steadily increased. However, the record was 
the result of indirect trade conducted through third countries of Hong Kong and 
72 This was particularly prevalent after the Western countries, including the US exercised the so-called 
4protectionism' in their economy. 
73 Lie Tek Tjeng, "Analisa Tentang Hubungan Perclagangan Langsung RI-RRC" [The Analysis of Direct 0M000 
Trade between Indonesia and China], Suara Karya, 1984. 
74 Pelita, 20 January 1986. 
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Singapore. The thinking among Indonesian leaders was that there was a significant 
amount of benefit for Hong Kong and Singapore from this activity, while at the same 
time the economic cost of holding indirect trade should be reduced. Thus, this 
economic cost should be reallocated in the interest of Indonesia. 
One of the main forces behind the idea to push for direct trade with China were 
75 
the businessmen who joined the Indonesian Chambers of Commerce (KADIN). 
Despite domestic opposition, KADIN with the government blessing conducted 
pioneering activities to open direct trade with the Chinese Center for the Promotion of 
International Trade (CCPIT) as its counterpart in China. KADIN's first move was to 
attend the Canton Fair in November 1977, calling it a "good-will mission". It later 
developed into intensive contacts between KADIN and CCPIT through the exchanges 
of businessmen, trade delegation, and government officials to explore market 
opportunities during the first part of the 1980s. The Indonesian government maintained 
that KADIN's mission was purely for business purpose and had nothing to do with the 
government position on normalization. In other words, trade relations with China 
should not be interpreted as a signal that Indonesia would soon normalize its relations 
76 with China. The government also showed its cautiousness by emphasizing the 
possibility of direct trade links being manipulated for political purposes by China. 77 On 
5 June 1985, CCPIT and KADIN signed a Memorandum of Understanding on direct 
trade between Indonesia and China. The Indonesian government through the 
publication of Presidential Decree No. 9/1985 later endorsed this agreement. 78 
However, Indonesia maintained its suspicion of China over the potential danger of the 
influx of Chinese nationals into Indonesia. In anticipating this threat, the government 
confirmed that visas could only be obtained either in Singapore or Hong Kong - not in 
75 The reason why KADIN played a crucial and unopposed role is simply because of the involvement of 
Suharto's close family in the organization, namely Sukamdani Sahid Gitosardjono and Probosutedjo. 
Additionally, KADIN is a private organization, therefore Suharto could distance itself from the 
accusation of sacrificing the military opposition. 
,6 Sinar Harapan, 19 December 1985. 
77 It was stated by Indonesian State Minister Soedharmono before the Parliament, as quoted by Kompas, 
19 December 1985. 
79 It consists of articles dealing with commodity trade, commerce, immigration, method of transaction, 
transportation, and communication and coordination. Antora, 26 July 1985. 
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their respective capitals - and Indonesia only designated certain ports of call for 
Chinese vessels. 
The lengthy process of resumption of direct trade underlined, once again, that 
political considerations remained supreme over economic factors. However, domestic 
and international economic realities had forced Indonesia to moderate its position 
towards China, especially as Indonesia needed to diversify its export commodities. In 
this regard, China was considered a potential market for Indonesian conu-nodities. At 
the same time, this new perception would undermine the position of those who 
perceived China to be a threat. In the end, the decision to resume direct trade could be 
considered as a compromise or middle range approach that could accommodate 
Indonesia's economic needs as well as to appease the military. This situation also 
revealed the emergence of KADIN as a new player in the conduct of relations with 
China. However, as direct trade relation with China began to operate, Indonesia's 
position on diplomatic normalization remained unchanged. Suharto himself stated that 
Indonesia was not in a hurry to thaw its relations with China as long as there was no 
assurance from the government and Communist Party of China that it no longer 
supported the banned communist movement in Indonesia. 79 
4.4. Towards Normalization of Diplomatic Relations: The Interaction between 
Domestic, Regional and External Dimensions (198 5-1990) 
By the mid 1980s, there were factors that ought to pave the way for 
normalization, namely Indonesia's economic reality, China's economic development 
and new departure in its foreign policy. Nevertheless, the Indonesian government was 
still reluctant to restore relations. Their concern continued to revolve around the danger 
of the PKI and communism. Thus, Indonesia's attitude on normalization was more 
determined by its domestic domain. What factors influenced Indonesia to restore 
relations with China? 
79 Pelita, 9 October 1985. 
146 
The Primacy of Suharto in Indonesian Politics 
The challenge towards Suharto's authority did not come until the mid 1970s, as 
indicated by the emergence of student demonstration against the growing influence of 
foreign investment and corruption, as it was later manifested in the Malari (Fifteen 
January Incident). As the facts unraveled, it was apparently not only against the Suharto 
regime, but it was also caused by the rivalry between two trusted assistants of Suharto, 
namely the then president's special assistant, Ali Murtopo and the then Chief of the 
Command for the Restoration of Order and Security (Pangkopkamtib) General 
Sumitro. 80 This event proved that Suharto was a master of strategy. The rivalry 
between his assistants easily diverted attention from his regime, foreign investment and 
corruption. 81 
Ap roaching the presidential election in 1978 there had been some calls among Pp 
army officials for Suharto to step down. However, the following events showed that 
Suharto was unwilling to relinquish his power and avoid open discussion of leadership 
succession. Despite student protests and some resentment from military quarters, 
Suharto was elected for the third consecutive time in 1978. However, in order to 
restrict student activities directed against Suharto, the same year witnessed the 
introduction of Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus (Non-nalization of the Campus Life), 
which banned students from any political activity. Consequently, the political activity 
in the universities has practically been neutralized since then. It became clear that 
Suharto was willing to implement every possible measure to silence critics and 
resentment. 
A new development in Indonesian politics sparked a row over the Suharto 
presidency. It was triggered by his speech on 27 March 1980, when he referred to the 
threat to Pancasila and UUD 45 from those who still associated themselves with the 
so See David Jenkins, Suharto and his Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983 (Ithaca: Comell 
Modem Indonesian Project, 1984); Interview with General (Ret. ) Soemitro, I have never offended Pak 
Harto", See, Galra, No. 14/IV, 21 February 1998. 
a' It also proved at a later stage that opposition against Suharto would have a devastating effect if 
accompanied by disagreement or competition between the elite politics. 
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value systems of the past, such as "Marxism, Leninism, Communism, Socialism, 
Marhaenism, Nationalism, and Religion". He also urged ABRI to select "its partners 
from like-minded groups who truly defend Pancasila, and have no doubts whatsoever 
82 in PancaWa" 
. 
This speech, as the expression of his ideas about the role of Pancasila 
as a national ideology, indeed provoked a new controversy among his old supporters 
and upset a large num ber of Indonesians, and prompted a challenge to him by asking 
him to clarify his speeches. This materialized in the emergence of the Petition-50 
Group that challenged Suharto. This group was considered to pose a serious and more 
powerfal threat to Suharto as it consists of prominent Indonesian figures, such as 
former vice-president Muhammad Hatta, and former Prime Minister Mohammad 
Natsir. Its quality was ftirther strengthened with the backing of a heavyweight political 
elite with a military background, such as former Minister of Defense and Security 
General (Ret. ) A. H. Nasution, former commander of West Java-based Siliwangi 
Military Division and the Secretary-General of ASEAN General (Ret. ) H. R. Dharsono, 
former Governor of Jakarta Lieutenant-General (Ret. ) Ali Sadikin, former Police Chief 
of Staff General (Ret. ) Hugeng. The group presented a petition called a "Statement of 
Concern" and submitted it to the People's Representatives Assembly (DPR) for its 
consideration. The main concern of the statement stated that the President's speeches 
had misunderstood Pancasila and caused controversy within the society. The Group 
ftirther rejected Suharto's way of using Pancasila "as a means to threaten political 
enemies" rather than as "a basis for unity". 83 
Suharto's reaction to the Petition Fifty Group was rather hostile and again cited 
the presence of a threat to national stability, rather than trying to meet the criticisms. 
The government, through the Chief of National Co-ordinating Intelligence (BAKIN 
General Yoga Sugomo) and the Commander of KOPKAMTIB Admiral Sudomo, 
stated that there was a plot to assassinate government officials, including President 
Suharto. 84 While the credibility of this statement was questionable, the President 
'2 Kompas, 8 April 1980. 
93 Quoted in John Bresnan, Managing Indonesia: The Modern Polifical Economy (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993), p. 207. 
94 Ibid. p. 208 
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ftuther reiterated that, "in order to implement development, we must all be able to 
maintain dynamic national stability. 85 In the end, the military authorities invoked the 
ever present communist threat waiting to exploit every opportunity resulting from any 
challenge to the New Order government. Those involved in the petition were politically 
isolated and denied access to any business activities. On 19 April 1980, Suharto 
delivered another speech in which he expressed his public anger at rumors orchestrated 
by "certain subversive groups" directed at him and his family. 
86 
Other opposition also came from the Muslim quarter, especially over the 
proposal to establish Pancasila as the only ideological basis for the state or azas 
tunggal. This resistance had turned into a violent riot that is known as the Tanjung 
Priok affairs in September 1984, in which the demonstrators were brutally put down by 
the military. This ruthless suppression, in which up to 200 people may have died, is an 
event yet to be erased from the minds of many Indonesian Muslims. The armed forces, 
under the leadership of a Christian general, L. B. Moerdani, angered many Muslim 
leaders as ABRI tried to cover up the victims and blamed the protesters for the 
outbreak of the incident. 87 For many Muslims, the incident remains a mystery. The 
blame is without doubt pointed at Moerdani. In the end, Pancasila was officially 
declared as the sole ideology. Accordingly, all political parties and organizations were 
obliged by laýv to adopt Pancasila as their sole ideological basis. In some cases, the 
armed forces drove Muslim radicals to spread terror so as to give justification for the 
regime to ftirther suppress Islamic forces. 
88 Some even speculate that Murtopo, 
g5 Kompas, 18 August 1980. 
96 See, Ulf Sundhaussen, "Regime Crisis in Indonesia: Facts, Fiction, Predictions", Asian Survey, Vol. 
XXI, No. 8, August 198 1, pp. 815-37. 
" Muslim's account on this incident See, Tanjung Priok Berdarah: Tanggung Jawab Siapa? Kumpulan 
Fakta dan Data [Bloody Tanjung Priok: Whose Responsibility? The Compilation of Facts and Data] 
(Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1998). 
8' One infamous example is Ali Moertopo's involvement in the creation of Komando Jihad (Holy 
Command) in 1977 by to persuade men associated with past Muslim rebellions to launch a renewed drive 
for an Islamic state. See Asia Watch, Human Rights in Indonesia and East Timor (New York: Human 
Rights Watch, 1989), pp. 76-85. 
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orchestrated the dramatic hijacking of a domestic airliner by Muslim radicals to 
Bangkok in 1981 for the same purpose before the 1982 general elections. 89 
Thus by the late 1980s, Suharto's policies to suppress any possible challenger, 
to effectively put ABRI under his control, to declare Pancasila as the sole ideology of 
state, and to* put down any dissent and criticism towards him, resulted in a degree of 
order and political stability that had been absent in Indonesian society for many years. 90 
This period undoubtedly vAtnessed the emergence of Suharto as the dominant force in 
Indonesian politics. Many scholars have described Suharto as a tactician and not as a 
strategist which means that he was a master in manipulating and overcoming short term 
problems, while he had no idea exactly how to bring Indonesia into a more 
institutionalized and democratic country. It was also clear that a voice questioning the 
longevity of Suharto in power began to emerge. In this regard, former foreign minister 
and president's advisor on the ideology of Pancasila, Roeslan Abdulgani stated: 
"Suharto is the person who knows when to start, but unfortunately does not know when 
to finisW'. 91 
Accordingly the dynamics and path of Indonesian politics revolved around 
Suharto. His formidable figure, with the support from ABRI, was at the apex of all 
political power in Indonesia. However, it is misleading to assume Suharto and ABRI 
were a solid and compact unit. When faced by an external enemy, it was clear that 
Suharto was the hýighest commander of the Indonesian armed forces. However, 
domestically, ABRI always strove to portray themselves as the guardians of the state, 
thus placing themselves above the state. Consequently, the challenge towards Suharto 
often came from ABRI quarters. In many cases, it also came from the students' 
movement. Thus a serious challenge would emerge if there were a convergence 
between these two camps. Given the fact that Suharto had succeeded in silencing 
'9 Michail R. J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for 
Change (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 30. 
90 To silence his critics, Suharto adopted a policy of "stick and carrot" by rewarding with lucrative 
business opportunities or promotions in government and private institutions to those who supported him. 
On the other hand, he had no hesitation in punishing those who showed their disagreement, dissent or 
simply were critical. The severe punishment was if they were accused of supporting communism. 
91 Interview with former foreign minister Roeslan Abdulgani on 4 December 1998. 
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previous criticisms and regulated Pancasila as the sole ideology, he had full confidence 
in his ability to alter Indonesia's foreign policy towards China for two reasons. First, 
the military's resistance could easily be overcome, and second the ideology of 
Pancasila should be able to confront communism. 
B. Increasing Indonesia's International Prestige 
Having secured his own backyard, Suharto paid more attention to foreign 
policy. Indeed, given his relative success in bringing economic development and 
political stability and order by the mid 1980s, Suharto started to indicate his interest in 
foreign policy, and showed his readiness to play a larger role in international forums. 
An award given by the International Food Organization as an acknowledgement of 
Suharto's success in achieving self-sufficient production of rice, certainly boosted 
Suharto's determination and confidence to enter the international stage, the area that 
had been neglected for two decades. Accordingly, he began to be more involved in the 
process of foreign-policy decision making. Accordingly, Suharto's fourth term (1983- 
1988) marked the beginning of Indonesia's more assertive foreign policy, as Jakarta 
began to reaffirm its claim to a leadership position. This was signaled in April 1985, 
when Indonesia hosted a gathering of eighty nations to commemorate the thirtieth 
anniversary of the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung to reaffirm the relevance of the 
Bandung principles. 92 This new development reflected a growing self-confidence on 
the part of Suharto as a leading voice in the nonaligned world and provided an extra- 
regional platform to claim proper international standing. Suharto, secure domestically 
in an environment of political stability and economic growth, prepared to assume the 
mantle of statesman. 
92 The 10 Point Principles are: (1) Respect for fundamental human rights and for purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the UN; (2) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; (3) 
Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small; (4) Abstention 
from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country; (5) Respect for the right of 
each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity Nvith the Charter of the UN; (6) a. 
Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve the particular interests of any big 
powers: b. Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries; (7) Refraining from acts 
or threats of aggression or the use of force against territorial integrity or political independence of any 
country; (8) Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, 
arbitration orjudicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity 
with the Charter of the UN; (9) Promotion of mutual interests and co-operation; (10) Respect or justice 
and international obligations. See'Some facts about the 1955 meeting', Jakarta Post, April 24,1995. 
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As ffirther implementation of its new foreign policy approach, Indonesia was 
then involved in a major campaign to host the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 
meeting initiated in 1985. Indonesia's aim was to gain a chairmanship position that 
would enable. it to authoritatively speak on behalf of the third world countries. 
Ironically, Indonesia was one of the founding members of NAM but had never hosted 
its summit. Indonesia's determination to enhance its international standing by 
performing in the context of NAM showed another consistency of Indonesian foreign 
policy, as was the case with the Sukarno era. Thus chairing the Movement would 
definitely answer the critics that Indonesia was too close to the West, at the same time 
lifting Indonesia's prestige on the international stage, as well as increasing Suharto's 
stature as a statesman. However, Indonesia's bid did not receive enough support from 
its members, and Indonesia had to face competition from Nicaragua. 93 
In fact, the -situation was unfavorable to Indonesia's candidacy in certain 
respects. First, there was an unsympathetic attitude shown by socialist countries, 
because of Indonesia's anti-Communist stand. Second, the former Portuguese colonies 
in Africa rejected the bid as a result of the Indonesian occupation of East Timor. Third, 
Indonesia's solidarity with ASEAN, particularly on the question of Indo-China had 
cost Vietnamese support. Finally, the absence of normal relations with the biggest 
member of the Non-Aligned group, namely China, had prevented the availability of 
support from the biggest Movement member. Of these factors, it was clear that the 
absence of support from China had made it impossible for Indonesia to host the 
surrunit. Therefore, the normalization of diplomatic relations NNith China would 
definitely provide Indonesia with a better chance. 
Another major initiative in foreign policy was concerned with the regional 
perspective. Along with other ASEAN members, Indonesia had adopted a long-term 
objective of establishing a regional order in Southeast Asia to include all ASEAN 
countries, the Indo-Chinese states and Myanmar. The main idea was to create a zone of 
" For Nicaragua, being the host of the summit would allow it to mobilize international support of the 
Sandinista government against the so-called colonialist and imperialist United States interference in its 
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94 
peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN) in the region. This conception rests on the 
basic tenet as stipulated in the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia 
concluded in 1976, regarding the peacefW settlement of conflicts and disputes in the 
region. 95 However, the Cambodian problem prevented the realization of tl-ýs idea and 
even caused a rift among ASEAN fellow members. 96 That is why the Cambodian 
problem was the issue that needed to be addressed immediately. 
Indonesia also actively pursued a solution to the Cambodian problem. In close 
cooperation with other ASEAN members, it kept the issue alive through various 
forums, such as the NAM meeting and the United Nations bodies. Jakarta also made an 
extra effort by hosting the first major breakthrough when the warring factions came to 
Jakarta on several occasions to attend Indonesian initiative of the Jakarta Infon-nal 
Meeting (JIM) in July 1988 and February 1989. These were historic meetings as for the 
first time, the warring factions sat down together and discussed their own problems. In 
the end, the Jakarta Meeting- had paved the way for the convening of the International 
Conference on Cambodia in Paris, 1989. In this context also the restoration of 
diplomatic relations with China could provide a better opportunity for both Indonesia 
and China to encourage a comprehensive solution to the Cambodian problem and to 
bring peace, freedom and neutrality in the Southeast Asian region. In the end, Indonesia 
learned that in order to create order and comprehensive peace and stability in the 
region, co-operation and normal diplomatic relations with China were essential. 97 
gh domestic affairs. The decision-making process of the Movement is only made possible throug 
consensus, thus ruling out any possible voting. 0 
9' See: "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration" (Kuala Lumpur Declaration). Kuala 
Lumpur, 27 November 197 1. ASEAN Document Series 1967-1986, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 1986. 
95 "The Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia7,24 February 1976. ASE, 4N Document 
Series. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 1986. 
96 Further discussion on Cambodian problem, See: Frank Frost, "The Cambodian Conflict: The Path 
towards Peace", Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 13, No. 2, September 199 1; Milton Osborne, Before 
Kampuchea, Preludes to Tragedy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979); Michael Vickery, Cambodia 
1978-1982 (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1984), especially Chapter 2. 
97 By the end of 1980s, these obstacles have disappeared as a result of the changing global political 
economy. As a result, Indonesia was eventually elected chair of the movement and host of the September 
1992 Jakarta Summit. In the preparation for the summit, as incoming chair, Suharto undertook the longest 
foreig gn tour of his career that lasted for twenty-three days (November - December 1991). He visited two Latin American countries and three African countries and attended the meetings of the Group of Fifteen C, (South-South Co-operations). Thus Indonesia formally abandoned its low profile, domestically and 
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4.5. Final Steps towards Nonnalization: Suharto's Decision 
A. Early Resistance: The Implication of the Tiananmen Incident 
Although trade relations continued to be encouraging from Indonesia's It:, 
perspective, normalization remained off the agenda. Nevertheless, Suharto's closest 
aide and State Minister Moerdiono encouraged Indonesian businessmen'not to hesitate 
98 in conducting trade with China. On their part, the military maintained their suspicions 
and presented new findings to highlight the danger of the PKI. In February 1988, for 
instance, the Chief of BAKIN disclosed that the outlawed PKI still had young cadres 
abroad, as the international communist party in Budapest was also attended by thirty- 
five participants who claimed to be PKI delegates and not known to BAKIN. The 
existence of such new cadres showed that communists continued to pose a potential 
threat to national st4bility. 91 Support for the opponents of normalization also came 
from Islamic factioný that pointed to the communists as a latent danger as in the case of 
the New People's Army in the Philippines that received support from China. 100 In his 
statement before the 1988 General Assembly of MPR, President Suharto also 
underlined that Indonesia still linked non-nalization of diplomatic relations with the 
willingness of China not to interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries, 
especially Indonesia, by supporting the communist remnants. 101 
According to the military, there were three preconditions for the reswnption of 
diplomatic relations with China. 102 First, China had to acknowledge its involvement in 
the 1965 coup attempt. Second, China had to apologize for its interference, and thirdly, 
regionally focused foreign policy. 0 
98 Suara Pembaruan and Suara Karya, 17 June 1988. 
99 Jakarta Post, 20 February 1998. 
'00 As expressed by Husnie Thamrin, deputy secretary general of Islamic PPP. The Jakarta Post, 22 April 
1988 and Imron Rosyadi, Member of the Parliament from PPP, Pikiran Ra4wt, 25 April 1988. 
101 Suara Pembantan, 13 April 1988. 
102 It was expressed by Chief of BAKIN Yoga Sugama before the Parliament on 18 February 1988. 
Pelita, 27 February 1988. 
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China had to promise not to repeat its interference in Indonesian domestic affairs. 
Sugama further stressed that, bearing in mind political and security developments, there 
was no urgency to thaw the relationship. Informal meetings between two officials could 
be held, but more time was required to restore diplomatic relations. When questioned 
whether China would be able to fulfill those three conditions, he did not answer the 
question. Instead, he emphasized these three preconditions as sensitive issues and 
quoting the foreign minister's previous statement that President Suharto remained sad 
deep inside his heart, particularly with regard to the fate of the army general killed by 
Gestapu/PKI. 
However, to the surprise of many observers, Suharto decided to normalize 
diplomatic relations during the funeral of the Emperor Akihito of Japan. After a 
meeting between Suharto and Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen on 23 February 
1989 the move became clear as both agreed on the basic principles underlining the 
normalization of diplomatic-- relations, including the settlement of outstanding issues. 
These were the issues of Indonesian debt to China, 
103 the granting of passports to 
Chinese citizens in Indonesia 104 and Chinese illegal immigrants. In fact, the meeting 
between Suharto and Qian Qichen has been preceded by the latter's meeting with 
Indonesia's State Secretary which apparently has laid down a general agreement on the 
principles of normalization. 105 Although there was no official statement of apology 
from the Chinese officials, as demanded by the military hard-liners, Moerdiono made it 
clear that, "I felt that I have received an assurance that the Chinese Communist Party 
and the Chinese govenunent would not maintain its contact, let alone support the 
103 According to Indonesia, its debt to China is amounted at SF91,87 million and E5,73 million, while 
China's record stands at SFI 17,06 million and fl. 86 million. In the end both governments agreed to 
come up with the figure of US84,222,475.14. 
104 Indonesian delegation to the technical meeting of normalisation of diplomatic relation presented that 0 
there were 299.224 Chinese citizen in Indonesia. It was the result of the Presidential Decree No. 10/ 1959 
in which they decided to opt for Chinese nationality or go back to China. However, because the ship that 
was supposed to carry them to China did not turn up, so they have been staying in Indonesia ever since. 
'0' There are three basic agreements towards normalisation. First, both parties will take further steps 
towards the normalisation of diplomatic relation. Second, the foundation agreed by both parties are Dosa 
Sila Bandung, while they agreed on 5 principles of (i) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial 
integrity; (ii) non-aggession; (iii) non- interference in their respective domestic affairs; (iv) the similar 
level of the two nations' degrees; and (v) benefits and peaceful co-existence. Third, each respective 
representatives in the United Nations should continue effort to normalize the relations, and should be its 
necessary both foreign minister could meet. 
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remnants of G30S/PKI". 106 In an interview with an Indonesian magazine, Editor, 
107 he 
underlined the fact that there was no third party involvement in the preparation of the 
meeting between two high officials and it was China who initiated the meeting. 108 He 
also observed that China had changed its position on supporting the remnants of the 
PKI. Indonesia and Clýiina also agreed to develop the relations based on the principles 
of Dasa Sila Bandung. 
On the way back to Indonesia, Suharto explained that maybe because of reform 
and other factors, the Chinese government had eventually adopted the policy of not 
supporting the remnants of G30S/PKI, in accordance with Indonesia's pre-condition. 
109 
His claim that China had bowed to Indonesia's demand was definitely aimed at his 
domestic audience. However, in order to accommodate the opponents of normalization, 
President Suharto reaffirmed that Indonesia should maintain its guard towards China. 
As the result of Suharto's agreement on making preparations for the restoration of 
diplomatic relations 3vith China, there was no choice for the military but to harmonize 
its voice and to line up behind Suharto, as the military leadership showed its 
conformity with Suharto's decision. The then Minister for Defense and Security Gen. 
Moerdani stated that, 
As a big nation enough nation, we should think rationally in developing 
relation vrith other countries, including China. Because in developing 
these relations we should not question communism but its system, and 
Indonesia should also distinguish between China and ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia. We are more advanced than China. Indonesian GNP is 
higher. Therefore, we should be convinced of our own ideology. If we 
are afraid that our ideology would be threatened simply because of 
developing relations with China, it means that we question our own 
ideology's resilience. ' 10 
106 Suara Pentbaruan, 24 February 1989. 
107 Editor, 4 March 1989. 
'0' There was speculation that the Japanese had arranged the meeting between Suharto and Chinese 
Foreign Minister. 
109 Antara, 27 February 1989. 
110 Angkatan Bersenjala, 2 March 1989. 
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However, since this Tokyo agreement did not state any time frame, those 
opposed to normalization argued that it should not be done in a hurry. While 
welcoming the agreement, Chief of ABRI Gen. Try Sutrisno said that ABRI would 
secure'the goverranent's decision to normalize official diplomatic relations with 
China. "' Nevertheless, this did not mean that Indonesia would lower its guard against 
China. Governor of ABRI think-tank Lemhanas (National Defense Agency) Gen. 
Subijakto also expressed his opinion by reminding the Indonesian people of the 
dangers of communism. He underlined the fact that one decision in a communist state 
should not be considered as a final one, because the party is the most influential 
decision-maker. 112 This suggested that Indonesian military thinkers might be waiting 
for authentic and genuine evidence from both the government and the Chinese 
Conu-nunist Party in Beijing to ensure that normalization would not lead to a 
communist revival in Indonesia. This opinion was supported by one of the Muslim 
leaders, H. J. Naro, a Member of Parliament from PPP who stated that Indonesia should 
be cautious because ýhina's approach was only at ministerial level. 
' 13 
Apparently, the opponents of the normalization followed the Tiananmen 
incident with great apprehension. One retired general stated that China after Tianaru-nen 
meant going back to adventurism. 114 Thus Indonesia should review its preparations for 
the normalization. On the contrary, the Indonesian Foreign Minister was reluctant to 
condemn the incident and refrained from making strong remarks. 
" S The reason was 
that Indonesia did not want to get involved in the domestic affairs of another 
country. 1 16 While emphasizing that Indonesia remained committed to the agreement 
with China on normalization, Alatas refused to link normalization and the Tiananmen 
incident. However, in the eyes of the military, Beijing's image had been undermined, 
1 "Jakarta Post, 2 March 1989. 
112 Merdeka, 2 March 1989. 
113 Angkatan Bersenjala, 28 February 1989. 
114 Ret. Gen. Soemitro, Suara Pembaruan, 23 October 1989. 
1'5 Kompas and Merdeka, 17 June 1989. 
116 It might also be used as a precedent for other countries to interfere in the domestic affairs of Indonesia. 
Indeed, Indonesian leaders are sensitive to any kind of outside interference. 
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and it even raised doubts about Chinese sincerity in improving relations with 
Indonesia. While the possibility of China being dominated by radicals or conservatives 
was still in question, there was no doubt that the Indonesian military exploited the 
incident as justification for their reluctance towards normalization. 
To support the military's resistance, Gen. Subijakto, Governor of Lernhanas 
stated that the choice of Jiang Zemin to succeed Zhao Ziyang in China's premiership 
I 
position could be expected to result in the Chinese Communist Party's becoming more 
inward looking. 117 Therefore, a party led by such a conservative and less progressive 
figure would focus its attention on internal party matters and consequently, have little 
willingness to build friendship with the outside world. He further said that he did not 
think it would be wise to accelerate the normalization process in the near future. On the 
contrary, Indonesian Minister for Defense and Security Gen. Moerdani seemed not to 
share the views expressed by Gen. Subijakto by stating the non-nalization process that 
was currently being -undertaken should be continued. ' 18 There was no doubt that his 
opinion was intended to balance ABRI's voice and to avoid ABRI from being seen as 
antagonizing Suharto's decision. I 
- As a result of the Tiananmen incident, there was a wide and strong criticism 
towards the Chinese government, especially from the Western countries. Even worse, 
the Western countries were leading an intensive campaign to isolate China as a 
member of the international community and to impose economic sanctions. This 
situation was a kind of blessing in disguise for Indonesia, as China seemed prepared to 
soften its position and accepted Indonesia's terms of normalization. Indeed, China 
appreciated Indonesia's position not to criticize and condemn the incident, which was 
against the overwhelming tendency of Western countries. Indonesia was also 
considered to be holding an important diplomatic key as China was trying to restore its 
image after the Tiananmen incident. Indeed, the normalization of diplomatic relations 
117 Jakarta Post, 27 June 1989. 
118 Kompas, 5 July 1989. 
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with Indonesia would give a boost of confidence for the Chinese leadership in 
reestablishing China's international stature. 
B. The Importance of Normalization 
While the decision to fteeze the diplomatic relations was in the hands of 
Indonesia, accordingly the initiative to normalize the situation would also need to come 
from Indonesia. On the occasion of attending the ESCAP meeting in Jakarta in April 
1988, the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Shuqing made a further clarification of 
China's position on normalization. ' 19 First, Beijing had no difficulty in restoring 
diplomatic relations with Indonesia, and developing a fflendship with Indonesia in 
accordance with Dasa Sila Bandung. Second China never interfered and would never 
do so in the domestic affairs of other countries. Third, China denied its involvement in 
the Gestapu, as it was the result of the internal conflict in Indonesia. Indonesia and 
China should forget past history. 
Eventually, the sign of diplomatic normalization emerged in October 1989 
when President Suharto sent a congratulatory telex to President Yang Shangkun on the 
occasion of the 40th Anniversary of the PRC. Many Indonesian observers such as Jusuf 
Wanandi, Juwono Sudarsono and A. Dahana interpreted it as a step closer to 
normalization. 120 It was the first time since the freezing of diplomatic relations in 1967 
that President Suharto had congratulated the Chinese leader on the occasion of the 
National Day 1 October 1989. At one seminar, Juwono Sudarsono reiterated that it was 
time for Indonesia not to be haunted by PRC, Chinese Communist Party and PKI. 
Although, Indonesia could not forget the bitter experience 24 years ago, but its 
vigilance should not prevent the restoration of diplomatic relations., 21 In the same 
fonim, former Chief of BAKIN, Yoga Sugama presented a different view on 
normalization by stating the need to wait until the Chinese domestic political direction 
'19 See, Angkatan Bersenjata, Jakarta Post, Antara, 13 April 1988, Suara Karya, 14 April 1988. 
120 Kompas, 7 October 1989. 
121 Kompas, 16 October 1989. 
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became clear. 122 His statement once again indicated the military's apprehension of the 
radicals in China staging a possible come back. 
At the end of 1989 as a follow up to February's agreement in Tokyo, a group of 
Chinese representatives visited Indonesia to discuss details of normalization. They held 
meetings with Indonesian counterparts on the agreements that had been signed and 
selected which one of these agreements where the commitment is still there. 123 The 
meetings ran smoothly and agreement was reached on the outstanding problems. After 
a series of meeting held from 5 to 9 December in Jakarta, a joint statement was agreed 
thus clearing the way for normalization. Entering 1990, the normalization of diplomatic 
relations became a matter of time, as both parties were actively involved in various 
preparations to solve the outstanding problems. It was during that meeting that China 
reiterated its assurance not to support communist movements in Indonesia. 124 Alatas' 
visit to Beijing also set the time for a formal re-opening of diplomatic relations, when 
China and Indonesia. agreed ýhat Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng was to visit Indonesia 
in early August 1996. 
Eventually both governments agreed that the official normalization would be 
conducted on 8 August of the same year. The Chinese government also agreed that the 
ceremony should take place in Jakarta where its Prime Minister would visit. Again, it 
symbolized Suharto's victory, at least in front of his domestic public, that a Chinese 
representative was willing to come and sign the agreement in Indonesia. The signing of 
a Memorandum of Understanding on the normalization of diplomatic relations 
eventually took place on 8 August 1990. The document contains provisions on non- 
interference in the internal affairs of other countries and the need for peaceful co- 
existence. Suharto and Li Peng also discussed the issue of Cambodia. The latter 
reiterated the attitude of the Chinese govenu-nent towards ethnic Chinese living outside 
122 Yoga Sugarna argued that is still uncertain to the future of Chinese domestic politics whether it would I be dominated by the conservative, the progressive or the status-quo groups. 
123 Up to 1965, Indonesia and China signed 19 agreements, which consists of 14 agreements on .DC, economic, 3 agreements on socio-cultural and 2 joint communiqud. Indonesia cancelled the 1955 Dual 
Nationality through the Law No. 4/1969. 
124 Kompas, 7 February 1990. 
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China. 125 He expected ethnic Chinese descendants, especially those living in Indonesia, 
to become good citizens, and China would not use them to promote its interest. 
During that meeting, China also expressed its support for Indonesia's role in the 
settlement of the Cambodian problem. For its part, Indonesia requested China to 
convince the conflicting parties in Cambodia to solve their differences through 
negotiation, and not by force. Indonesia fully realized that the non-inclusion of China, 
as the principal supporter of the Khmer Rouge, in the two meetings on Cambodia in 
Jakarta had barely borne a fruitful result. Cambodia was a complex problem since it 
involved Cambodian factions as well as outside powers, particularly China and 
Vietnam. 126 For Indonesia, the normalization would enable her to take a more active 
role in the building of peace and regional order in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the 
improvement of diplomatic relations with China would surely pave the way for 
Indonesia's. bid to chair the Non-Aligned Movement. Above all, the most basic reason 
for Indonesia to normalize its ties with China was based on the need to implement a 
free and active foreign policy. ' 27 As proof of Indonesian consistency on these 
principles, Indonesia maintained its "One China Policy" that ruled her out from 
dipfornatically recognizing Taiwan. 
Domestically, the timing of the normalization of diplomatic relations proved 
that Suharto was in control of Indonesia's foreign policy. His success in bringing 
economic development, creating stability and order had boosted his power and 
increased confidence in foreign policy. His decision to restore relations was indeed 
against the prevailing military opinion. Thus, once again he proved who was the 
master. Nevertheless, his move on China could not be seen as eventually taking the 
125 This explanation was given by State Minister Moerdiono, See Kompas, 8 August 1990 and Suara 
Karya, 8 August 1990. 
126 The Cambodia conflict was a complex issue, since it involved both domestic political factions as well 
as external power interference. The political factions consisted of political factions that were divided and 
hostile towards each other. Vietnam, supported by the Soviet Union, was also directly involved after its 
military intervention into Cambodia in 1979. Thus domestic rivalries had been complicated by the 
presence of external patron, namely China and Vietnam. In a broader context, the Cambodian conflict 
also involved the competition between China and the Soviet Union. 
127 State Secretary Moerdiono as quoted by Kompas, 7 February 1990. 
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side of the proponents of normalization. This is because it was not in his character to 
give credit and appreciation to others. Instead, he always tried to get credit for himself 
Therefore, the timing of the decision was taken to show that the credit is his. In a 
broader context, the normalization was also intended to increase Indonesia's 
international stature and prestige. 
As far as China is concerned, its relations with Indonesia were also considered 
to be very important. Generally, as indicated by Harris, close ties with the Third World 
are very crucial because they provide China with an essential international buffer 
against the superpowers, an expanded base for reference and authority, and the 
potential for mutual economic assistance and co-operation. 128 China saw Indonesia as 
the biggest country in Southeast Asia with its economic potential and strategic location 
in her southern backyard. 129 China obviously did not want Indonesia to be too close to 
Japan, the US and the Soviet Union, as it related to Indonesia's control of the strategic 
Malacca Straits that channeled trade to Europe and the Middle East. Thus China 
needed a peaceful and stable environment that was conducive to its development plan. 
Moreover, the normalization of diplomatic relations could be seen in the context of 
China's effort to rehabilitate her international standing, particularly after the 
Tiananmen incident. 
4.6. Conclusion 
For more than two decades, Indonesia had maintained its projection of China as 
a threat to Indonesia's security. While the domestic enemy of the PKI was banned, 
China as its external ally had been kept at bay by the freezing of diplomatic relations. 
Due to the dominance of the military in the New Order regime, it was their views, 
supported by Suharto, which had prevailed in Indonesian domestic politics. The word 
4normalization' was rather taboo during the first decade of New Order as it might 
challenge the very basis of the government's interpretation of China. However, the 
... Lilian Craig, Harris, China's Foreign Policy toward the Third World (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1985), p. 62. 
129 Interview with officials of the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta, 16 November 1998. 
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bandwagon of normalization was only moving forward after China began signaling its 
willingness to improve its relations with Indonesia. There is no doubt that the coming 
of the moderate and progressive leader Deng )Gaoping in 1978 significantly played its 
part in creating a more conducive environment, especially through the introduction of 
modernization and open door policy. These policies made it necessary for China to 
create a stable and peacefal external environment. Thus restoring relations with 
Indonesia should also be seen in this direction. 
China's initiative towards normalization was received with mixed feelings 
among Indonesian elite leaders. The opponents of normalization mostly came from the 
Ministry of Defense (Hankam) and the influential intelligence body of BAKIN. They 
presented various reasons of objection ranging from the security dimension, the issue 
of ethnic Chinese as well as Chinese political ambition in Southeast Asia. They argued 
that there remained considerable obstacles to a restoration of diplomatic relations. At 
the forefront was the thorny, two-dimensional 'Chinese problem' - communism and 
the ethnic Chinese. Indonesia's staunch anticommunist military leadership also 
remained bitter over China's alleged role in the 1965 abortive communist coup 
attempt. On the contrary, the proponents of normalization that were centered to be 
around Adam Malik, argued that normalization was a necessity due to the increasing 
role of China in the world. Additionally, it should also help facilitate the settlement of 
the Cambodian problem, bring benefit for Indonesia's economy and more importantly, 
pave the way for Indonesia's intention to play a leadership role, especially in the 
context of the Non-Aligned Movement. 
Up to 1978, Indonesia's perception of China followed the views of the military, 
which was fully shared and supported by Suharto. China's initiative to non-nalize the 
relations with Indonesia was regarded as the biggest challenge to the military's 
perception of China. To a lesser extent, the changes in the international environment, 
particularly the Sino-US rapprochement, the improved relations between Malaysia and 
Thailand with China which culminated in the opening of diplomatic relations in the 
mid 1970s, had certainly put more pressure on Indonesia. In the end Indonesia did not 
budge at all, as the military's opposition remained strong against such a move, while 
Suharto put himself behýind the military. This sequence also underlined that 
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normalisation was more a domestic issue for Indonesia and subject to the dynamics of 
Indonesian politics. Despite Suharto's intervention in March 1978 that underlined 
Indonesia's willingness to cooperate with China as long as Beijing respected the 
principles of non-interference and mutual respect, it appeared that the opponents of 
normalization remained reluctant to embark on the restoration of diplomatic relations. 
Thus the road to normalization still had a long way to go. 
However, the development of the international economy affected Indonesia's 
development, particularly over the drop in oil prices in 1984. As a result, the 
government was compelled to make a structural adjustment by reducing its dependence 
on oil exports and diversifying its non-oil commodity exports and to expand the market 
for its commodities. China in this regard was seen, particularly among private and 
business quarters, as a market opportunity. Indeed, the emerging Chinese economy, in 
this context, has been regarded as one of the potential cures for Indonesia's economic 
problems. Thus to protect -Indonesia's interest of economic development, Suharto 
finally agreed to formally reopen direct trade with China which was realized in 1985. It 
was expected that China would become one of Indonesia's export commodities 
markets. Suharto appeared to be behind this idea and cleverly played the card of the 
KADIN as a force seemingly behind the move. For the military, they had no other 
option but to reluctantly support Indonesia's move to conduct a direct trade with China. 
However, to appease the opponents of the normalization, Suharto's government made 
it clear that the opening of direct trade should not be interpreted as leading to 
normalization of diplomatic relations. On their part, the military maintained vigilance 
by issuing regulations to prevent the arrival of communist subversive elements from 
China. 
To the surprise of many, in 1989 President Suharto and the Chinese Foreign 
Minister agreed to restore relations during the funeral of Japanese Emperor Hirohito. 
One year later, relations were fully restored. Indeed Indonesia's decision to nonnalize 
diplomatic relations with China was influenced by several factors. First, it was the 
result of Suharto's success in creating stability and order. This is particularly evident 
after Suharto successfully declared Pancasila as the sole ideology by 1985 and its 
subsequent acceptance by all political parties and other organizations. In this context 
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Pancasila should help to provide ideological protection for Indonesia from the threat 
emanating from China, communism and the ethnic Chinese. Second, Suharto's success 
in securing his oAm backyard through the creation of economic development and 
stability had boosted his confidence. Accordingly, he began paying more attention to 
foreign policy. Thus the decision of diplomatic normalization with China should be 
understood in part as deriving from Suharto's primacy in Indonesia's foreign policy 
decision making process. 
Third, the normalization of diplomatic relations with China should be 
understood in the context of Suharto's effort to increase Indonesia's intemational 
prestige by playing a bigger role on the world stage, while at the same time 
emphasizing Indonesia's free and active foreign policy. In this context, Indonesia 
needed China's support to actively participate in the solution of regional and 
international problems, especially those faced by the developing countries. Fourth, 
Suharto considered -China as an opportunity from which Indonesia might benefit. 
Indeed, the trade balance between both countries since the convening of direct trade 
showed an encouraging record in favor of Indonesia. Finally, China's guar-antee not to 
support the PKI, and not to interfere in Indonesian domestic affairs and not to exploit 
the Indonesian ethnic Chinese had definitely given an impetus towards better relations. 
Chapter Five 
Rederining the Perceptions of China: 
The Emphasis on Domestic and Economic Perspectives 
(1990 - 1997) 
Ile normalisation of diplomatic relations vAth China could broadly be 
understood as the result of the interaction between three factors, namely developments 
in the domestic political and economic contexts in Indonesia and China, as well as 
changes in the international environment. As the final decision to restore relations was 
made by Suharto, he also proved his domination in foreign policy decision-mak-ing. 
One of the biggest consequences after the normalization has been Indonesia's change of 
perception of China from a threat to an economic opportunity and a possible aid in 
boosting Indonesia's international stature. However, the decision to restore diplomatic 
relations Mth China left unanswered questions. What was the Indonesian elite's 
perception of normalization, particularly the military? How has the issue of the ethnic 
Chinese been affected by the dynamics of Indonesian politics? How has the military 
readjusted its perception of China and how have they viewed the role of ethnic 
Chinese? 
Therefore, the aim of this Chapter is to analyse how the Indonesian elite leaders 
have redefined the perception of China and to find out how the perceived the link, 
between China and Indonesian ethnic Chinese has been affected. In so doing, this 
Chapter is divided into five parts. The first part focuses on the perception of the 
restoration of diplomatic relations with China. Ile second section examines the 
dynamics of Indonesian domestic politics, particularly the shifting balance of power CP 
and the emergence of Islam. Ilie third portion discusses the issue of the ethnic Chinese. 
Ile fourth segment examines and analyses how threat perceptions of China have 
gradually shifted from political and security concerns to economic considerations. The 
last part is the conclusion. 
5.1. Indonesian Elite Views of the Implication of Normalization: Purposes and 
Advantages 
166 
A. Reactions towards Normalization: Maintaining Security Concern and 
Suspicions of Ethnic Chinese 
What was the Indonesian elite's reaction to the normalization of diplomatic 
relations with China? Mostly, they were in agreement with Suharto's decision to reopen 
the formal link v-ith China that was regarded as having significant benefits at the socio- 
political, economic and strategic levels. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
decision to normalise ties with China came from Suharto. Consequently, the majority of 
the domestic audience supported this move, as they were not prepared to be seen as 
antagonising Suharto. However, this move did not necessarily receive full support from 
other elite groups, particularly the military and some elements of the Muslim right 
%%ing. While the enthusiasm and expectation from the opening of diplomatic relations 
was high, there was also concern expressed that economic interest should not sacrifice 
other interests, particularly the security of the nation. Several statements expressed by 
military officials explained their attitude. In explaining why it took so long for 
Indonesia to agree to the restoration of diplomatic relations with China, Defence and 
Security Nfinister L. B. Moerdani, for example, told reporters that Indonesia required a 
long period to resume ties with China because of strong anti-China feelings in the 
country. 1 
While maintaining the need for vigilance, the military also believed that 
Indonesia's social and political condition was strong enough to resist any external 
ideological challenge. Chief of Armed Forces (ABRI) General Try Sutrisno, for 
instance, stated that the normalization of diplomatic relations with China did not mean 
the loosening of Indonesian vigilance towards the communist threat or danger. The 
reason why Indonesia decided to normalise its relations with China was because "the 
Indonesian nation is currently strong enough, that is why [we] should not be afraid of 
other parties that are trying to disseminate their ideo logy. 112 However, one should not 
underestimate the importance of national conditions that may decide the fate of 
communism. In this regard, Indonesian former foreign minister Roeslan Abdoelgani 
stated Indonesia should not be xvorried about the communist threat, as long as the 
1 Jakarta Post. 6 August 1990. 
As quoted by Antara. 8 February 1990. 
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conditions where communist seeds grow can be eradicated. 3 The fertile place for 
communism to expand is, among others, where there are conditions of poverty, social 
injustice and domestic political pressure. Given that Indonesia's economic situation was 
rather good, the communist issue should not be a problem in Indonesia. As far as the 
revival of the PKI was concerned, he considered it impossible as the Indonesian 
govemment officially outlawed the party, and the Chinese government had clearly 
declared no it longer supported the communist party in Indonesia. 
However, the military officials also realised the importance of the economic 
dimension of normalization. In this regard, former Head of State's Intelligence 
Coordination Agency (BAKIN) Sutopo Juwono also shared the view that Indonesia 
could not maintain its rigid position towards China and changes should be undertaken. 
He explained, "We cannot always look back. Everything now has changed. And more 
importantly, whether you like it or dislike it China has more than one billion people. It 
certainly cannot be ignored, " This view was obviously shared by many Indonesian 
businessmen who had been in favour of the opening of diplomatic relations. In this 
regard, one pron-dnent Indonesian businessman and a close family member of Suharto 
stated, "We cannot ignore the fact that the PRC with a population of more Um one 
billion is a huge potential market. ' 
A cautious view was also expressed by eight Islamic Youth organisation leaders 
just one day before the arrival of Li Peng in Jakarta in August 1990. They made their 
opposition known by issuing a waming on the possibility that diplomatic non-nalization 
might be used by "certain quarters" to promote their own self-interest. 
6 It is strongly 
believed that their concern was directed towards the Indonesian ethnic Chinese 
7 tycoons. While understanding the govemment decision that was intended to serve the 
national interest and the interest of Indonesian people, they asserted that the relations 
3 Kompas, 5 Juli 1990. 
4 Interview with suara Kar)-a, 6 August 1990. 
11- PrObOsutedjO, kno-n as younger brother of Suharto, is one of Indonesia's tycoons. As quoted by 
,4 ntara, 2 August 1 ()90. 
Pelita, 7 August 1990, Jakarta Post, 7 August 1990. 
In the Indonesian parlance, they are called "conglomerate" which means big businessman or tycoon. 
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with China should be based on five principles! This statement further reminded all 
Indonesians to be vigilant against the communist threat in all its forms. Communism is 
a latent danger therefore the developments relating to the ideology in the world should 
not carry us away as if it has collapsed. This statement appeared to reflect the military's 
line of thinking, particularly on the part of ethnic Chinese and communism. 
The Musl4n group in parliament, which did not cherish the nonnalization with 
China also, expressed its concern over security. A leading legislative figure from the 
Islamic United Development Party (PPP), Jailani Naro, warned that Indonesia should 
not lower its guard against a possible communist revival now that it had decided to re- 
establish official diplomatic relations with Chýina. 9 Although he could not deny the 
importance of the restoration of diplomatic ties, efforts should be made to ensure that 
the 1965 incident should not reoccur. He clearly referred to Jakarta's claims that the 
coup attempt was conducted by the Chinese-backed conununist party or the PKI. China 
should have by now learned "a lesson" from the absence of its official relations with 
Indonesia, that it would pay dearly if it interfered in the internal affairs of other 
countries. 10 In expressing the implication of diplomatic norinalization, the spokesman 
of the PPP even went further by warning that if indigenous businessmen were not given 
more leeway to develop their business activities, the ethnic Chinese would soon 
monopolise the economy and control the government as a whole. " 
In its editorial, a Nfuslim oriented newspaper stated that although the assurance 
from China not to interfere in the domestic affairs of Indonesia had been guaranteed, 
Indonesia should receive it %%ith vigilance, as there were many issues to be observed 
thoroughly. ' For example, the normalization should not impede the realisation of the 
First before the relations could be further developed, Prime Minister Li Peng, on behalf of the Chinese 
government and people must apologise 10 Indonesia for China's involvement in the communist attempt of 
September 30,1965. Second, as proof of good will, the Chinese govemment/the Communist Party must 
repatriate PKI figures to Indonesia so they can be brought to trial. Third, China must not (any longer) 
interfere in Indonesia's domestic affairs. Fourth, PRC must not revive the outlawed PKI and must not 
spread communist ideology in Indonesia. Fifth, PRC must not grant citizenship for ethnic Chinese who 
have become Indonesian nationals. 
9 JaA-ta Post. 7 July 1990. 
'0 Jailani Naro. intemiew with Jakarta Post, 7 August 1990. 
Thahcransyah, as quoted by Jakarta Post, 10 August 1990. 
Pelita. 19 November 1990. 
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nation building process that had consistently been pursued by the government. On the 
contrary, the Central office of jVuharnmadiyah Youth Organisation welcomed the 
normalization and appealed to aH Indonesians to use this normalization to the 
maximum for the wealth of the people and the success of national development. " This 
mixed reception towards normaliýation among the Islamic groups underlines that there 
was no agreement among the Muslims over normalization. " 11uham=4-ah represents 
the progressive movement, while Naro is known for his close relations with the 
military. 
Additionally, the normalization also raised the issue of ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia, particularly over their position and domination in the structure of the 
Indonesian economy. In this context, the opening of diplomatic relations was perceived 
by some as threatening the Indonesian economy, especially because of the potential 
flight to China of capital owned by Indonesian ethnic Chinese tycoons. This once again 
underlined the ý, %idespread suspicions of the ethriic Chinese loyalty. The Chairman of 
Indonesian Assimilation Foundation, Jusuf Hamka, stated that, "After the restoration of 
diplomatic relations, the ethnic Chinese community that had lived in Indonesia for 
decades should not be indecisive, rather they must strengthen the sense of nationalism 
and their love of Indonesia. " iMeanwhile, Vice-President Try Sutrisno was quoted as 
saying that thegovemment never promised to allow the Chinese to retain their outward 
cultural attributes. He further stated that the Chinese should forget their edinic origins 
as much as possible. 16 
The above expressions reflect the fact that there was still concern that 
Indonesian ethnic Chinese may be drawn by their identity and cultural links to turn their 
loyalty to Beijing. Anther opinion underlining this concern was also expressed by a 
member of KAD IN, that the question of nationalism among the ethnic Chinese played a 
Kompas, 7 August 1990. 
Those %%ho opposed the normalization from the Islamic forces were known close to the military. This is 
also the case %%ith Jailani Naro %%ho received military backing in the run up of vice-president election in 
the parliament in 1989. 
15 Interview %kith, %ferdeka, 14 February 1990. 
16 Ajioweek, 31 March 1995. 
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significant role in trade and economic relations. " Thus, a relationship that is based on 
primordialism. should be avoided. Consequently, the issue of assimilation or integration 
between pribumi and the ethnic Chinese need to be further addressed. As long as the 
Indonesian ethnic Chinese conglomerates contributed to the promotion of national 
interests, their presence should create no harm. On the contrary, should they become 
the channels for foreign interest to penetrate Indonesia's domestic market without 
social awareness, then the problem must be there. Moerdani underlined that "That role 
would remind us of the status of comprador in the colonial period. "" 
For its part, China has made its position with regard to the ethnic Chinese clear. 
Premier Li Peng was quoted sa)ing that they [ethnic Chinese settling abroad] were "no 
longer Chinese nationals" and therefore they should "fulfil their obligations to their 
adopted country just like other citizens. "" He further stated that, "As for those ethnic 
Chinese who retain Chinese nationality, we have all long requested and educated them 
to observe the laws. and decrees of the country of their residence, respect the local 
customs and live in firiendship and harmony with the local people of other ethnic groups 
and contribute their share to the nation building. " A similar confirmation was later 
repeated during his meeting , %ith Indonesian senior editors that the Chinese government 
had no intention at all to use ethnic Chinese for China's interest. He also welcomed 
those ethnic Chinese %%ishing to come to China, to visit families, give respect to their 
ancestry or for other motives. " 
B. The Optimistic Perception of Normalisation: Promoting Trade and 
Realising, Regional Peace and Security 
For those who supported the normalization, the move to restore diplomatic 
relations with China was considered as a necessity. It was a positive response to 
domestic d)mamism, regional and international realities, and particularly the changes 
17 Jacob Hendraw-an, Vice-ChairTnan of Chinese Committee of KADIN as quoted by Alerdeka, 14 
February 1990. 
'a Kompas. 26 July 1990. 
19 JaAarta Past. 9 August 1990. 
:0 Prcmicr Li Peng's intmiew with newspapers chief editor and head of news agency: Jacob Oetama 
WOmP-), Sabarn Si3gian (Jakarta Post), Ani Bertha Simamora (Suara Pembaruan) and Pami Hadi 
(LKB. V A wara), See, Kompas, II August 199 1. 
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that had been taking place in China, as well as enabling Indonesia to play a greater role 
on the international stage. They generally welcomed the improvement in Sino- 
Indonesian relations and expected that it should contribute towards Indonesia's 
interests, especially in economy and trade. It should also pave the way for the solution 
of regional and international problems to which Indonesia was willing to contribute. 
Therefore, the positive reception was mainly concentrated on two aspects, namely the 
benefit for Indonesian economy, and the creation of peace and stability in the region. 
As far as the economy was concerned, normalization was seen as, at least 
increasing the opportunities for the export of non-oil and gas commodities to China. As 
the first non-governmental organisation that pioneered the reopening of trade contacts 
with China, Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (KADIN) welcomed the normalization. 
Its Chairman reminded the nation of the fact that there has been a significant increase of 
trade volume between these two countries .2' Therefore the opening of diplomatic 
relations should create a favourable atmosphere that should eventually create a fimher 
increase in trade volume. In this regard, the massive population in China has been 
considered as a large potential market for Indonesian goods. Nevertheless, it remains to 
be seen whether the majority of the Chinese population would automatically consume 
Indonesian products. This is a major question since China is in the same position as 
other members of the developing countries. Thus instead of absorbing Indonesian 
products, there is a possibility of China becoming a competitor of Indonesian 
commodities. 2' While exploring the potential opportunities in trade, Indonesia should 
maintain its vigilance and prevent the negative implication towards domestic industry 
from competition %vith Chinese products. 
It was expected that the restoration of diplomatic relations would also 
contribute to the creation of peace and security in the region. Indeed, the most 
immediate concern for the countries in the region has been the settlement of the 
Cambodian issue that had on some occasions put the ASEAN member countries' 
respective positions at odds with each other. The settlement of the Cambodian problem 
21 Indonesia- China trade volume in 1986 amounted USS424 billion and it was expected to reach US$800 
billion by 19S9. Antara, 12 Febnjary 1990. 
22 For example, these similarities can be found in natural gas and oil, and other products using a simple 
industrial technology. 
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should eliminate one source of conflict and enable countries in the region to embark on 
more important issues. In practice the existence of diplomatic relations between 
Indonesia and China would facilitate and expedite the settlement process of the 
Cambodian problem. This is the case because as mediator it was thought that Indonesia 
should be able. to persuade China to use its influence on the Khmer Rouge. Premier Li 
Peng also underlined that both Indonesia and China sought the creation of peace and 
stability in Southeast Asia, especially on the settlement of the Cambodian problem. " 
One Indonesian scholar stated that, "With the settlement of Cambodian problem, the 
effort to realise Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia 
becomes more apparent. " This view was shared by another Indonesian prominent 
scholar, Juwono Sudarsono. " In the end, the restoration of diplomatic relations would 
enable both countries to develop good relations in overcoming regional problems. "' 
In a wider context, the proponents of nonnalization presented their support and 
underlined various advantages from which Indonesia would gain. A Member of 
Parliament from Golkar ffirther stated that the normalization was the most significant 
achievement in Indonesian diplomacy, which also opened the horizon for a greater role 
for Indonesia in Asia. " Singapore, for instance, had long awaited this move, since they 
had previously made it clear that improvement in their own relationship with Cbýina 
would only be possible soon after Indonesia had sought normalization. " Meanwhile, 
one Indonesian nationalist and former foreign minister Roeslan Abdulgani underlined 
that the reopening of ties gave the Indonesian goverrurient an opportunity to follow the 
situation in China directly which used to be conducted through Indonesian embassies in 
23 As quoted by Kompas, II August 1990. 
24 A. Dahana, interview with Merdeka, 9 February 1990. 
25 Merdelca, 9 July 1990. 
26 Kompas, 26 July 1990. 
27 Marzuki Darusman, Suara Karya, 4 July 1990. 
28 As a country with the majority of its population being ethinc Chinese, Singapore did not want to upset 
its big neighbour by an early opening of diplomatic relations which might arouse suspicion against 
Singapore. Statement of the Singaporean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as quoted by Antara, 5 July 1990. 
Other countries that welcome the normalization are Vietnam, Thailand Japan, Malaysia, Australia Soviet 
Union, See: Antara, 5,7,8 July and 7 August 1990; Merdeka, 9 and 14 July 1990; Kompas, 14 July 1990. 
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Singapore and Thailand. "' Indonesia would also be able to develop economic relations 
without third party involvement. Thus Indonesian commodities should be marketed to 
China directly and vice versa 
5.2. The Development of Indonesian Domestic Politics: The Shifting Balance of 
Power and the Emergence of Islam 
A. Challenges to Suharto: Resistance from the Military I 
By March 1988, Suharto was elected for his uninterrupted fifth term in office. 
And nearly a decade after the imposition of Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus (the 
Normalization of the Campus Life) in 1978, students began to make themselves heard 
through protests. All the expression of dissatisfaction directed against Suharto did not 
materialise into threatening his regime. Any dissent was effectively silenced through 
arrests, as Suharto remained sensitive to any form of criticism. The oppositions were 
curbed, and the political mechanisms serving the maintenance of stability and order 
remained in place. Thus, by the late 1980s, the only viable challenge to Suharto came 
from the military quarters that had long supported him. 
Indeed, the establishment of stability and order under Suharto without a doubt 
enjoyed full backing from the military. In its development, under the leadership of 
influential Gen. Moerdani, the military established itself further as a dominant player in 
Indonesian domestic politics. " The growing support among military officials for C) 
Moerdani and his ability to effectively put ABRI under I-Lis conunand did indeed 
compel Suharto to re-examine his overall relations with the military. One of his 
immediate actions was to remove Moerdani shortly before the beginning of the 
People's Representatives Assembly (MPR) session in March 1988, thus leaving him 
without direct access to ABRI's command system. " It appeared that Suharto's policy of 
29 Kompas, 5 Juli 1990. 
30 For the background of Gen. Moerdani, See, Julius Pour, Benny IvIberdank The Profile of a Slatesman 
Soldier (Jakarta: Yayasan Kejuangan Panglima Besar Sudirman, 1993). 
31 It is widely believed that Moerdani's criticism of Suharto's family conduct in business as well as his 
tacit support towards PDI has put his relation with Suharto aloof. 
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divide and rule applied to civil society was also being implemented against the mi litary. 
He immediately introduced a new and unprecedented policy by filling the military's top 
offices with members of the army that used to serve as his adjutants. 11 In describing the 
relation between Suharto and the military in the structure of Indonesian politics, one 
Indonesian observer noticed that though the military clique rule was still widely 
employed outside Indonesia, inside the country it was clear that only Suharto ruled. 33 
Nevertheless, Moerdani remained an influential figure among the military 
officers. The military's resistance to Subarto was later shown in the process of the 
selection of vice-president. " This new development in Indonesia's politics indicated the 
emergence of friction between Suharto and the military, particularly after the removal 
of General Moerdani . 
35 Other events suggested further that the rift between Suharto and 
ABRI had become apparent. Suharto's decision to punish military officers involved in 
the Dili incident of November 1991 was taken against the military, and their sources 
have since insisted the army was not entirely to blame for the tragedy. " In the same 
year, after the annual commanders meeting in September 1991, Suharto invited* the 
assembled ABRI cornmand to his favourite place, the Tapos ranch outside Jakarta. 
During this meeting Suharto gave a lecture about his favourite subject of Pancasila. 
However the essence of the. lecture was a kind of warning from Suharto to ABRI: dare 
not threaten the state; Vetat cest moi. " 'Me event was considered as an embarrassing 
moment for ABRI as it was later broadcast through Indonesian national television. 
32 One of the obvious choices has been the appointment of former adjutant Gen. Try Sutrisno who to the 
surprise of many observer did not come from the elite mainstream ABRI. 
33 Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto, p. 5. 
34 ABRI's rejection of Sudharmono is mainly because of the following- (a) He is not comince, from 
mainstream ABRI. He is a lawyer by training and spent his military career as a prosecutor; (b) his policies 
of giving lucrative government tenders away from the military to civilian business associate of Suharto 
had angered military leaders; and (c) His position as Chairman of Golkar had enabled civilian to dominate 
the institution and giving him a strong support. 
35 General Moerdani had been the Commander of ABRI for five years. He had done a lot for the military, 
particularly in overhauling its structure, trimming down the forces, and overseeing the generation 
transition of leadership. He also gained high respect for profesionalising and modernisingg ABRI. 
However, his removal remains a matter of speculation, ranging from Suharto's concern of Moerdani's 
increased popularity and influence among members of ABRI and Suharto's anger because of Moerdani's 
warning about his children. 
36 Vatikiotis, Ibid. p. 186. 
37 Ibid. p. 187. 
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From the above events, it became clear that Suharto dominated ABRI, while for their 
part ABRI showed resistance to Suharto. In effect, Suharto began losing the support of 
ABRI's officials who felt humiliated by a series of events that had damaged the 
integrity and image of the military. Additionally, Suharto also began reducing the role 
of the military in the Golkar through the candidacy of Suharto's civilian favourite, 
Harmoko as chairman. " Although he was later appointed as the first civilian to hold the 
job, the military reacted bitterly to this appointment. A retired general insisted that 
Harmoko was not a genuine leader and he could only survive under Suharto's 
patronage. He fin-ther said that the military might be excluded from Golk-ar's board of 
leadership, but it would remain a decisive force in the process of presidential 
succession. In this regard, he finther warned, "Golkar without the military support V411 
be nothing. If in the next election the military decides to support the PDI, this party will 
surely be the winner, not Golkar". " 
In the beginýing of the New Order era, it was simply impossible to dissociate 
Suharto and the miIiiary. For over thirty-years the two were inseparable in dominating 
the power structure and the direction of Indonesian politics. As time went by, 
regeneration among the military officials has left a gap between Suharto and young 
officers who wanted to serve the country in a more professional way. The military also 
began questioning the longevity of Suharto in power and the involvement of his family 
in business activities. Suharto's decision to appoint top military leaders from his own 
circle created a dangerous situation for the military, as people could not distinguish 
them from Suharto. Suharto also embarked on the process of clearing Moerdani's 
elements from the military, particularly those among the intelligence services. At the 
same time, Suharto seemed to realise the need to develop political support to counter 
the danger of decreasing influence over ABRI. One option for him was to turn to the 
Islamic forces that seemed to work enthusiastically with Suharto. 
39 See, Kompas, 24 April 1993; Editor, 22 May 1993 and 7 October 1993; and DeTik, 13-19 October 
1993. 
39 See, Editor, II November 1993; Tempo, 6 November 1993. 
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Changes in Power Structure: The Reintroduction of the Islamic Forces 
Islam is the religion embraced by the majority of Indonesians, and it previously 
played a major role in national politics in the first two decades of independence. 
However, the influence of Islam in Indonesian politics was practically curtailed after 
the coming of the New Order regime. Intervention by a largely secular state 
signýificantly reduced its unity as well as influence over the course of Indonesian 
politics. For many Muslim politicians, life under the New Order was marked as a long 
series of defeats. While the Islamic inspired United Development Party (PPP) was 
allowed to contest in Indonesian politics, its real participation only emerged in general 
elections. " Suharto did not have any intention of reviving Islamic political parties that 
flourished in the previous era. In fact, Suharto borrowed the Dutch colonial policy of 
suppressing the Islamic movement as a potential rallying symbol of anti-establishment 
views. Under these conditions, Islam was confined to the mosque and its political 
expression was limited. This conscious separation of theology from the state has been 
considered as the national consensus among Indonesian leaders. 
Accordingly, under the New Order the Islamic forces were suppressed and 
frequently discredited for any social and political upheavals. The incidents in Aceh, 
Tonjung Priok and Lampung were three events that are often referred to as examples of 
how the government and the military had no hesitation to use force to check the 
emergence of Islamic forces. "' Tlie military also adopted a doctrine that viewed Islam 
as a danger from the extreme right in Indonesia. However, in the late 1980s there 
emerged the revival of religious sentiment. At an individual level, the use of Islamic 
42 symbols was certainly increasing. Even Suharto's family showed new behaviour by 
adopting those symbols and supporting Muslim charity organisations . 4' At the 
40 The government adopted a policy of floating-mass meaning that political participation is only allowed 
in the process of general election and political parties, except Golkar, were forbid to establish branches at 
village level. 0 
41 These resentments did not necessarily related to religious reason, as in many cases it was caused by 
imbalance of development between regional and central government. 
'2 Some of the symbols are the use of the Islamic greeting, Assalamu'alaikum which means "may peace 
be with you" and the use of veil (head-dress for woman). 
43 It was widely believed that this tendency was aimed at garnering political support, particularly for 
Suharto's ambitious daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana. 
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institutional level, the government adopted a new outlook that favoured the Muslim. 
This was followed by various measures that enabled the Islamic forces that had long 
been ignored to reclaim their position. The election of the Chairman of the Islamic 
United Development Party in August 1989 was surprisingly conducted without any 
interference from the government. 44 Subsequently, the party was allowed to voice a 
more united stand. The recognition of Islam by the government was later symbolised in 
matters related to concern for their followers' everyday life. The passing of the Law on 
Religious Courts in 1989 was a manifestation of the acceptance by the government of 
the legitimate role of Islamic law (syariah) in public life. " 
Why did Suharto reintroduce Islam? There are several explanations of this new 
tendency. First, since the coming of the New Order regime, Islam had been banned 
from participating directly in politics. As a result, their energies had been channelled 
towards deepening their study of Islam. Thus the revival of Islam was the consequence 
of that long process.. Second, Suharto was getting older and became more religious. He 
also wanted to "repay" his mistakes in previously suppressing the Muslims. As he grew 
older, Suharto became more religious and even performed a Haj to Mecca, which was 
extensively covered by the Indonesian media and television. Third, it was an attempt by 
Suharto to widen political support, as the succession issue hotted up. In this context, 
Suharto also wanted to secure his position that may have been threatened by 
disillusionment among members of the military, as the 1992 general election was 
approaching. What is clear is that this new situation gave a momentum for efforts of the 
Islamic forces to legitimise themselves to re-enter politics. 
However, the most important and controversial development was the creation 
of ICMI, the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (Ratan Cendekimvan 
Muslim Indonesia) in December 1990. "' 1CM1 is an organisation pioneered by 
44 See Syamsuddin Haris, "PPP and Politics under the New Order", Prisma (Jakarta), No. 49, June 1990, 
pp. 3 1-5 1. 
43 The Syariah is only applied to issues of marital and inheritance disputes. However, its implementation 
among the Muslim is uneven and the government does not officially encourage it. 
46 For various comments on the establishment of ICMI, See, Lukman Hakiem, Tansil Linrung and 
Mahmud F. Rakasina (eds), Mereka Bicara tentang ICMI (They Talk about ICMI] (Jakarta: Penerbit 
Amanah Putra Nusantara, 1995). 
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prominent Muslim intellectuals, such as Dawam Rahardjo, Soetjipto Wirosardjono, and 
Amien Rais. They perceived a need to create an organisation to distil the views of 
different Muslim groups in order to formulate a united position in negotiations with the 
government. The establishment of ICMI was with full backing and blessing from 
Suharto as he officially opened its first conference in December 1990. His close 
associate, the Minister for Research and Technology, B. J. Habibie, was elected as its 
chairman. Interestingly, there were no military officers attending the meeting. Their 
absence from the meeting underlined three things. First, the rift between the military 
and Suharto had become prevalent. Second, the military did not support the creation of 
ICMI. Third, Suharto's support for ICMI should be seen in an attempt to shore up his 
power base amongst a large section of the population in response to the military's move 
to distance itself from Suharto. 
Suharto's attitude in opening the gate for Islamic forces was indeed being 
challenged by the. military and Abdurrahman Wahid. " For the fon-ner, the 
reintroduction of thelslamic card into politics violated the New Order commitment to 
separate the state and religion. Thus, the military as the guardian of the state saw a risk 
of Indonesia returning to sectarianism. On the other hand, Wahid was suspicious of the 
attitude of his fellow Muslims in using Islam to enter politics. He considered ICMI as a 
"Trojan Horse" to power through which the elements of its members have maintained a 
close link with Habibie. To express his disagreement, Wahid initiated the creation of a 
Democracy Forum aimed at balancing ICMI. Its member is varied, ranging from 
Islamic, nationalist and even Christian scholars and political activists. From this 
perspective, it is clear that Islam is far from a united force. Rather, it consists of various 
groups that regard political reality in a different way. " 
'7 Chairman of the biggest Islamic organisation, the Nahdatul Ulama, with over twenty millions 
followers, mainly in East Java province. Although to western observers he was seen as a true democratic, 
many Muslim regard him as a controversial and ambiguous figure. There are many young kyai (priest) 
who do not agree with his political activity, including his own uncle Wahid Hasyim. This is one of the 
reasons why approaching the 1999 general election, NU has been divided into several parties, such as NU 
Party, PKB and PBB. While other NlYs leader, Hamzah Haz, leads PPP. 
"i The conventional division of Islam is between the so-called santri (devoted Muslim) and abangan 
(secular Muslim). However, santri consist of those modernist and conservative groups. 
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Why did Suharto turn to Islam and what was its connection with the restoration 
of diplomatic relations with China? The normalization of diplomatic relations with 
China had challenged the very foundation of the military doctrine that portrayed China 
as a threat to Indonesia. In effect, it reduced ABRI's support for Suharto. Thus to 
maintain his grip on power, Suharto had used the Islam card to balance the loosening of 
ABRI's support. Suharto's idea to reintroduce Islam was received with enthusiasm by 
the Muslim groups that by the end of the 1980s it had shown signs of revival. 
Therefore, Suharto's initiatives in foreign and domestic policy had further alienated him 
from the military. At the same time, the situation had exposed the military's suspicion 
towards ethnic Chinese, an issue where Suharto and the military had a different view. 
5.3. Revisiting the Issue of Ethnic Chinese: A Shift from Political and Security 
Concerns to Economic Aspects 
The New Order position had perceived the ethnic Chinese in the context of their 
alleged involvement-in the 1965 coup. Apart from their association with the PKI, they 
were also regarded as close to China. Thus domestic and external considerations 
converged in the person of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. In this situation, the views 
towards the ethnic Chinese had been predominantly based on political considerations. 
In principle, the improvement of the relationship with China eliminated China as a 
source of external threat, while the revival of the PKI was practically in check. What 
has been the consequence of normalization with China for the ethnic Chinese, bearing 
in mind the dynamics of Indonesia's domestic politics? 
A. Ethnic Chinese under the New Order: The Persistence and Complexity 
of the Ethnic Chinese Issue 
Scrutinizing the Ethnic Chinese 
The ethnic Chinese constitute three and a half percent of the Indonesian 
population. In 1995, it was estimated that around 5.4 million ethnic Chinese were living 
in Indonesia. They were mostly concentrated in urban centres and, as a goup, enjoying 
49 
economic advantages. Contrary to their numbers, ethnic Chinese in Indonesia occupy 
The wealth of the ethnic Chinese is not evenly distributed, and even many of them are poor. 
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a dominant role in the country's economic sector. Some estimations indicate that the 
ethnic Chinese control around 70% of the vast country's economic wealth. " Of the top 
fifteen private Indonesian companies, eleven are owned by the ethnic Chinese. 
51 The 
fate of the ethnic Chinese has been complicated as a result of their ventures in the 
political field.. Under the radically nationalist Sukarno regime, the ethnic Chinese 
organised itself in the BAPERKI (Consultative Council of Indonesian Citizenship) for 
social and political organisation. This organisation was later aligned with the PKI in 
order to protect themselves and their interests. Accordingly, the ethnic Chinese had 
been implicated by the 1965 coup attempt. Since then the involvement of the ethnic 
Chinese in politics has been curbed, and its linkage with the PKI and China was 
portrayed as a danger to Indonesian security. All Chinese schools were either closed or 
converted to government schools. Chinese language and media were banned, and the 
expression of Chinese culture and symbols, even the use of ethnic Chinese names was 
"discouraged". Subsequently, ethnic Chinese political organisations were replaced by a 
government agency, called BAKOM-PKB (Communicative Body for the Appreciation 
of National Unity) w. ith its main task to promote the assimilation of ethnic Chinese into 
Indonesian society. " 
Under the Suharto regime, Indonesian central government policy has adopted 
the policy of naturalisation in accordance with 1958 Citizenship Law 
53 and demanded 
that they assimilate into the Indonesian community. However, the government policy to 
achieve total assimilation through Indonesianisation of names and inter-marriage 
50 Indonesian sociologist George Aditjondro questioned the view that 3.5 per cent of ethnic Chinese 
ge dominate 70 per cent of Indonesia's economy. He argued that the myth originates from a passag 
in the 
1995 study of Michael Backman, Executive Officer at the East Australian Unit of the Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Canberra. However, ethnic Chinese minority is far from 
controlling 70 per cent of Indonesia's economy. The reason is because many "instant specialist" on 
Chinese Indonesians miss the extremely important footnote that explains the term of "market 
capitalisation" that states: "Control by market capitalisation has been determined after listed finns control 
by governments or foreigners are discounted. " See, George J. Aditjondro, "The Chinese Economic 
Domination Myth", 10 August 1998, http: //w%vw. huaren. org/focus/id/081098-07. htmi. 
51 Asiaweek, 31 March 1995. 
52 The government did not allow the ethnic Chinese to form a political party and limited their entrance 
into the bureaucracy. However, they were given to play their role in the economic field. Thus, their 
concentration was mainly in economic activities. 
53 See Mely G. Tan, "The Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia: Issues and Identity", in Leo Suryadinata (ed. ), 
Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians (Singapore: ISEAS, 1997). 
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remains the unfinished business of the integration process. In the words of one 
Indonesian scholar, the concept of assimilation is a never-ending effort. " The 
government has indeed adopted a policy that this part of the special ethnic group should 
be included in the development process. However, there remain the political, 
psychological, social and cultural obstacles towards assimilation. " Thus, instead of 
progress and acl-ýievement in the assimilation process, it was the domination of the 
economic activities that has prevailed. 
Indeed, prior to 1997 Indonesia's economic success in economic development 
was widely recognised. This success was measured in terms of growth rates, the 
development of physical infi-astructure, the achievement of near self-sufficiency in 
food, and declining rates of population growth and absolute poverty. However, from 
these successes there were t%,. -o implications that were vddely perceived as the 
necessary price to pay. First, there was the growing gap in standards of living between 
the rich and the poor. This gap was mostly evident in the urban centres. Unfortunately, 
the rich were perceived to mostly consist of ethnic Chinese. Second, there was a 
growing gap in the levels of development and an acute imbalance in the distribution of 
investment in different parts of the country. For instance, in 1994, Java-Madura enjoyed 
the largest share of total investments, while the eastern part of Indonesia had merely 7.7 
of the overall investment for that year. 56 
Entering 1990, the issue of ethnic Chinese domination in the Indonesian 
economy suddenly took off in Indonesian political discourse. It was definitely triggered 
by Suharto after he summoned thirty-one of the most successful Indonesian 
businessmen at the beginning of March 1990. Interestingly, the majority attending the 
meeting that was held in his favourite Tapos ranch were ethnic Chinese tycoons. In that 
particular meeting, which was later broadcasted on the national television, Suharto 
called on them to promote social equality by selling 25 per cent of the equity to co- 
54 Jusuf Wanandi, Kompas, 26 July 1990. 
55 See, among others, Lie Tek Tjeng, Afasalah IVNI dan Masalah Huakiau di Indonesia [111e Problems of 
WNI and Huakiau in Indonesia] (Jakarta: LIPI, 1969); Leo Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians, the 
Chinese Minority and China (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann, 1978). 
56 Leonard C. Sebastian and Reza Y. Siregar, "Indonesia: Setting the Stage for Soharto's Re-election, " 
Southeast Asian Affairs 1996 (Singapore: ISEAS, 1996), p. 188. 
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operatives firms. Suharto was quoted as saying, "I invite you to prevent the possibility 
of social unrest as early as possible, " to the businessmen that have flourished through 
his patronage. " There were calls from senior economists that Indonesia must build up 
its small-scale businesses to help stem the concentration of economic Power and wealth 
in the hands of mainly ethnic Chinese businesses. In responding to these calls, the 
Planning Minister said that Indonesia's potentially explosive income gap was widening 
and will probably worsen unless steps are taken to support small businesses. 58 
What did the meeting mean and what was its relation to the problems facing 
Indonesian imbalance of economic development? First, Suharto was aware of growing 
criticism towards his family business link with the ethnic Chinese and the issue of the 
economic gap. Thus the meeting would divert the attention from the real problem to the 
greed of ethnic Chinese businessmen. Second, this meeting showed the extraordinary 
power of Suharto. Although the nature of his speech was a kind of appeal, in practice 
his minister was hurriedly asked to prepare the implementation of the scheme. Third, 
Suharto's intervention questioned his determination to apply liberalisation policies that 
began moving beyond his control. That was why the growth in the private sector was 
been balanced by the call to redistribute their investment to co-operatives. 
What should be underlined from this meeting is that Suharto opened and 
legitimised the attack on the wealth and privilege of the ethnic Chinese. Several 
Indonesians, including Suharto's half-brother ProbosutedJo demanded that the 
government restrict the domination of Indonesian economy through the enactment of 
anti-monopoly laws. He also asked that Chinese conglomerates sell shares to Workers' 
Co-operatives to narrow the gap between ethnic Chinese and pribumi. If necessary 
financially strong businessmen who enjoyed facilities could be forced to limit their 
businesses so as not to make small and medium sized-businesses go bankrupt. " What 
Suharto did to ethnic Chinese businessmen was just like a boomerang. This was the 
case since those ethnic Chinese businessmen have flourished with the co-operation of 
his own family and the military. 
57 TeMpo' 10 March 1990. 
58 Reuters, 14 August 1994. 
'9 As quoted by Antara, 13 March 1990. 
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Ethnic Chinese as A Problem 
Indeed Suharto's attack reopened the sensitive issue of the ethnic Chinese, since 
the ordinary people became more aware of their wealth and domýination of the 
Indonesian economy. Indeed, the ethnic Chinese were involved in the economic 
development under the New Order. ' In line with Indonesian economic progress, they 
have developed into what is perceived as rich and exclusive groups. Many Indonesians 
also believed they had achieved econon-dc success due to their collaboration and 
collusion with government officials and the military. In this regard, one of the founding 
members of ICMI, Nasir Tamara, explains: 
... the ethnic Chinese are those rich people, receive privileges 
from the 
government, are close to the generals, and they are traders and tycoons. 
That is their image is as a minority but they act as a determinant factor. 
And because the perception is that they are rich, they are consequently 
exclusive, and unwilling to maintain contact with the pribumi, that is the 
perception, which does not necessarily, correspond to the reality. 
Basically, that perception is untrue, manipulated and exacerbated by the 
New Order's interests. Although it is not necessarily the Order itself, but 
some of its leaders gave that line of thinking. There are also some leaders 
and generals who exploit them. If there is any political problem, they 
may become an easy target or a scapegoat. This is the case because they 
could not blame other ethnic groups. 61 
It is true that there should be a distinction between reality and perception. 
Although perception does not necessarily reflect the reality, it nevertheless constitutes 
part and parcel of reality, which could not be ignored. Accordingly, the perception of 
the ethnic Chinese consists of a picture of a rich and exclusive class, small in number 
but econon-dcally powerful, and unwilling to co-operate with pribumi. What is 
interesting is that this perception has enabled the ethnic Chinese question to be 
manipulated in the New Order's interest, or at least some of its leaders. And the worst is 
that they have been used as a scapegoat when there are any social or political problems. 
60 According to Kwik Kian Gie, development strategy under the New Order regime was absolutely 
centred on several tycoons or conglomerates that have been used as development locomotive. They were 
regarded to be able to "get things done" and needed to achieve a sustainable development. See, Kwik 0 Kian Gie & Nurcholish Madjid, Masalah Pri danNon Pri Deivasa Ini [The Current Problem of Pri and 
Non Pri] (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1998). 
61 Interview with Nasir Tamara on 24 November 1998. 
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There is no question that the perception of the ethnic Chinese has mostly been 
negative. One Indonesian pribumi businessman and Chairman of the Indonesian 
Chamber of Commerce (KADIN) Aburizal Bakrie, for instance, explained that the 
problem of ethnic Chinese conglomerate and businessmen stems from a bad image 
spreading among the people. 62 "Image is more important than the substance itself, " he 
reiterated. The negative perception that has been in the minds of the people was caused 
by their domination of the Indonesian economy. This situation has created and become 
a source of jealousy, and it is also a potential to trigger riots because the have-nots 
[mostly pribumi] feel they have the right to take something from the haves [ethnic 
Chinese minority]. Similarly, retired General Sayidiman stated that as a result of the 
ethnic Chinese domination in Indonesian economy, there emerges an emotional 
condition that exists among ordinary people. " As long as that emotional condition is 
still there, it would be very difficult to consider the ethnic Chinese the same as others. 
Thus, the factor of jealousy because of their economic dominance has become the 
underlining factor of an ethnic Chinese problem in Indonesia. 
Indeed, Indonesia's economic development has created a disturbing gap 
between the haves and the have-nots. A study conducted by a leading Indonesian 
economist, Christianto Wibisono, revealed that ten of the largest local tycoons 
contributed 30 per cent of the national gross domestic product (GDP) in 1994. In the 
previous year, Indonesia's top 3 00 conglomerates recorded a total turnover of Rp. 144.4 
trillion or 48.1 per cent of the GDP, while their assets reached Rp. 227.3 trillion or 75.8 
per cent of the GDP. This fact clearly indicates that few economic players dominate the 
Indonesian economy. He described how some ethnic Chinese conglomerates in 
Indonesia became big businessmen because of facilities or concessions from certain 
govenunent officials. This group of people have been branded by Wibisono as "crony 
capitalist conglomerates", which amounted to 4,67 per cent out of 300 companies in 
Indonesia. 
62 Aburizal Bakrie, as quoted in Republika, II August 1998, from a Seminar in Jakarta, 10 August 1998, 
entitled "Apa yang Salah di Negcri ini" [What's Wrong in this Country]. 
63 Kompas, 27 October 1989. 
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Indeed, the negative perception of the ethnic Chýinese was exacerbated by the 
acts of their counterparts who were involved in activities such as smuggling and bank 
credit problems. One of the infamous scandals involved an ethnic Chinese, Eddy 
Tanzil. He was convicted of taking more than US$430 million in a credit scarn from the 
state-owned Bapindo bank between 1989 and 1991 for the construction of several 
chemical factories under his Golden Key Group. He was serving the second year of a 
17-year sentence for corruption and violation of bank contracts but he escaped in 
1996. ' Up to now, the Indonesian government is still tracking dowin the escaped 
tycoon-convict Eddy Tansil but to no avail. To make matters worse, the trial process 
only resulted in a relatively light sentence, which was seen by many Indonesians as 
unfair. The government has also asked the Chinese government to help find him, " and 
it is rumoured he may live in China. In this regard, former minister of finance Mari'e 
Muhammad also argued that the government should have taken a firm action on the 
bankers - mainly ethnic Chinese - who are really dishonest (nakaý. If necessary, they 
should be brought to justice. 66 
In responding to the attitude towards Indonesian ethnic Chinese, Mochtar Riady 
argued that the negative sentiment towards the ethnic Chinese should not be 
generalised. He stated that there might be around 170 ethnic Chinese, including him, 
out of 200 Indonesian big businessmen. 67 However, they should not be seen as 
representing the whole Indonesian ethnic Chinese. He gave details that ethnic Chinese 
in Indonesia consist of 5,000 middle-range people conducting various businesses from 
shop-owners to export-import services, and around 250,000 are involved in small 
business. The rest are farmers, fishermen, teachers and ordinary workers. Many of them 
are poor and there is no difference from the pribumi. Therefore, they must be treated 
64 Eddy Tanzil saga also involved top level New Order former ministers, namely Soedomo and J. B. 
Sumarlin, as well as one of Suharto's business family. It is believed his escape from prison was facilitated 
by "those in powei" as part of the deal with Tanzil not to reveal the true nature of his business and the 
involvement of others in power. 
65 Indonesian foreign minister, Ali Alatas, said "We are still waiting for an official response from the 
Chinese govenunent. " Tempo, 1998. 
66 Marie Muhammad, as quoted in Republika, II August 1998, from a Seminar in Jakarta, 10 August 
1998, entitled "Apa yang Salah di Negeri ini" [What's Wrong in this Country]. MarVe Muhammad is 
widely known as Mr. Clean in Suharto's cabinet as he was often known to refuse giving favourable 
treatment to Suharto's family and cronies. 
67 Mochtar Riady, as quoted in Republika, II August 1998, from a Seminar in Jakarta, 10 August 1998, 
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equally. TUs is very important, and there should not be any tendency to believe that 
every Chinese descendant is always forced into a comer, or become the target of the 
infuriated masses. On the contrary, it may be true that a number of ethnic Chinese 
businessmen carry a set of problems (bermasalah). For instance, in conducting the 
business, they always allow any practices, including collusion, corruption, monopoly or 
other. But, he underlined that not all businessmen behave in that way. Riady also 
explained that nearly all-big businessmen, regardless of their ethnicity practise 
collusion. Corruption and collusion are not the choice of the businessmen, rather it was 
because the government officials "sell" the power in their hands, thus indirectly forcing 
the businessmen to "buy". 
In describing ethnic Chinese under the New Order, one Indonesian scholar 
Tengku Luckman Sinar presented the rationale behýnd the perception of ethnic Chinese 
by linking historical, economic and political aspects. " From various periods of history, 
there has been a generalisation of perception among Indonesian pribumi of ethnic 
Chinese as an exclusive and rich people. Many Indonesians perceive their achievement 
was the result of collusion with those in power. Indeed, there has been a consistent 
pattern of the New Order in which its leaders have been working very closely with the 
ethnic Chinese. " Additionally, he stated that for the past 32 years, the ethnic Chinese 
businessmen have colluded with the elite New Order. As a result, there emerged a wide 
economic disparity where most of the pribumi live in poverty. Consequently, when a 
riot takes place, all the ethnic Chinese are seen as the personification of the practice of 
corruption, collusion and nepotism. "Because the people have no courage to hit the 
elite, thus the ethnic Chinese become an easy target. " Luckman Sinar also recognised 
that "Not all the ethnic Chinese are wicked. There are some good people. However, 
when riots occur, no one can distinguish between the good and the wicked one. "" 
entitled "Apa yang Salah di Negeri ini" [What's Wrong in this Coun ]. 1ý 
try 
68 Tengku Luckman Sinar, a Chinese expert, historian and lecturer at North Sumatra University (USU), 
the biggest university in North Sumatra, as quoted by Latar, 20 October 1998 from the convening of the 
Symposium and Panel Discussion held by 66 Exponent, in Medan, 17 October 1998. 
69 Suharto has maintained a close relation with Liem Sioe Liong and Bob Hasan. Even the military is also 
doing its business in cooperation with the ethnic Chinese. 
70 Ibid. 
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In a desperate attempt to counter a growing resentment over the influence of the 
powerful businessmen, in January 1995 Suharto defended the role of the ethnic Chinese 
tycoons. He also assured that the big businessmen who are mainly controlled by ethnic 
Chinese, are not planning to leave the country and take their business with them. In 
August 1995, the armed forces warned that national stability could be disrupted as the 
economic power of the ethnic Chinese was widening the country's income gap. 7 1 The 
government has attempted to encourage Chinese businesses to help smaller businesses 
with capital, training, and marketing, in order to spread wealth more equitably. Further 
implementation of tl-ds effort has been the creation of Kelompok Jimbaran. 72 
Apparently, this initiative was seen as purely for cosmetic purposes only. According to 
one Islamic prominent political activist and member of ICMI Adi Sasono this effort 
was not appropriate, and intended only for public relations, for it did not structurally 
solve the problem. What the government needs is to set up regulations aimed at limiting 
the ownership of product assets by the ethnic Chinese. He underlined that there must be 
something wrong in. Indones 
, 
ia . 7' How could a minority with 3% 
in number be able to 
dominate 70% of the Indonesian economy, he questioned. As an alternative, Sasono 
suggested that Indonesia should refer to Malaysia as an example of how to handle 
bumiputra and the ethnic Chinese. And it is timely now for the Indonesian pribumi to 
be given a special treatment so as to enable them to catch up with the ethnic Chinese. 
From the above discussion, it can be seen that there has been increased attention 
to the ethnic Chinese issue. The difference is that the focus is now more on the 
economic perspective, instead of communism. However, the core issue remains the 
same, namely suspicions about their loyalty. At the same time, the goverment had no 
answer to address the issue of the ethnic Chinese. One Indonesian prominent scholar 
Juwono Sudarsono argued that Indonesians need to treat Indonesian-Chinese in a 
proper way. The policy should no longer emphasise the importance of assimilation with 
the majority, it should probably emphasize how the majority can better accommodate 
71 Reuters, 21 January 1995. 
72 Kelompok Jimbaran was created in August 1995 in Jimbaran, Bali Island. It was the meeting among 95 
big businessmen aimed at showing their commitment towards partnership and the implementation of the 
development of business partnership, particularly between the big (mostly consists of ethnic Chinese) and 
small businesses (pribumi). 
" Interview with Adi Sasono on 16 November 1998. 
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and improve its understanding toward minorities. "' Christianto Wibisono, an economic 
observer of Chinese descent noted that the government needs to adopt better policies, 
which are progressive, modem and not discriminatory in order to totally implement the 
integration of the Indonesian-Chinese into Indonesian society. 7' He further stated that 
without the ability to create such a situation that is not discriminatory, Indonesian 
economic structure would not become very strong, because people of Chinese origin 
might feel it is more convenient to move their capital to other countries which do not 
have discriminatory policies. It is not surprising that the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia has 
been seen more as a liability than an asset. 
B. Increased Anti-Chinese Feelings: The Implication of the Dynamics of 
New Order Politics 
It had been a recurring feature of the New Order period that any resentment of 
the government or public disorder that manifested itself in the form of mass 
demonstrations often developed and exploded into riots in which the ethnic Chinese 
become the victim. While the cause of the incident was not necessarily related to the 
issue of the ethnic Chinese, its implication would definitely affect the ethnic Chinese. 
In 1980, for instance, anti-Chinese riots broke out in several big cities, such as in Ujung 
Pandang, the capital of South Sulawesi Province, a three-day anti-Chinese riot with a 
more devastating effect in Solo (Central Java) on November 19 which five days later 
spread to Semarang (the capital of Central Java), and to other smaller towns such as 
Pekalongan, Kudus and Magelang. 76 Similar outbreaks also took place in Aceh and 
North Sumatran cities. They were all initially as the result of the growing tension 
between the government and Muslim cornmunity over the government effort to force 
Pancasila as azas lunggaL Following the infamous Tanjung Priok incident in 1984, the 
Muslim protesters directed their anger against the ethnic Chinese shops and properties 
in downtown Jakarta in which a series of bombings took place. 77 While the government 
" Jakarta Post, 16 October 1989. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Guy Sacerdati, "Small Fight with big Results", Far Eastern Economic Review, 5- 11 December 1980. 
77 See "Tiga Ledakan di Ubukota, Pangab: ABRI bertanggungjawab Atas Keselamatan Semua Warga 
Negara" [Three Explosions in the Capital, ABRI Commander: ABRI is Responsible for the Safety of all 
Citizens), Kompas, October 5,1984; and Susumu Awanohara, "Bombs in Chinatown, " Far Eastern 
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dutifully blamed the Islamic extremists, there are strong indications that the government 
78 
either instigated or encouraged actions that it later prosecuted. 
Indeed, anti-Chinese violence of one form or another had accompanied virtually 
every outbreak of social, political unrest during the New Order tenure. Given the depth 
of anti-Chinese feelings, they became very vulnerable to any political change in 
Indonesia. Indeed, Suharto seemed to ignore the fact that the riots against ethnic 
Chinese were also the expression of frustration towards his family ihvolvement in 
business that in many cases had collaborated with ethnic Chinese. To make matters 
worse, a large number of the conglomerates are controlled by non-indigenous 
businessmen or the ethnic Chinese, while the majority of the fast-rising businesses are 
operated by the children of government officials, notably Suharto's family. " Instead of 
recognising the existence of a racial problem and economic gap between the majority 
of pribumi and the ethnic Chinese, the government always diverted the attention by 
blaming the third party as a scapegoat. Accordingly, the government often launched 
allegations that thosý who were allegedly involved in any public dissent had political 
motives and an agenda to overthrow the legitimate government. It was then followed by 
security personnel searching for organizations or masterminds behind these events. In 
many cases, it was easily linked to communist or PKI with the help of outside forces. 
Indeed, the government response to redress the incidents involving anti-Chinese 
sentiments has been slow. They would quickly break their silence if a scapegoat could 
be found. 
Due to the sensitivity of the issue of the ethnic Chinese in the history of Sino- 
Indonesian relations, Beijing kept silent about any attack towards Indonesian ethnic 
Chinese prior to nonualization. 'Mere are two reasons why Beijing adopted a low 
profile position. First, China did not want to be accused of interfering in the internal 
Economic Review, October 18,1984. 
78 "Violence in Lampung", an Asia Watch Report, 16 March 1989. 
'9 Futher details and discussion on co-operation between ethnic Chinese, Suharto's family and the 
military, See, among others, Richard Robison, The Rise of Capitalism (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 4ý' 
edition, 1988); Prospek No. 46, Year VII-6, July 1988; Eksekutif, 25 April 1992; Iswandi, Bisnis Militer 
Orde Baru: Keterlibatan ABRI dalam Bidang Ekonomi dan Pengaruhnya Terhadap Pembenlukan Re: im 
Otoriter [New Order Military Business: The Involvement of ABRI in Economic Field and its Implication 
on the Establishment of Authoritarian Regime] (Bandung: PT Remaja Rosdakarya, 1998). 
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affairs of Indonesia. Second, should China express its high-profile position, it would 
have been counter-productive and might have triggered Indonesian nationalism which 
manifested in further anti-Chinese sentiments. However, for the first time China 
responded to the 1994 anti-Chinese rioting in Medan. " Beijing expressed concern over 
this riot that left one Chinese businessman dead, scores of Chinese-owned shops 
destroyed and dozens of cars overturned or set ablaze. " Indonesian Foreign Minister, 
Ali Alatas, assured Beijing that his country could handle anti-Chinese rioting in Medan, 
northern Sumatra. " The event indeed alarmed government and business leaders who 
feared that the violence could spread to other parts of Indonesia, which has an economy 
dominated by ethnic Chinese and a work force consisting of mainly pribumi. China's 
concern in fact did not infuriate the Indonesian domestic audience. This was due to the 
gravity of the incident in Medan as well as constraint from the press in not exposing 
China's concern. The Indonesian government later denied that the Chinese government 
had made a formal complaint, instead it was only an answer by a Chinese foreign 
minister spokesman to a question from a Singaporean journalist in a routine weekly 
briefing. " As far aý the May 1998 riots in which many ethnic Chinese and their 
properties were targeted, Beijing again appeared not to upset Indonesia. The Chinese 
government hoped that Indonesia took effective measures to protect the physical safety 
of the Indonesian nation, including those of Chinese descent. " 
Given the closeness of ethnic Chinese businessmen with Suharto, many 
analysts believed that once Suharto retired, the ethnic Cfiýinese community would be the 
most vulnerable to any instability. The most affected would be poor and small-scale 
" Medan is the third largest city in Indonesia, located 870 miles Northwest of Jakarta. Unlike most 
Indonesian cities, Medan has a large ethnic Chinese community making up a third of the city's 2.2 million 
people. 
81 The riots began as thousands of labourers took to the streets demanding higher wages and an 
explanation for the mysterious death of a union activist. 
82 See, Tempo, 30 April 1994. 
83 Interview with the then Indonesian Ambassador to China, Juwana, Jakarta Post, 27 May 1994. 
8' Press Release of the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta, quoted by Suara Karya, 18 May 1998. Chinese 
Deputy Foreign Minister, Yang Wenchang, underlined that China was concerned about May riots and the 
violations against their rights. However, this incident would not weaken the good relations between 
Indonesia and China. China also believed that Indonesia would investigate the incident and take necessary 
actions. See, Suara Pembaruan, 1-2 October 1998. 
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Chinese business people. This assumption was proved during the May 1998 riots prior 
to the fall of Suharto. " There is no doubt that the government and the military officials 
had exaggerated the sentiment of anti-Chinese. For example, in an attempt to prevent 
the ftirther deterioration of the value of Indonesian currency, the government launched 
the "I love Rupiah" campaign. In the process, the Armed Forces Chief claimed that the 
ethnic Chinese Indonesian family businesses had sent money overseas and called on the 
owners of conglomerates to return and gave an estimate of US$80 billion which the 
military claimed had been sent overseas. 86 Still in the context of this campaign, thirteen 
business tycoons were reported to have received "threatening phone calls" from the 
87 military. 
The Chief of the Armed Forces was also reported to have met with Indonesian 
journalists and editors advising them to write articles critical of ethnic Chinese 
Indonesians. 88 Without specifically mentioning the ethnic Chinese, Lieutenant General 
Syarwan Hamid was reported to have stated that Indonesia needed to "eradicate rats" 
from the economy. He was further reported as saying "These rats took away the fruits 
of our national development and work for their own self interest... Don't think that the 
, 89 people do not know who these rats are. It is time to eliminate these rats' . Meanwhile 
the military continuously denied the existence of a campaign to incite discrimination 
against ethnic Chinese and claimed that they were not discriminating against them. 
'5 The involvement of ethnic Chinese issue during this particular time should also be seen in the context 
of strug le for power among ABRI officials, particularly between Gen. Wiranto and Gen. Prabowo og (Suharto's son-in-law) fdctions. Some of Muslim right-wing, especially KISDI (Committee for Islamic 
Solidarity) - known as close to Prabowo - was also involved through its alienation with Prabowo. The 
attack on ethnic Chinese was regarded as an attempt by Prabowo to undermine Wiranto in which case it 
would enable Prabowo to become top military leader. Although the fact Joint Fact-Finding Team (TGPF) 
recommends to uncover and make sure the role of Prabowo, the follow-up of this recommendation has 
never been implemented. Instead, Pmbowo was fired from the military. Some believed it might endanger 
those who remain in power, such as Gen. Feisal Tanjung and Gen. Wiranto. See, The Final Report of the 
Joint Fact-Finding Team (TGPF) on the May 13-15 May 1998; Ariel Heryanto, "Flaws of Riot Media 
Coverage", Jakarta Post, 15 July 1998; Ita Sembiring, Catatan dan Refleksi: Tragedi Jakarta, 13-14 Mei 
1998 [Note and Reflection: Jakarta Tragedy, 13-14 May 1998] (Jakarta: PT Elex Media Komputindo, 
1998); Julius Pour, Jakarta Semasa Lengser Keprabon [Jakarta During the Resignation] (Jakarta: PT Elex 
Media Komputiondo, 1998). 
96 Sydney Herald Morning, 27 January and 16 February 1998. 
87 Bruce Gilley, John McBeth, Ben Dolven, "Entrepreneurs: Ready, Set... " Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 19 February 1998. 
88 Sydney Morning Herald, 16 February 1998. 
89 American Reporter, February 1998. 
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However towards Suharto's fall, ABRI associated itself with ordinary Indonesian 
people in criticising the ethnic Chinese. The military's motive was clearly to attract 
sympathy from the people or to create an opinion that they come from and belong to the 
people, as they always claim, as part of their campaign to anticipate the fall of Suharto. 
It was in this situation that ABRI's unity was tested. ' 
What is appalling is that sporadic anti-Chinese riots have indeed occurred more 
frequently in the 1990s. Why did this happen? There are several explanations for this 
situation. The first is that Suharto's much publicised attack on ethnic the Clýiinese 
businessmen has reopened the "Pandora's Box" of the dominant role of the ethnic 
Chinese in Indonesian economy. Follow up calls by government officials and military 
leaders have indeed increased the awareness of many people of the depth of the 
problem. Secondly, there has been a growing dissatisfaction among ordinary 
Indonesians towards Suharto, particularly over the involvement of his family in various 
business sectors. Their business activities are not based on expertise, rather because of 
special treatment awarded by the government. In these circumstances, their businesses 
always involve ethnic Chinese businessmen. Thirdly, it was the consequence of 
economic development that has enriched many ethnic Chinese, while many ordinary 
Indonesians become poorer. Thus the development process has widened the gap 
between the majority of pribumi and ethnic Chinese minority. Lastly, it was because of 
the emergence of cleavages among the New Order political elite, particularly between 
Suharto and ABRI as well as the internal rivalry among military officials. Thus the 
ethnic Chinese once again became caught up by the dynamics of Indonesian domestic 
politics. 
C. Ethnic Chinese and ABRI: A Conspiracy against Islam 
In the 1950s, the ethnic Chinese were under attack as a result of the issuing of 
the 1959 decree that expelled ethnic Chinese traders from rural areas so as to give 
90 It was particularly between Gen. Wiranto and Gen. Prabowo, camps. It is the latter that was believed to 
be anti-Chinese and has been working closely with one of right-wing Islamic group called KISDI 
(Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with Islam). 
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pribumi more opportunity to develop trade activities. 91 This purge was widely known to 
be carried out by a Muslim group, although the involvement of the army officials was 
well known. The unfortunate saga of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia continued in the 
aftermath of the 1965 coup in which many ethnic Chinese were killed and they were 
suspected of being communists, particularly in East Java. Ironically, many of the 
killings were conducted by the Islamic group and condoned by local military leaders. 
What could be learned from these two incidents is the continuity in which a Muslim 
group in co-operation with the military attacked the ethnic Chinese. First, economic 
factors were a key issue since many members of the indigenous traders and 
businessmen in Indonesia mostly came from West Sumatra and the coastal towns of 
Java which embraced Islam. Second, there was a linkage between ideology and politics 
insofar as many Islamic leaders were against the ethnic Chinese because they had 
allegedly been part of the PKI. 
Generally, the religious orientation of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia mostly 
follows Taoism, Cofifucianism, Buddhism or a mixture of these three teachings. While 
there is no figure that describes the exact number of their religious orientation, Leo 
Suryadinata noted that the interest of the ethnic Chinese in Confucianism was 
decreasing. " On the contrary, as protection against accusation of being communist 
sympathisers, many ethnic Chinese converted to Christianity, some embraced Niciren 
Syosyu Indonesia (NSI) and the rest turned to Islam. However, those who chose Islam 
are only estimated to be around 10 per cent of the whole ethnic Chinese, or equal to 
around 500,000. " Therefore, the majority of ethnic Chinese did not blend into the 
religion of the majority as they had in Thailand and the Philippines. Why didn't they 
turn to Islam? According to one Indonesian respected scholar, Nurcholish Madjid, one 
of the reasons is because of the presence of a certain "mind set" among the ethnic 
9' As discussed earlier in Chapter 3, this policy was fully supporied by the army leaders, aimed at 
undermining the growing close relations between Indonesia and China, in which the Indonesian 
Communist Party was the only beneficiary from this development. 
92 Leo Suryadinata, "Kong Hu Cuisme dan Agama Kong Hu Cu di Indonesia: Sebuah Kajian Awal, " 
[Confucianism and the Religion of Confucian: A Preliminary Study] in Konfusianisme di Indonesia: 
Pergulalan Mencari Ali Diri [Confucianism in Indonesia: A Struggle to Find Identity], Seri Dian III 
Tahun 11 (Yogyakarta: Interfidei, 1995), pp. 201-202. 
93 See, Junus Yahya, Islam di Mata WNI [Islam in the Eyes of Ethnic Chinese] (Jakarta: Yayasan Haji 
Karim Oei, no year); Leo Suryadinata, "Chinese Seek Allah to Find a Place in the Sun, " FEER, 28 
August 1986. 
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Chinese who perceived Islam as the religion of the pribumi. ' Thus embracing Muslim 
had the connotation ofjoining the religion of the lower classes. 
Under the New Order regime, the ethnic Chinese were banned from social and 
political activities. They were only allowed to express their aspirations through various 
organisations that had been created by the government, such as Bakom-PKB (Co- 
ordination Body for the Appreciation of the Unity of the Nation), CSIS (Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies) and Golkar ruling party. The ethiiic Chinese who 
preferred Islam, such as Yunus Jahja, were mostly low-profile figures and actively 
involved in social activities, particularly Bakom-PKB. On the contrary, those who did 
not embrace Islam and are considered as high profile figures such as Jusuf Wanandi 
and Harry Tjan Silalahi are more active in the CSIS. '" It is this situation that later raised 
suspicion among the Muslim of the emergence of a new alliance between the ethnic 
Chinese and Christians. The Centre was widely known to formulate the New Order's 
policies, including those policies allegedly directed against the Muslims. Muslims 
considered the Centre a controversial institution since it represented the interests of the 
Christians, the military, the ethnic-Chinese, or as a combination of the anti-Islam 
forces. 
Several indications seemed to support the existence of this alliance. In the 
1970s, for instance, there was a new development that indicated a new tendency in 
relations between the ethnic Chinese, Christians and the ruling power. In this regard, 
the assimilationist ethnic Chinese Catholics worked -with Indonesian army intelligence 
led by Suharto's trusted assistants, Ali Murtopo and Soedjono Hoemardhani to 
establish a think tank called the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 
1971. There is no doubt as to the work of the institution as a research body producing 
9' Nurcholish Madjid, delivered in a Seminar on "Masalah Pri dan Nonpri Dewasa ini" (Ilie Current 
Problem of Pribumi and Ethnic Chinese], See Kwik Kian Gie and Nurcholish Madjid, Masalah Pribund 
dan Nonpri Dewasa ini (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar harapan, 1998), p. 67. 
95 The CSIS was established on 12 July 1971 by "Yayasan Proklamasi" (Proclamation Foundation). 
Supported by Suharto's close aides Soedjono Hoemardani and Ali Murtopo, the founders of the CSIS are 
Sofyan Wanandi, Jusuf Wanandi, Harry Tjan Silalahi and Daoed Joesoef. This think-tank institution, as it 
is often called as the Centre, has played an important influence on Suharto's government. A number of 
issues such as investment, monetary tariff, trade as well as political issue such as de-politicization of 
campuses, and foreign policy have been discussed at the Centre. There was also unconfirmed report that 
military operation in East Timor has been discussed in this institution. Further discussion on the CSIS and 
its role, Gatra, No. 13. Vol. 4,14 February 1998. 
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qualified political and economic studies. However, the institution has been widely seen 
as the think tank of Suharto's, or at least Ali Murtopo's policies, where the operations 
were covertly planned and formulated. Among other things, the infamous policies are 
those relating to the invasion of East Timor in 1975 and the creation of Komando Shad 
(Holy War Command) in 1977.96 The campaign against Muslims was also intended to 
provide a pretext for a more general round up of Muslim political activists. 
The suspicion of the existence of a conspiracy between ethnic Chinese, 
Christians and the military was prolonged after General Moerdani, commander of the 
armed forces from 1983-1988 and himself a Catholic, succeeded Ali Murtopo as the 
patron of the CSIS. The suspicion among some Muslims of an ethnic Chinese- 
Christian-ABRI conspiracy gained a new momentum, particularly after the Tanjung 
Priok incident in September 1984. Thus the events of Komando Xhad and Tanjung 
Priok linked with Ali Murtopo and Moerdani to the CSIS were perceived as directed 
against the Muslims. 97 The immediate effect of the Tanjung Priok incident killings was 
a bombing, allegedly conducted by Muslim, aimed at the office of the Bank Central 
Asia owned by Liern Sioe Liong, an ethnic Chinese tycoon and a close confidant of 
Suharto. 
The resentment against ethnic Chinese and Christian became more prevalent as 
the attacks against them were directed at their properties and churches. Events soon 
demonstrated that anti-Chinese and anti-Christian sentiment were becaming more 
intertwined. On 4 November 1995, for instance, more than 60 people were arrested 
following three days of riots in the Purwakarta district in West Java. The riots 
reportedly began when a 14-year old Muslim girl was allegedly slapped by her ethnic 
Chinese employees and the owner of a local shop for stealing chocolate. At its high 
point, more than 20,000 people rampaged the business centre. Over 20 shops and 
several cars and homes were seriously damaged. By 26 November, calm was reported 
96 See, Human Rights in Indonesia and East Timor (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1989), pp. 76-85. 
97 CSIS was again under attack in January 1998 after one prominent ethnic-Chinese leader, Sofyan 
Wanandi, refused to support the I love the Rupiah" campaign. While he was accused of his involvement 
in a bomb explosion in Jakarta (January 1998) allegedly conducted by members of the banned political 
organisation of People's Democratic Party (Partai Dcmokrasi Rakyat, PRD), a public demonstration was 
held outside the CSIS of which he and his brother, Jusuf Wanandi, are directors. 
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in the city of Pekalongan, 325 km east of Jakarta, following three days of anti-Chinese 
riots. 'Me rioting reportedly began after an ethnic Chinese tore a page from the Holy 
Koran. The police have released 23 people arrested in connection with the violence. 
Property owned by the ethnic Chinese was ransacked. 98 On 30 November, the ethnic 
Chinese man, who reportedly instigated the riots in Pekalongan had died under 
mysterious circumstances in a jail. The results of an autopsy were not released. 99 In 
October 1996 in Situbondo, East Java, twenty-seven churches and one Chinese temple 
were wrecked after a local court handed down a sentence in a blaspherhy case that local 
Muslim groups reportedly considered too light. " 
The culmination against the CSIS took place in early 1998 when various 
Muslim groups held a meeting on 8 January in one of the biggest mosques Al-Azhar. 
Interestingly, the main theme of this meeting was "Membedah Jantung Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies" [Bypassing the Heart of the CSIS]. ` The 
organisation of the meeting was dominated by Muslim right wing activists. However, 
the convening of the meeting was part of a series of campaigns of similar protest. 
Initially, it was the alleged involvement of Soýan Wanandi (brother of CSIS' Jusuf 
Wanandi) who was alleged for his involvement in the bombing in Tanah Tinggi Jakarta 
on 18 January. The security claim was based on the document in which Sofjan 
Wanandi and Jusuf Wanandi were mentioned as supporters of PRD. They were accused 
by the government as supporting the leftist movement in Indonesia and and initiating 
various riots in 1996.102 
98 Reuters, 26 November 1995. 
99 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 30 November 1995. 
100 Similar anti Chinese riots took place again in Tasikmalaya (26 December 1996), Rengasdengklok 
(January 1997), and banjarmasin (May 1997). 
101 Gatra, No. 13/IV, 14 February 1998. 
'0' Since then criticism and demonstration were directed against SofJan Wanandi and the CSIS. Tens of 
youths claimed as "Solidaritas Mahasiswa untuk Persatuan Indonesia" (Student Solidarity for Indonesian 
Unity) held demonstration on 26 January 1996, shortly before SofJan Wanandi left the country. They 
demanded that CSIS be dissolved. In the following day a group of people called themselves as Forum 
Pemulihan Martabat Bangsa (The Forum of the Recovery of the Dignity of the Nation). At the same day, 
Forum Keluarga Besar Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia (FKB-KAPPI) Exponen '66 held a press 
conference attacking So0an Wanandi. Apart from supporting the security to examine SofJan, they also 
condemned So0an's rejection to contribute dollar as the expression of support from conglomerate in 
overcoming economic crisis. 
197 
The situation became heated as Sofjan, the spokesman for the Jimbaran Group, 
left the country two days before the Immigration Off ice issued a letter temporarily 
banning him going abroad. The Mass media reported that Sofian went to Australia 
without a specific purpose, while his case was being examined in Indonesia. KISDI 
also issued a list of the sins of CSIS and Sofian Wanandi. " And now, the Muslims had 
to bear the responsibilities of economic disaster because of their conglomerate strategy. 
According to Ahmad Soemargono, Head of Daily Executive of KISDI, Sofian had 
contributed to the worsening of economic crisis. He also stressed that the CSIS people 
used to have a negative view towards the Muslims, and it was they who inflicted losses 
on Muslim interests, particularly the Centre's input to the government on the 1973 
marriage draft regulation. For its part, the CSIS denied all the accusations and 
underlined that the institution was a research body that focused on economics and 
international relations, and did not operate in the political field. " 
5.4. The Percepti6n of China: Adjusting the Concept of China as a Threat 
Although this study does not specifically focus on the issue of the ethnic 
Chinese, this element has had a significant role in the relationship between Indonesia 
and C 1-ýina, particularly on the part of Indonesia. The negative perception of the ethnic 
Chinese used to focus on their alleged link with the PKI. While China was regarded as 
external enemy, the PKI was portrayed as a domestic ally of China. It is in this context 
that the presence of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia was considered a weakness that might 
revive the communist threat and China. The elimination of the threat of the Chinese 
communist as the consequence of normalization meant that the military had to find 
other means to maintain the idea of such a threat, which was critical for its own 
legitimacy. The question now was how to redefine the concept of a China threat after 
the normalization of diplomatic relations.. It appears that the decreasing factor of 
communism coincided with the re-ernergence of concern over the ethnic Chinese role 
in the Indonesian economy and the dynamics of Indonesian politics, namely the friction 
between Suharto and the military. 
10' Both were seen as playing a significant role in Indonesian political and economic fields for more than 
twenty-years. It was during that period the Muslims have been slandered and clashed with ABRI. 
104 Interview with Jusuf Wanandi, Gatra, No. 13/IV. 14 February 1998. 
198 
China as a Source of Threat: The Issue of Communism 
With the normalization of diplomatic relations and a Chinese guarantee not to 
support the PKI, theoretically the issue of ethnic Cfiýnese and the PKI remnants in 
China became a non-issue in Sino-Indonesian relations. Has the negative perception 
towards communist China and ethnic Chinese already disappeared or at least been 
decreasing? This is a question that needs to be seen and examined in more detail, 
particularly from the military's point of view. Why the military? The reason is because 
the perception of China has been dominated by the views of the military, although in 
some cases this coincided with the opinion of some Muslim factions. And it is the 
doctrine of the military that has long regarded China as a threat. Thus reorienting 
perceptions could not be done in a short time, since the military would surely find 
another justification to maintain the image of the China threat. 
Since coming' to power, the New Order regime as dominated by the military had 
conducted political socialisation through history teaching in schools and mass media. 
Every year, I October is conu-nemorated as Hari Kesaklian Pancasila (Pancasila's 
Sacred Day). On the eve of this day, national television put on air the event of the 1965 
coup attempt and even showed the savage acts of the PKI. Education was also part of 
the campaign through the introduction of P4 (Penataran Penghayatan dan Pengamalan 
Pancasila) or The Course for the Understanding and Implementation of Pancasila. 
Every government official was obliged to follow this program. T'he content of the 
course mainly dealt with the barbaric acts of the PKI that determined to replace the 
ideology of Pancasila with communism. 'llius most young Indonesians knew the 
history of the coup, PKI's political sins, the involvement of ethnic Chinese and China 
as a consequence of the government's systematic indoctrination. 
Nevertheless, Indonesian leaders seemed gradually to change their perception 
of Communist China and the PKI. Upon his return from Beijing in November 1990, for 
instance, President Suharto made it clear that Indonesia would accept ex-PKI members 
who lived in China, provided that they were accountable for their past conduct. If they 
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could prove that they were innocent, then they should be freed. "' The head of the 
military Information Centre, Brig. Gen. Nurhadi Purwosaputro explained that the 
number of ex-PKI in China was predicted to be around 20 people. " Their average age 
was roughly more than 40 years old, and some of them even reached the age of 70. 
Nevertheless, be stated that the exact number of ex-PKI members living abroad was 
unknown, but the number was still significant. Apart from China, some of them lived in 
Eastern. Europe and there were some that always moved from one country to another. 
Purwosaputro further identified them as students who were financed by the communist 
party to study abroad and PKI cadres who were abroad during the G30S/PKI. While 
elements of the PKI living abroad are still there, it is doubtful whether their presence 
would be considered as threatening to Indonesian security. But although the degree of 
suspicion became less, at least, they could function or be used by ABRI to remind 
Indonesian that PKI elements and cadres remain in existence. 
In responding to a question asked by a foreign journalist on the possible revival 
of communism in Iridonesia, the military's Chief Staff of Social and Political Affairs 
Gen. Syarwan Hamid underlined that the latent danger of communism remains alive., " 
While recognising that the biggest and oldest communist empire has gone bankrupt, it 
was not necessarily the case with China, as well as Cuba and North Korea. He also 
argued that the PKI cadres abroad and in Indonesia have been waiting to take revenge 
because of historical vendetta, obsession and idealism. In this regard, Harnid recognised 
that since economic development had not fulfilled the aspirations of all Indonesians, its 
shortcomings had been exploited and exaggerated to become a fertile soil of communist 
ideology. From this statement, it appeared that the military referred to China as a 
reminder of the possibility of a revival of threat, while the threat would be more 
imminent if the development process failed to fulfil the people's needs. 
105 Suara Karya, Suara Pembaruan, 20 November 1990. 
106 Suara Pembaruan, 22 November 1990. 
107 "Pointers Kepala Staf Sosial dan Politik ABRI tentang Peristiwa Kerusuhan 27 Juli 1996 Di Depan 
Dubes/Kepala Perwak-ilan Asing di Jakarta" [Pointers Head of ABRI's Social and Political Staff 
Regarding 27 July 1996 Incident Before Ambassador/Head of Foreign Representative in Jakarta], Jakarta, 
5 AucUst 1996. 
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Do the ordinary people share the opinion of those government or military 
officers? Polling was conducted by Tajuk and CESDA-LP3ES in August 1998 and 
aimed at examining the attitudes of the respondents towards communism. "' This 
survey reveals that the majority of Indonesian people remain suspicious of communism 
and consider it as a threat to Indonesia (73.1%). Those who did not consider 
communism as a threat still rejected the possibility of the establishment of a party with 
communist orientation (79.9%) and refused the rehabilitation of political rights of PKI 
members (64.3%). Thus the New Order regime perceptions of corrununism as a latent 
danger remains shared by Indonesian people. There is no doubt that it was the result of 
systematic campaign to create "fear" among the society and to discredit the PKI leaders 
and its members in the early days of the New Order regime. It was also accompanied 
by harsh measures such as incommunicado detention, imprisonment, death sentence, 
and isolation of their families from normal social life. Those who wanted to join 
government institutions or bureaucracies had to pass Litsus (penelitian khusus) or 
special investigation. Anyone that had kinship links with the alleged members of the 
PKI would definitelY be declared as unqualified. What is important from this polling is 
the absence of a link between China and communism. Indeed, this survey also revealed 
that the source of threat was nothing to do with external forces or the interaction 
between domestic and external factors, rather it was the deterioration of economic 
development that might provide a fertile soil for the revival of communism and PKI 
(67.5%). Consequently, in the minds of many ordinary Indonesians, China was no 
longer considered as a source of threat. 
The above survey indicated that the military's suspicion of communism 
remained shared by the ordinary people. However, the source of communist threat is no 
longer coming from China, rather from domestic conditions. Nevertheless, the military 
remained suspicious of China. This persistence is better illustrated in the case of visa 
application for Chinese nationals to visit Indonesia as well as clearances for Indonesian 
ethnic Chinese nationals to visit China. Unlike improvements in other fields, Indonesia 
was reluctant to loosen its visa regulations, thus the granting of Indonesian visas and 
the pennission for an Indonesian national to visit China still requires a clearance from 
108 The survey was conducted from 13-26 August 1998, with 1,000 respondents in Jakarta, Surabaya and 
Medan respectively. Its margin error is (+-) 3.7%. See, Tqjuk, No. 15,1-17 September 1998. 
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the influential military body, BAKIN. One senior military official stated that although 
Indonesia had reopened relations with China, this did not mean that there would be 
relaxation. 109 Indonesian officials were apparently concerned over the possible flood of 
people visiting China, in relation to the convening of the 1990 Asian games in 
Beijing. 110 In the end the government decided to limit the number of supporters to 
1.500,111 while maintaining that Indonesians who wanted to visit China needed 
government clearance. 1 12 
However, the government's handling of visa issue received criticism from 
various quarters. In its editorial, one Indonesian newspaper stated that while 
maintaining the need for vigilance, Indonesia should no longer place emphasis on a 
security approach as a pretext to prolong the visiting procedure to China. 113 It should be 
underlined that trade and economic relations required a speed that would determine the 
flow of business. It further added those who had been to China bore witness that the 
Chinese people did not care about ideology. The Tiananmen incident showed the world 
that there was an ong*oing process of democratisation in China. The coming of foreign 
investment in order to accelerate and modemise the development process has 
questioned China's commitment to communist principles that strove for the creation of 
a communist society in mainland China. Thus, the military's strict administrative 
barrier was not in accordance with the requirements of economy and co-operation. The 
government's ambiguous and uncoordinated policy towards the flow of people 
reflected the fact that the military retained a significant say in determining policy in 
relation to China. 
109 Brig. Gen. Nurhadi Purwosaputro, Head of Center for Information of ABRI, Bisnis Indonesia, 13 
August 1990. 
110 Initially, it was linked with the convening of the Asian Games held in Beijing (22 September to 7 
October 1990) where many Indonesians, allegedly with ethnic Chinese background, were anticipated to 
become supporter. One Indonesian senior minister also questioned the number of supporters as he 
accused them of wasting foreign exchange and urged them to cancel their trip. The government seemingly 
tough measures received with mixed reactions from parliamentary members and civilian leaders as many 
of them suggested that the government should not exaggerate the situation by exposing mass departure of 
ethnic Chinese. See, Suara Karya, 26 July 1990, Suara Karya, Kompas, Jakarta Post, 23 August 1990, 
Kompas, 24 and 25 August 1990. 
111 Angkalan Bersenjata, 6 September 1990. 
112 Suara Karya, Merdeka, 31 October 1990. 
113 Suara Pembaruan, 16 November 1990. 
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In August 1991, the Indonesian government reviewed the administrative 
restriction of its visa policy which meant that BAKIN's clearance was no longer 
required, "' and Chinese nationals could also obtain a visa from any Indonesian 
embassy in the world. "' Similarly, Indonesian nationals could travel to China without 
any restriction. "" Nevertheless, the immigration authorities restricted the arrival of 
Chinese nationals to only a number of designated airports and seaports. "' 
Unfortunately, the visa issue was far from being resolved, particularly over the length 
of its application process. Indeed, the government maintained its vigilance by arguing 
"who will be responsible if they do not return to China. ""' Accordingly, the Indonesian 
Embassy in Beijing signed an agreement with eight travel agents to improve 
cooperation on visa application. "' This agreement was mainly related to the 
requirement of a sponsor in China and Indonesia for those Chinese nationals who want 
to travel to Indonesia. This policy was criticised by former Chairman of KADIN, S. 
Gitosardjono who said that it should be enough for the Chinese visitors to hold a return 
ticket and an adequAte amount of cash for their visit. ` Although rather strange and 
possibly to please the military, the Indonesian Ambassador to China, Juwana said that, 
"In the era of openness, it is not only soft wind that is entering Indonesia, but also 
putrid wind, therefore alertness is needed in regulating human traffic". "' Eventually, by 
Media Indonesia, 6 August 199 1. 
Previously, Chinese nationals had to apply visa either from Hong Kong or Singapore. 
116 Jakarta Post, 21 August 199 1. 
117 The airports are are Sokarno-Hatta Jakarta, Polonia Medan, Ngurah Rai Bali, while the seaport include 
Tanjung Priok Jakarta, Tanjung Perak Surabaya, Makassar Ujung Pandang and Belawan Medan. 
Angkatan Bersenjata, 27 September 199 1. 
"a Juwana, Indonesian Ambasador to China, Suara Pembaruan, 7 September 1994. See also Suara 
Peniharuan, 27 September 1996. 
"9 Those travel agents are: China International Travel Service, China Youth Travel Service, China 
Golden Bridge Travel Service Corporation, Fujian Overseas Tourist Enterprise Co., China Travel Service 
in Fujian and Guangdong Provinces, Guangdong Overseas Tourist Corporation and Hainan Tourist 00g Corporation. See, Suara Karya, 1995. 
120 Jakarta Post, 10 September 1996. 
121 Suara Karya, 19 July 1995. 
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the end of 1998 the Indonesian govermnent insisted that the visa issue was no longer a 
problem. "' 
B. Ethnic Cl-ýinese Connection and China: A New Threat from Chinese 
Nationalism and "the Greater China" 
The period of the 1990s has witnessed the emergence of East Asian countries 
such as Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and China as economic powers. One cannot 
deny the fact that these countries mainly consist of ethnic Chinese. This was a very 
interesting circumstance as at the same time China began showing its determination to 
further pursue economic development by appealing for overseas Chinese to help 
develop the mainland. Although the Chinese government has not formally abandoned 
the communist ideology, there is no doubt that in many ways, they have already 
adopted and implemented a market economic system. The Chinese economy, with a 
rate of growth that reaches 10% per year, has indeed attracted many other countries and 
foreign investors to benefit from the development in China. Even the criticisms in the 
aftermath of the Tia nanmen incident did not, at least in the longer run, prevent the 
willingness of foreign investors to enter China. 
Indeed, judging by the changes that have taken place in China, it appeared that 
economic interest, and not ideology, has been the driving force of China's foreign 
policy. For example, despite the traditional rivalry and claim of sovereignty and 
representation, Beijing increased its economic links with Taipei. What could be leamed 
from this event is that there seemed to be an on-going process of de-ideologisation in 
China where ideological considerations no longer played a dominant role, as they are 
being replaced by pragmatism, business, economic and politico-economic realities. 
Indeed, the new reorientation in Beijing has enabled them to focus on economic 
development and attract more capital into China, particularly owned by the ethnic 
Chinese. In this regard, there is a strong connection between overseas Chinese and the 
development of China. Table 5.1 shows that China's economic development has been 
supported by the involvement of overseas Chinese in investing their capital in China, as 
"' Interview with the Director-General of Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 December 
1998. 
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foreign direct investment in China mainly came from countries dominated by ethnic 
Chinese, particularly Hong Kong, Macao and Singapore. 
Table 5.1: The Origin of Foreign Direct Investment in China, 1979-94 
CountrN, Noicai Coniract 
Numbcr 
ed Investment 
USS billion 
Hong KonglMacao 139,959 200.39 
Taiwan 27,002 23.61 
United States 16,257 20.73 
Japan 10,322 14.23 
Sineavore 4.567 8.63 
United Kingdom 1,017 5.8 
South Korea 4,247 3.78 
"Mailand 1.967 2.9 
Gcrmany 892 2.72 
Canada 2,178 2.7 
Source: Foreign Investment Administration, MUFl EC (BeUing), 12 June 199. ). 
Indeed, there are two immediate implications that need to be underlined as the 
result of China's economic development. Firstly, China needs more capital to maintain 
and increase its economic growth. Secondly, this also means that the Chinese 
government would attract capital, including that owned by the overseas Chinese. "' The 
Chinese government policies to open a special economic zone and to give special 
treatments are clearly intended to attract foreign capital into China. Accordingly, the 
overseas Chinese, including Indonesian ethnic Chinese, would be tempted to invest 
their capital in China. In this regard, one Indonesian ethnic Chinese tycoon, Liem Sioe 
Liong, invested his capital in China in cooperation together with the Rong Chao group 
in Shangzeng Honglu and Guan Yuan. "' This group also built Hotel Rong Chiao in 
Fuking and Yuan Hong Garden in Fuzhou. 
Prior to normalization, there was no significant debate in Indonesia about 
investment in China. This may have been caused by several factors such as the low 
quantity of investment, the prevailing self-restraint among ethnic Chinese businessmen 
not to upset the authorities and not to be associated with communism and China, while 
China itself was not economically attractive yet. Only after the non-nalization did the 
issue become public and people began talking about capital flight to China. This 
123 Indeed, the overseas Chinese who live in Southeast Asia alone have succeeded in accumulating the 
fortune amounted at $200 billion, which is twice more than Indonesia's GNP in 1990s. See, Harvard 
Business Review, March-April 1993. 
124 Pelita, 4 February 199 1. 
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situation leads to the question of Indonesian perception towards ethnic Chinese and 
their link with China after normalization. In this connection, one Indonesian scholar 
presented her opinion that there are also many circles in Indonesian society who still 
regard the ethnic Chinese as having the same attachment as their relatives who live in 
mainland China. ` Their loyalty and bond to China is considered more important than 
to Indonesia. It is widely known that the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta maintains contacts 
and holds regular meetings with the Indonesian ethnic Chinese. Something that is not 
surprising as it happened before at a higher level in November 1994, during which 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin attended a gathering of the ethnic Chinese community 
living in Jakarta. "" 
In anticipating such a tendency of the revival of an ethnic Chinese link with 
China, one Indonesian economic observer, Christianto Wibisono, warned that 
ideologically based solidarity as the pattern of relationships between the PRC and 
communist movements in ASEAN countries would shift towards a pattern of solidarity 
deriving from ethnic/racial considerations. "' He finiher postulated that because of their 
racial and ethnic vulnerability, ethnic Chinese in ASEAN countries- even those who 
were anti-Communist or capitalists- with the liberalisation in China would be absorbed 
into the syndrome of Chinese cultural greatness in the 21st century, especially when 
they were continuously discriminated against. Thus for many Indonesian ethnic 
Chinese, their affiliation to PRC was not based on ideological considerations but rather 
their cultural orientation. 
Indeed the cultural link has given Indonesian ethnic Chinese businessmen a 
good opportunity to enter the market of China. 'Iliis is the consequence of the situation 
in which most of Indonesian pribumi businessmen do not speak Chinese neither do 
their counterparts from China speak bahasa Indonesia. In such a situation, the 
Indonesian ethnic Chinese businessmen have a massive advantage and head start vis-A- 
123 Ani Soetjipto, "Masalah Etnik Cina dalarn Normalisasi Hubungan RI-RRC" [The Problem of Ethnic 
Chinese in Normalization Relation between Indonesia and PRC], Kompas, 6 December 1989. 
126 Jakarta Post, 18 November 1994. 
127 Christianto Wibisono, , "Terobosan Jakarta-Beijing Via Tokyo" [New Breakthrough Jakarta-Beijing 
via Tokyo], Suara Pembaruan, 5 April 1989. 
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vis Indonesian pribumi businessmen. Therefore, there is still a language barrier against 
Indonesian pribumi businessmen entering China. Indeed, the discriminatory policies 
implemented by the Indonesian government in their every day life would consequently 
tempt them to look at other places to live. This would get worse if they are also 
continuously looked at with suspicion or as immigrants. Thus the tendency to move 
would always be there as long as the government and the pribumi consider them to be 
different. "' While the domestic factor to push the ethnic Chinese remains there, the 
external factor, in this case China, is seen as playing its part as a pull factor. 
As far as the military is concerned, their feelings of suspicion towards China 
and the ethnic Chinese remain high. "' While the conu-nunist ideological threat looked 
less credible, the military increased its focus on Chinese nationalism. One retired 
general observed that China seemed to be using less communist ideology in 
international relations, instead China began appealing to a bond of nationalism that 
surely fascinated overseas Chinese. "' It does not mean that the Chinese government 
would literally interfere in the domestic affairs of Indonesia, but social and cultural 
links would surely be employed by the Chinese government to attract them, not for any 
political purpose or subversive act but obviously for economic reasons. Thus, the 
perception of aggressiveness and imperialist nature of the Chinese Empire and state are 
often referred to as a source of threat, and it is the nature of PRC to inherit these 
characteristics. Therefore, continuity has now emerged in which China's attitude should 
now'be viewed in the context of their economic aggressiveness to attract and appeal to 
overseas Chinese to invest their capital in their homeland and the expansion of Chinese 
influence. Cultural orientation has indeed replaced ideological considerations. Thus the 
readiness of overseas Chinese to invest in China is allegedly based more on their shared 
culture with China than for economic interests. Therefore, this tendency tends to 
128 Ibid. 
129 At the same time the military have also economically benefited from ethnic Chinese. In many cases, 
ABRI do their business in co-operation with ethnic Chinese. See, Indria Samego et al., Bila ABRI 
Berbisnis: Buku Perfama yang Menyingkap Data don Kasus Penyimpangan dalam Praklik Bisnis 
Kalangan Militer [If ABRI Conducting Business: The First Book to Unravel Data and Cases of 
Irregularities in Military's Business Practice (Jakarta: Mizan Pustaka, 1998) and Budi Susanto, SJ & A. 
Made Tony Supriatma, ABRI. Siasat Kebudayaan 1945-1995 [ABRI: Cultural Strategy 1945-1995] 
(Jakarta: Penerbit Kanisius, 1995). 
130 Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, "Konsekuensi dari Normalisasi Hubungan dengan RRC" [The 
Consequences of Normaliztion of Relation with PRC], Suara Pembaruan, 19 April 1989. 
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strengthen the perception of "Once a Chinese, always a Chinese" and pen-nanent 
loyalty to China. 
From Indonesia's perspective, China's needs for capital inevitably clashes with 
Indonesia's interest for the same purpose. While the conflict of interest may take place 
in the international capital market, Indonesia is more concerned about the possibility of 
flight of capital owned by Indonesian ethnic Chinese to China. The government 
position on capital investments in China remains positive as long as they would benefit 
the Indonesian economy. However, those in the military circle doubt this possibility 
and consider this new phenomenon as posing a threat to Indonesian economic stability 
and development. Accordingly, Indonesian security officials begin talking about the 
danger of the co-operation among ethnic Chinese all over the world known as "Greater 
China" or "the ethnic Chinese Commonwealth". They are considered as, in Sterling 
Seagrave's term, empire without state border, government or nation flag. "' In this 
regard, the convening of World Chinese Merchant's Convention in Hong Kong, 22-24 
November 1993 was perceived as a symbol of the way in which ethnic Chinese are 
being used by the Chinese government. Indeed, the meeting was received 'with great 
alann, as Indonesian tycoons with Chinese background also attended the meeting. 132 
In fact the Hong Kong meeting was the continuation of the previous one held in 
Singapore in August 1991. However, the second meeting was far livelier and attracted 
more attention since it was attended by ethnic Chinese big names such as Robert Kuok 
(Malaysia), Chatri Sophonpanich (Tliailand), and Li Ka Shing (Hong Kong). At the 
same time the meeting was considered controversial as it was initially proposed by the 
Singaporean senior minister, Lee Kuan Yew who so far has promoted "Singapore 
nationalism". Although China was not officially the convenor of the meeting, there is 
no doubt that China rendered its support as proved by the use of its Chamber of 
Commerce in Hong Kong as the venue as well as hosting a trip for participants to 
131 Sterling Seagrave, Lords of the Rim: The Invisible Empire of the Overseas Chinese (London: Corgi 
Books, 1996), p. 14. 
132 Media Indonesia, 9 August 1994. 
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inspect economic free zones in Guangdong province, South China. 133 Without 
specifically referring to China's economic boom, many observers believe that the 
convention was aimed at attracting capital by invoking race solidarity. "" 
In commenting on this trend, former governor of the military's think-tank 
Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo stated that the tendency of overseas Chinese to unite their 
businesses must not inflict a loss on Indonesian development. "' The reason is because 
investment meant the creation of more work opportunities. While the investment in 
China might be based on various considerations, such as business opportunity or better 
economic environment, Suryohadirojo added that it would be worse for Indonesia if the 
investment in China was because of the presence of a stronger bond towards China, as 
it might threaten national security. On the other hand, the Chinese Commonwealth 
tendency could also benefit Indonesia. For example, the ethnic Chinese could use their 
guanxi network links to help bring more capital and develop the Indonesian economy. 
One of Indonesia's leading newspaper, Suara Pembarzian, published a special 
report regarding investment by Indonesian businessmen in China. 136 It reported that 
their investment in China amounted to US$7 billion. TNs is an unofficial figure as there 
is no official record provided by both the Indonesian and Chinese government. 
However, Indonesian businessmen seemed to play down the issue of capital flight by 
ethnic Chinese and justified it as business like and nothing to do with primordial 
linkages. Antoni Salim, son of Liem, for instance stated that he had already prepared to 
invest in China, particularly in export oriented goods, a long time ago. "' Although 
acknowledging that he does not know exactly whether investment in China was based 
on business judgement or primordial links, Djisman Simandjuntak of the CSIS felt it 
133 H. Tarmizi Taher, Masyarakat Cina: Ketahanan Nasional dan Integrasi Bngsa di Indonesia [Chinese 
Society: National Defense and the Integration of Nation in Indonesia] (Jakarta: Pusat Pengkajian Islam 
dan Masyarakat - PPIM, 1997), p. 108. 
134 See, A. Dahana, "Masalah Cina Perantauan" [The Problem of Overseas Chinese], in M Dawarri 
Rahardjo (ed. ), Profil Indonesia [Indonesian Profile], CIDES Yearly Journal, No. I (1994), p. 59. 
135 Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, "Indonesia dan Masyarakat Cina Intemasional" [Indonesia and 
International Chinese Community], Kompas, 12 April 1993. 
136 Suara Pembaruan, 20 October 1997. 
137 Pelita, 4 February 199 1. 
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mainly stemmed from business considerations. "' However, government officials and 
scholars agreed that capital investment in China should be directed to boost the 
Indonesian economy. 
In fact, Indonesian ethnic Chinese investment in China was not something new. 
In one of its cover stories, Tempo noted that many decades ago, Chang Pi Shih and 
Tjong A Fie, two Chinese immigrants, succeeded in becoming big businessmen in 
Indonesia and invested their capital back into China. "' This report also examined how 
one of Indonesia's richest men and close confidante of Suharto, Liern Sioe Liong, 
invested his capital in his hometown, Fuqing. Apart from his generosity in supporting 
the building of public facilities, Liem is also known in the area because of his 
involvement in the Rong, Chian Industrial Group. "" Among businessmen, this Group is 
known as the "Fujian Clan" as it aims at creating a conducive environment for 
investment in Fujian. Although those businessmen are not citizens of Clýiina, the bond 
with their homeland should have a special meaning. This is an emotional and 
primordial bond. Therefore, the military suspicion of the linkage between ethnic 
Chinese and China had some justification. The striking difference has been between the 
emphasis on political interests before normalization and on economic realities after 
normalization. This seems to be in line with the change in China in which the concept 
of Zhongguo (Middle Kingdom) which emphasized on territorial aspect has gradually 
been accompanied by the concept of Zhonghua (Greater China) that is concerned with 
cultural and racial bonds. 
5.5. Conclusion 
Indonesia's decision to restore diplomatic relations with China was received 
with a mixed reaction among Indonesian leaders. For the proponents of the move, it 
was greeted with high optimism and expectation that Indonesia would benefit from the 
move. It was also regarded as an inevitable step in the light of Indonesia's interests, 
139 Pelita, 4 February 199 1. 
139 Tempo, 24 November 1990. 
"0 This Group consists of 30 businessmen originated from Fujian who live in various countries. The 
prominent members of this group are Indonesian ethnic Chinese, such as are Liem Sieo Long, Djuhar 
Sutanto, Eddy Pesik, Setyo Atmcjo, Lin Tzu Chin, and Hendrik Honosutomo. 
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particularly in the domestic economic field, and the need to play a greater role on the 
international stage. However, the opponents of normalization, particularly the military, 
were faced by a situation in wl-dch they had no other choice, except lining up their 
support behind Suharto. In fact, normalization was carried out against the conservative 
position of the military that had long considered China as a threat. Indeed, the portrayal 
of China as a threat gave the military a basis of legitimacy as the protector of the state 
against the enemy. However, a 'sudden' change of attitude towards the enemy put the 
military in a defensive position and indeed threatened its legitimate role as the guardian 
of the state. 
In Indonesia's domestic politics, the period after non-nalization was 
characterized by the apparent cleavage between Suharto and the military. In fact, this 
became apparent in the late 1980s during the election process for the vice-presidency. 
This situation could not be separated from the fact that the military had become more 
concerned about Suharto's domination and its ramifications. The removal of Gen. 
Benny Moerdani from the military command indicated that Suharto felt threatened by 
the military. To secure his grip on the military, he filled in the top positions in the 
military with those who had served previously as his adjutants. Aware of decreasing 
support from the military, Suharto made the unpredictable move of reintroducing Islam 
into Indonesian politics through the creation of the ICMI. This was absolutely 
challenged by the military and Indonesian nationalists who had long considered it 
"taboo" to exploit religious sentiment for political purposes. VAI-ile there were other 
reasons why Suharto embarked on that move, it was strongly believed that Suharto 
needed strong support to secure his re-election in the 1993 general election, and to 
balance the unreliable support from ABRI. However, it would be misleading to 
interpret Islam as a solid and unified force, as in fact it remains divided between Santri 
and abangan. Those who joined ICMI are mostly from the reformist Islam, while their 
opponents mostly come from conservative Islam led by Abdurrachman Wal-iid. Thus, 
the reintroduction of Islam has complicated the political map of Indonesian politics. 
The introduction of Islam into Indonesian politics not only aroused the military's 
apprehension about the possible increasing influence of Islam in Indonesian politics, 
but it increased the military's hostility towards Suharto. 
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Along with the developments in Indonesian domestic politics, particularly the 
friction between ABRI and Suharto as well as the reintroduction of Islam, the period 
after normalization was also characterized by increased anti-Chinese feelings. There is 
no doubt that these were sparked by Suharto's much publicised call to ethnic Chinese 
businessmen to spare some amount of their equity for Indonesian pribumi co- 
operatives. While Suharto's call was initially intended to answer critics of economic 
domination by ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, it simultaneously made ordinary 
Indonesians aware of the existence of an economic gap. By attacking ethnic Chinese 
businessmen, at the same time Suharto also criticized his own family business in which 
many of them have collaborated with ethnic Chinese businessmen. In the end, the 
policy backfired. It was unfortunate that in this situation, the attacks upon ethnic 
Chinese became more frequent and violent. Nearly all the riots that initially had nothing 
to do with ethnic Chinese easily turned into an expression of anti-Chinese feelings. This 
was mainly caused by two factors. First, riots were generally aimed at the government. 
Anti-Chinese feeling was an expression of frustration and disillusionment on the part of 
ordinary people as wresult of the close relations between the government elite and the 
ethnic Chinese. Second, invigorated by Suharto's favour, the Islamic right-wing 
elements were able to voice their concern by exploiting the issue of ethnic Chinese 
domination in the economy as an injustice to Indonesian pribumi. They even tended to 
widen the issue by focusing on the existence of a conspiracy between the ethnic 
Chinese and the military against Islam. Third, Suharto failed to recognize the strength 
of racial feelings in Indonesia. Instead, he always portrayed the ethnic Chinese issue as 
a problem of economic disparity. Finally, the military's ambiguous attitude towards the 
ethnic Chinese also played a part. Indeed, the ethnic Chinese were largely useful for the 
military in terms of economic and financial resources. However, when something went 
wrong, the military could easily put the blame on the ethnic Chinese as an easy target or 
scapegoat. 
After the normalisation, the military remained suspicious of China while the 
latter did not officially abandon its communist ideology. The ideological persistence in 
China has even been used to prove that the collapse of the communist empire in Eastern 
Europe did necessarily mean the disappearance of the communist threat. Unlike the 
prevailing views among the military, ordinary Indonesians seem not to regard 
communism as threat. In this situation the military was in effect challenged to find 
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another justification to legitimise its hold on power. In this context, the military 
portrayed the China threat not only in the form of communism but more importantly in 
the form of Chinese nationalism. In this context, China has been portrayed as the 
continuation of the aggressive and expansionist old Chinese Empire. As the emphasis 
changed over time, so the economic factor began to be particularly stressed. Thus China 
has been perceived as being in the process of reviving social and cultural sentiment to 
appeal to the Indonesian ethnic Chinese to invest in China. Thus what had at one time 
been depicted essentially as a communist threat experienced a gradual transformation 
first to Zhongguo (Middle Kingdom), then to involve Zhonghua (Greater China). In 
other words the traditional notion of a Chinese threat of territorial domination was 
expanded to encompass cultural and ethnic dimensions. 
Chapter Six 
The Projection of Indonesian Perceptions of China into Foreign Policy: 
, aging 
China (1990-1997) Eng 
For about a quarter century, the relations between Indonesia and China have 
generally been dominated by political and security consideration, particularly from 
Indonesia's perspective. Although the relations were restored by August 1990, 
suspicions toward China remains in place, especially among the military officials. 
Interestingly, there has been a transformation of the concept of threat that is not viewed 
only in terms of political/ideological aspects, but more importantly it also involves 
economic perspectives. This also means that changes and adjustment would take place 
in accordance with that reality. Subsequently, there remains one question that needs to 
be addressed. What has been the implication of the prevailing domestic perception of 
China in Indonesian foreign policy towards China? What kind of policy has been 
implemented in dealing with China? What has been its effect on Sino-Indonesian 
economic relations? 
Therefore, the aim of this Chapter is to analyse how Indonesia has translated its 
domestic perception of China after the 1990 normalization into its foreign policy. In so 
doing, this Chapter is divided into four parts. The first part focuses on the underlying 
factors of Indonesian policy towards China. Examination is also conducted into the 
options and possibilities for Indonesia in conducting its relations with China. The 
second portion analyses how Indonesia deals with China, especially in crucial political 
and security fields. A thorough analysis is also made of the South China Sea issue, 
especially over Indonesia's role in the conflict and the dispute with China surrounding 
the Natuna Islands. The third segment examines the pattern of the relationship in 
economic and trade domain. The last portion is the conclusion. 
6.1. Indonesia's Foreign Policy in the 1990s: General Direction and Orientation 
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A. Indonesia's Foreign Policy in the 1990s: Suharto in Command 
Up to the mid 1980s, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry (Deplu) and the military 
appeared not always to agree on foreign policy. It was the result of different visions 
between Adam Malik and the military. ' Although China was not the only iSSUe, 
2 it had 
become one of the classical examples in which both Deplu and the military had tried to 
win the support of Suharto in conducting a relationship with China. While assuming 
the general tasks of conducting diplomacy and inter-state relations, Deplu had to share 
its authority with the military on the issue of China due to the involvement of security 
and defence aspects. For more than twenty-years, the influence of Deplu on the issue of 
China was practically overpowered by the military as Suharto threw his weight behind 
the military's position of distancing Indonesia from Communist China. The outspoken 
civilian foreign minister Malik could not do much or otherwise he would be seen as 
stepping over the military's authority on the issue of national security. 
Under Malik's successor, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, there was no significant 
change. However, it is interesting to note that by the first part of 1980 the Indonesian 
Chamber of Commerce and Trade (KADIN), which consists of Indonesian 
businessmen, began taking part in influencing the direction of Sino-Indonesian 
relations, particularly on trade issues. In fact, as early as 1977, KADIN already 
supported the establishment of a direct trade link with China aimed at increasing 
Indonesia's export commodities such as rubber, timber and palm oil. 
3 However, only 
According to the Director General for Political Affairs of Indonesia's Foreign Ministry, Nugroho 
Wisnumurti, although there was different perception and inclination, there was no friction between Deplu 
and ABRI. They simply had some sort of different visions that were not yet translated into policy. 
Interview on 4 December 1998. 
2 Examples of these disagreements involved the visit of Suharto to Japan in 1968, Indonesia's policy over 
the representation of China in the United Nations, the ending of Konfrontasi with Malaysia. See, Franklin 
Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From Sukarno to Suharto 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), p. 334; and the Indonesian infamous intervention of East Timor, 
See, J. Stephen Hoadley, The Future of Portuguese Timor. - Dilemmas and Opportunities, Occasional 
Paper No. 27 (Singapore: ISEAS, 1975) quoted also by Leo Suryadinata, Indonesia's Foreign Policy 
Under Suharto, Aspiring to International Leadership (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1966); Hamish 
McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia (Victoria: Fontana Books, 198 1). 
3 "Delegasi Ke Canton Fair Berangkat, Tugas Utama: Menjajagi Kemungkinan Pengembangan di Bidang 
Perdagang n, " [Delegation Departs to canton Fair, The Main Task: To Explore the Development of ., ga 
Trade], Sinar Harapan, 10 November 1977; "Tidak ada alasan, tak ujudkan hubungan dagang RI-RRT 
[There is No Reason of not Realizing Indonesia-RRC Trade Relations], Merdeka, 29 December 1977. 
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after the appointment of Suharto's brother in-law Sukamdani S. Gitosardjono to chair 
KADIN in 1984, did Sino-Indonesian relations begin improving. His appointment did 
indeed facilitate the process of the re-opening of direct trade with China in 1985 as he 
had direct access to the President and at the same time neutralizing opposition towards 
the improvement in Sino-Indonesian relations. Nevertheless, the restoration of 
diplomatic relations remained off the agenda. 
While trade relations were underway, the proponents of normalization received 
a more encouraging development as the result of the continuing changes in China and 
the coming of the unexpected new international environment by the late 1980s. 
However, it took about four more years for Indonesia to normalize relations with 
China, which was final-ly announced by Suharto in February 1989. This development 
proved two things. First, the military's suspicion of China remained strong. Second, it 
was Suharto who held the key in determining the relationswith China. In other words, 
Suharto had shown himself as the actor who made the final decision on foreign policy 
initiatives. Tbus, it is misleading to read the formulation of Indonesian foreign policy 
only as merely the result of competitive interaction between the various institutions, 
especially the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of defence. The factor of 
Suharto after the mid 1980s should not be considered lightly, as he was the figure who 
took a slow and gradual steps to assert his authority. Although Suharto eventually 
adopted a policy that had been proposed by Deplu, in the end any decision on foreign 
policy was always claimed as the work of Suharto and it was he who eventually 
received credit. 
Along with the general tendency of Indonesia's domestic politics by 1990 in 
which the relationship between Suharto and the military had turned strained, it soon 
became clear that Suharto had become more assured of his involvement in foreign 
policy. He seemed to enjoy talking about foreign policy and subsequently conducted 
more trips abroad. It was a strong indication that Suharto gained full confidence to play 
a bigger role in the international forum. It was not surprising that in travelling abroad 
Suharto was often accompanied by his trusted assistant and State Secretary, 
Moerdiono. The latter was also often entrusted to brief the press on foreign policy 
issues. Indeed, Moerdiono was Suharto's mouthpiece on foreign policy. Tbus the role 
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of Deplu and the military had decreased. Nevertheless, on the issues concerned with 
security and defence, Deplu continued to share responsibility with the military, while 
the final decision rested in the hands of Suharto. Interestingly, Deplu was able to 
maintain its role and function through close relations between Alatas and Moerdiono. 4 
Indeed, a close relation to the latter meant none other than a direct and easy access to 
Suharto. On the other hand, Suharto also needed a strong back up and expertise from 
Deplu for the implementation of Indonesia's assertive foreign policy, particularly in his 
capacity as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement. As far as the military were 
concerned, as a result of the shift in Indonesia's political constellation, they were 
practically less involved in foreign policy. An Indonesian scholar suggested that the 
military were too preoccupied to reassess their future role and had no time to pay 
attention to foreign PoliCY. 5 Nevertheless, they had always returned to prominence 
when the issue of national security was at stake. 
B. Assertive Foreign Policy: International Engagement and Domestic 
Obstacles 
Since his coming to power, Suharto had kept Indonesian foreign policy on a 
low profile. In this context, it was mainly aimed at serving domestic requirements of 
creating stability, order and economic development. Thus foreign policy was confined 
to domestic and regional perspectives, and specifically aimed at facilitating the creation 
of stability and economic development. Indeed, Suharto's low profile and good 
neighbourhood policy was greatly welcomed by Southeast Asian countries, particularly 
after Sukarno's turbulent years. As a result, peace and stability were created in the 
Southeast Asian region. However, the inward looking orientation of Suharto's 
govenunent seemed to suppress the nationalist feelings and prevented Indonesia to play 
a bigger role in the world stage. 6 Therefore, one of Indonesia's reasons to restore 
relations with China had been to serve the national interest of increasing Indonesia's 
4 Foreign Minister Ali Alatas developed good relations with Moerdiono, State Secretary, which in many 0 
ways helped facilitate the work of Deplu, particularly on issues intersected with security interest, such as 
China and East Timor. 
5 Interview with Rizal Sukma, 12 December 1998. 
6 It was especially after the creation of stability and relative economic success in the second half of the 
1980s. 
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prestige by playing a larger role on the world scene. Accordingly, Indonesia's most 
immediate objective in foreign policy was to secure the candidacy for the 
Chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement. 7 
At long last, in September 1991 Indonesia was elected to lead the Non-Aligned 
Movement, and eventually hosted the Tenth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) in Jakarta in September 1993.8 The meeting was attended by 108 leaders from 
non-aligned countries. It was regarded as a great success as it overcame initial anxieties 
of poor attendance that might consequently raise questions about NAM's continued 
relevancy in the post-Cold War era. Substantially, Indonesia succeeded in steering 
NAM away from political interests to socio-economic concerns. The result was later 
formulated in the final document of "The Jakarta Message" which contains, among Z 
other things, a call for constructive North-South dialog and underlies the importance of 
South-South Cooperation among NAM countries. 9 Over all, the prevailing tone of the 
message was consultative-- rather than confrontational. And it was Suharto's 
responsibility to assure the implementation of the Message. In this regard, Suharto 
visited Tokyo in 1993 during which he, on behalf of NAM, submitted the Jakarta 
Message to the leaders of the G7 Summit, through the Japanese Prime Minister. 
Indeed, in the 1990s, Indonesia has played an active role in various 
international forums, not only a leading role in the settlement of Cambodian conflict 
and in the context of ASEAN, but also the participation in the Organisation of Islamic 
Conference (OIC), the G15 Group and the South-South Dialog, as well as hosting the 
APEC meeting in October 1994. Thus, it was widely believed that Suharto's attempt to 
re-establish a respected place for Indonesia in the international community has 
succeeded. Nevertheless, the Indonesian foreign policy and its participation in any 
7 In the longer term, the normalization should also increase the opportunity for the realization of the Zone 
of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), particularly on the settlement of Cambodian problem. 
8 This event recalled Indonesia's earlier prominence in the Movement starting with the 1955 Afro-Asian 
conference held in Bandung. 
9 See, The Jakarta Message: A Call for Collective Action and the Democralisation of International 
Relations, (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1992). 
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forum were always overshadowed by domestic constraints, especially the question of 
East Timor. 10 Diplomatically, up to 1983 Indonesia successUly defied international 
criticism and refuted any United Nations' resolutions calling her to withdraw from the 
territory. And since 1984, Indonesia has managed to persuade the UN General 
Assembly to defer the discussion on East Timor in the General Assembly and entrust 
the UN Secretary General with convening a tripartite meeting between Indonesia, and 
Portugal to find an internationally acceptable and comprehensive solution to the 
issue. ' 1 
However, Indonesia's entrance to the world stage coincided with the coming of 
a new international environment by 1990 that changed the fortunes of Indonesian 
diplomacy. 12 The sense of satisfaction over foreign policy successes and higher profile 
was overshadowed by Indonesia's failure to resolve the issue of East Timor. The 
November 1991 Dili incident in which the Indonesian troops opened fire on a peaceful 
demonstration and atound 200 people were reported to have been killed, was a turning 
point in Indonesia's diplomacy. The incident was a major blow that put the issue of 
East Timor back under international scrutiny. Indeed, it overshadowed the success of 
the New Order regime afterwards and marked the beginning of a long political ordeal 
for Indonesia, internally and internationally. The incident made its consequence on the 
military in which Suharto immediately took tough measures by setting up a 
commission to investigate the incident. 13 On 28 December 1991, after his meeting with 
senior government ministers, Suharto made a number of decisions including the 
10 In the wake of the civil war in 1975 as the Portuguese departed from East Timor, Indonesia annexed 
the territory and integrated it in the following year as Indonesia's 27h province. The United Nations has 
never recognized Indonesia's. occupation of East Timor. The issue remains under discussion in the UN 
General Assembly as East Timor is considered as a non-self goveming territory. 0 
The Indonesian government decision to hold a referendum in August 1999 was also the result of Ion., 
negotiations between Portugal, Indonesia and the UN Secretary-General. 1 
12 The new paradigm in international relations has been democratization, human rights and environment. 
Accordingly, the Western powers became more critical of Indonesia's human rights record, including in 
East Timor. 
" The findings of an official inquiry commission into the incident were released in January 1992. It is 
revealed that at least 50 people killed (the Army's claim was 19). 
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removal of two generals 14 and the setting up of an Honorary Council. 
15 Domestically, 
the incident ftirther distanced Suharto and the military as the latter were dissatisfied by 
his decision to mainly blame and punish members of the military. Internationally, the 
incident generated a strong worldwide condemnation toward the Indonesian 
government. Some governments such as Canada, Denmark and the Netherlands 
decided to suspend economic aid to Indonesia. 
16 Since then Indonesia has been the 
target of international criticism and condemnation over its persistent occupation and 
human rights violation in East Timor in nearly every international organization and 
meeting. 17 
C. Indonesia's Policy towards China 
Domestic Resistance 
Although relations between Indonesia and China have improved significantly, 
the issue of the ethnic Chinese always plays its part. As discussed in previous chapters, 
there remains a general suspicion among pribumi and the elite toward Indonesian 
ethnic Chinese who are regarded as being alien, having connections with Beijing, and 
being opportunist. It is widely believed that the government's negative campaign 
against communist China, the link with ethnic Chinese and communism has been 
excessive. It is not surprising therefore that the perception of the ethnic Chinese 
community in Indonesia always bears the ambiguous connotations of its link- to their 
motherland. 18 
" They are Maj. Gen. Sintong Panjaitan, Chief of the Udayana Military Command which oversees Bali 
and the Lesser Sunda Island, including East Timor, as well as Brig. Gen. Samuel Warouw, chief of the 
Military Command in East Timor. 
15 The Council was chaired by Gen. Eddy Sudradjat with its task to further investigate the army's 
command's policy and procedures in handling the incident. 
16 Suharto retaliated Dutch criticism of linking aid to human rights by disbanding the International Group 
on Indonesia (IGGI). Indonesia later invited the World Bank to take over the chairmanship of a new aid 
grouping, the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) which consisted of all IGGI members except the 
Netherlands. 
17 Foreign Minister Alatas referred to East Timor problem as a pebble in the shoes. 
18 After the downfall of the Suharto in May 1998, there has been an extensive discussion to change the 
term "Cina" to "Tionghoa". However, the military seemed disagree on this proposal as they might start 
demanding an equal treatment as other Indonesian indigenous ethnic races. 
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One of the infamous incidents linking ethnic Chinese, PRC and Chinese citizen 
took place in 1992. It began when one Indonesian ethnic Chinese businessman, Eka 
Tjipta Widjaja (Oey Ek Tjhong), planned to build the Indah Kiat paper factory in 
Indonesia. 19 In order to meet the electricity need that was not sufficiently provided by 
the state, he built an electricity powerhouse with the government's permission. In its 
realization, he imported machinery and employed 1,000 skilled Chinese national 
technicians as part of the deal. However, the arrival of Chinese workers sparked severe 
criticism from various quarters. The reaction that was extensively published in the 
national press ranged from nationalism to the issue of unemployment in Indonesia. It 
became a national issue. In the end, the Chinese workers were gradually sent home. 
This incident once again underlined the animosity towards ethnic Chinese, especially 
when they are perceived as having a link to China. 
Indeed, the pýriod of the 1990s has been characterized by increasing quality and 
quantity of anti-Chinese demonstrations in Indonesia. While the cause of the protests 
had nothing to do with the ethnic Chinese, they easily turned into an expression of anti- 
Chinese feelings. Suharto's attack on ethnic Chinese businessmen had raised people's 
awareness of the extent of the economic gap between ethnic Chinese and pribumi. In 
spite of recognizing the presence of a racial problem, the New Order always focused on 
the economic perspective. Therefore, the government's policy in handling the issue of 
ethnic Chinese played its part in the deteriorating situation of the ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia. Indeed, the tendency to target the ethnic Chinese was also part of the 
expression of people's dissatisfaction towards Suharto, especially his family businesses 
and their link to the ethnic Chinese tycoons. Since ordinary Indonesians were unable to 
attack Suharto directly, the next and easier target was the ethnic Chinese that were seen 
as close to him, his family, his crony and his regime. Thus, the ethnic Chinese have 
become the target as the result of economic and political dissatisfaction against the 
government. Nevertheless, some evidence even suggested that the victimization of 
19 See, "Pelajaran yang Mahal dari Serangý' [Expensive Lesson from Serang], Tempo, 5 September 1992; 
"Meng i Nasionalisme Konglomerat" [Testiq; Conglomerate's Nationalism] and "Protes Hanya Karena . Ui RRC" [Protest Simply Because of PRC), "Indah Kiat Mengimport TKA" [Indah Kiat Importing Foreign 
Workers], Fonim Keadilan, I October 1992. 
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ethnic Chinese was part of the government's policy to put the blame on the worsening 
economic situation. 20 
Yet, none of the underlying domestic factors undermined Sino-Indonesian 
relations in general. While the Chinese government might find the fate of ethnic 
Chinese in Indonesia appalling, it always constrained itself not to publicly criticize the 
Indonesian government in addressing the issue. Rather, it opted to quietly present its 
concern, thus avoiding the backlash of invoking nationalism and anti-Chinese feelings 
in Indonesia. This was the case as anti-Chinese riots took place in Medan in April 
1994. in this regard, the Chinese government politely expressed its concern over the 
situation, and expected the Indonesian government to solve the problem because China 
was friendly towards Indonesia. 21 Apparently, the Chinese government was also fully 
aware that criticism might only give ammunition to the anti-Chinese elements in 
Indonesia, which may easily be turned into an accusation that China was interfering in 
the domestic affairs of Indonesia. 22 Additionally, the Chinese government appears to be 
sensitive of the criticism that might similarly be leveled against Beijing, especially on 
the issue of human rights. China also adopted a similar attitude with regard to the May 
1998 riot in which many ethnic Chinese had become the victims of political change in 
Indonesia. 
External Factors: Chinese Foreign Policy and the Projection of its Power 
What is the characteristic of Chinese foreign policy in the 1990s? At least, it 
should embark on the premise that China's foreign policy walks on three legs - 
domestic, external, inter-China - in the pursuit of three declared foreign policy 
objectives: modernization, reunification and anti-hegemoniSM. 23 As the East-West 
confrontation has gone, Chinese foreign policy has increasingly become mired in and 
20 Human Rights Watch, "Indonesia Alert: Economic crisis Leads to Scapegoating Ethnic Chinese", New 
York, 1998. 
21 Strait Times, 26 April 1994. 
22 Especially from the military and Islamic hard-liners. 
23 Samuel S. Kim, "China's Pacific Policy: Reconciling the Irreconcilable", International Journal, 
Summer 1995, p. 464. 
222 
symptomatic of domestic politics, particularly also after the Tianarimen incident. Kim 
also argued there is an inordinate push in its international relations for China-specific 
exemption and China-specific entitlement in international institutions, as well as for 
restoring China's great-power status in the world, to make up for domestic deficits. 
Accordingly, close attention must be paid to domestic politics and self-image of 
Chinese leaders in shaping Beijing definition of and response to the changing 
international situation. 
Therefore, despite showing a major departure from Mao's foreign policy, China 
is still showing continuity in some aspects. First, China continues to reject the presence 
of hegemonic power in its environment, particularly in East Asia. While historically, 
this power was associated with the Soviet Union threat which was labeled as 
revisionist, China also rejected Vietnam domination over Indo-China. Second, China 
always associates herself as part of developing or Third World countries. China's 
position has currently strengthened by its attitude on the issue of level of economic 
development, particularly in the contentious question of rich and poor countries 
between North-South countries, in which China defends the interest of less developed 
countries. Third, China remains sensitive to any external threat. This threat is 
unnecessarily in the presence of a real and tangible enemy, but it is very often related to 
its implications that will undermine national sovereignty or regime survival. Some 
examples in this case can be mentioned such as the support of the independence of 
Tibet and Taiwan. In order to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity, China is 
undoubtedly willing to use its military power. 
Nevertheless, Chinese leaders generally' welcomed the coming of a new 
international environment. They assumed that with the end of the confrontation 
between these superpowers (the US and the Soviet Union), global warwill not occur in 
the 20th century. 24 However, the elimination of the Soviet Union from the international 
scene, at least for the time being, was not followed by the coming of peace and 
international order as it still contains itself with vulnerabilities. This assumption has 
been based on the following factors. First, although the bipolar structure has dissolved, 
2' Shulong Chu, "The PRC Girds for Limited, High-Tech War", ORBIS, Spring 1994, p. 178. 
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the new structure of international relations is yet to be found. It is further 
overshadowed by the emergence of new conflicts and contradiction. This opinion has, 
among others, been expressed by the Secretary General of the Chinese Communist 
Party, Jiang Zemin in its 14th Congress in October 1992.25 Second, the end of the Cold 
War has caused great apprehension among the Chinese leaders as to the intention of the 
US, which is considered the sole-superpower. In this situation, America is seen as 
attempting to create a New World order based on American values, culture and 
ideology. Thus, the US is seen to be applying power politics. The Chinese leaders are 
convinced that the US will prevent the emergence of any regional power that poses a 
threat to its interests. 26 Third, Chinese leaders and analysts predict that economic 
competition will escalate, and the competition between nations to create a more 
significant comprehensive national power as unavoidable. They also believe that the 
position of a particular nation in the current world order is based on its national power. 
Therefore, if China wants to enhance its position, there is no other way than to increase 
its comprehensive n4tional power. I 
Bearing in mind the above factors, it is not surprising therefore that the Chinese 
leaders' views of the international situation have been rather pessimistic. Although they 
welcome the coming of the new era, it does not necessarily mean the arrival of a better 
world order. Thus the possibility of the outbreak of conflicts could not be ruled out. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has been referred to as evidence that instability and 
conflict still dominate the nature of international relations. This opinion is clearly 
expressed by the Chinese Premier, Li Peng before National People's Congress in March 
1991: 
VAiile we welcome the changes caused by the relaxation of certain 
regional conflicts and the prospects for their political settlement, the 
grim facts show that our world is not peaceful, that peace and 
development which people of the world over aspire to are still facing a 
severe challenge, and that hegemonism and power politics still continue 
to develop. The facts also show that certain hidden political and national 
25 Jiang Zhemin, "Accelerating Reform and Opening-up", A Statement delivered before the 140'National 0 Congress, Beying Review, Vol. 35, no. 43,26 October -I October 1992, p. 26. 
26 Arthur S. Ding, "Peking! s Foreign Policy in the Changing World", Issues & Studies 27, no. 8, August 
1991, p. 20. 
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problems have come to the fore, that the disparity in the balance of 
strength has also triggered new contradictions, and that the difference 
between the haves and have-nots in the North and the South has 
continued to widen. In fact, because of the intertwining new and old 
contradictions, the world has become even more turbulent. 
27 
On the contrary, when it comes to East Asia, Chinese leaders had a more positive 
perception. In his visit to Singapore, for example, then-President Yang Shangkun said 
that the situation in Asia was far more stable than the world and was moving towards 
peace and stability. 28 This optimistic evaluation is certainly related to the positive 
developments in the region at the end of the 1980s when Beijing succeeded in opening 
diplomatic relations with Indonesia and Singapore, improving relations with Vietnam 
as well as creating good relations with Seoul and Tokyo. Above all, China was able to 
develop good relations with Asian major powers. 
China is also continuing to reform its economy, which is aimed at enabling 
China to compete on the world stage. China considered that domestic stability must be 
accompanied by an attempt to create peaceful and conducive circumstances in its 
environment. Accordingly, China is actively forging friendly cooperative relations Nvith 
the countries, particularly those in East Asia and Southeast Asia. However, China is 
also continuing its reform in the military field. After the Gulf War, the emphasis was 
shifted to the employment of high-tech military equipment to meet the needs of modem 
warfare. 29 The aims are mainly related to China's effort to build-up a strong air force 
and naval build-up. Additionally, Beijing has also imported large quantities of 
advanced Soviet weaponry and military technology. Although China is not yet 
comprehensively strong, it has the potential to be so with a strong economy. While the 
People's Liberation Army (PLA) still does not have a blue-water navy, China's military 
development has caused great concern to its neighbouring countries. One of the 
indicators of China's growing strength include its increased defence spending four 
27 China Daily, 21 March 1991, quoted in Shulong Chu, "The PRC Girds for Limited, High-Tech War". 
Orbis, Spring 1994, p. 178. 
28 Shulong Chu, Ibid. See also Guo Zhenyuan, 'Asian-Pacific Region Remains Peaceful', Beying Review, 
February 5-11,1996. 
29 Arthur S. Ding, "The impact of the Persian Gulf War on the PLA", Zhonggzlo dahlyanjill (Mainland 
China Studies) (Taipei) 34, no. 12 (December 1991), pp. 27-36 in "The PRC's Military Modernization 
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years in a row, ranging between B and 15 per cent increases. 30 This is shown by the 
fact that the PLA are becoming more assertive in support of China's territorial claims. 
Accordingly, states are talking about China as a threat. 
In fact, the issue of the China threat emerged on the international scene when in 
1993 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) re-listed countries economically 
according to the purchasing power parity assumption it! which China's gross domestic 
product was inflated four times using current exchange rates. With its increasing 
economic power, China may eventually develop its military power and pursue an 
expansionist policy. In 1994, for instance, China was ranked as the 7h highest country 
with military expenditures, with the spending amounting to US$6.3 billion. 31 Aware of 
great apprehension among its neighbours caused by military development, the Chinese 
government has sought to assure the region that China does not seek hegemony now, 
nor will it do so in the future, even when it is economically developed. 32 Beijing has 
steadily counter-attacked the notion of the China threat as an attempt by anti-China 
Westerners "to sow discord between China and its neighbouring countries and to 
, 03 destroy China's plans of reunification and economic development. 
D. Projection of Sino-Indonesian. Relations: Options and Possibilities 
In the 1990s, the relations between China and Indonesia improved significantly. 
The normalization was immediately followed by an increased cooperation in nearly all 
sectors, be they political, economic, trade, social and cultural activities. There was a 
sense of enthusiasm from both sides to catch up the time that had been seemingly lost 
during the absence of diplomatic relations. At the highest level, official exchanges took 
place. As a response to a good gesture shown by Premier Li Peng's visit to Indonesia in 
and a Security Mechanism for the Asia Pacific", Issue andStudies, Vol. 3 1, No. 8, August 1995. 
30 James Linder, "Chinese Military Strategy, " Global Strateiul, Winter 1993, p. 59. 
31 China was behind US, Japan, France, Gerniany, Britain, and India. See, London Institute for 
International Strategic Studies, October 1994. 
32 Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, as quoted by Michael Richardson, "China*Said to Court Asians 
as a Buffer Against the US, " International Herald Tribune, 24-25 July 1993. 
33 Wei Zhengyan, "China's Diplomacy in 1993, " Beying Review, 17-23 January 1994, p. 15. 
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August 1990, President Suharto went to China from 14 to 19 November 1990. It was 
the first time for the New Order leader to visit China, twenty-three years after the 
freezing of diplomatic relations. 34 Apart from discussing bilateral matters and regional 
problem with President Yang Shangkun, tWs occasion marked the end of enmity 
between Indonesia and China. 35 During that visit, both parties underlined the 
importance of Bandung Principles (Dasa Sila Bandung) and five principles of peaceful 
co-existence as the foundation of the relations between two countries. 36 Thus both 
countries underlined their agreement to adopt the principles of non-interference and 
cooperation as the basis of the relationship. 
The visit was followed by the arrival of President Yang Shangkun in Indonesia 
from 5 to 9 June 1991 in which he reiterated China's position with regard to building 
new political and economic order. 37 Although this visit was more symbolic, full of 
diplomatic attributes and the reiteration of general principles of bilateral relations, he 
identified four main- issues as a basis of relations between these two states. First, all 
countries, regardless of its size, big or small, strong or weak, should have the same 
level and be entitled to participate in the consultation in resolving all international 
problems. Second, every country has the right to determine its own social system and 
economic pattern and the direction of its development in accordance with their 
respective conditions. Each state also should respect each other's sovereignty and not 
interfere in the domestic affairs of others. Third, international conflicts should be 
solved through a just and peaceful way. Fourth, international economic relations should 
reflect the principle of equality and mutually beneficial. In general, China welcomed 
34 The last visit by Indonesian highest official was conducted by Sukarno on 4-5 November 1963. On the 
part of China, it was conducted by President Liu Shaoqi on 12-20 April 1963. 
35 Lie Tek Tjeng argued there are three factors underlining Suharto's visit to China. Firstý the changes in 
geo-political strategy, particularly in the context of evolving relations between China, Japan and the US, 
Second, the importance of China in the settlement of Asia-Pacific problems, especially the issue of 
Cambodia. Finally, it should be seen in the context of China as a potential market for Indonesia, 
particularly after the Western countries and Japan have become more protective. See, Lie Tek Tjenc,, g "Kunjungan Presiden ke Jepang, RRC dan Vietnam" [The Visit of the President to Japan, PRC and 
Vietnam], Kompas, 17 November 1990. 
36 "Pagi Ini, Suharto-Li Peng Adakan Pembicaraan Empat Mata, " [This Morning, Suharto-Li Peng 
Conducting a Face-to-face Meeting], Kompas, 15 November 1990. 
37 "Presiden: RI-RRC Punya Tautan Sejarah, " [The President: Indonesia and China Have a Historical 
Link], Kompas, 6 June 199 1. 
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the improvement of relations between China and Indonesia and made clear China's 
position on some issues, such as communism, Cambodia, the creation of East Asian 
38 Economic Caucus (EAEC) and foreign military bases in Southeast Asia. On the same 
occasion, President Suharto reiterated the important contribution of normalization for 
peace and stability in the region that should facilitate the development process as well 
as towards the settlement of the Cambodian problem. 39 
Unlike the upswing in the economic and trade sectors '40 bilateral political 
cooperation was somewhat left behind, regardless of foreign minister Ali Alatas 
insistence that there is no problem in developing relations with China. 41 What has been 
the effect of domestic and external realities? How does Indonesia develop relations 
with China? And, what options are available? In replying to a question as to what kind 
of diplomatic relations would take place between Indonesia and China, Alatas replied 
that diplomatic relations with China should be developed proportionally. 42 This was an 
ambiguous response that explained that Indonesia was still searching for the right 
direction for its relationship with China. Indonesian leaders, particularly the military, 
are surely reluctant to be seen as politically too close to China, while Deplu does not 
want to be seen courting with China. 
38 On communism, China reiterated that each and every country has the right to choose its own social 
system, ideology, model and the road to development in accordance with its own national conditions. 
China also had no intention to impose its model to other countries. China also respects Indonesia's social 
system, road to development and the ideology of Pancasila. On Cambodia, China supported an early, 
comprehensive, fair and reasonable settlement within the framework of the Paris Conference and the 
fi-amework document and draft agreement of the Permanent Five. China also appreciates Indonesia's role 
in the settlement process of Cambodian problem. On the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), China 
preferred to wait the views of other ASEAN members, while underlined the importance of China's 
participation in Asia-Pacific Economic Forum (APEC). On foreign military bases in Southeast Asia, 
China seems to go along with ASEAN's position to rule out the establishment of foreign basis in 
Southeast Asia and supports the creation of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality. Jakarta Post, 5 June 
1991. 
39 "Kunjungan Presiden RRC Paripumakan Normalisasi, " [Chinese Presidential Visit as the Culmination 
of Normalization], Suara Karya, 6 June 199 1. 
40 Bilateral economic relations are discussed separately in this chapter. 
41 Suara Pembaruan, 19 November 1990. 
42 Tempo, 4 March 1989. 
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The then Indonesian Ambassador to Beijing, Juwana, stated that bilateral 
relations should be intensified but in "rational and correct" circumstances. 43 He warned 
that if relations with China are developed too quickly, there could emerge a lot of 
disturbances in which Indonesia also has to make a speedy adjustment. What is 
important in developing relations with China is, he added, the implementation of the 
principles of chengxin and chengyi or good will and good faith. Indeed, the prevailing 
views among the Indonesian elite remained cautious of China. One Indonesian senior 
official described the relations with China as politically fine while at the same time he 
recognised the existence of probleMS. 44 There is no doubt that this reflects the presence 
of suspicions towards China, particularly among the military leaders, and the sensitive 
issue of ethnic Chinese among ordinary Indonesians. The ups and down of an unstable 
and sometimes violent history of relations between China and Indonesia obviously 
played its part in the conduct of Indonesia's foreign policy towards China. 45 
Given the domestic realities in Indonesia, there are two forms of foreign policy 
that have been implemented vis-A-vis China. First, Indonesia will not conduct close 
bilateral relations with China, particularly in the security and political fields. 46 T-hUS, 
Indonesia is more inclined to pursue its relations in these fields through multilateral 
cooperation, such as ASEAN and other cooperative institutions. By working 
multilaterally, Indonesia should be able to put pressure on China on various issues, and 
to make Indonesia more secure. Additionally, the government should be able to 
appease the domestic audience that remains suspicious of China. Indeed, Asian 
regional organizations will have an important role to play in a campaign of 
reconciliation with China, namely ASEAN and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). 47 
Second, Indonesia considers its relations ý*ith China more in the context of pursuing 
43 Kompas, 22 July 1994 and 4 August 1997. 
44 Interview with the Director General of Political Affairs, Nugroho Wisnumurti, 4 December 1998. 
45 Interview with Rizal Sukma, 12 December 1998. 
46 Nevertheless, Indonesia would also be willina to develop bilateral relations with China on non- 
sensitive issues such as in the social and cultural fields. 
47 Douglas T. Stuart, "Toward Concert in Asia", Asian Surve),, Vol. 37, No. 3, March 1997, p. 240. 
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Indonesia's economic interest. Thus, such a cooperation is expected to benefit 
Indonesia economically. 
6.2. Indonesia's Political and Security Policies: A Multilateral Constructive 
Engagement 
A. Sino-Indonesian Relations and the Major Powers: A Fragile 
Environment 
Interrelations between the Major Powers 
The perception of threat in East Asia is complex and goes beyond the Cold War 
dichotomy of the US and the Soviet Union. Although many countries perceived the 
Soviet Union as a threat to their security, they also perceived other Asian countries as 
threats to their security. 48 It is not surprising that in the 1990s the old inter-state 
problems have shown persistence, which involves jurisdictional disputes and over- 
lapping territorial cWms. These disputes are nearly embraced by all countries, or at 
least confronted by countries bordering the South China Sea. To add weight to the 
problem, these conflicts also involve all major regional powers such as Japan and 
China over the Senkaku Island in the East China Sea, and Japan and Russia over the 
Northern Territories. Similar conflicts also exist between the most successful regional 
cooperation institution ASEAN, in which its members are in contention against another 
over the ownership of various islands. It includes Indonesia-Malaysia over Sipadan and 
Ligitan islands in the Celebes Sea, between Singapore and Malaysia over ownership of 
Pulau Batu Putih in the Straits of Johor, and the Philippines and Malaysia over Sabah. 
However, the most delicate and worrying one is the dispute of sovereignty and 
overlapping claims of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea between Brunei, 
China, Malaysia, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam. 49 Thus, it is less clear that 
change in international relations will bring about the same "peace dividend" to the 
region. 50 
49 Henry Kissinger, "East Asia, the Pacific and the West: Strategic Trends and Implications: Part I", in C, 
Robert ONeill (ed. ), The EastAsia and Internafional Security, London, MacMillan Press, 1987, pp. 1-8. 
'9 The South China Sea issue is discussed in this chapter in so far it is relevant to Sino-Indonesian 
relations. 
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As far as regional order is concerned, there is no doubt whatsoever that the US 
is holding a key role in the maintenance of security and stability in the region, 
especially in balancing contradicting forces such as China and Japan. As the only 
country that remains providing a security umbrella to the region, the US has more 
leverage to influence the shape of East Asian security structure. Iberefore a future 
picture of a strategic relationship in the region cannot be separated from its policy 
towards the region. The reason is simply because there is no indigenous East Asian 
power that could be accepted by most of the countries in the region to fill in the 
American footsteps without prompting other forces to counter-balance. China will 
surely reject a greater role for Japan. For instance, a Beying Review article in February 
1992 warned that Japan has become active and independent in its foreign policy to fill 
the vacancy left by the withdrawal of American and Russian influences. 51 
The apprehension of the Japanese was supported by the fact that its 
t 
procurement spending on major weapons could be the third highest in the world after 
that of the US and France, exceeding that of the UK, Gennany and Russia. 52 Korea 
also expresses similar concern as it said that even after future reunification, American 
53 forces should be maintained in the Peninsular to protect Korea from Japan. While 
reluctantly accepting the American forces, Southeast Asian countries, including 
Indonesia, have repeatedly warned against Japanese remilitarism. Although Japanese 
policy is still far from the one practiced during, the Second World War, those countries 
are concerned that Japan may revert to its old foreign policy. This potential might come 
into reality if the Japanese are faced by the following conditions. First, the situation in 
which a US-Japanese alliance is no longer reliable to them. Japan feels that should it 
lose its security link with the US, it would become "an international orphan, disliked, 
50 Soedibyo, "Developments in the Asia-Pacific Region and Their Implications for China and Indonesia", 
in Ji Guoxing and Hadi Soesastro (eds. ), Sino-Indonesian Relations in the Post-Cold War Era (Jakarta: 
CSIS, 1992), p. 75. 
51 Lin Xiaoguang, "Japan Seeks Greater Role in the World", Beying Review, February 1992. 
52 Stockholm International Peace Research International (SIPRI), Yearbook 1993, p. 39 1. 
53 Kishore Mahbubani, "Japan Adrift", Foreign Policy, No. 87, Summer 1993, p. 129. 
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distrusted, and vulnerable to its heavily armed neighbors". 54 Second, its strategic 
environment is changing dramatically, such as North Korea achieving nuclear 
armaments that provoked South Korea to follow suit. Third, China becomes 
adventurous in asserting its claims towards Taiwan, the disputed Senkaku Islands, and 
other territories in the South China Sea and opting for military force. Therefore the 
changing nature of the US-Japan relations would be very crucial to the region. 
The discussion of security and peace in the region must undoubtedly also refer 
to China as one of East Asian major powers. In this context, Sino-American relations 
also played an important part in creating stability in the region. Unfortunately, since the 
later 1980s, Beijing has come to see the United States not as a strategic partner but as 
the chief obstacle to its own strategic ambitions. 55 Therefore their relations have been 
characterized by various conflicts and indifferences which include Chinese human 
rights records, Tibet, China's link with North Korea, nuclear test as well as trade 
issues. 56 However, the Chinese government reacted very angrily when the issue of 
sovereignty was involved. Consequently, whenever Taiwan showed a signal toward 
independence, or the United States moved toward recognizing Taiwan, China had no 
hesitation to use every possible means, including military forces. One scholar even 
referred to the Taiwan case as a time bomb in the Far East. 57 Indeed, in the 1990s 
China has shown its military muscle several times to deter Taiwan from gaining full 
independence which in effect threatens the security of East Asia as a whole. 
Meanwhile, Sino-Japanese relations remains complex and uneasy, reflecting among 
other things the inevitable competitiveness of their positions and the Chinese belief that 
Japan is not sufficiently repentant for its invasion of China in the 1930s and is not 
54 See, Eugene Brown, "The Debate Over Japan's Strategic Future: Bilateralism Versus Regionalism" 
ge Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 6, June 1993; Edward C. Luck, "Layers of Security: Regional Arrang ment, 
the United nations, and the Japanese-American Security Treaty, " Asian Sun, ey, Vol. 35, No. 3, March 
1995. 
53 Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "The Coming Conflict with America, " Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, 
no. 2, March/April 1997. 
56 See, Richard P. Cronin, "The United States and Asia in 1994", Asian Survey, Vol. 24, No. 1, January 
1995, pp. 112-16. 
57 Xuewu Gu, "Taiwan: Time Bomb in the Far East", Aussenpolitik, Vol. 47, no. 2, February 1996. 
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responding adequately to China's economic needs for capital and technology. 58 
In the end, it can be argued that the triangular relationship between China, 
Japan aný the US would certainly maintain and determine the structure of international 
relations in the region. The US role in the region, Japanese restraint in arming 
themselves and its capability to maintain its security alliance with the US, and Chinese 
transparent military development and clear foreign policy objectives will significantly 
contribute to the creation of regional stability. Although the US has pulled out its forces 
from their military basis in the Philippines, its policy towards the region today has not 
completely changed. 59 As in the case of Europe, the US presence in the Asia-Pacific 
region is still considered vital for the maintenance of regional peace and stability. Its 
primary role in the region is to help assure that other big powers will restrain 
themselves from causing instabilities to arise in the region. This means that the US 
presence is also aimed at checking China, India and Japan. 
60 Indeed, the United States 
hopes that Japan will gradually assume a greater role in checking the PRC's grovNing 
influence in the region. 61 
Indonesia and China: the US as a Factor 
Insofar as the United States identifies democracy and human rights as pillars of 
its foreign policy, there is bound to be friction with those states that perceive an 
insistence on these values as interference in their internal affairs and an attempt to 
change the nature of their regimes. 62 Indeed, this has been the case with Indonesia and 
58 See, Yong Deng, "Chinese Relations with Japan: Implications for Asia-Pacific Regionalism", Pacific 
Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 3, Fall 1997, pp. 373-391; Harvey W. Nelsen, "Japan Eyes China, " Journal of 
Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. XIC, No. 4, Winter 1995. 
59 For the discussion on the US engagement in East Asia, see, Richard P. Cronin, "The United States and 
Asia in 1994, " Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 1, January 1995; Sheldon W. Simon, "U. S. Interest in 
Southeast Asia, The Future Military Presence, " Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 1, July 1991; Donald P. 
Gregg, "Frcsh Perspectives on East Asia's Future: The Case for Continued Engagement, " Orbis, Summer 
1997. 
60 Jusuf Wanandi, ASEAN and Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Jakarta: The Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, October 1990). 
61 David 1. Hitchock, Jr., "East Asia's New Security Agenda, " The lVashington Quarterly 17, no. I 
(Winter 1994), pp. 91-105. 
233 
China. Apart from the military role and the nature of authoritarian regimes in the 
respective domestic domains, there is a striking resemblance between Indonesia and 
China as far as their relations with the US are concerned. This was particularly evident 
after the Tian Annien incident in 1989 and Dili incident in 1991. During these two 
incidents both respective annies had opened fire and killed a number of peaceful 
demonstrators. For some years, both had faced severe criticisms about their respective 
63 human rights records, especially with regard to East Timor and Tibet. This situation 
has compelled Indonesia and China to work closer on human rights issues. 
64 As far as 
Indonesia is concerned, its strategic importance vis-A-vis the US, particularly after the 
end of the Cold War, has significantly decreased. Accordingly, the latter was more 
critical towards Indonesia and collision could not be avoided, particularly human 
rights. The Indonesian Defence Minister, however, objected to a US congressional 
action connecting US arms sales to an improvement of human rights conditions in East 
Timor. 65 
Indeed, since the 1991 Dili incident, the Indonesian government has been under 
increasing international pressure on human rights issues. Indonesia had to defend itself 
from increasing criticism of political freedom and human rights records as well as its 
continuing occupation of East Timor in nearly every forum. To soften international 
criticism, Indonesia hosted an Asia-Pacific human rights workshop in January 19933, 
and set up a National Conunission of Human Rights. Indonesia also participated in 
Bangkok Asian Regional Meeting of March-April, which submitted a declaration for 
consideration by the UN-sponsored Second World Conference on Human Rights at 
Vienna in June 1993.66 Interestingly, this Declaration reflected the position of 
62 Sheldon W. Simon, "East Asian Security, the Playing Field Has Changed", Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 
12, December 1994, p. 1049. 
63 For discussion on human rights in China, see among others, Ann Kent, "China and the International 
Human Rights Regime: A Case Study of Multilateral Monitoring, 1989-1994", Human Rights Quarterl), 
17,1995; "Human Rights in China", Beijing Review, 12-18 December 1994. 
64 At the United Nations' Commission on Human Rights, Indonesia and China supported each other in 
rejecting resolution concerning the question of East Timor and Tibet. ID 0 
65 Sheldon W. Simon, "East Asian Security... ", p. 1055. 
66 Bangkok Declaration, The UN General Assembly, Doc. No. A/CONF. I 57/ASRM/8,7 April 1993. 
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Indonesia and China that favoured a strong declaration of "Asian Principles", such as 
the inclusion of articles concerning the nature of human rights. 
67 While acknowledging 
the "universality, objectivity, and non-selectivity" of human rights, the meeting stressed 
"the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural 
and religious backgrounds". Critical of what was perceived as the Western obsession 
with civil and political rights, the meeting also identified poverty as "one of the main 
obstacles hindering the full enjoyment of human rights" and asserted "the 
interdependence and indivisibility of economic, social and cultural rights". The 
meeting also stressed "the principles of respect for national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity as well as non-interference in the internal affairs of states" and expressly 
opposed "any attempt to use human rights as a conditionality for extending 
development assistance". 68 
One of the fiercest criticisms to Indonesia has come from the US. The latter's 
dissatisfaction towards Indonesia's human rights records resulted in the termination of 
the US$2.3 million military training aid, the refusal to give pennission to Jordan to sell 
surplus American-supplied F-5, and the adoption by the US Senate's Foreign relations 
Cornmittee for amendment requiring the President to determine "whether there have 
been improvements in the human rights situation in East Timor. 1,69 The US later 
widened its scope to include a tough measure on the issues of a labor movement and 
rights in Indonesia. The Clinton administration was under pressure at home from 
unions and manufacturers, who claimed that the imported cheap goods from Third 
World countries have harmed their interests. Among other issues, Indonesia was 
accused of restricting trade unions, ignoring minimum wages provisions, and 
67 China did not use ideological reason to counter the Western criticism, but rather expressing Asianess 
that was shared by Indonesia. 
6' Further discussion on Asian values and human rights, see, "Nobody Elects the Press, Mahathir Speaks 
out of media, culture and trade, Far Eastern Econotnic Review (FEER), 7 April 1994; Tran Quang Co, 0 
"Rights and Values", FEER, 4 August 1994; "Forget about ASEAN Taking up Burma's Case, The 
Nation, 22 February 1993; "In Southeast Asia, human rights should be borderless", The Nation, 24 
February 1993; "Prime moral value of human rights", The Nation, 25 March 1993; "Human Rights 
Standards in East or West are Universal", The Nation, 25 March 1993. 
69 See, Larry Nikch, Indonesian-US Relations and Impact of the East Timor (Washington DC: 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 15 December 1992), pp. 13-14. 
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employing child labor. As a result, the US threatened to withdraw the tariff privilege 
enjoyed by Indonesia under a Generalized System of Preferences (GSp). 
70 
The Chinese government similarly experienced the circumstances surrounding 
US-Indonesia . relations. 
71 Thus, the dynamics of Sino-American relations and 
Indonesian American relations have created opportunities for both Indonesia and China 
to work together. Indeed both have worked closely in upholding the notion of 
collective and individual rights which include the notion of commun-ities coming 
before individuals, duties and obligations before rights and privilege. However, this 
kind of cooperation was rather a temporary political alliance with no positive 
spillovers. It also did not come from genuine mutual domestic requirements, rather out 
of necessity due to external pressure. Therefore, the perspective of this mutual support 
is for rather a short-term period. Still, in the longer term, Indonesia prefers to deal with 
China in the framework of multilateral cooperation, particularly in the context of 
72 ASEAN. 
B. Sino-Indonesian Relations in a Multilateral Framework: Pulling China 
into a Web of Cooperation 
Constructive Multilateral Engagement el 
Given the current delicate problems among East Asian major powers and the 
complexity of their relations, it is increasingly obvious that the region needs security 
institutions of some sort with which tensions and conflict could be addressed. The 
urgency is there as the countries in the region are mostly apprehensive about the 
behavior and intentions of China, especially regarding Taiwan and the disputed islands 
70 In 1992, for instance, Indonesia's exports to the United States under the GSP amounted about US$600 
million or 14 per cent of exports to the United States. See, "Indonesia to keep US trade perks for 6 more 
months", Straits Times, 18 February 1994. 
" Despite similarities in the form authoritarian renime, China was under severe attack on the issue of 
Tibet, political freedom and labor rights. 
72* To the surprise of many observers, the incumbent President Abdurrachman Wahid expressed his 
willingness to revive Sino-Indonesian close relations. it is widely believed that this statement was 
gness to Nvin the support of 
the US. Nevertheless, Wahid also delivered in the context of his willing 
expressed his determination for Indonesia to work in the context of ASEAN. See, Suara Pembarzian, 16 
and 26 November 1999. 
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in the South China Sea. Other problems overshadowing the future of the region include 
Japan's future role, disputes in the Korean Peninsula, and uncertainty over the 
American commitment to the security of the region. Only after entering the 1990s was 
the question of multilateral security and economic cooperation more often addressed. 
Indeed, in a region where there are no declared adversaries (with the exception of the 
Korean peninsular) multilateral efforts have been on the rise as a means for promoting 
security with rather than against states. 
In regard to thýis, the idea to pursue a multilateral forum to discuss security 
problems in East Asia can be traced back to the work of ASEAN. Realizing that the 
ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting (PMC) had expanded in membership, and that 
security problems in the region are inextricably intertwined, ASEAN took the initiative 
to establish the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the first region-wide forum set up 
73 specially for discussing political and security issues. The initial members of the ARF 
consisted of seven ASEAN member countries, the United States, Japan, Australia, 
Canada, Cambodia, New Zealand, South Korea, the representative of the European 
Union, Russia, China, Laos, and Papua New Guinea. With the inclusion of India and 
Myanrnar, by 1996 the ARF members amount to twenty-one. 74 Why is multilateral 
security cooperation so important? In this regard, US Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asia and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord said that multilateral security fonims are 
necessary to manage or prevent emerging concerns, such as arms races, competing 
alignments and efforts by one power or group of powers to dominate this strategic 
region. 75 
The first ARF meeting was held in Bangkok in July 1994, followed by yearly 
meeting in different ASEAN member countrieS. 76 Although the work of this fortim 
remains to be seen, at least it can be regarded as a breakthrough in the search for 
73 Joint Communiqud of the twenty-sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 23-24 July 1993, p. I. 
74 Kompas, 12 May 1996. 
75 As quoted by Susumu Awanohara, in "Foreign Relations: Group Theory", Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 15 April 1993. 
76 The subsequent ARF meetings were held in Bangkok (1994), Brunei Darussalam (1995), Jakarta 
(1996), Subang Jaya (1997), Manila (1998), and Singapore (1999). 
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security cooperation in the region. What is important from these developments is that 
all major powers in the region have endorsed a more cooperative approach to security 
and multilateral regional security dialog. 77 This also means the significant recognition 
of the role of ASEAN in the creation of a new 'indigenous' institution to discuss the 
security problems of the region. In its first meeting, the ARF endorsed the purposes and 
principles of ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia as a code of 
conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for 
regional confidence-building, preventive diplomacy and political and security 
cooperation. 78 Despite its shortcomings, the creation of the ARF has created an 
optimistic atmosphere for the solving of regional problems by peaceful means, and 
more importantly to provide a forum in which countries directly concerned with 
developments in the region can discuss their problem. 
Discussion on security cooperation is also undertaken through a non- 
governmental Track-H level -by the creation of the Council on Security Cooperation in 
the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). It was originally proposed by the Australian Foreign 
Minister Gareth Evans in 1990. Due to the objection of many Asians, the forum was 
transformed to discuss security issues at a non-governmental level . 
79 The CSCAP is 
expected to support the work of the ARF as the former has considerable intellectual 
strength and expertise, drawn from research institutes, universities and officials acting 
in their private capacities. Although, on the positive side, the aim of the dialog is to 
provide a forum for security discussion, Sheldon W. Simon argued that both ARF and 
CSCAP have brought outsiders into Southeast Asian security discussions whose 
ultimate, though unstated, purpose is to discourage Chinese hegemony. 80 
Pauline Kerr, "The Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific", Pacific Review, Vol. 7, No. 4,1994, p. 398. 
79 ASEAN Update, Jakarta, December 1995, p. 7. 
79 See, The Security of the Asia Pacific Region, Memorandum No. I (CSCAP, Pro-Tem Committee, 
April 1994). 
go Sheldon W. Simon, "Alternative Visions of Security in the Asia Pacific, " Pacific Affairs, Vol. 69, Fall 
1996, p. 383. 
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Indeed, one of the other major achievements has been in attracting China into 
cooperation not only in the context of ARF but also in the ftamework of the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which was established by the end of 
1989.81 Indeed, China, along with Taiwan and Hong Kong, joined APEC in 1991. 
Given the diversity of political background of the participant states, it was expected 
that intra-East Asian trade and econornic dynamism would help smooth political and 
security developments. What is important in the APEC forum is the willingness of 
member countries to put aside political differences and to embark on economic dialog 
and cooperation. This has been truly the case, especially when one looks at the 
membership of China and Taiwan. However, significant problems remain if the trade 
issue goes beyond the economic domain and begins entering the political and security 
fields. Despite hosting an APEC meeting in 1994, Indonesia also played a crucial role 
in determining the direction of the APEC, particularly over the Prime Minister of 
Malaysia's initiative to create the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG), which later 
turned into a caucus; 82 Indonesia was also supportive of the membership of China in 
the forum, which was none other than part of the effort to attract China into 
cooperation. 
However, whether China is going to be a superpower pursuing a status-quo or 
revolutionary power in the future, it all also depends on how ASEAN conducts its 
relations with China and brings China into greater involvement in this region. 83 
Constructive engagement with China is the region's only viable alternative for there is 
no intention of taking on China militarily. In this regard, the predominant sentiment 
throughout the region is accommodation. Meaning that instead of arguing about 
China's military build-up, the ASEAN countries try to accommodate the inevitable rise 
of China as a regional superpower. Yoichi Funabashi argued that there is no serious 
81 See, Gary Klinworth, "China and APEC, " International Journal, Summer 1995, p. 493; Fred Bergsten, 
"APEC and World Trade, " Fbreign, 4ffairs, May/June 1994, p. 2 1. 
82 Under Mahathir's proposal, Japan should lead East Asia. The consequence of this initiative means the 
exclusion of the US from the involvement in the region that may threaten the US-Japanese security 
arrangement. 
83 S. R. Nathan, Kompas. 22 October 1997 
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support for any stronger response than trying to get the Chinese "incorporated into a 
multilateral security framework. "84 
For its part, China had no difficulty in working with ASEAN for an obvious 
reason that it has been working as an Asian organization. Thus ASEAN had a much 
better chance of getting China to the multilateral table than any Western-inspired 
institution. " It is not surprising therefore that the improvement of the relationship 
between China and ASEAN developed quickly. When attending the opening session of 
the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991 Chinese Foreign 
Minister Qian Qichen, expressed China's interest in strengthening cooperation with 
ASEAN for mutual benefit. ASEAN responded positively and began preparing the way 
for a formal ASEAN-China relationship. 86 Eventually, ASEAN and China formalized 
the establishment of two joint committees 87 and agreed to engage in consultations on 
political and security issues of conu-non concern in July 1994. Two years later, China 
was accorded full Dialog Partner status in ASEAN that means that both will conduct an 
98 
annual meeting to discuss political, security, economic and development cooperation. 
At the beginning of 1996, China took the initiative in creating better relations 
with Southeast Asian countries by submitting a draft to the ASEAN for a joint 
consideration of a code of conduct to be applied to relations between ASEAN and 
China. The draft makes reference to the principle of international relations held in high 
esteem by both sides, such as non-intervention in respective internal affairs. This 
94 Yoichi Funabashi, "The Asianisation of Asia, " Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5 (November[December 
1993), p. 84. 
85 Shaun Narine, "ASEAN and the ARF: The Limits of 'ASEAN Way', " Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 10, 
October 1997. 
96 Press Statement: Meeting to Explore the Establishment of the Consultative Relationship with the D 
People's Republic of China, Beijing, China, 13-14 September 1993, ASEAN Documents Series 1992- 
1994, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 1994, p. 89. 
97 They are The Joint Committee on Economic and Trade Cooperation and the Joint Committee on 
Scientific and Technological Cooperation. 
China has participated in a series of consultative meetings with ASEAN which includes the ASEAN 
Regional Forum, the Post Ministerial meeting conference, the Joint Cooperation Committee Meeting and 
the ASEAN-China Senior Officlam Meeting Consultations and the ASEAN-China Business Council 
Meeting. To date, three ASEAN-China SOM Consultations have been held in Hangzhou, China (April 
1995), Bukittinggi, Indonesia (June 1996), and Huangshan, China (April 1997). 
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proposal was received with a cautious response among ASEAN member states. This 
was in part because the proposed declaration language was rather vague and the 
principles are already contained in the United Nations Charter and the ASEAN's 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). ASEAN states prefer to see an explicit 
assurance by China, such as it will not occupy more of the islands, to which it lays 
claim in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, China continues its participation towards 
the establishment of confidence building measures. 
Towards the Establishment of Confidence Building Measures 
The modernization of China's defence forces could instill or reinforce the 
lingering fear of Beijing. China has used force in dealing with Southeast Asia, notably 
in the case of Vietnam, and recent developments in the South China Sea have 
particularly worried the ASEAN region. 89 There is also uncertainty over the future 
attitude of China, as they are still in the process of transformation, including in the 
political fields, especially regeneration changes, economic progress as well as military 
and defense development. Although China has made known to ASEAN states that it is 
determined to pursue peaceful resolution of the overlapping claims and that it would 
like to shelve the sovereignty issue for the time being and join others in developing the 
Spratlys, its action in practice has not been helpful in projecting a benign intention. 
Indeed, there have been discrepancies between China's words and actions. A senior 
Indonesian official believed that China is adopting a policy of "talk and grab" which 
means continuing talking and at the same time having no hesitation in using force 
whenever it is deemed necessary. 90 The situation seems to confirm China's alleged 
attitude - as contained in a book called Can China's Armed Forces Win the Next War? 
- of adopting the policy of bluffing, blustering, and deception as important weapons in 
China's diplomatic and military arsenals. 91 In this regard, Eric Hyer argued that the 
89 Lee Lai To, "ASEAN-PRC Political and Security Cooperation, Problems, Proposals and Prospects, " 
Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 11, November 1993. 
90 Interview with one of Indonesian high-ranking official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 November 
1998. 
91 On 16 November 1993, The New York Times ran a brief article about the book and how it was 
discovered in a Beijing bookshop. See, Ross H. Munro, "Eavesdropping on the Chinese Military: Where 
It Expects War - Where It Doesn't, " Orbis, 1993. 
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military buildup in the South China Sea does not necessarily indicate that Beijing will 
use force to occupy more islands, but rather that Beijing seeks to enhance its military 
presence to augment its bargaining leverage in future negotiations. 92 
Nevertheless, regional cooperation began showing results following an 
encouragement from ARF for its member to be more transparent in its military 
activities by submitting statements of their defense policy. 93 In this regard, for the first 
time in its history, Indonesia released its first Defence Vaiite Paper in October 1995 . 
94 
Indonesia's previous adventurist behaviour during the Sukarno era could easily revive 
concerns about Indonesia as a threat to its smaller neighbours. In this regard, the paper 
seems to refute the concept of Indonesia as a threat, and it is considered as a unilateral 
assurance from the part of Indonesia not to be seen as seeking regional hegemony. 
Indeed, the paper is an important statement from Indonesia to its regional neighbours 
aimed not only at generating a greater understanding of Indonesia's defence and 
security priorities bul reflecting its desire for transparency and openness in defence and 
security matters. By launching the paper, Indonesia also wants to be seen as building 
and promoting confidence and trust as a responsible member of the international 
community. 
In an effort to show its transparency, to develop confidence, and to neutralize 
the assumption of a threat to its neighbours, China also published a white book entitled 
"China: Arms Control and Disarmament" on 16 November 1995.95 It consists of six 
parts: (i) promoting peace and development for all mankind; (ii) military personnel 
reduced by one million; (iii) maintaining above level of defence spending; (iv) peaceful 
uses for military industrial making use of military industrial technology for peaceful 
92 Eric Hyer, "The South China Sea Disputes: Implications of China's Earlier Territorial Settlements, " 
Pacific Affairs, vol. 68, Spring 1995, p. 34. 
93 Chairman's Statement at the Second ASEAN Regional Forum, Brunei Darussalam, I August 1995, 
http: //www. aseansec. org. 
9' The Policy ofthe State Defense andSecurity ofthe Republic ofIndonesia (Jakarta: Ministry of Defense 
and Security, Republic of Indonesia, 1955). 
95 "China: Arms Control and Disarmament", The Information Office of the State Council of the People's 
Republic of China, quoted from Xinhua agency in BBC Summary of World Broadcast, Part 3, Asia 
Pacific, FE/2943,17 November 1995. 
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purpose; (v) tight monitoring of the transfer of sensitive military stuff; and (vi) 
increasing the supervision of international armaments. This white book was essentially 
a restatement of China's argument that China was a threat to no one. Its military budget 
was minimal, its forces were being reduced, and it had behaved responsibly in 
transferring military hardware to other countries, and it was actively involved in the 
promotion of arms control and disarmament. It also emphasizes that China needs a 
peaceful environment to further implement its modernization program. China considers 
that peace is not comprehensively achieved as long as there still exist arms conflict and 
local war, regional tension, and political hegemony. Peace can only be created provided 
that all nations work together, devote themselves to peace and development, continue 
monitoring and supervising disarmament, and as regulated by the international political 
and economics which should be based upon five principles of peaceful co-existence or 
any other regulations recognized in international relations. The white book further 
stated that China is also determined to participate in the monitoring of arms and 
disarmament, to co-operate with all peaceful nations in order to realize peace, stability, 
and the welfare of human beings entering the 21 st century. 
Overall, this white book can be seen as a political statement and there is 
nothing new in it, especially when it comes to the question of Taiwan and the South 
China Sea. In fact, China continues to maintain and develop its air defense and sea 
power as well as complete its nuclear capabilities. Interestingly, the Chinese defense 
budget in 1994 amounted at US$ 6,626 billions, thus between 1979 to 1994 there has 
been an increase of 6,2 % per year. For this reason, several western countries assume 
that if China achieves economic progress and becomes strong, she would become a 
threat to other countries. As China's military expenditure continues to increase this 
assumption seems to be justified. However, China refuted that view and argued that 
although China succeeds in developing her economy and is able to increase the welfare 
of its people, China is still at a low level due to its massive population. 
The increased defence budget does not necessarily mean an automatic 
expansion of armaments as funds are mainly used to increase the welfare of the 
personnel. However, one-third of the budget was allocated to research activities, arms 
experiments, arms buying and transportation. China is still in the process of 
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moderilizing its military staff and personnel, and bearing in mind the presence of 
limitation, the budget disparity might be taken from the gains received by the 
companies or military industry that had been converted to civil industry. As China is 
allegedly helping Pakistan in developing a nuclear reactor and selling a military arsenal 
to Iran, this is certainly against China's own statement about the sensitive transfer of 
military technology as stated in the white book. Nevertheless, there are certainly some 
positive aspects from the publication of the white book. At least, most countries take 
note of the readiness of China to explain its military capabilities and the transparency 
of her defence policy and the monitoring of an-naments. This -vould be very useful in 
developing confidence building measures, particularly those of Southeast Asian 
countries, as most of them still consider China as a threat. 
In 1997, Indonesia published its second white paper, assessing the changing 
strategic environment in the'*East Asian region and updating the earlier version issued 
in 1995.96 The white paper considered the triangular relationship between China, Japan 
and the United States as the key to regional stability. It also endorses the new 
Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation. This view means that as long as US- 
Japan alliance remains in place, and Japan is being denied from developing nuclear 
weapons or carrying a significant power projection capability, the emergence of a threat 
from Japan is most unlikely. On the contrary, Indonesia continues to regard China as 
the main potential threat to the region and its own security and sovereignty. One other 
thing that should be underlined is that the white paper foresees more room for ASEAN 
to play the role of a major power in the new regional environment. Although up to 
1997 China has not accepted the ARF's proposal for preventive diplomacy, including 
the peaceM dispute settlement, at least they have partially fulfilled the requirements of 
the ARF concept. This surely indicates China's willingness to integrate or allow itself 
to be integrated into the process of dialog and cooperation. 
96 "Dephankam Terbitkan Buku Putih 1997, " [The Ministry of Defence Publish a 1997 White Book], 
Kompas, 23 July 1997. 
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C. Interpreting China's Behavior in the South China Sea Disputes 
China at the Centre of the Disputes 
The South China Sea is a "semi-enclosed sea" as it is referred to in the new 
97 
regime of the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC 1982). It is bordered by ASEAN 
member states (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Kampuchea 
and Vietnam), China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Motivated by their security and 
economic interests, the coastal states have made frequent claims and counter-claims 
over the sovereignty of the South China Sea Islands since the late 1960s and early 
1970s. These claims continued after the Vietnam War and persisted throughout the 
1980s. 98 After the settlement of the Cambodian problem, these overlapping claims 
culminated in today's military partition of the Spratly Islands archipelago. 
99 Six nations 
have laid claims to the numerous islets in the Spratlys area of the South China Sea, 
while China and Týiwan claim the entire South China Sea. 
100 The Philippines has 
occupied some eight islets in an area, which a Filipino explorer has christened "ne 
Kalayan Group". 101 Vietnam occupies twenty islets. 102 Malaysia claims certain islets in 
the Spratlys some of which overlap with those claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines. 
97 Article 122 of the LOSC defines enclosed or semi-enclosed seas as: (i) a "gulf, basin, or sea 
surrounded by two or more states and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet"; or (ii) 
"consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more 
coastal states". 
9' For a detailed review of early history of the dispute see Dieter Henzig, Disputed Islands in the South 
China Sea: Paracels, Spratlys, Pralas, Macclesfield Bank (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1976); Marwyn S. 
Samuels, Contests for the South China Sea (New York: Methuen, 1982); Chi-kin Lo, China's Policy 
Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case ofthe South China Sea Islands (London: Routledge, 1989). 
99 Zhiguo Gao, "The South China Sea: From Conflict to Cooperation? " Ocean Development and 
International Law, Vol. 25,1994, p. 345. 
S 100 The discussion on the difference between China's and Taiwan's claim, see, Chen Hurn-yu, "A 
Comparison Between Taipei and Peking in Their Policies and Concepts Regarding the South China Sea", 
Issues and Studies, Vol. 29, No. 9, September 1993. 
101 The discussion on the Philippines' claim, See: J. N. Mak, The, Lmv of the Sea Afier UNCLOSfor the 
South China Sea Disputes (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysia Institute of Maritime Affairs, 1993); Dieter Heinzig, 
Disputed Islands in the South China Sea (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz, 1976). 
102 For the discussion on Vietnamese claim, See; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic Socialist of 
Vietnam, White Book on Vietnam's Sovereignty over the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes 
(Hanoi; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RSV, 1979). 
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While not occupying any of the islets, Brunei Darussalam claims Louiýa Reef as part of 
its continental shelf and economic exclusive zone. 103 It is not surprising therefore that 
American expert on the South China Sea, Mark Valencia, called this area "Troubled 
Waters". 1 04 
From a geopolitical point of view, the South China Sea is strategic because of 
its economic, political and military value in the future. 105 This region is also part of an 
important sea-lane for everyone in East Asia, let alone the major powers such as the US 
and China, and more importantly for Japan since its oil supply from the middle-east 
passes through this sea. 106 Although the South China Sea consists of small islands and 
atolls that number around 190, their gas and mineral content have lured countries that 
require massive energy, particularly China. This is the result of the situation where 
industrialization in the region has been actively pursued. The South China Sea is 
NNidely believed to be rich in oil and natural gas sources, although it remains unclear 
how large the quantity of its reserves. In the Spratlys, the estimation ranges from I- 
17.7 billion tons, thus it underlines that oil and gas reserves is a major factor underlying 
claims in the region. 107 
Historically, in the 1970s, several coastal states began asserting their claim 
more in their actions and not only through the publication of statements. They included, 4ý 
among others, the display of a national flag, physical occupation and the installation of Z 
military garrisons, the establishment of scientific stations, the declaration of laws, the 
integration of the islands with the nearest province, the publication of new maps related 
103 The discussion on the Malaysian and Brunei's claims, See: Bilver Singh, "Resolving Questions of 
Overlapping Sovereignty: The South China Sea Dispute", A paper presented at the meeting of ASEAN 
Into the 21" Century, Dealing with Unresolved Issues, Manila, 14-25 January 1994. 
104 Mark J. Valencia, "Troubled Waters: Oil is only one reason for Asia's many-sided disputes over tiny, 
uninhabitable islands", The Bulletin ofthe Atoinic Scienfists, January/February 1997. 
105 South China Sea is today is the most productive offshore areas in the world. Since 1950,29 oil fields 
and 4, gas fields have been developed in the South China Sea. See, "Territorial Disputes Simmer in Areas 
of South China Sea", Oil& Gas Journal, 13 July 1992, p. 2 1. 
106 For the discussion on Japan and the South China Sea, see, Lam Peng Er, "Japan and the Spratlys 0 
Dispute: Aspirations and Limitations", Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 10, October 1996. 
10' "Creeping Irredentism in the Spratlys Islands, " Strategic Comments, no. 3,22 March 1995. 0 
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to their respective claims, and the grant of concessions to foreign oil exploration 
companies, and the stationing of military forces. 108 Why did the claimant states 
suddenly come into a rush? There are several factors that have encouraged their 
actions. First, it is related to the world situation in which the oil crisis took place in 
1973. This situation has increased the awareness of the claimant states of the potential 
oil content of the coastal sea or seabed in the Spratlys Islands. Second, the convening 
of the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1973, which discussed the demands 
from the developing countries for the extension of the rights of coastal states, made C. 
them realize their rights over the wealth of territorial waters adjacent the coast. It is at 
this stage that the Conference discussed the idea of an Economic Exclusive Zone 
(EEZ). However, by the mid 1970s, the scramble for the Spratlys Islands slowed down 
due to developments in regional politics, mainly due to the fact that Vietnam was 
preoccupied with its unification and the outbreak of the Cambodian conflict. 
In the 1980s the disputes developed into small military conflicts involving 
China, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. 109 The claimant states appeared to 
increase their military activities and capabilities projected to anticipate the break out of 
conflict in the area as military clashes continued to take place in the 1990s. 110 Some 
observers even predicted the dispute in the South China Sea as one of the reasons for 
the coming of arms races in East Asia. "' Although the anxiety seemed to be 
exaggerated, the main point has been the emergence of a growing concern over China 
as it showed its determination to assert its claim by using military force if necessary, 
while maintaining that Beijing's sovereignty over Spratly Islands was indisputable. 112 
108 Mark J. Valencia, "China and the South China Sea Disputes", Adelphi Papers 298 (October 1995), 
P. 8. 
109 See, Chang Pao Min, "A New Scramble for the South China Sea Islands", Contemporary Southeast 
Asia 12, No. I (June 1990), p. 24-25; Strait Times, 29 June 1988. 
110 See, Bisnis Indonesia, 16 August 1994; Kompas, 14 May 1993; and Mark J. Valencia, "China and the 0 South China Sea", Asian Wall Street Journal, 10-11 March 1995. 
111 See, Michael Klare in "The Next Great Arms Race", Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, Summer 1993 
and and "East Asia's Arms Races" and East Asia's Militaries Muscle Up", The Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, January, 1997; J. N. Mak, The ASEAN naval build-up: implications for the regional order", 
Pacific Review, Vol. 8, No. 2,1995. 
112 For discussion on China's military development, see, among others, Michael Leifer, "Chinese 
Economic Reform and Security Policy: The South China Sea Connection", Survival, vol. 37, no. 2,1995; 
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Indeed, Beijing regards the South China Sea and Spratlys Islands as part of its 
territorial sovereignty. 113 Interestingly, China is the onlY country that has an 
overlapping claim in the South China Sea. Thus China is at the center of the dispute 
and its attitude and policy inevitably affect other claimant states. Indeed, to protect its 
claims, in 1992 China published The Law of the People's Republic of China on Its 
Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zone (Zhong-hua Renmin Gungheguo Linghai Ji 
Bidaqu Fa) in which Article 2 of the Law states that, 
... The land territory of the People's Republic of 
China includes the 
mainland of the People's Republic of China and its coastal islands; 
Taiwan and all islands appertaining thereto including the Diaoyu Islands; 
the Penghu Islands; the Dongsha Islands; the Xisha Islands; the 
Zhongsha Islands and the Nansha Islands; as well as other islands 
belonging to the People's Republic of China. 114 
While China has established its claim on historical grounds, there are 
- hypotheses that explain the motives of China's behavior at different times on the issue 
of the South China Sea ranging from the increasing role of the PLA after the 
Tiananmen incident, the need for oil, and fears of disintegration. ' 15 Nevertheless, 
Herbert Yee argued that it would be a mistake to assume that the Chinese are only 
interested in the oil and other natural resources in the area. 116 He further underlined that 
despite the tremendous increase in demand for oil and the projected decline in oil 
Arthur S. Ding, "The PRC's Military Modernization and a Security Mechanism for the Asia-Pacific", 
Issues and Studies, vol. 3 1, no. 8, August 1995. 
113 There are significant interests among scholar on the question of the South China Sea and China. For 
discussion on China's claim, see, among others: Eric Hyes, "The South China Sea Disputes: Implications 
of China's Earlier Territorial Settlements, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 68, Spring 1995; Shen- Lijun, China's 
Policy towards the Spratly Islands, Working Paper No. 287 (Canberra: Strategic Defence Studies Centre, 
the Australian National University, 1995); John W. Garver, "China's Push Through the South China Sea: 
The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests, China Quarterly, no. 132, December 1992. 
114 Law ofthe People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, translated by 
the Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the 
People's Republic of China. See, United Nations Technical Information Service, Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service: Volume L China (FBIS-CHI), 28 February 1992, pp. 2-3. 
115 See, Mark J. Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes, especially Chapter 1; John W. 
Garver, "China's Push Through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and national 
Interests", China Quarterly, No. 132, December 1992. 
116 Herbert S. Yee, "Beijing's Policies Toward Southeast Asia and the Spratly Islands in the Post-Cold 
War Era, "Issues & Studies, vol. 3 1, no. 7, July 1995. 
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production in China in the near future, Beijing has more important long-term strategic 
interests in the region - that is, it wants to turn the South China Sea into a "Chinese 
lake. " 
Indonesia and the South China Sea: Facilitating Dialog Process 
There have been proposals for the settlement of the conflict over the dispute of 
sovereignty over the South China Sea and its islands which include joint administration 
on a trusteeship basis, ' 17 a condominium system, ' 18 the Antarctic Treaty model, ' 19 and 
joint development. 120 Cooperation would bring about various advantages. 
Economically, the claimant states should be able to benefit from joint cooperation and 
exploration. Politically, the effort to cooperate would certainly create a conducive 
environment to eliminate mutual suspicion among the countries in the region, which 
eventually would help facilitate the creation of peace, security and order in the whole 
region. However, cooperation would not come by itself unless the conflicting parties 
agreed to meet and address the issue. Indeed, the regional political situation prior to 
1990s prevented such an initiative, as the countries in the region were engaged and 
involved in a more visible conflict in the context of the Cold War. 
In the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident in 1989, China adopted a friendlier 
attitude by proposing a joint development of the disputed area as expressed by the 
Chinese Premier Li Peng during his Southeast Asian tour in August 1990.1 21 
Encouraged by the normalization of diplomatic relations Nvith China, Indonesia took 
the initiative to host the first Informal Workshop on the South China Sea in 1990. 
117 See, D. C. Driggot, "Oil Interests and the law of the Sea: The Case of the Philippines, " Ocean 
Development and International Law 12 (1982), p. 50. 
118 J. R. Coquia, "Maritime Boundary Problems in the South China Sea", University of British Columbia 
Law Review 24 (1990), p. 124. 
119 A. Harnzah, "Jurisdictional Issues and the Conflicting Claims in the Spratlys, " Indonesian Quarterly, 
Vol. 18, No. 2, Second Quarter, 1990, pp. 149-152. 
120 This idea has been proposed by a number of scholars. For example, see M. J. Valencia and M. 
Miyoshi, "Southeast Asian Seas: Joint Development of Hydrocarbons in Overlapping Claim Areas? " 
Ocean Development and International Development 16 (1986), p. 211. 
12 1 Bangkok Post, 14 AugUst 1990 0 
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Indeed, Indonesia, supported by Canada, ' 22 has taken a leading role in paving the way 
for informal meeting among the officials of the claimant states to explore the 
possibilities of promoting cooperation in the South China Sea. Although Indonesia had 
no claim over the islands, it was obviously concerned with the development in the 
South China Sea as Indonesia regards the South China Sea in terms of its strategic 
value and importance, as clearly expressed by the Indonesian foreign minister, 
The strategic importance of the South China Sea is, of course, beyond 
question. As a semi-enclosed sea linking the Indian and Pacific Ocean 
and located between continental Asia and insular Southeast Asia, it 
encompasses important sea lanes of communications, and indeed, the 
Straits of Malacca and Singapore at its Southern entrance rank among 
the busiest straits in the world. 
[therefore] one can hardly avoid the first impression that the South 
China Sea, after Cambodia may well become the next, acute source of 
conflict in the region. 123 
Indonesia also perceives that a war in the region might jeoperdize Indonesian 
shipping lanes. The implication would be in the form of disruption of its external trade 
and economic relations with Asian major trading partners. The South China Sea has 
indeed furictioned as the heart of Southeast Asian trade activities that connect the 
Indian and Pacitic Oceans. It is in this heart that lies the strategic and important 
shipping lanes. One of the main lanes is the route that connects the Malacca Strait lane 
through Singapore and Hong Kong northwards to South Korea and Japan to the west 
coast of the US. It is not surprising since most of Indonesia's trade activities go through 
the South China Sea. For instance, Indonesia's exports to Japan in 1993 and 1994 
contributed 25 per cent of the total value of exports. In the same period, Indonesian 
imports from Japan came to 24.20 per cent of the total imports. 124 Equally important, 
Suharto's support for Indonesia to broker a successful resolution to the disputes would 
enhance his reputation as a regional, and potentially, global leader. 125 
122 The support from Canada is given by the Ocean Institute of CanadalSouth China Sea Informal 
Working Group. 
123 Speech by Foreign Minister Ali Alatas when officiating the Workshop on the South China Sea in Bali, 
22 January 1990, The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. XV111, No. 2 (Second Quarter), 1990, pp. 114-115. 
124 Indonesian Bureau ofStalistics, 1995. 
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Given its concerns and the fact that Indonesia itself was neutral and had no part 
in the disputes, in the end, its initiative in the convening of dialog was received with no. 
suspicions among the claimant states. By the end of 1989, the ASEAN member 
countries welcomed Indonesia's initiative as they agreed that the nature of the forum 
should be informal, involving academics, mass media and government officials in a 
private capacity. It was hoped that the meeting should be policy oriented without 
binding their respective governments. The forum, as later agreed, took shape in the 
form of a workshop with the title The Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in 
the South China Sea. The Workshop eventually began its work in 1990 and held a 
yearly meeting in different cities of Indonesia. 126 Although the participation of 
government officials was in a private capacity, the workshop at least enabled the 
claimant countries to discuss and explore potential cooperation and provided a forum 
to address the issues. Indeed, the Workshop was not intended to resolve the dispute, 
rather to reduce the- level of potential conflict and to identify and pursue potential 
cooperation. 
Despite showing a cooperative attitude towards regional cooperation, the 
development of China's military capabilities and determination to use force in asserting 
its claim, alarmed the Southeast Asian countries. Indonesia was more concerned when 
there was an indication that the dispute escalated in 1992. For example, the Indonesian 
foreign minister Alatas pointed out that the controversial conflict in the South China 
Sea had been causing growing concern among the Southeast Asian countries. 127 
Indonesia once again underlined its position as a neutral and honest broker not only for 
the benefit of Indonesia, but also for the countries in the region. Indeed, Indonesia 
always maintained its neutral position in the conflict, as Alatas pointed out, "Indonesia 
does not want to make ajudgement about who is right and who is, %&Tong with regard to 
the disputes". 128 
125 Mark J. Valencia, China and the South China Sea Dispute, p. 4 1. 
126 The Workshop has been held in Bali (1991), Yogyakarta (1992), Surabaya (1993), Bukittinggi (1994), 
Bal ikpapan (1995), Jakarta (1998). 
127 Kompas, 30 June 1992. 
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However, one of the stumbling blocks in thds process has been China's 
persistent refusal of the suggestion to upgrade the meeting to an official level. 129 China 
also rejects a formal commitment to talks and setting up of a support secretariat. 130 
Instead, China preferred to pursue a joint development, in which the solution to the 
dispute would be sought bilaterally with other claimant countries. China's position has 
kept it from being put under pressure while at the same time enabling it to maintain 
leverage. Up to the 6th Workshop in October 1995, there was no final agreement 
concerning the three main discussion points, namely non-execution of military 
manoeuvres in the South China Sea, the establishment and development of social 
contacts between military commanders, and the confirmation of the commitment to 
non-aggression. In the regional context, ASEAN produced two formal declarations on 
the issue of the South China Sea, which generally urged the claimant states to refrain 
from using force and to undertake cooperative activities. ' 31 ASEAN's effort was seen 
by China as an attempt to intemationalise the issues and sabotage Chinese effort to 
limit the issues to bilateral discussions. 132 
t 
Why does China continue its participation in the workshop organized by 
Indonesia? First, it is because of the nature of the workshop that it has been kept 
informal. Although government officials are present at the meetings, their participation 
is in a private capacity and does not necessarily reflect the respective government's 
position. Thus China is not bound by the result of the meetings. Second, Beijing wants 
to keep its good relations with ASEAN member countries. Should Beijing cease its 
participation in the dialog or take a fin-ner stand on the sovereignty dispute, ASEAN 
'will most likely invite external powers to counter China. Accordingly, ASEAN would 
be exploited by the US as part of a containment policy by using the South China Sea 
islands as a rallying point. At present, Beijing can apply its policy of continuing dialog 
128 Pelita, 30 June 1992. 
129 Jakarta Post, 22 July 1992. 
130 Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes, p. 52. 
13 1 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, Manila, Philippines, 22 July 1992; and Statement by the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Recent Development in the South China Sea, 18 March 1995. 
132 Sheng Lijun, "Beijing and the Spratlys", Issues & Studies, Vol. 3 1, No. 7, July 1995. p. 28. 
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while at the same time using a limited military deterrence, while the US seems to be 
reluctant to be drawn into a direct conflict with China on this issue. 
The Impact of the Disputes for Indonesia: The Issue Surrounding China's Claim 
of the Territorial Water of the Natuna Islands 
At the official governmental level, Beijing did not show any mistrust of 
Indonesia's role in the South Chýina Sea disputes. However, as early as 1989, one 
Chinese scholar stated that instead of being a total outsider, Indonesia has itself 
"annexed" 50,000 square kilometers of what is traditionally China's territory in the 
Spratlys, under an agreement with Malaysia signed in 1989 which di"ided the 
continental shelf between the two countries. 133 Apparently, none of Indonesia's 
officials were unaware of this opinion. The most probable explanation was that the 
Indonesian officials were preoccupied With the issue of normalization. Therefore, 
despite having no claim over the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the Spratly Islands, the 
South China Sea problem **has spilled over to Indonesia. Only in 1993) was the 
Indonesian government aware of not being a neutral part in the dispute, particularly as 
far as China is concerned. It happened after the Chinese delegation to the Workshop in 
Surabaya produced a map showing their southern country's claim. China's claim 
clearly incorporates Indonesia's rich Natuna gas field in the South China Sea. 134 
The Natuna Islands is located 150 miles north west of Borneo, forming the only 
Indonesian territory ever approaching the Chinese claimed Nansha (Spratly) Islands 
(See Feature 6.1). Indeed, the claim appears to encompass Indonesia's Natuna gas 
reserves areas that have been leased to American companies, with which Indonesia has 
signed a $35 billion agreement with the Exxon Corporation to develop some of these 
resources. 135 Since the Natuna territorial water is rich in gas deposits and has been 
under Indonesia's jurisdiction, the mood in Jakarta was decidedly unhappy. 136 
133 Ding Chuanying, "Our Country's Treasure Islands: The Spratly Islands, " Guoji ziliao xin-ci 
(International Infonnation), Beijing, 1988, No. 1: 27, quoted by Sheng Lijun, "Beijing and the Spratlys", 
p. 27 
134 John McBcth, "Oil-Rich Dict", Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 April 1995, p. 28. 
135 Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 February 1995. 
13' According to the United States Energy Information Administration, Indonesia's D-alpha field is the 
253 
Feature 6.1: Competing Claims in the South China Sea =1 
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Source: The United States Energy Information Energy, August 1998, 
httl2: //www. eia. doe. Eiov/enieti/cabs/schina. htnil. 
Jakarta immediately sought China's clarification by sending a diplomatic note 
to Beijing and appeared not to raise tensions with China. It was not until 10 April 1995 
that the Indonesian government acknoNvIedged the existence of that note. 137 Indonesian 
largest in Southeast Asia that contains an estimated 46 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) recoverable reserve. See, zP 
http*'/www. eia. doe. a. ov/, January 1999. 
137 Douglas Johnson, "Drawn into the Fray: Indonesia's Natuna Islands Meets China's Long Gaze 
South, " Asian Affairs: An American Review, 22 September 1997. 
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foreign ministry spokesman, Irawan Abidin, said of his government's long-held silence 
on its diplomatic note to China, "We didn't want to make a big fuss out of it. " Indeed, 
Indonesia appeared to avoid treating China's claim with a fon-nal response, thus 
granting China a certain level of legitimacy. In this context, Foreign Minister Alatas 
warned that repetition of an untruth would ultimately make it appear as truth. 138 He 
also asserted that the Chinese map could not be taken seriously because it gave no co- 
ordinates or other explanatory marks. He was quoted as saying, "They cannot make a. 
real map just by indicating certain points. It is therefore considered an illustrative map 
and not a real one. " 139 
Nevertheless, Indonesia was concerned about China's claim. In July 1995 
Alatas paid a visit to Beijing to seek fiulher clarification. On his return from a three- 
day visit to China he announced that his Chinese counterpart Qian Qichen stated 
clearly that the Natuna Islands belong to Indonesia and the Chinese government has 
never claimed the islands. 140 It was an empty-handed visit, as China did not make 
reference to the issue of the territorial water of the Natuna Islands. Indeed, on 15 May 
1996, China proclaimed the delimitation of the Chinese baseline border in South China 
Sea, which is claimed in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, especially on the principle of an archipelagic state straight baseline. 141 
It was officially presented to the Indonesian government through Chinese Embassy 
Note no. 0133-96 of 21 May 1996 which informs Indonesia of the Chinese laws 
regarding the delimitation of a baseline measuring territorial sea along the Chinese 
continent and Paracel Islands in South China Sea. 142 However China has still not 
138 "Jakarta Pushes Beijing on Sea Claims", Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 April 1995. 
139 Straits Times, 4 June 1995. 
140 Antara, 21 July 1995. 
14 1 The meeting the National People's Congress on 7-15 Ma 1996 decided to accept the United Nations C, 0y 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982. As a result, China's jurisdictional territory has been 
enlarged from 370,000 kM2 to 3 millions kM2 . At the same time, China also announced the drawing of 
China Sea base line as part of Chinese continent and Paracel Island territorial sea. It prompted a strong 
reaction from the Phillipines and Vietnam as both considered it as disturbing the stability in the region 
and as a step backward towards cooperation in the region. See, Kompas, 26 July 1996. C, 
"2 Kompas, 23) July 1996. 
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declared whether it lays claim to the gas and oil fields just fewer than 225 kilometres 
off the Natuna Islands, to which Indonesia lays claim. 
This declaration deepened the Indonesian government's apprehension. One 
week later it sought clarification by presenting an aide-memoir to China, particularly 
on the establishment of a baseline to measure the territorial sea along the Chinese 
continent and Paracel Islands. Despite concern over China's delimitation of the 
territorial sea around the Natuna Island, Indonesia also considers the drawing of the 
baseline is contrary to the 1982 Law of the Sea as the Paracel Islands are not covered in 
the definition of archipelago, and China could not be classified as an archipelago 
state. 143 Indonesia's aide-memoir was obviously to anticipate the overlapping claim of 
the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as it is not known yet which one is the Chinese 
EEZ. 144 Indonesia also considers that one baseline which is drawn in the points along 
with coastal area and a point along Hainan Island as far too long. This is considered as 
taking too large a portion from high sea as against Article 89 of the UNCLOS (United 
Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea), which regulates the invalidity of 
sovereignty claim over high seas. China should not draw the baseline straight and join 
it with the outpost points of the Paracel Islands. While referring to China as a 
continental power, Indonesia argued that China could not draw baselines around the 
Spratlys islands according to the concept of archipelago state, thus China could not 
claim the South China Sea as its own territory. 145 
Indeed, Indonesia found China's historical claim unsatisfactory. The Indonesian 
foreign ministry's maritime-law expert, Ambassador Hashim Djalal, for instance, was 
quoted as saying, "They tell us this is the national heritage of China and tha t is all clear. 
They don't argue, they just go on talking about dynasties. We have a great difficulty 
analyzing what they're claiming. 046 Despite Indonesia's repeated demand for 
143 Kompas, 22 September 1997. 
144 Former Director General of Political Affairs, Izhar Ibrahim, Kompas, 22 September 1997. 
14' Leszek Buszyunski, "Trends, Development, and Challenges in South East Asia", Southeast Asian 
Affairs 1996 (Singapore: ISEAS, 1996), p. 14. 
146 See, John Mcbeth, "Oil-Rich Diet, " Far Eastern Economic Review, Ibid. 
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clarification, China opted not to answer Indonesia's question, while stating that China 
would seek opinions from various experts. 147 The Chinese officials only promised to 
announce their view after considering various complicated processes in the region. The 
issue is still being discussed between the two government officials through quiet 
diplomacy but no formula emerged from settling the issue, as China's position remains 
unclear. Although Indonesia considers China to have shown a positive attitude in the 
dialog process, 148 as long as the latter's claim does not disappear from the map or a 
delineation of Chinese claim is presented clearly, suspicion will prevail in Indonesia. 
China's ratification of the Law of the Sea in 1997 was considered to indicate China's 
willingness to abide by the rules of the game. However, it is rather too early to predict 
that it may pave the way for the settlement of the issue, simply because international 
law has serious limitations in providing solutions to the problems of territorial claims 
in the South China Sea. 149 
Indeed, China's claim concerns Indonesia's leaders. Unlike the reaction from 
the ministry of foreign afthirs, the Indonesian military officials took a harder line. Air 
Force Chief of Staff Marshal Rilo Pambudi said air patrols over the islands and 
surrounding waters "will continuously be increased. 150 According to Gallagher 
recalling Indonesia's disastrous relations with China in the 1960s, the generals in 
Jakarta probably feel that they have every reason to be wary of China's intrusion into 
the South China Sea. 151 Allen S. Whitting went even further by arguing that in Jakarta, 
civilian and military officials alike referred to the distant time when "suzerainty" 
sanctioned Beijing vesting Javanese kings with legitimacy. ' 52 Tbus the past record and 0 
147 Chinese Ambassador in Jakarta,. Shen Guofang, as quoted in "China tak akan Nlenjawab 'Aide- 
memoire'dari Rl, " [China Won't Answer Indonesia's Aide-memoir], Kompas, 24 July 1996. 
148 Interview with Director General of Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nugroho 
Wisnumurti, 5 December 1998. 
149 See, R. Haller-Trost, The Sprally Islands A Study on the Limitations ofInternational Lmv, Occasional 
paper No. 14, University of Kent At Canterburry, October 1990. 
John McBeth, "Oil-Rich Diet", Far Eastern Economic Revionv, Ibid. 
Michael G. Galagher, "China; s Illusory Threat to the South China Sea", International Security, Vol. 
19, No. 1, Summer 1994, p. 173. 
152 Allen S. Whiting, "ASEAN Eyes China, The Security Dimension", Asian Survey, Vol. 37, no. 4, April 
1997, p. 302. 
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current situation contribute to the portrayal of Clýiina as an aggressive and expansionist 
power. Indeed, the present circumstance tends to justify the military perception of 
China. One Indonesian scholar noted that China is still beholden by the holy trinity of 
state sovereignty, state status, and state security. 153 Whatever the case, the fact indicates 
that China remains to be seen as a regional threat of significant magnitude, which will 
not diminish in the foreseeable future. However, in order not to upset China, the 
Indonesian officials are rather reluctant to specifically use the term "threat". In private 
discussion, they take care to moderate terminology. "We do not talk about 'threat'with 
", 154 respect to China, instead we use 'challenge' or 'risk . Indeed, they are more 
comfortable to refer to China in that way, which in essence is just the same. 
VA-ffle China appears to be distancing itself from its claims over the Natuna gas 
fields, Indonesia continues to be watchful of Chinese actions. Despite persisting efforts 
to seek clarification, the Indonesian government has unilaterally taken two measures as 
a response to China's assertiveness in the South China Sea. First, despite its economic 
limitations, Indonesia added to its military capabilities by purchasing thirty-nine vessels 
from the former East German navy Indonesia's February 1993 with follow-on plans to 
construct twenty-one modem frigates in local shipyards. 155 Indonesia also secured the 
purchase of nine F- 17 jet fighters from the US. 156 This tendency has been particularly 
evident in the early part of the 1990s. However, after realizing that China put claim 
over the territorial water of the Natuna Islands and did not give a satisfactory reply of 
the foundation for that claim, Indonesia showed a hardeninLy line through the conduct 
of a series of military exercise in the area of Natuna Island. It was a big scale military 
exercise that involved all Indonesian air, sea and continental forces. All these measures 
were believed to be directed as a warning to China of Indonesia's seriousness to protect 
its tcrritory. 157 
153 Hilman Adil, "China's Aspirations in Southeast Asia, " Jakarta Post, 16 May 1995. 
154 Allen S. Whiting, Ibid. p. 307. 
155 Michael Vatikiotis, "Instant Navyl', Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 February 1993. 
156 Kompas, 27 April 1996. 
137 Kompas, 19 September 1996. 
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Second, Indonesia took a more strategic measure by concluding an 
unprecedented mutual defence agreement with Australia on 18 December 1995.158 
Although Indonesia argued that the agreement is to guarantee peace and security in the 
region as well as appeasing concern among an Australian domestic audience who 
consider Indonesia as a threat, 159 there is no doubt that Indonesia's decision has invited 
criticism over the principle of free and active foreign policy. Indonesia's State 
Secretary denied that Indonesia has sacrificed the principles of foreign policy. 160 
However, there is no doubt that the signing of defence agreement with Australia was 
conducted while China was in the mind of Indonesia's leaders. 161 Subsequent 
developments seemed to confirm this assumption. Indonesia and Australia are further 
reviewing the possibility of developing a defensive strategy in the Natuna Islands, 
which included strategic monitoring conducted through aeroplane, satellite and remote 
radar. 162 It was also reported that a number of Australian defence and specialist 
officials have visited Indonesia to realize the Natuna Islands defence operation. This 
cooperation was no. coincidence as Indonesia has been alerted to China's territorial 
seawater claim around the Islands. 
6.3. Sino-Indonesian Trade and Economic Relations: Problems and Prospects 
One of the rationales for the restoration of diplomatic relations with China was 
to serve the national interest of economic development. In fact, it Nvas not really a 
surprise as Indonesia already indicated towards such a move by reopening economic 
153 The Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security, official text issued in Canberra, 14 
December 1995. See also, Alan Dupont, "The Austral ia-Indones ia Security Ao-reement, " Indonesian 
Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 2, Second Quarter, 1996, pp. 195-206. Due to the worsening relations between 
Australia and Indonesia in the aftermath of the announcement of the result of August 1999 referendum in 
East Timor, on 16 September 1999 the Indonesian government unilaterally cancelled the agreement. 
"Perjanjian Keamanan dengan Australia Batal" [Defence Agreement with Australia Cancelled], Suara 
Pembaruan, 16 September 1999. 
'59 Interview with Director General for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nugroho 
Wisnumurti, 5 December 1998. 
160 Stated by State Secretary, Moerdiono, Media Indonesia, 19 March 1996. 
16 ' Australia proposed the agreement to Indonesia in June 1994 but it was not until September 1995 that 
Suharto agreed to elaborate a draft text. 
162 Kompas, I August 1997. 
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ties with China as early as 1985. The opening of diplomatic relations with China was 
indeed expected to fin-ther open new markets and to boost Indonesia's export to China 
that up to the end of 1980s had benefited Indonesia. It appeared that this objective 
received wide support among a large segment of Indonesian society, due to the fact that 
economic issues are less sensitive than the political one. While Indonesia emphasized 
on the advantages in the economic field in which China only extends trade preference 
to countries that have diplomatic relations, the thaw of diplomatic relations does not 
automatically open opportunities for economic cooperation and immediate gains, as 
there are many factors besides the political ones that are involved in the process. 
A. The Realisation of Bilateral Trade Relations 
China as a Market 
Indonesia's decision to reopen official trade relations with China was 
welcomed by Ind8nesian businessmen. Subsequently, various explorations of 
cooperation in economic and trade sectors followed. Early indication showed that 
Indonesia's benefit from trade activities with China increased significantly and reached 
an average growth of 24 per cent for export and 19 per cent of import per year. 163 The 
total trade volume between the t-, vo countries also showed an improvement in 1989 by 
reaching the value of USS800 million, which was a hundred per cent increase 
compared to three years earlier. Indeed, by 1990 trade volume was recorded at US$1.18 
billion. 164 In the short term, the normalization of diplomatic relations has increased 
trade volume between the two countries, and from Indonesia's perspective it has 
increased its export comi-nodities to China. Thus, Indonesia's economic rationale has 
beenjustified. 
Although the statistics show that trade volume between Indonesia and China 
has steadily been expanding every year (See Table 6.1), there is still a lot of work to 
163 According to the Centre of Statistic Bureau (BPS) Indonesian trade with China experiences a stuplus 
inconsecutive years 1989 (USS4 1.1 million), 1990 (USS 182.1 million), 1991 (USS355.9 million), 1992 
(USS644.9 million), 1993 (USS313.3 million). 
'64 Suara Karya, 5 June 199 1. 
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undertake to secure Indonesia's interest in the longer term. This is particularly evident 
when the trade relations of both countries are taken into consideration in the context of 
other ma . or trading partners. As far as Indonesia is concerned, China is not the main j 
market destination for her commodities. Trade volume with China contributed only 
1.39 per cent of overall trade in 1991 and 1.22 in 1992. It appeared that there was no 
significant increase in the next four years as the figure stayed at 1.23 per cent. 
165 
Although the general over all trade was increasing, in real terms the trade volume was 
relatively small and less significant. Additionally, this achievement was mainly because 
of the contribution of oil and plywood in Indonesia's cornmodities export structure to 
China. ' 66 
Table 6.1: Indonesia-China Trade Volume 1990-1997 
I: - f 
1990 0,834.4 0.652.3 1,486. 
1991 1.190.8 0.834.9 2,025.7 
1992 1.396.0 0.751 2,148.0 
1993 1.249.0 0.936 - 
2,185.0 
1994 1.322.0 1.369.0 - 
2.691.0 
1995 1,742.0 1,495.0 , 37.0 
1996 2.057.5 1,597.6 3,655.1 
1997 2.2293 1,518.0 3,747.3 
Source: The Statistic Central Bureau (BPS), 1998 
The other factor that should be underlined is that the success of China's 
economy has so far been the result of its intensive contacts and dealings with countries 
in Asia that are categorized as the Greater China which include Hong Kong, Macao 
and Taiwan. Table 6.2 and its conversion into Figure 6.2 confinns that China's 
economic activities are mainly conducted in the East and Southeast Asian region. Its 
total trade value in Asia reached USS73446.70 million, while in comparison, Chinese 
trade volume with the US amounted to USS21461.48 million. Accordingly, China 
would emphasize more developing economic and trade relations particularly with the 
so-called the "Greater China" which according to Andrew Brick means exploiting 
China's advantage from a network of ethnic Chinese with proven entrepreneurial 
prowess throughout the region. 167 At the same time, China tends also to 
develop its 
165 Suara Pembaruan, 7 October 1996. 
166 Central Bureau of Statistic (BPS), as quoted in Suara Karya, 27 Mach 1991. 
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trade %Nith major developed countries such as Northern America and European 
countries, leaving Indonesia in a lower priority. 
Table 6.2: China's Major Trading Partners, 1994 
(Unit: USS I million) 
Rcgion and Sek-cud Counuics 
Asi3 
Export 
73446.70 
Import 
68765.15 
Total Value (USS I 
million 
142211.85 
Japan 21573.12 26320.77 49893.89 
Within Greater Chin3 35273.16 23673.45 58946.67 
HonR Kone 32364.41 9456.62 41821.16 
MaC30 666.50 132. DO 798.50 
Tai%k-an 2242.15 14084.83 326.98 
Korea (. Nonh) 424.52 199.22 623.74 
Korea (South) 4402.30 7318.34 11720.65 
ASEAN 6379.01 6829.85 13208.85 
Brunei 16,26 0 16.26 
Indonesia 1031.70 1588.37 2640.07 
\1313%, si3 1117.66 1622.67 2740.32 
Philippines 475.69 272.40 48.09 
Sineavore 2558.42 2482.02 5040.44 
Thailand 1159.28 864.39 2023.67 
369.11 143.28 512.39 
C3mbodia 35.27 1.00 36.27 
LWS 34.97 4.38 40.36 
Vietnam 341ý66 149.19 532.82 
Africa 1749.05 893.98 2643.03 
Europe 18803.99 25040.20 43844.19 
EU 14580.23 16938.76 31518.99 
United Kinedom 2414.00 1769.90 4183.91 
Germanv 4761.45 7136*73 11898.23 
France 1424.36 1939.01 3363.37 
Italv 1590.66 3068.06 4658.72 
Former USSR 1946.55 4662.58 6609.13 
Russi3 1581.14 3495.75 50 6.89 
Latin America 2454.75 2247.38 4702.13 
Nonh Amcric3 22860.16 15801.30 386A I Af, 
Can3d3 1396,94 1830.75 3227.69 
USA 21 11 8 : 1 ý 139.42 35431.90 
Occania i 7 2 iý8ý 2915.61 -: 639.45 
Australa 1487.87 2451-91 3939-68 
Source: China's Latest Economic Statistics, February 1995, pp. 19-23. 
167 Andrew B. Brick, "Chinese Water Torture: Subversion Through Development, " GlobalAffairs, Vol. 
7, No. 2 (Spring 1992), p. 97. 
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Feature 6.2: China's Foreign Trade (1994) 
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Consequently, the importance and position of China's respective major trading partners 
has mainly caused a low level of trade volume between Indonesia and China. In this 
regard, Indonesia was China's tx%-elfth trading partner, while China was Indonesia's 
fifth trade partner. 168 From this point of view, it appears that Indonesia relatively needs 
China more than the other way round. 
Identifying Problems in Trade Relations 
Once the political barrier was removed, the flow of people conducting business 
between China and Indonesia %vas expected to follow smoothly. Ironically, the 
Indonesian government, particularly the military as represented by BAKIN, was 
reluctant to lessen visa regulations. Procedurally, these were processed through several 
layers of bureaucracies, such as the Indonesian Embassy in Beijing, the Inunigration 
Office and the influential Indonesian Intelligence Coordination Agency (BAKIN). 
While the overall process might take more than ten days, officials sometimes had 
different opinions. 169 One of the infamous incidents was the refusal of five Chinese 
I" Suara Pembaruan, 4 November 1997. 
169 Visa application submitted to Indonesian Embassy in Beijing is further submitted to "clearing house" 
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businessmen to enter Indonesia despite the fact that they already held Indonesian visas 
issued in Beijing. In this case, Indonesian immigration officers did not consider the visa 
issued by Indonesian representative in Beijing as an official document. It was an 
embarrassing incident for the Indonesian foreign ministry. However, visa problems 
also created an imbalance of visits between the two countries. According to the data of 
Indonesia's Immigration Office and the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta, in 1996 alone, for 
example, 80,000 Indonesian nationals visited China, while only 14,000 Chinese 
nationals visited Indonesia. 170 
Another problem emerged with regard to the trade balance between both 
countries. Besides the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on the 
normalization of diplomatic relations in August 1990, Indonesia and China also signed 
a trade agreement. According to this agreement both governments should promote the 
expansion of trade relations and grant each other most-favoured-nation treatment with 
respect to customs duties and other taxes, and duties applicable to trade exchange. 171 
Therefore, Sino-Indonesian trade and economic relations were expected to have a 
balance and be mutually beneficial. However, problem might arise when there is an 
imbalance of trade between these two countries in which each would ask the other to 
increase its imports. Thus from time to time, the maintenance of the balance of trade 
became a difficult problem to handle as the governments' influence over the economy 
became less significant. 172 
Meanwhile, the question of inspection procedures took years to resolve. This 
reality showed that both countries applied a rigid policy in which China did not allow 
foreign surveyors to operate in China, while Indonesia insisted that its surveyors (SGS) 
be allowed to conduct inspection. The unresolved problem of inspection has increased 
suspicion of China dumping its products in Indonesia. After a discussion between 
in Jakarta that holds its meeting twice a week (Tuesday and Friday). The result is to be informed back to 
Beijing. 
170 Suara Peniboruan, 9 December 1997. 
171 Jakarta Post, 9 August 1990. 
172 Suara Pembaruan, 7 September 1995. 
264 
Indonesia's Trade Minister and Chinese Trade and Economic Relations Minister, both 
countries agreed to address the dumping issue. In this regard, the Chinese government 
drafted new regulations giving it the power to punish any company involved in 
dumping abroad. 173 While the dumping allegation was hard to prove, China's 
exclusion from the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) prevents Indonesia 
from pursuing the matter through this body. For this reason, Indonesia supports the 
acceptance of China into GATT or the World trade Organization (WTO), which is also 
intended to tie China to perform according to the agreed international rules. Once 
China is accepted as the WTO member and bound by the GATT rules, it should 
consequently conduct deregulation and de-bureaucratisation to lessen tariff protection 
and non-tariff barriers, to eliminate all subsidies in contravention to the GATT ruling, 
and to adjust its policies in accordance with the pattern of a market economy. 
Accordingly, the Chinese market should be more open, and provide opportunities for 
the coming of imports from all over the world, including Indonesia. 
VvUle the effort to increase trade volume is still being pursued, China and 
Indonesia are actively involved in finding a solution to various problems arising from 
these activities. In fact, both governments have regularly convened a Joint Commission 
meeting to discuss problems and issues related to economic and trade relations. The 
meeting has been conducted four times, with the latest one held in Jakarta in August 
1997. This is the place where both delegations exchange views on how to increase 
economic relations as well as to raise issues concerned to any party. Eventually, China 
identified three problems impeding the development of economic relations with China. 
These problems are the difficulties in getting an Indonesian visa and the length of time 
permitted for a Chinese national to stay in Indonesia, and the absence of the Bank of 
Cl-iina branches in Indonesia, and the piracy of Chinese trade marks in Indonesia. 174 
B. Pattern of Trade Relations: Complementary or Competition 
173 Jakarta Post, II September 199 1. 
174 This view is expressed by Hu Cuo Chai, the Director of Asia, Ministry of Trade and Economic 
Cooperation of China, Suara Pembaruan, 4 November 1997. 
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Similarities and Differences of Economic Structure 
During the period of 1968-81, Indonesia has enjoyed a rapid economic growth 
of roughly around 8% per annum and a healthy development in its balance of 
payments. 175 This achievement was very much induced by foreign aid and an 
unprecedented increase in oil revenues. However, the collapse of oil prices caused 
Indonesian economy to decline, partirpularly in the mid 1980s in which there was a 
sharp decline of surplus 4 per cent of GDP in 1980 to a deficit of 5.5 per cent in 1986. 
In responding to this situation the government attempted to reduce the country's 
dependence on oil exports. A series of deregulation packages was adopted with a view 
to improving the investment climate for private investors, including foreign investors, 
and promoting a more efficient private sector. Indonesia also introduced trade reforms 
aimed at reducing the anti-export bias in its trade regime. The most significant step 
taken by the government was to increase the competitive advantage of the 
manufacturing industry and agriculture sector in the international market place. As a 
result, there was a surge in manufactured exports, particularly low skill labour- 
intensive manufactured export since the late 1980s which for the first time put 
Indonesia on an export-led growth path similar to the one traversed earlier by the 
North-east Asian newly-industrialising economies (NIEs). 176 
Entering the 1990s, there was great optimism about the development of 
Indonesia's economy as real GDP grew more than 7 per cent per annurn and the 
perennial foreign exchange constraint appeared to have been pen-nanently relaxed. 177 In 
general, Indonesia's rapid economic growth was underpinned by rapid growth of all 
three major sectors, agriculture, manufacturing and services. 179 In 1995 Indonesia was, 
175 Anwar Nasution, "Recent Economic Reform in Indonesia", Indonesian Quarterlyl Vol. 19, No. 1, 
First Quarter, 199 1, p. 13. 
176 Thee Kian Wie, "Indonesia's Economic Performance Under the New Order: The Effect of 
Liberalization and Globalization", Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 2, Second Quarter, 1988, p. 123. 
177 Anwar Nasution, "The Years of Living Dangerously: The Impacts of Financial Sector Policy Reforms 
and Increasing Private Sector External Indebtedness in Indonesia, 1983-1992", Indonesian Quarterly, 
Vol. 20, No. 4, Fourth Quarter, 1992, p. 405. 
179 See, World Bank-, 1992, World Bank Report 1992 - Development and the Emironment, Oxford 
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in terms of manufacturing value added, the seventh largest manufacturing sector among 
the developing countries. 179 In 1996, Indonesia's imports recorded an increase by 
5.66% to US$42,928.5 million compared to the previous year. The increase was both 
registered in imports of oil and non-oil, respectively by 23.52% to US$3,595.5 million 
and US$39,333.0 million. Meanwhile, Indonesia's exports increased by 9.68% to 
US$49,814.8 'million, and oil exports rose by 12% reaching US$11,721.8 million and 
non-oil exports rose by 8.98% to US$ 38,093.0 million. By 1997, the World Bank 
released its annual report and noted that the Indonesian economy in recent years had 
been performing well with GDP growing at an average of 7.7 per cent during the 
period of 1991-1994, at 8.2 per cent in 1995 and at 7.8 per cent in 1996.180 
As far as China is concerned, in the 1990s it emerged as an economic power 
with a high economic growth. Domestic income, for instance, grew at an average of 8.7 
per cent per year so did the population's income per capita in rural and urban areas. Up 
to 1995, Chinese reserved foreign currency amounted to US$280.8 billions with a 
surplus of US$16.8 billions, making her the biggest eleventh in the foreign trade. China 
is also among one of the first destinations for foreign investments. In 1995 there had 
been 258.00 foreign direct investments a-geed worth USS397.5 billions and in that 
same year US$135.4 billion had been implemented. In 1997, China succeeded in 
ranking itself as among the top ten in the world trade, in which its total trade volume is 
recorded at US$32.5 billion. '&' 
However, a simple comparison of the basic indicators of China and Indonesia 
as presented in Table 6.33 reveals many similarities as well as some important 
University Press, World Development Indicators, Table 2, pp. 220; World Bank-, 1977 (b), World 
Development Indicators 1977, IEC Information Center, Development Data Group, Washington D. C., 
Table 4.1, pp. 130-133. 
179 It was after China, Brazil, South Korea, Mexico, Argentina and India. See World Bank, 1977 (b), 
World Development Indicators 1977, IEC Information Center, Development Data Group, Washington 
D. C., Table 4.1 9 pp. 134-136. 
180 World Bank, Indonesia: Sustaining High Growth with Equity, Washington D. C., Report no. 16433- 
IND, May 1997, p. 1. 
'g' The rank consists of the US, Germany, Japan, Britain, France, Italy, Hong Kong, Canada, Holland and 
China. See, Beying Review, March 30 - April 5,1998. 
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differences between these two most populous countries in East Asia. Not long ago, 
both economies were relatively dependent on their agriculture sector. 182 And by the late 
1980s, they were moving in the same direction from agriculture to industrialization. 
The data also indicates that these two agricultural economies were characterised by a 
relatively small endowment of capital relative to labour. In the process of pursuing 
industrialization, therefore, both are apt to capitalize on their comparative advantage in 
labour-intensive manufacture with a low human capital input. In terms of 
specialization, both utilise the agricultural sector to develop exports of agricultural 
resource-based goods. Consequently, both countries have large potential in the 
production and export of light manufacturers. 
Table 6.3: Basic Indicators of China and Indonesia 
Population mid-1991 (in million) 1,149.5 181.3 
Area ('000 km2) 9.561 1,905 
Life Expectancv at birth (Nvm) in 1991 69 60 
Adult Illiteracy 1990 (%) 27 23 
Structure of Production 1991 
GDP (millions of dollars) 369.651 116,476 
Distribution (*/a) 
Aeficulture 27 19 
Industry 42 41 
Manufacturing 38 21 
Scrvices 32 39 
GDP per capita 
Dollars 1991 370 610 
Averan annual gro%%ib rate 
1980-1991 7.8 3.9 
Avcra, -c annual ratc of inflation 
1970-1980 0.9 21.5 
1980-1991 5.8 8.5 
Merchandise trade 1991 (million of dollws) 
Exports 72.875 28.997 
Imports 63.791 25,869 
Avera2c of Annual Growth rate No) 
Exports 
1970-1980 8.7 7.2 
1980-1991 11.5 4.5 
Imports 
1970-1980 11.3 13.0 
1980-1991 9.5 2.6 
Tenns of Tradc 
1985 109 134 
1991 111 101 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1993, Washington D. C., 1993. 
192 In 1988,32% of China's GDP originates from agriculture, while the contribution of agriculture in the 
case of Indonesia was 24%. See, World Bank, lVorld Development Report, Washington D. C., 1990, 
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Despite Indonesia's greater economic openness, as reflected by the role of 
external trade in GDP, it is obvious that China's industrial isation has accelerated faster 
than Indonesia's. One of the important features of trade relationship reveals that the 
structure of Indonesia's export to China is less diversified than the structure of 
Indonesia's imports from China. Thus, against the high expectations of benefits from 
the opening Of diplomatic relations with China, the fact shows that there are indeed 
barriers for Indonesia to benefit from dealing with China. As far as the structure of 
Indonesia's exports to China is concerned, it reveals that Indonesia's trade with China 
is very much focused on the segment of oil and gas commodities. From 1989 oil and 
gas became Indonesia's main export commodities to China. 183 It is understandable, as 
China needs an enormous amount of energy to keep its industries moving. On the other 
hand, Indonesia's balance of trade on non-oil and gas commodity leans toward 
China. 184 
As far as product commodities are concerned, Indonesia does not have 
comparative advantage vis-A-vis products from China. Indonesia and China seemed to 
rely on the same area of cheap labour. China is also a competitor to Indonesia's export 
goods, because its economic structure has a similar characteristic. For instance, China 
produces export-oriented goods, and light manufacturing goods such as textiles that 
was coincidentally one of Indonesia's main non-oil export commodities. Indeed, there 
are similarities in the types of product, particularly in small and mediurn industries 
such as tyre, textile, electronic, bicycle, freezers and children's toys. As a result, it is 
difficult for Indonesia's products to compete in the Chinese domestic market. 
The Projection of Trade Relations 
China began transforming its economy through the introduction of reform and 
modernization in the late 1970s. For its part, Indonesia reluctantly moved towards 
183 According, to the Center of Statistics Bureau, Indonesia's oil and gas export to China shows as 0 follows: US$230.8 million (1989), USS259.5 million (1990), USS516.4 million (1991), USS628.7 
million (1992), US$553.8 million (1993). 
18' According to the Central Statistics Bureau, except in 1992 Indonesian experienced a deficit of non-oil 
and gas trade balance. The figure shows that in 1989 Indonesia encountered deficit of USSI 85.3 million, 
US$66.6 million (1990), USS153.4 million (1991), and USS200.4 million (1993). 
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opening its market and adopted an export-oriented industry in the mid 1980s only after 
realizing that oil revenues could no longer be expected to maintain economic 
development. However, China appeared to accelerate its economic development and 
even surpassed Indonesia by the first half of the 1980s. In this regard, one Indonesian 
economist already warned of the implication of liberalization of the socio-political and 
economic system in China, which would eventually compete with Indonesia in 
attracting foreign capital and advanced technology from the developed countries. 185 
Both countries would have to compete in selling their products to the world market that 
was becoming more protectionists. Nowadays, the old ideological commodity exports 
from Beijing have been replaced by the influx of industrial commodities to the world, 
let alone Indonesia. The competition has been predicted to be more intense as 
Indonesia is expected to take-off by the year 2000, while the Chinese Modemisation 
Strategy has already set its deadline for the same year. 186 
Since the normalization, there have been intensive visits by private 
businessmen from both countries from August 1990. In 1990, for instance, there were 
1.063 Indonesian businessmen representing 574 companies who visited China, while 
5.790 Chinese businessmen representing 1.368 companies travelled to Indonesia. The 
trend appeared to increase. In January 1991 alone, the record shows that there were 973 
people representing 187 companies visiting Indonesia, while the number from 
Indonesia only reached the figure of 75 people representing 46 companies 187 This 
short period and figure suggests that China was more aggressive in opening its market 
opportunities than Indonesia. * Indeed, since normalization China has appeared to be 
more active and prepared in expanding its market in Indonesia. 
Despite the obstacles for Indonesia in penetrating the Chinese market due to 
similarities of trade structure, China is also considered as a serious competitor for 
"5 Christianto Wibisono, Sinar Harapan, "Perspektif Kompetisi RI-RRC: Mampukah Orde Baru 
Mendemokratisasikan Diri [The Perspective of Competition between Indonesia and China: Would The 
New Order be able to Democratize Itselfl, Sinar Harapon, 29 May 1985. 
186 The situation has totally changed as the result of economic crisis and political stability in Indonesia 
since 1998. 
197 Merdeka, 16 March 199 1. 
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Indonesia's business economy. As the result of Chinese export-oriented production, the 
threat materialized in the form of the influx of Chinese goods that are much cheaper 
than the same one made in Indonesia. Indonesia's goods are unable to compete in the 
international market, and Chinese products in the Middle East have replaced even 
some of Indonesia's commodities. 188 Indonesian Minister for Industry Hartarto has 
openly referred to China as the main competitor to Indonesian industry-189. Indeed, 
China has a large potential to develop further as an economic power, particularly in its 
export-oriented industry. He also underlined that China has become a competitive and 
an efficient industrial state. In June 1991, the Indonesian Minister of Trade J. 
Soedradjad Djiwandono met Chinese Deputy Trade and External Relations Wang 
Wendong in Jakarta and drew their attention of the influx of cheaper Chinese goods 
into Indonesia. 190 In this regard, Indonesia would impose an additional import duty 
aimed at protecting the same goods already produced in Indonesia, especially small 
machine equipment, chemical products, gannents, shoes and bicycles. Indonesia 
suspected the possibility that the Chinese government gave subsidies to these 
industries. 
Five years after the normalization of diplomatic relations, the trade balance 
between Indonesia and China was poised roughly in Indonesia's favour at an average 
of $292.4 million. From this balance, Indonesia's export volume has been larger than 
its import. The average growth of its exports to China stood at 7.95 percent, while its 
imports increased by 13.69 per cent, nearly twice its exports. If this growth is 
maintained, in the future the trade balance will soon be in favour of China. While both 
exports and imports showed an increasing tendency, looking at its export structure 
Indonesia depends very much on oil and gas, in which 40 to 50 percent of Indonesia's 
products are exported to China. 191 As far as non-oil and gas exports are concerned, the 
average growth is 10.71 percent. At the same, time, non-oil and gas imports are higher 
and stand at 16.22 percent per year. While Indonesia maintains its comparative 
188 Kompas, II April 199 1. 
189 Suara Karya, 20 May 199 1. 
190 Kompas, 7 June 199 1. 
191 "Prospek Hubungan Bisnis Indonesia & Cina, " [The Prospect of Sino-Indonesian Business Relations]. 
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advantage over oil and gas commodities, China holds a competitive advantage on non- 
oil and gas products. This is the case since the Chinese products are of higher quality 
than Indonesian, which makes them more competitive in Indonesian domestic and 
international markets. Table 6.4 shows that Indonesia tends to import more from 
China, for example in 1993 alone the Indonesian balance of non-oil/gas commodities 
suffered a US$200million deficit. Therefore, in the longer term, Indonesia could be 
predicted to import more goods from China. 
Table 6A The Value of Indonesian Oil/Gas and Non Oil/Gas Export/Import Commodities to China 
Table 6.5 shows that China has a stronger and better performance than 
Indonesia, particularly in products such as textiles, shoes and home appliances. It is the 
home appliance product that has contributed as the biggest contributor to attract foreign 
reserves that is US$43.9 billion or 29.5 percent from its total export. This value has 
jumped 25 times from the 1985 figure of US$1.7 billion. Among home appliance 
products are ship, machine, computer component, communication equipment, and 
optical goods. As far as textiles are concerned, China contributes 13 percent of the 
world market. According to Chinese government statistics, the value of exports of 
textiles from January to May 1997 is USS 16 billion, which is an increase of 333 percent 
from the same period of previous year. The most significant contribution has been in 
garments (US$10.5 billion) and textiles (US$5.5 billion) that are an increase of '30 
percent and 24 percent respectively. Chinese performance on shoes has been 
spectacular as its share stands at 40 percent from 9 billion of world product. In 1996, 
for instance, China gained the value of 8.5 billion from shoe exports. The development 
of Chinese economic power is predicted to continue further, along with its economic 
reform. 
Bisnis Indonesia, 30 September 1996. 
Source: The Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) 
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Table 6.5: The Comparison of the Performance of Product Export 
Between Indonesia and China in Global Market 
Commodities China Indonc sii 
- Value (USSbillion Exoort Gro%ih No) 
. 
Value (USSbillion) e Mport -Go, "h 
Textile & Product 
Textile 
16 33 2.76 l2. SI 
Shoes 8.6 28 2.45 
F 
4.62 
Machine and 
Electronics 
43.9 139 3 26 30.59 
Source: Bisnis Indonesia, 2 October 1997 
Indonesian non-oil/gas export commodities to China between 1990-1994 
increased by 6.81 percent, while its imports increased by 15.51 percent. According to 
the Central Bureau of Statistics, Indonesia's exports to China increased by an average 
of 10.16 percent per annum in 1990-1994, while its imports from that country grew by 
17.31 percent per year. 192 Far from increasing its readiness to compete with China, 
Indonesia simply tried to diversify its exports to China, which again remain in the 
domain of primary commodities, particularly plywood. This is best illustrated by the 
statement of former Chairman of Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (KADIN) and the 
Chairman of the Indonesia-China Foundation for Economic, Social and Cultural 
Cooperation who argued, 
We have to keep the balance of our trade with China, whose exports to 
Indonesia have been increasing at a faster pace than its import from it. 
To cope with the increasing imports from china, we should boost our 
exports of wood products, oil, natural gas and palm oil to China. Our 
trade with China will be in deficit if we import more capital goods, while 
our exports to that country (China) comprise mostly of agricultural 
produce. 193 
C. Investment Issue: Extending Suspicions of Ethnic Chinese 
One of the characteristics of economic development in China and Indonesia has 
been their respective need to attract more foreign capital. According to the World 
Bank, China succeeded in attracting USS. 38 billion foreign direct investment, while 
192 Jakarta Post, 3 August 1995. 
193 Ibid. 
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Indonesia was far below at USS5 billion. 194 As both China and Indonesia are actively 
in need of foreign investment, there is a fundamental difference in their strategies. ' 95 
For China, the effort to attract investment is part of the modernization process. More 
importantly, it is also a long-term strategy, which is intended to bring the latest 
technology and modem management techniques. In other words, it is an answer to the 
situation where China has been left behind not only in terms of technology, but also in 
management techniques and human resource development. For Indonesia, its strategy 
to attract foreign investment aims at increasing capital, %vith only an indirect focus on 
the incumbent management skills, technology and human resource development. 
Indonesia's need for capital is tremendous (US$480 billion per year), compared to 
China's huge economy which requires only $ 100 billion a year, due to the growing gap 
between domestic savings and investment as evidenced by the persistent current and 
capital accounts deficits and government shortfalls. On the contrary, China's savings 
are catcl-ýng up with its investment requirements. 
Apart from absorbing foreign investors and their technology and management 
skills, China's strategy also involves a large amount of foreign-investment abroad to 
strengthen its capital account. Thus the investment abroad would generate future 
income. On the contrary, Indonesian is very much dictated by the concern for 
immediate gains. Thus its orientation has been short-term, lasting for five years, 
regardless whether technology and management skills are attached to the investment. 
The Indonesian economy has been in a hurry to catch up to the last train concept, which 
means that everyone was in a rush to cash in on what was perceived to be the last 
opportunity. 196 Apparently, this was as the result of 25-year economic development 
plan, and more importantly the then ageing figure of President Suharto's leadership that 
had given no hint of an apparent successor. 
194 The WorldBank Tables, External Finance for Developing Countries, 1966. The surge of foreign direct 
investment in China was mainly due to better opportunities, low risks and take-off in flows from overseas 
Chinese and Korean investors. 
'95 Jakarta Post, 29 July 1993. 
196 As a result, the interest rate level is always high and the uncertainty becomes the most certain variable 
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In order to attract more foreign investors, the Indonesian government issued 
government regulation no. 20/1994, which enables foreign investors to invest their 
capital in various sectors and to own 100 percent of its share. 197 It Was intended to 
create efficiency, to increase Indonesia's competitiveness in the international market as 
well as to anticipate the global market. Ironically, the government effort is often faced 
by the dilemma of reality to protect national interests. Political uncertainty over the 
future of Indonesia's political stability, especially the issue of leadership, has prevented 
the investor from engaging in long-term investment in Indonesia. However, given the 
short orientation of investment, interest rates in Indonesia are relatively higher than 
China. Thus, when this advantage is added to better infrastructure and goverrunent 
facilities in the areas of economic zones, Indonesia is unable to compete with China. In 
this regard, Indonesia and China are competing in attracting foreign investment. 198 
Former US Ambassador to Indonesia John Holdridge argued that China needs capital 
investment especially in small industry, so does Indonesia, therefore it is difficult for 
both to avoid competition in the international capital market. 199 The then Indonesian 
foreign minister Ali Alatas argued that many respect, Indonesia and China could 
become a counterpart. However, their economies as developing countries would not 
complement each other, and occasionally have to compete . 
200 The existence of 
competition between Indonesia and China to attract foreign investment was indeed 
acknowledged by other Indonesian official. 201 
While the competition is there, it does not mean that Indonesia and China could 
not co-operate in the context of investment. Both could benefit from investments in 
their respective countries. However, this sort of cooperation with China invites two 
197 "Nilai Perdagngan Mesin dan Elektronika RI-Cina Masih di Bawah Lima Persen, " (Trade Value on 
Machinery and Electronic Goods between Indonesia and China is Still under 5 per cent], Suara 
Pembaruan, 2 June 1995. 
198 By 1993, China has replaced Indonesia and regained its position as the leading recipient of Japanese 
ODA (official development assistance). See, Yong, Den-, "Chinese Relations with Japan: .... Pacific Affairs, Ibid. p. 378. 
1" Antara, 26 November 1990. 
200 Business Ninvs, 30 November 1990. 
201 Nugroho Wisnumurti, Director General of Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interview on 
4 December 1998. 
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opinions. First, it consists of those who encourage efforts to attract China to invest its 
capital in Indonesia. Second, there are those who are in favour of investing in China. 
Their argument is based on the assumption of various advantages held by China such 
as better infrastructure, facilities and lower interest rate. There is only one way in which 
these two assumptions can be pursued, namely by harmonizing investment with 
economic and national interests. 'Mus investment in China should only be conducted as 
long as it gives benefit to Indpnesia. In practice, for instance, it could be implemented 
by utilising Indonesian raw materials, thus bringing in foreign currencies and 
increasing half-processed products, such as crude palm oil, rubber raw materials and 
canned industrial food. Indonesian investment in China should be directed to control 
export commodities distribution in order to strengthen market access in China. 
However, there are still many Chinese businessmen who still prefer to maintain an 
202 indirect business with Indonesia through Hong Kong and Singapore. This is the 
legacy of an old pattern that was long practised from 1967 to 1985. 
However, the issue of investment in China has been complicated by allegations 
of capital flight, which has become a big topic in the Indonesian domestic political 
discourse of 1990s, linking China and the ethnic Chinese. It was the investment of 
capital owned by Indonesian ethnic Chinese in China that became an issue. Many 
Indonesians believed that investment in China by the Indonesian ethnic Chinese was 
equal to capital flight. There should not be a problem if this trend was intended to help 
Indonesian economy, and the cultural and social orientation of the ethnic Chinese was 
not involved. However, those who were against this trend presented their case by 
arguing that investment in China was against the national interest, given that Indonesia 
still needed capital to maintain its development. 203 On the positive side, some 
prominent figures categorized this trend as part of globalisation and the investment in 
China was carried out more because of economic reasons than affiliation. 204 
202 Bisnis Indonesia, 22 October 1994. 
2,03 Merdeka, 2 April 1993; Bisnis Indonesia, 8 April 1993; "Analisa Kwick Kian Gie: Invcstasi 
Pengusaha Indonesia di RRC" [The Analysis of Ki%vk Kian Gic: The Investment of Indonesian 0 Businessmen in China], Bisnis Indonesia, 12April 1993. 
20'Suara Pembaritan, 7 April 1993; Bisnis Indonesia, 12 April 1993. 
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According to data from the Coordination Council for Capital Investment 
(BKPNI), by 1992 Chinese investment in Indonesia stands at US$41,5 million or 0.1 
per cent from total foreign investment in Indonesia. 205 This also means placing China 
at number 28 of 41 countries investing in Indonesia. Other Chinese investments in 
Indonesia include in the development of small industry in Surabaya, the development 
of refinery project and urea fertiliser project between Sinopec and Indonesian 
companies such as the Barito Pacific Group, the Bimantara Group and the Napan 
206 Group. In 1994, China's investment is worth US$164.9 million, which consists of 
25 projects. 207 However, China estimates that its investment in Indonesia is worth 
US$240 million. 208 The investment is mostly in the oil and gas sectors, mining and 
financial services. According to China, Indonesian investment in Chins shows US$3) 19 
million in the field of ceramic industry and property. It is expected that with the 
regulation introduced by the government, China would flulher increase its investment 
in Indonesia. 
By late 1992, there were a significant number of Indonesian investors putting 
their money in China, mainly in infrastructure projects such as the development of an 
industrial complex and food industry. 209 The Lippo Ltd, for instance, invested USSI 
billion in Fujian. Hagemeger Pacific Corporation Ltd of Liern Sioei Liong developed 
five thousand acres of industrial estate to accommodate hundreds of industrial activities 
in the south China seashore. Another Liern company, Indomie, invested US$600,000 in 
Beijing. Additionally, there are three pulp factories from Indonesia in China established 
by the Grup Sinar Mas and the Group Indrayon, in which each value is estimated to be 
worth between USSI to 2 billion, and the former also built an industrial estate 
205 "Hubungan Perckonomian Indonesia-RRC Pascanorrnalisasi, "(Sino-indonesian Economic Relations 
After the Normalization], Bisnis Indonesia, 23 June 1993. 
206 Ibid. 
207 "Neraca Perdagangan Dengan Cina Dikha%vatirkan Akan Terus Minus, " [Trade Balance with China Is 
Worryingly Expected to be Minus], Suara Pembaruan, 22 August 1995. 
209 "Hubungan Bisnis Indonesia-Cina: Belurn Menggambarkan Potensi Rjil, " [Sino-Indonesian Business 
Relations Has not Reflected the Real Potential], Bisnis Indonesia, 18 November 1997. 
209 "Hubungan Perekonomian... " Business Indonesia, Ibid. 
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estimated to be worth US$350 million. 21 0 However, Table 6.6 underlines that there is a 
huge increase in the value of Indonesia's investment in China in 1992. However, no 
one knows the exact figure of Indonesian businessmen's investment in China. There 
has been no official record, either from neither the government nor the businessmen 
themselves. Similarly, there has been no declaration from the Chinese government in 
this regard. While not knowing the exact figure, Indonesian Ambassador to China 
mentioned the figure of US$6 billion, mostly in Fujian. 211 
However, there are indeed some reasons why China's investment in Indonesia 
is relatively low. First, the Chinese government does not encourage this move, as China 
itself still needs capital to develop its economy. Second, investors from both sides have 
not had guarantees for their investments, as the two governments have not signed an 
investment guaranty. Furthermore, on the part of China, they believe that the licensing 
212 
process in Indonesia is complicated. Third, Indonesian perceptions and suspicions 
about people coming from China have prevented the government from granting a 
speedy entry visa. Even up to 1995, Chinese businessmen complained of their 
difficulties in gaining Indonesian visas. 213 Fourth, no Chinese bank operates in 
Indonesia, as the Indonesian govemment was concerned that it might be used by the 
ethnic Chinese businessmen to transfer their capital to China directly, without 
government knowledge and control. 
Table 6.6: ASEAN Countries' Foreign Direct Investment in China 
If IRS Millinn) 
Singapore 
1984 
62.6 
1985 
75.5 
1986 
137.4 
1987 
69.8 
1988 
136.6 
1989 
1 111.1 
1990 1991 
1 103.5 155.2 
1992 
996.6 
Total 
1.848.3 
Thailand 23.3 14.6 13.2 4.5 37.7 56.8 41.7 108.3 7234 1.023.5 
The Philippines 
t 
2.1; 
" 
40.46 3.8 30.4 7.3 4.7 10.8 17.4 273.2 390.3 
Mala-, 3ia 0 .4 .2 0.2 
9.6 5.2 2.7 3.2 40.2 2091 270.9 
Indonesia 0.8 1* 1.2 2.1 1.0 0.3 109 121.4 139.4 
Total 892 89.2 132.6 132.6 154.6 115.5 188.9 176.3 159.5 332 2.323.7 3.672.3 
Source: Asia, rNC, November 1993. 
2 10 The figure is provided by Indonesian Embassy official in Beijing. Suara Peniharilan, 6 November 
1997. 
211 Suara Pembaruan, 7 September 1995. 
212 Suara Karya, 24 December 1994. 
213 Media Indonesia, 17 June 1995. 
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In the 1990s, there were reports that Indonesian ethnic Chinese businessmen 
were investing their capital in China. Mochtar Riady, for example, was reported to 
have invested US$10 billion in Fujian. However, the Indonesian government played 
down the allegation of capital flight and even dubbed it as a "selling game" from 
China. 214 The then Indonesian Minister for Investment Sanyoto fin-ther explained that 
the flow of capital could not be categorised as capital flight. He defines capital flight as 
meaning that the capital would never return back to the country of origin. Nevertheless, 
he failed to explain how Indonesia would benefit from such investment. The 
investment in China received a strong opposition from Indonesia since it still needs the 
same capital to develop its domestic economy. 215 Many Indonesians remain suspicious 
of the true motive of the ethnic Chinese tycoons' investment in China. 
6.4. Conclusion 
Indonesia's foreign policy in 1990s was characterised by the domination of 
Suharto and his efforts to bring Indonesia to the world stage. As part of the 
implementation of a free and active foreign policy, Indonesia became more assertive 
and claimed the leadership of the third world countries, especially in the context of the 
Non-Aligned Movement. Indeed, the normalization of diplomatic relations with China 
has paved the way for Indonesia to play a bigger role in international politics. However, 
as far as Sino-Indonesian relations are concerned, there remain domestic factors that 
prevent the development of a close relationship %vith China, which include the old 
historical aspects, suspicion towards Indonesian ethnic Chinese and more importantly 
the military's mistrust towards the ethnic Chinese and China. As a result, Indonesia has 
embarked on two approaches in developing its relations with China. In terms of 
strategic political and security aspects, Indonesia adopts a multilateral approach, which 
means that cooperation with China is mainly pursued in the context of multilateral 
214 Bisnis Indonesia, 16 August 1993. 
215 To prevent the capital flight to China, the Indonesian government has taken a measure by increasing 
interest rate. Ironically, it affected Indonesian domestic economic such as the increase of credit interest up 
to 20 per cent. On the contrary, the interest rate in China shows 7 to 8 per cent, while its inflation rate is 
less than 2 per cent per annum. Therefore, the investment opportunity in China is more conducive and 
attractive than in Indonesia. Consequently, foreign investors are more willing to invest their capital in 
China than Indonesia, and even Indonesians who own capital prefer China. 
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cooperation. However, as far as the economy is concerned, Indonesia has been more 
than willing to develop bilateral cooperation. 
There is no doubt that the dynamics of Sino-Indonesian relations have been 
influenced by interrelations among the major powers in the region, particularly the US, 
China and Japan. Indeed, the future structure of the balance of power in the region 
where both Indonesia and China interact remains to be seen. At least, Indonesia 
reluctantly prefers the continuation of the US presence in the region, instead of China 
or Japan. Early indications showed that the rift between the US against Indonesia and 
China respectively, has caused both countries to work closer with each other. However, 
this kind of cooperation was based on a marriage of convenience, especially when both 
countries were put under pressure from the Western countries on issues sensitive to 
them such as human rights. Thus, it was rather for a short-term purpose and had no 
spill over into other fields. 
Indeed, the political constellation in East Asia had opened a significant 
opportunity for the ASEAN to play a role in facilitating dialog among major powers. 
Indeed, ASEAN has found its increasingly important role in defining the future 
structure of order in the region. In this context, Indonesia, along %vith other ASEAN 
member countries, has ftirther tried to attract China into a web of cooperation that 
includes the ARF and more importantly a dialog on managing potential conflicts in the 
South China Sea. It is worth noting that Indonesia and ASEAN had no other choice 
than to engage China, as they had no capability or intention to militarily confront 
China. In this context, the increasing power and influence of China has been 
considered as inevitable. Therefore, the nature of engagement with China has been 
more appeasement and cooperation than confrontation. Nevertheless, Indonesia and 
other ASEAN member countries would stand up if their national interests were 
threatened. While officials continue their talks, there seemed an encouraging sign when 
China as well as Indonesia began publishing white books on defence and security, 
which were aimed to calm their respective neighbours as to their respective attitude in 
the future. 
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Indeed, one of the striking features in the 1990s has been apprehension towards 
China's growing military power and development as the consequences of its economic 
success. The situation became more alarming when one looked at it in the context of 
the South China Sea disputes. While agreeing to participate in the informal Workshop 
initiated by Indonesia, China continues its policy of asserting its claim over the islands 
by using military forces. At the same time, China is reluctant to solve the issue 
multilaterally, rather it favours bilateral negotiations with other claimant states. As far 
as Indonesia is concerned, it always claimed to be an honest and impartial part of the 
disputes. However, by 1993 Indonesian officials knew that China has laid claim over 
the territorial water of the Natuna Islands in which Indonesia has built a gas exploration 
field, which came as a shock to them. 
Nevertheless, China appeared to avoid giving a satisfactory explanation to 
Indonesia's request for clarification, rather than underlining that China's claim was 
based on historical grounds. Indonesia has also sent officials to Beijing but to no avail. 
China's claim of the delimitation of the Chinese baseline border in South- China Sea 
was formally delivered to Indonesian government in May 1996, which sparked great 
alarm among Indonesian leaders. While the civilian foreign ministry tried to open 
dialogue, the military appeared to prefer to push a harder line against China. Alongside 
efforts to increase Indonesia's military capability in the early 1990s, the military 
conducted a series of full military exercises in the area surrounding the Natuna Islands. 
This action was taken to wam China of Indonesia's seriousness in asserting its claim. 
Another option has also been conducted by concluding an unprecedented defence pact 
with Australia. There is no question that the policy of embarking on these measures 
had Suharto's support. 
As far as economy and trade is concerned, Indonesia has indeed developed 
extensive relations with China. Unfortunately, the economic structure of both countries 
has put Indonesia in a less competitive circumstance vis-A-vis China. At the same time, 
old suspicion of the linkage between Indonesian ethnic Chinese and China have 
impeded investment activities. Many Indonesians regard the trend of Indonesian 
investment in China as capital flight. Indeed, as ethnic Chinese minority owns the 
majority of the capital, this tendency has become a major issue in Indonesian domestic 
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politics. The government's policy on investment in China is quite supportive, provided 
that it would generate national income for Indonesia. However, that expectation is far 
from reality as the Indonesian economy has a number of similarities with China, which 
prevent that from happening. 
Chapter Seven 
Conclusions: The Evolution of Indonesian Perceptions of China 
and Policies Towards China 
Given the composition of the New Order leadership, there is no question that 
Indonesia's perception of China has been dominated by the views of Suharto and his 
military supporters. Indeed, Indonesia's portrayal of China as a threat officially emerged 
only after the coming of the New Order regime. However, this perception was not 
formulated in a short time and as the result of the 1965 coup attempt. Rather, it was 
shaped as the result of their experiences during previous periods after the proclamation 
of independence in August 1945. Thus, previous Indonesian historical background and 
experience has significantly contributed to the formulation of the New Order's outlook 
towards China, as well as other major powers, with the concept and nature of China as a 
threat to Indonesia eventually defined under the New Order regime. In this context, 
three periods may be seen as having basically laid the foundation to the perception of 
China among Indonesian leaders. 
The first of these is the revolutionary period of 1945-1949, when Indonesia was 
struggling to achieve sovereignty and to maintain its independence and territorial 
integrity. In other words, the revolutionary period in Indonesian history was dominated 
by attempts to gain vital national interests. During this period, the threat to Indonesia 
had come from within and without the boundary of Indonesia, especially in uniting the 
Indonesian vast territory and in upholding the authority of the central government. The 
Communist action to launch a rebellion in 1948 was widely seen as an act of betrayal at 
a time when the struggle to achieve full independence was still being pursued. This 
action left a deep suspicion among Indonesian leaders, particularly among the military 
and Islamic quarters, and a predisposition to distrust the communists. Meanwhile, the 
Western powers' refusal to grant an immediate recognition to the newly proclaimed 
Indonesia left Indonesian nationalist leaders fuming. As the result, they believed that 
that Indonesia should not be dependent on them. Coinciding with the coming of 
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confrontation between the Soviet Union and America, the Indonesian leaders then 
formulated the principle of a free and independent foreign policy, which emphasised 
that Indonesian foreign policy, should be directed to serve national interests. 
The second formative period was during the implementation o*f parliamentary 
democracy. This era was characterised by political instability and domestic cleavages 
that followed the lines of ethnicity and religious sentiment. The failure of this system 
was symbolized by the inability of any cabinet to realize Indonesia's national interest in 
economic development. Foreign policy became a contentious issue. Any effort to attract 
foreign aid was seen as sacrificing Indonesia's free and independent foreign policy. 
Thus the Indonesian political system was embroiled in domestic political rivalry among 
elite leaders, from which foreign policy could not escape. Indonesia's unity was also 
threatened by the emergence of regional rebellions with the support of Western powers, 
particularly the US. In this context, with clear evidence of Western interference in 
Indonesia's domestic affairs, suspicion and mistrust of the Western powers deepened. 
The implementation of democracy also coincided with the establishment of 
formal links between Indonesia and China. Prior to 1950 both countries were 
preoccupied by respective internal matters. Relations began to emerge only after the 
communists took power in China and Indonesia gained full international recognition in 
1949. However, the relationship did not run smoothly from the very beginning as the 
result of Chinese hostility after Indonesia successfully crushed the communist inspired 
Madiun rebellion in 1948 and the prevailing suspicions among the Indonesian leaders 
towards communism. The opening of diplomatic relations took place only after the then 
Hatta's cabinet realized that it would be difficult for Indonesia to maintain its 
independent and active foreign policy principles without opening formal ties with China. 
However, the situation was somewhat vulnerable to pressure from the Indonesian 
domestic audience. To contain suspicions of China among Islamic political leaders, the 
relations were kept at a low key by raising Indonesia's representation in Beijing to 
ambassadorial level. In fact, many other Indonesian leaders shared the suspicion of 
China. Their distrust mainly sternmed from China's attitude towards the overseas 
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Chinese in Indonesia. For Beijing, the issue of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia was part 
of its struggle to win overseas Chinese support against Taipei. To the Indonesian 
military, on the other hand, they believed that Chinese officials rendered their support to 
revive the battered PKI with support from the Chinese nationals who lived in Indonesia. 
Indeed, the improvement in Sino-Indonesian relations only occurred after the 
exclusion of the Muslim oriented Masyumi party from the cabinet, while at the same 
time the PKI was included to reach a majority. The relations rapidly improved and 
enabled Sukarno to conclude the Sino-Indonesian Treaty on Dual Nationality which 
according to Jakarta was considered an important step towards cutting Beijing's ties 
with the economically powerful overseas Chinese in Indonesia. Indonesia's interest in 
combating neo-colonialism and imperialism under Sukarno had further enabled 
Indonesia and China to get closer. Nevertheless, Sukarno's policy appeared to be against 
the wish of the military, particularly the army, which were concerned about the growing 
influence of the PKI and the support given by the ethnic Chinese to the PKI. Thus the 
expulsion of the ethnic Chinese and the ban on their conducting business in rural areas 
of West Java province in the late 1950s was intended to upset that political 
configuration. However, Beijing's apprehension that Indonesia might fall into the 
Moscow or Washington camp enabled the Chinese leaders to soften their attitude to 
Indonesia. 
The third period was after Sukarno's introduction of Guided Democracy in 1959. 
By applying this system, he rested his power base on two main pillars, namely the army 
and the PKI. Sukarno often played one pillar against the other with the aim of 
maintaining his authority, while keeping them in check. Under Guided Democracy, 
Sukarno intensified Indonesia's effort to gain the vital national interest of achieving 
comprehensive independence, particularly the return of West Irian. However, the 
Western powers' reluctance to give immediate support to Indonesia in regaining the 
West Irian territory had the effect of radicalizing Indonesia's foreign policy. Indonesia 
was then dominated by revolutionary waves, and immediately embarked on a two front 
diplomacy of conducting negotiations through the United Nations and embarking on 
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military measure to overtake the territory. Only after the intervention of the US was the 
solution achieved and military conflict avoided. 
Inspired. by the success of regaining West Irian, Sukamo continued his 
revolutionary struggle against Western powers. This time, the threat was portrayed as 
Western neo-colonialism and imperialism, as symbolized by Indonesia's confrontation 
against the creation of the Malaysian Federation, which was perceived as a base from 
which neo-colonialist and imperialist power would jeoperdize Indonesia's security. In 
fact, the conflict with Malaysia was also part of rivalry between the army and the PKI. 
For the latter, it was intended to abort the prospect of an American-backed economic 
stabilization, while for the former it was to help it maintain its nationalist stature. For 
Sukarno, the conflict was to keep political initiative in his hands. However, the effect of 
Sukarno's radical foreign policy was to bring Indonesia closer to China. The latter had 
no difficulty in supporting Indonesia as Beijing shared Sukarno's revolutionary struggle 
as the price of drawing Indonesia closer to China. Beijing considered its alliance with 
Jakarta as the key to break the US encircelment and containment in Southeast Asia. 
Indeed, there seemed to be an ideological and psychological compatibility 
between Sukarno and the views of revolutionary China and the PKI leaders. 
Accordingly, Sukarno's assessment of China as a dominant force in Asia was paralleled 
by his attitude towards the PKI in domestic politics. This created a situation where the 
PKI was able to exert more influence and gain considerable power. Accordingly, a 
power structure relationship was created where China became Indonesia's main foreign 
friend, while the PKI was established as Sukarno's chief domestic ally. China seemed 
determined to maintain good relations with Indonesia, regardless of the outbreak of the 
anti-Chinese demonstration in 1963, when Beijing blamed the incident on imperialist 
and anti-revolutionary groups. The relationship soon improved and both countries 
agreed to conclude the creation of a 'Peking-Jak-arta Axis. ' However, the close 
relationship between the two countries did not reflect Indonesian domestic political 
reality. It created apprehension and increased enmity towards the PKI among Indonesian 
leaders, particularly the army, and, to a lesser extent, the Islamic forces as well as 
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conservative nationalist groups. Sukarno's close relations with the PKI eventually tipped 
the equilibrium in favour of the latter at the expense of the army. Indeed, the balance of 
power between the army and the PKI in which Sukarno played as a balancing force had 
become difficult to maintain. In the end, the events of the 30 September/I October 1965 
coup destroyed Sukarno's system and eventually changed the direction of Indonesia's 
political course. Although there remains controversy surrounding the exact nature of the 
coup and the issue remains debatable, the New Order's version was that the PKI, with 
the support from Beijing, was considered to be the main perpetrator of the event. 
While Sukarno was practically weakened and powerless after the coup attempt, it 
soon appeared that the destruction of Guided Democracy meant that the army emerged 
as the victor against Sukarno's other pillars, the PKI. Indeed, the situation created an 
opportunity for Suharto and the military to seize the initiative. With support from the 
army generals Suharto gradually asserted his authority and systematically pushed 
Sukarno away from power. The PKI was immediately outlawed and its members were 
persecuted while some others were arbitrarily prosecuted. Suharto subsequently 
managed to take control of power and he declared his new regime as the New Order as it 
was an antithesis from the previous era, then to be called the Old Order. Despite 
blaming the PKI, China was also implicated for its involvement. While China's 
involvement is still debatable, what matters here is that Suharto and his anny generals 
perceived it that way. In this regard, China was considered as the external supporter of 
the PKI and was allegedly involved in the 1965 abortive coup. Inevitably, the freezing 
of diplomatic relations with China was the consequence of the hostility and rivalry 
between the army and the PKI that developed under the Guided Democracy period. 
Thus, since the coming of the New Order regime, Communist China was regarded as a 
threat to Indonesia's national security. 
Suffice it to say that the New Order marked the ascendancy of the military in 
Indonesian politics. Suharto worked closely with the army generals to assert control and 
dominate the direction of Indonesia's destiny. He immediately redefined Indonesia's 
national interest in terms of creating political stability and economic development. 
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Suharto adopted a more authoritarian style in which the political system was maintained 
with the primary objective to facilitate the creation of stability. Indeed, political stability 
was regarded as a prerequisite for economic development. Thus, while maintaining the 
importance of the vital interests of maintaining territorial integrity, sovereignty and 
independence, Suharto gave the highest priority to the realization of political stability 
and economic development. Suharto also immediately reintroduced the doctrine of 
dwifungsi that enabled the military to assume not only a defence role, but also to become 
a social and political force. Thus the military played a pivotal role in the highest ranks of 
government at regional and local levels. At the same time, the political parties ceased to 
be a driving force in Indonesian politics. The New Order appeared to distrust the multi- 
party system as implemented during the liberal democracy. Instead, the government 
limited the number of political parties and interfered in the parties' affairs in an effort to 
keep them weak. Here too, the objective was to serve the creation of stability. The 
govemment also created the Golkar, which functioned as a political tool to garner 
support during the five yearly general elections. The parliament, which was heavily 
dominated by pro-goverrunent members, acted only as a rubber stamp for government 
policy. 
While maintaining the principle of a free and active foreign policy, the New 
Order regime discontinued Sukarno's aggressive foreign policy. Instead, they adopted a 
low profile and good neighbourhood style that was aimed at creating stability in 
Indonesia's environment and easing apprehension among its neighbours. Indonesia 
continued as a member of the non-aligned movement countries while distancing itself 
from the socialist/communist states. This orientation also enabled Indonesia to focus on 
developing its economy, and to attract foreign aid and capital from anti-Communist 
countries, particularly the US. Indonesia always maintained a policy that in principle 
kept a distance from the rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union. Thus the 
emphasis was on a policy of cooperation and accommodation that was intended to gain 
international support for Indonesia's stability and economic development, while at the 
same time maintaining its freedom of action. In fact, Suharto was more than prepared to 
288 
discard the suspicion and hostility towards Western powers that had been shown by his 
predecessor. 
The impact of the freezing of diplomatic relations with China led essentially to 
no diplomatic* relations at all existing from the beginning of the New Order. Indonesia 
was then able to channel its energy into addressing domestic problems. Under these 
circumstances, foreign policy was directed to serve Indonesia's national interests in 
creating stability and economic development. Regionally, foreign policy was focused on 
creating peace and stability in the Southeast Asian region that had been absent for so 
many years. Suharto discontinued Sukarno's aggressiveness and replaced its style with a 
low profile foreign policy. Since foreign policy was now intended to serve Indonesia's 
economic development, Indonesia in practical terms came closer to the West, 
particularly in the light of Indonesia's need for foreign aid and capital investment. In the 
first decade of the New Order regime, this situation did not change to any significant 
extent. 
Indeed, the main difference between Sukarno and Suharto was in the attitude 
towards the Western powers, China and communism. While adopting a distinct policy of 
viewing the Western powers as allies, the New Order portrayed China and communism 
as threats to Indonesia. The concept of threat was indeed a point of contention between 
Sukarno and the military, which went back to the period under the Guided Democracy. 
For Sukarno, the so-called threat from the North was associated with the creation of the 
Malaysian Federation and British involvement in that process which was considered as a 
neo-colonialist threat to encircle Indonesia. On the contrary, the military perceived the 
threat from the North as a danger posed by the communist, notably China. Accordingly, 
the fall of Sukarno meant that it was the military's perception that prevailed. Indeed, 
given the dominant position of the military, Indonesian perceptions of China essentially 
reflected their views. It is worth noting that in the early years of the New Order, there 
was no distinction between Suharto and the military as both were part of a solid and 
unified unit. Indeed, they defined the concept of China as a threat to Indonesia's national 
security in three ways. First, it was portrayed as hostile to the ideology of Pancasila. 
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Indeed, China with its communism was regarded as a danger to the ideology of 
Pancasila that essentially does not recognize class struggles. In this identity China was 
perceived to be a danger to the already diverse Indonesian society. Second, China was 
seen as supporting the communist movement in Indonesia, particularly in the context of 
the PKI's effort to make a political come back. Third, China was accused of interfering 
in the political affairs of Indonesia by exercising influence over the ethnic Chinese. 
Indeed, whenever they launched allegations of China's involvement and interference in 
Indonesian domestic politics, the military always justified their claims by revealing 
proof of China's interference with the ethnic Chinese. 
Accordingly, the portrayal of China as a threat can be considered as the 
crystallization of the long running background that was experienced by the military 
leaders, including Suharto, among Indonesian leaders and Indonesian society. In this 
regard, the concept of China as a threat should be understood as carrying two 
connotations, namely the external and the domestic. As far as the external dimension is 
concerned, China has been portrayed as inheriting the attitude of the old Chinese 
Empire. Accordingly, the modem state of China is always perceived as an expansionist 
and aggressive power that always tries to expand its influence over Southeast Asia. 
China is also seen as an external power that would always try to dominate the Southeast 
Asian region, including Indonesia. Contemporary historical experiences seemed to 
strengthen Indonesia's perception of China. As far as the domestic perspective is 
concemed, the threat of China was always related to the issue of the ethnic Chinese. 
Howcver, a hostile Indonesian perception of the ethnic-Chinese is not a recent 
phenomenon, rather the product of a long historical experience going back to the 
colonial period. The social and privileged status conferred upon them by the Dutch 
colonial powers left a deep hatred among ordinary Indonesians towards the ethnic 
Chinese. The issue of ethnic Chinese is often perceived in the context of the question of 
loyalty, cultural orientation, economic domination and the attitude of the ethnic Chinese. 
However, the alleged involvement of the ethnic Chinese in the 1965 coup attempt 
further undermined their place in Indonesian society. Unfortunately, they have often 
been politicised by the New Order regime for both economic and political purposes. 
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In fact, the government benefited from the portrayal of China as a threat in four 
ways. First, the reference to China as a threat became one of the sources of legitimacy 
for Suharto, for the military and for the whole New Order regime. Indeed, they claimed 
to be the saviours of the state, thus giving a source of legitimacy for the New Order 
regime in strengthening its authority and power. Second, it facilitated the creation of 
stability and economic development. Additionally, any force that was perceived as being 
against or undermining the credibility of the New Order policy could easily be 
discredited as conspiring with the enemy. Externally, it brought sympathy from states 
hostile to communism, thus opening the way for foreign aid and economic assistance 
from the countries that held a similar anti-Communist outlook, particularly the United 
States, in terms of financial and political support, that was required to build Indonesia's 
economy. Third, it was intended to encourage the integration of the ethnic Chinese into 
Indonesian society. It was hoped that the ethnic Chinese would be unwilling to 
jeopardize their fate by turning their attention to Beijing, or otherwise they would easily 
be accused of being symphatetic to communism. Fourth, it helped facilitate the creation 
of regional cooperation in the form of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). It is widely believed that the factor of China was the raison d'etre for the 
establishment of ASEAN due to the sense of insecurity against China. 
The New Order perception of China had its repercussions on foreign policy. 
Along with the overall nature of Suharto's regime, foreign policy making was 
undoubtedly influenced also by the military. This was particularly evident on issues 
related to the question of security and defence. Indeed, policy towards China became 
one of the military's centres of attention since it went to the heart of the notion of the 
threat of China. Thus, as the main institution responsible for the conduct of foreign 
policy, the ministry of foreign affairs (Deplu) had to share its authority with the military. 
However the relationship between Deplu and the military was also centred on Suharto 
who rested at the centre of the power structure. While Deplu retained the main functions 
of the conduct of diplomacy and relations with other countries, as far as China was 
concerned the involvement of the military was compulsory. It is the dynamic of the 
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relationship between Suharto, the military and Deplu that was characteristic of 
Indonesia's foreign policy of China. 
Indeed, the New Order regime succeeded in maintaining the perception of China 
as a threat and the freezing of diplomatic relations for more than two decades. During 
this period, it appeared that Suharto and the military shared similar views of China. The 
need to serve domestic interests and the presence of hard-line elements in China had 
prevented any early move towards rapprochement. In the mean time, the constellation of 
world politics that was characterized by the East West competition had sharpened 
suspicion towards communism. However, the nature and concept of China as a threat 
was not static, indeed its multifaceted nature held the potential for evolution and 
reformulation over time, which in turn had implications for the policy towards China. 
Indeed, Indonesia's perception of China was changing in line with the development in 
Indonesia's domestic political economy, the transformation in its environment, and more 
importantly the political, economic and security dynamics of China, the country that had 
long been considered as a threat. Thus any changes to one of these factors might 
certainly challenge the Indonesian perception. 
In line with its modemisation policy introduced in 1978, Chinaý under Deng 
Xiaoping indicated its willingness to restore relations with Indonesia. This proposal was 
made in the context of China's effort to create a friendly environment to boost its 
economic program. China's initiative did indeed open up the 'taboo' subject of 
normalisation that had been suppressed in the first decade of the New Order. The 
dominant position of the military during that time prevented any prospects in that 
direction. However, it subsequently appeared that there had been disagreement among 
Indonesian elite leaders that crystallised into two camps of opponents and proponents of 
normalisation, namely the military (Hankam) and civilian ministry of foreign affairs 
(Deplu). For the opponents of normalisation that mostly came from the Ministry of 
Defense (Hankarn and BAKIN), their objections ranged from the security dimension, 
including the issue of ethnic Chinese as well as Chinese political ambitions in Southeast 
Asia. On the contrary, the proponents of normalisation, as pioneered by foreign minister 
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Adam Malik, argued that normalisation was required due to the increasing role of China 
in the world. At the same time, it should help facilitate the settlement of the Cambodian 
problem, bring benefit for Indonesia's economy and more importantly, pave the way for 
Indonesia's intention to play a leadership role, especially in the context of the Non- 
Aligned Movement. 
Malik's position seemed to be more far reaching, as the military remained 
concerned with the domestic political situation. In the end, Suharto intervened by 
underlining that Indonesia was willing to conduct relations with any state, regardless of 
its having a political system that was different to Indonesia. However, he set a condition 
that the relationships should be based on mutual respect and non-interference in the 
domestic affairs. While keeping the need to be vigilant, Suharto stated that Indonesia 
was in the process of normalizing relations with China. Indeed, Suharto appeared to 
comprehend China's signal for normalisation, including its decision to cease support for 
the communist revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia, notably the PKI. Suharto's 
intervention appeared to tame Malik's repeated call for normalisation, while at the same 
time appeasing the military's assertion of the need to be vigilant towards China. 
Nevertheless, this development revealed different perceptions between the military and 
the civilian leadership over the issue of China. 
However, the first significant challenge to Indonesia's perception of China 
originated from China's economic success by the mid 1980s as a result of the 
introduction of modernisation and the open door policy. Concurrently, Indonesia was 
also faced by two new realities. First, Indonesia had a problem of maintaining its 
economic growth that had been long dependent on oil export commodities. In this 
condition, Indonesia was compelled to increase its non-oil commodity exports. Thus, 
China was considered as a market opportunity for Indonesia's products. Second, the 
New Order had successfully created political stability by fusing political parties into 
three by early 1970s, and more importantly through the acceptance of Pancasila as the 
sole ideology. Accordingly, all the political parties and organizations had to declare their 
belief in Pancasila in their respective bylaws. At the same, it also reduced the possible 
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exploitation of the ethnic Chinese by China as the former had already declared their 
adherence to Pancasila. This development certainly increased Indonesia's confidence in 
dealing with Communist China. This development in effect decreased the possible 
subversion by other ideologies, including communism, as Pancasila was considered to 
be strong enough to counter these challenges. In the end, the sense of security had 
increased significantly, thus the conditions for normalisation were ripe by the mid 
1980S. 
However, strong resistance from the military had prevented such a move from 
materialising. Thus the change of perception of China as a threat appeared to emerge 
more in Suharto than the military. Eventually, Suharto agreed to the reopening of direct 
trade as it was concluded in 1985, while the issue of normalisation was kept off the 
agenda. He obviously supported this move and cleverly played the card of the KADIN 
as a force behind this action. However, to appease the opponents of the normalisation, 
Suharto's government made it clear that the opening of direct trade should not be 
interpreted as leading to normalisation of diplomatic relations. For the military, they had 
no other option but to reluctantly support Indonesia's move to conduct a direct trade 
with China. Nevertheless, they maintained vigilance by issuing administrative 
regulations and barriers to prevent the coming of communist subversive elements from 
China. 
It took about four years for Indonesia to non-nalize the relations with China. To 
the surprise of many, Suharto and the Chinese Foreign Minister agreed to restore 
relations during the funeral of Japanese Emperor Hirohito in 1989. One year later, 
relations were fully restored. It appeared that the timing of this move coincided with the 
ascendancy of Suharto as the sole dominant player over the military. Suharto's decision 
to restore diplomatic relations came as a surprise many Indonesian elite leaders, let 
alone the military. For the proponents of the move, it was an inevitable situation as the 
result of the need to fulfil Indonesia's interests, particularly in the domestic economic 
field, and the need to play a greater role on the international stage. More importantly, 
China's guarantee not to support the PKI, and not to interfere in Indonesian domestic 
294 
affairs and not to exploit the Indonesian ethnic Chinese had definitely assured and 
convinced Suharto of China's vAllingness to develop good and fruitful relations with 
Indonesia. 
However, the opponents of normalisation, particularly the military, were faced 
by a situation in which they had no other choice, except lining up their support behind 
Suharto. In fact, normalisation was carried out against the conservative opposition of the 
military that had long perceived China as a threat. As the portrayal of China as a threat 
gave the military a legitimate basis as the protector of the state against the enemy, the 
'sudden' disappearance of the projected external enemy put the military in a defensive 
position and indeed threatened its legitimate role as the guardian of the state. However, 
it is misleading to read the normalisation as Suharto siding with Deplu, rather it 
symbolized Suharto's primacy over the military and domination in foreign policy. The 
military tried to halt the process by exploiting the Tianarimen incident as a proof that 
China had not changed and the conservative elements remained in place. However, it 
did not succeed as China showed its determination to normalize relations with 
Indonesia, especially in its effort to restore China's image that has been tarnished by the 
Tiananmen incident, and Suharto was the one who held the final say. Thus the 
normalisation symbolized the disagreement between Suharto and his old supporters. 
It soon appeared that the period after normalisation was characterized by a 
visible cleavage between Suharto and the military. In fact, it began to emerge in the late 
1980s during the election process for the vice-presidency post in which the military 
became worried about Suharto's domination. The latter immediately reacted by 
removing the influential Chief of Military Command Gen. Benny Moerdani, filling in 
the top position with those who had served previously as his adjutant. Suharto's decision 
to blame and punish the military officers involved in the 1991 Dili incident had 
exaggerated the relations. However, one of his most controversial decisions was the 
reintroduction of Islam into Indonesian politics through the creation of the ICMI in 
December 1990. While Suharto's true motive is still debatable, there are opinions 
suggesting that Suharto needed strong support to secure his re-election in the 1993 
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general election, and to balance the unreliable support from the military. Suharto's move 
was considered as blatantly violating the national consensus to keep sectarianism away 
from politics. However, the implications did not only concern this national consensus, 
but the increasing military hostility towards Suharto. 
The period after nonnalisation was also characterized by increased anti-Chinese 
feelings. There is no doubt that Suharto's much publicized call in early 1990s to ethnic 
Chinese businessmen to spare some amount of their equity to Indonesian pribumi 
cooperatives did, to a certain extent, play a part. While Suharto's call was initially 
intended to answer critics of economic domination by ethnic Chinese under the New 
Order, it simultaneously made ordinary Indonesians aware of the extent of the economic 
gap between priburni and the ethnic Chinese. While attacking ethnic Chinese 
businessmen, Suharto also denounced his family business in which many of them have 
collaborated with ethnic Chinese businessmen. In the end, this policy backfired. it was 
unfortunate that in this situation,. the attack upon the ethnic Chinese became more 
frequent and violent. Nearly all riots that initially had nothing to do with ethnic Chinese 
easily turned into an expression of anti-Chinese feelings. 
However, the increased anti-Chinese feeling was mainly triggered by four 
factors. First, it was generally directed against the government. Anti-Chinese feeling 
was an expression of frustration and disillusionment on the part of ordinary people as a 
result of collusion, corruption and collaboration than often involved elite leaders and 
ethnic Chinese. Second, enhanced by Suharto's support, the Islamic right-wing elements 
exploited the situation by raising the issue of ethnic Chinese domination in the economy 
as an injustice to Indonesian pribumi. They even tended to widen the issue by claiming 
the existence of a conspiracy between the ethnic Chinese and the military against Islam. 
Third, it was the result of Suharto's failure to recognize the existence of racial problems 
in Indonesia. Instead, he always underlined the ethnic Chinese issue as merely a 
problem of economic disparity. Fourth, the military's ambiguous attitude towards ethnic 
Chinese also played its part. Indeed, the military largely exploited the ethnic Chinese in 
terms of economy and financial resources. However, if something went wrong, they 
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could easily put the blame on the ethnic Chinese as a handy scapegoat. On some 
occasions, the military also let the riots target the ethnic Chinese, which was, to a certain 
extent, aimed at discrediting Subarto. 
In the midst of a domestic power struggle and the reemergence of the issue of 
ethnic Chinese, the perception of China as a threat experienced several changes. At the 
top of Indonesia's leadership, Suharto appeared to already abandon the view of China as 
a threat. On the other hand, the military remained suspicious of China for as long as the 
ideology of communism was not officially abandoned. The ideological persistence in 
China was even used as a warning that the collapse of the communist empire in Eastern 
Europe did not necessarily mean the disappearance of the communist threat. Tlius the 
military was in a position of needing to seek another justification. The answer was found 
in the form of the reemergence of Chinese nationalism in which China was portrayed as 
inheriting the aggressive and expansionist attitude of the old Chinese Empire. The image 
of China as persisting in expanding its influence was widened to include the economic 
perspective. In this regard, China was portrayed as being in the process of reviving 
cultural and ethnic sentiments to appeal the Indonesian ethnic Chinese to invest their 
capital in China. Thus the threat of communism was expanded from Zhonggzio (Middle 
Kingdom) to also involve Zhonghua (Greater China). 
As far as foreign policy was concerned, the period of the 1990s was 
characterised by the domination of Suharto and his participation in bringing Indonesia to 
the world stage. As part of the implementation of free and active principles, Indonesia's 
foreign policy became more assertive and Suharto actively involved himself in various 
international meetings, especially in his capacity as the leader of the Non-Aligned 
Movement. Indeed, foreign policy had become one of Suharto's priorities. Accordingly, 
the military role was less significant, while Deplu retained its importance due to 
Suharto's need of backing and expertise in diplomacy. Indeed, the normalisation of 
diplomatic relations with China paved the way for Indonesia -and Suharto- to play a 
bigger role in international politics. While, Suharto appeared to succeed in increasing 
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Indonesia's international prestige, domestic realities particularly over the issue of East 
Timor, seemed to antagonize and overshadow Indonesia's success. 
However, as far as Sino-Indonesian relations are concerned, the domestic factors 
in Indonesia prevented the development of a close relationship with China. They 
included the old historical aspect, suspicion towards Indonesian ethnic Chinese and 
more importantly the military's mistrust of the ethnic Chinese and China. Although their 
respective problems with the US, especially over human rights issues, brought the two 
countries closer, there was no sPill over into other fields as the military leaders had not 
forgotten the perceived involvement of China in the 1965 attempted coup. As a result, in 
developing relations with China, Indonesia will be reluctant to develop close bilateral 
relations. Indeed, there is no doubt that the dynamic of Sino-Indonesian relations has 
been, and will always be, influenced by interrelations among major powers in the 
region, particularly the US, China and Japan. Thus, the presence of the US in the region 
was able to create stability against a possible Chinese or Japanese threat. The most 
worrying development in the 1990s has been growing apprehension towards China's 
military power and development as the result of its economic success and unclear 
foreign policy objectives. Indonesia, along with other ASEAN member countries, has 
attracted China into a web of cooperation that includes the ARF and more importantly a 
dialog on managing potential conflicts in the South China Sea. It is worth noting that 
Indonesia and ASEAN had no other choice but to engage China, as they had no 
capability or intention to militarily confront China. In this context, the increasing power 
and influence of China was considered as inevitable. Therefore, the nature of 
engagement with China has been more concerned with accommodation and cooperation 
rather than confrontation. %ile officials continued their talks, there seemed an 
encouraging sign in which China as well as Indonesia began publishing a white book on 
defence and security, which was aimed at calming their respective neighbours as to their 
respective attitude in the future. 
Nevertheless, Indonesia and the ASEAN member countries would stand up if 
China threatened their national interests. This is particularly evident in the case of the 
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South China Sea disputes. China's attitude remains ambiguous. While agreeing to 
participate in the informal Workshop initiated by Indonesia, China continues its policy 
of asserting its claim over the islands by using military force. China is reluctant to settle 
through multilateral negotiation, especially when it involved non-claimant states. 
Bilateral negotiation has been China's preferred approach to settle the issue. As far as 
Indonesia is concerned, it always claimed to take an honest and impartial position in the 
disputes. However, by 1993 the Indonesian officials knew that China had laid claim 
over the territorial water of the Natuna Islands in which Indonesia has built a gas 
exploration field. This was a shock for Indonesian leaders who immediately demanded a 
clarification from China. 
Nevertheless, China appeared to avoid giving a satisfactory reply to Indonesia's 
request for clarification, rather than repeating their claim as being based on historical 
grounds. To assert its claim, Beijing officially presented its claim of the delimitation of 
1, the baseline border in the South China Sea to Jakarta in May 1996, which was received 
with great alarm among Indonesian leaders. While the civilian foreign ministry officials 
conducted dialogue, the military adopted a harder line. This initially took the form of 
increasing Indonesia's military capabilities in the early 1990s, and conducting military 
exercises in the territorial water of the Natuna Islands. These actions were none other 
than to warn China of Indonesia's seriousness in asserting its claim. There is no question 
that the policy to embark on these measures enjoyed Suharto's support. In an 
unprecedented move, Suharto also concluded a craftily worked out defence agreement 
with Australia without intensive involvement of the ministry of foreign affairs in its 
process. Despite being aimed at appeasing the Australian hostile domestic audience, the 
agreement was also directed at China. Thus when a vital national interest was in 
jeopardy, Indonesian leaders would line up together and speak the same rhetoric. 
Indonesia's domestic reality and suspicion of China affected the development in 
trade and economic relations in the 1990s. While trade relations have developed 
extensively, the economic structure of both countries has placed Indonesia in a less 
competitive condition vis-A-vis China. While the short-term trade balance was 
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encouraging for Indonesia, in the longer term Indonesia would suffer from the possible 
influx of competitive and cheaper Chinese commodities. Additionally, the old suspicion 
of the linkage between Indonesian ethnic Chinese and China has prevented the 
development of investment activities. Many Indonesians regard the trend of Indonesian 
investment in China as a capital flight, as the ethnic Chinese minority owns most of 
Indonesian capital. This reality has become a major issue in Indonesian domestic 
politics. The government's policy on investment in China is quite supportive, provided 
that it would generate national income for Indonesia. However, that expectation is far 
from reality as it would be impossible to measure how investment in China might 
benefit Indonesia. 
To conclude, national interest has been one of the most important driving forces 
behind foreign policy in Indonesia as elsewhere. Indeed, it was the source of foreign 
policy that determined the state's policy in relation to with other countries. For most 
countries, the most important national interests have been to preserve national unity and 
territorial integrity that are often called vital interests. There are also other national 
interests, which mean their level of priorities are lower than such vital interests and their 
priority has been changing from time to time. They include, among others, the 
objectives to pursue economic development, to fulfil the political needs of a state and its 
political leaders, to increase international prestige, and to expand the capability of the 
state. While there has been a wide agreement about the correlation between national 
interests and foreign policy, the question of who defines national interest and foreign 
policy became an issue of disagreement among scholars. They may come up with 
different models as a way of analysing the decision making process. The 
implementation of these models of analysis appeared to be more suitable in the case of 
the developed countries, wHe for the developing countries they need to be modified to 
accommodate the political reality. Therefore, the answer after all lies in the political 
condition and structure of states, with an obvious distinction between the so-called 
developing countries and the developed countries. 
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Given their lack of institutional development and democratic practice and 
tradition, most of the developing countries are also characterized by a significant 
weakness in the form of inadequacies in the state institutions that are required to unite 
their mostly diversified societies. Consequently, they often fall under strong leadership 
as a way of keeping the country intact. There is also a significant tradition and history in 
the developing countries for the executive power to hold a dominant role. Accordingly, 
the power structure relationship also often follows a personalized or patrimonial 
network, which is mostly supported by their tradition and history. While holding the 
ultimate power, the executive leader tends to foster rivalry between bureaucratic 
departments, which eventually would strengthen his power. Equally important, the 
personal experience of this particular leader would certainly contribute to the 
formulation of national interest and foreign policy. 
Accordingly, the pursuit of national interest should also be seen in the context of 
the interest of the ruling regime. In this regard, national interest has blatantly been 
exploited to serve certain parts of the ruling faction, notably the military and the head of 
the government. National interest was also. used as a base of legitimacy and to prolong 
their stay in power. Indeed, national interest and foreign policy in the developing 
countries are the business of the elite politics, particularly those surrounding the 
executive power. However, it is also important to note that the formulation of national 
interest and foreign policy are not merely the result of interactions between bureaucratic 
offices around the government. Special attention should equally be given to the role and 
position of the top executive leader, who gradually asserts his influence and control over 
domestic politics and foreign policy. These purely domestic factors have been pivotal in 
the formulation and evolution of Indonesian perceptions of, and policy towards China. 
As this thesis has sought to demonstrate, Indonesia's policy towards China has emerged 
from the interplay between the domestic politics of Indonesia and China's multiple (and 
variable) identity in Indonesian minds as an ideological force, a regional superpower 
and a domestic and international economic power. 
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